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Information Security

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  • If an administrator can circumvent it, then why get into double the trouble? Commented Nov 1, 2011 at 13:06
  • I don't see how an admin can circumvent a smart card... Isn't it the case that the smart card is the only place the private key is stored? If the admin does not have access to the card, they have no way of generating a signature. No amount of "manipulating the application" will generate a fake signature (assuming the public key remains genuine). Commented Nov 1, 2011 at 20:53
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    The idea behind the attack is this: The user wants to sign document A, but in the background the manipulated application signs document B, then confirms to the user that document A was signed. Smartcard readers from banks prevent this kind of attack by displaying the amount and target of a money transaction on their own display. But this does not work for complex documents. Commented Nov 1, 2011 at 21:22