Consider a risk-averse agent (whose utility for money is strictly concave) that maximizes expected utility. Would such agent ever a accept a gamble whose expected value is negative? (E.g., think of state sponsored-lotteries Lotto 649, or Atlantic lotto, etc.)
More formally, consider an agent with a utility function $u$ that is increasing and concave, e.g., $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$. Define a lottery $L$, with probability $\alpha$ for a low state $x_l$ and probability $1-\alpha$ for a high state $x_h$, that has negative expectation, i.e., $E[L]<0$. Assume initial wealth $W$ that is then higher $E[L]$. We say the agent will accept the lottery $L$ iff her expected utility from this lottery $E_u[L]$ is higher then her utility without the lottery. The question is: given that $E[L]$ is negative, can we say that the agent with a concave utility function $u$ will never accept the lottery $L$.