I am looking at at the $1–2 \space \text{oblivious transfer}$ that is described here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer#:~:text=In%20cryptography%2C%20an%20oblivious%20transfer,Rabin.
I want to show that a malicious sender (Alice) can attack this protocol if it can deviate from it, namely, send a wrong RSA key pair, and learn the secret bit $b$.
If the sender (Alice) sends $e$ such that $gcd(e, \phi(N)) \neq 1$, then the RSA key is not valid, but the receiver (Bob) can't efficiently know this without the factorization of $N$.
However, I don't exactly understand how sending such an invalid input $e$ helps.
Since $e$ and $\phi(N)$ aren't coprime, then $k^e$ from the protocol that the receiver sends is not exactly random. But how does it help to understand who is $b$?
Help would be appreciated.