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Questions tagged [side-channel-attack]

attacks using information leaked by implementations of cryptographic algorithms to obtain information about keys or (plaintext) data, instead of (or additional to) using cryptographic weaknesses.

2 votes
1 answer
109 views

To prevent some side-channel attacks in RSA, I've seen people use multiplicative blinding $$ a^d\bmod N=(r^{-1})^d(ra)^d\bmod N $$ or additive exponent blinding $$ a^d=a^{d+r\phi(N)}\bmod N. $$ ...
yoyo's user avatar
  • 522
1 vote
1 answer
120 views

I'm carrying out a research project on vulnerabilities in ECDSA implementation especially on the part of the signatures. This what got me to lattice attacks on vulnerable signatures with leaked bits ...
иυэł's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
44 views

I've attempted to perform a template attack on TINYAES128. Plaintext and key are both 16 bytes and my attack targets each subkey (byte) separately. The AES implementation is mostly like the one ...
Roei's user avatar
  • 11
3 votes
1 answer
117 views

I've encountered numerous theoretical works on non-malleable codes (NMCs), including constructions for various tampering classes and improvements in efficiency or security models. Some notable ...
user's user avatar
  • 323
2 votes
3 answers
321 views

Everybody seems to rely happily on the set of Intel instructions on > 2010 CPUs to accelerate AES256 encryption. This might be a too naive question but, being the exact algorithms an industrial ...
Mephisto's user avatar
  • 163
8 votes
0 answers
308 views

In the paper "Efficient Boolean-to-Arithmetic Mask Conversion in Hardware" by Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi and Michael Hutter of PQShield, the authors claim to have found a method for boolean-to-...
Nathan Lowry's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
55 views

Is it solely by exploiting that accessing a given memory address depends on its location? E.g. column hit? Or is it just the CPU cache pre-fetching? Or is it something else (or more)? Also, how ...
caveman's user avatar
  • 721
4 votes
1 answer
158 views

I have been studying the CRYSTALS-KYBER cryptosystem and came across the description of a Decryption Failure Attack in the paper. The specific part (Section 5.5 https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/data/...
ABCD's user avatar
  • 95
13 votes
5 answers
4k views

In JP Aumasson's cryptocoding guidelines, he states that memory containing secret data should be cleared before it goes out of scope. This is to prevent vulnerabilities where, for example, an attacker ...
DerekKnowles's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
123 views

In the second paragraph of section 2.5 of the paper Remote Timing Attacks are Practical the authors write: When $g$ is just below a multiple of $q$, then OpenSSL almost always uses fast Karatsuba ...
finks's user avatar
  • 121
7 votes
3 answers
2k views

Until recently, my list of what can cause side channels exfiltrating secret data (including data depending on secrets) from code running in a computer was limited to: Hardware emissions: power (e.g. ...
fgrieu's user avatar
  • 151k
3 votes
2 answers
1k views

In cache-timing attacks like prime+probe, attacking programs are able to discover the addresses of a victim program's data in main memory. These attacks are often used to determine the secret keys ...
scha's user avatar
  • 33
1 vote
0 answers
314 views

The paper "Biased nonce sense" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/023.pdf) covers key recovery for MSB and LSB, the latter case being handled by doing modular inverse of 2 to the power of the ...
gquere's user avatar
  • 11
3 votes
2 answers
385 views

I learned that some AES implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks due to how the SBOX structure is implemented. The output have to be nonlinear, therefore having low bit inputs results in ...
moju22's user avatar
  • 53
1 vote
0 answers
649 views

I'm trying to solve the CTF challenge called ProSign 3 at Cryptohack platform which involves exploiting an ECDSA signing service that allows us to sign a fixed message being padded with the time ... ...
YazeedAllabadi24's user avatar

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