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Information Security

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  • Firefox is modern and still accepts cert without SAN, and TTBOMK so does Safari. Commented Mar 29, 2022 at 4:33
  • @dave_thompson_085 by default? Commented Mar 29, 2022 at 6:45
  • The whole point of me going out of my way to add name constraints to the CA is to limit damage in case a malicious actor gained access to the private key. Such a malicious actor would definitely issue certs without SAN if that allowed him to get around the DNS name constraints. The question is: how can I specify DirectoryName constraints to prevent the CN to point to any domain other than mine? Commented Mar 29, 2022 at 9:56
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    You can't do this with DirectoryName name type constraints. And if attacker gained access to CAs private key -- your CA is compromised with unfortunate consequences. And name constraints is your least problem here. Commented Mar 29, 2022 at 10:00
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    RFC 2818 states If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Therefore, if you just stick to DNS names in a SAN extension and forget the whole Common Name piece, it should work for all conforming relying parties. Assuming you're using the certs for HTTPS of course. Commented Mar 29, 2022 at 11:56