Let's consider there is an instrument N traded on a single venue (centralized anonymous limit orderbook). Let's say that most taker orders are tiny, therefore the one who stays at the best bid/offer gets most turnover. A market maker, who knows this, pursues the following strategy:
if inventory < X, place a buy order at the best bid + one tick
if inventory > X, place a sell order at the best ask - one tick
In such case, a manipulator might appear who can exploit the maker the following way. Let's denote:
a - best ask quote by anyone apart from the maker and the manipulator
b - best bid quote by anyone apart from the maker and the manipulator
t - price tick
Then, within a short period t, while a and b remain constant, the following can happen:
- The manipulator places a buy order at a-2t
- The maker places a buy order at a-t
- The manipulator sells to the maker at a-t
- When the maker's inventory is full, the manipulator removes its buy order and places a sell order at b+2t
- The maker places a sell order at b+t
- The manipulator closes its position at b+t with profit
- 1-6 repeated in a loop until the maker is run out of money
Is there a way a maker can protect itself from such manipulation? To be more percise, is there a strategy for a maker which wouldn't sacrafice much turnover for which there does not exist a strategy for a manipulator which allows to make risk-free profit by placing spoofing orders?