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    $\begingroup$ "Assuming optimal play" is ambiguous in concurrent games like this. $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 8, 2024 at 10:16
  • $\begingroup$ @PattuX fair point, my intention was to say that each player chooses a strategy which maximises their win percentage under the assumption that the other player chooses the best possible counter-strategy. (Discussion: mathoverflow.net/questions/407083/…) $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 8, 2024 at 11:02
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    $\begingroup$ So are you looking for a Nash equilibrium for this game? Both playing random where Bndrew succeeds 1 out of 3 does not look like such equilibrium (if Andrew plays random Bndrew can do better and reach (a bit more than) 1/2 using probability help). That said, sure there may exist a clever other equilibrium, perhaps with worse or better odds for Bndrew, or maybe the point is to prove there is none such equilibrium? All this assuming you ask for equilibrium.... Thanks for great question $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 11, 2024 at 0:04
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    $\begingroup$ @FirstNameLastName that's right, I'm looking for a Nash equilibrium or an argument that there isn't one. $\endgroup$ Commented Jul 11, 2024 at 16:32