Attention and Action

Attention is described as a “scarce commodity” that is traded in “a marketplace.” This, it is further claimed, contributes to a “widespread sense of attentional crisis.” But is there really an attention market, and if so, what, if anything, is wrong with it? We defend the claim that there are markets in attention. We provide an account of such attention markets and use that account to address what is morally wrong with them. Our account draws on knowledge of how attention (...) works and what roles it plays in the mind. The attention market trades in an ability to influence our attention – somewhat (though not exactly) like the labor market trades in an ability to influence how we use our capacity for work. Specifically, the commodity it trades in is attentional landscaping potential, viz. the ability to systematically influence patterns of attention by changes to the sensory environment individuals are exposed to. Attention markets thus, we argue, commodify influence over a human capacity that plays a central role in shaping individual experience, agency, and belief formation. This feature of attention markets makes them ethically problematic. As markets in access to external influence, attention markets pose a special threat to individual autonomy and escape the classical liberal defense of free markets. Those who value autonomy should worry about the attention markets that exist today. (shrink)

Obsessive thinking is a problem case for the philosophy of mental action, insofar as it both (1) feels passive but (2) manifests our agency. Our solution to this “Puzzle of Obsessive Thinking” rests on a fundamental distinction between what we call “occurrent” and “aggregative” agency. Occurrent agency reflects the agent’s capacity to guide her current behavior and thoughts as they unfold over time. We argue that obsessive thinking is a form of occurrent mental agency, since the agent’s attention is guided (...) at the personal level, endorsed, and resistible. Our paper’s first contribution is therefore to argue for the heterodox view that obsessive thinking is active and, thus, for a de-intellectualized, emotional, form of action. Why, then, do obsessive thoughts feel passive? We argue that this is because they undermine aggregative agency. Aggregative agency reflects the agent’s capacity to organize and distribute her actions over time. Although each episode of obsessive thinking is guided, the sheer frequency of those episodes undermines the agent's ability to organize her mental actions. Obsessive thinking is therefore occurrently active but aggregatively passive. Our paper’s second contribution is therefore to use obsessive thinking as a wedge to pry these forms of agency apart. (shrink)

I seek an explanation for the etiology and the function of mind wandering episodes. My proposal – which I call the cognitive control proposal – is that mind wandering is a form of non-conscious guidance due to cognitive control. When the agent’s current goal is deemed insufficiently rewarding, the cognitive control system initiates a search for a new, more rewarding goal. This search is the process of unintentional mind wandering. After developing the proposal, and relating it to literature on mind (...) wandering and on cognitive control, I discuss explanations the proposal affords, testable predictions the proposal makes, and philosophical implications the proposal has. (shrink)

Focō, Ergo Volō: "I Focus, Therefore I Will," develops a unified architecture of attention that reframes free will as the structured governance of awareness. Rather than treating agency and freedom as a problem of escaping causality, this work relocates the question within the dynamics of conscious control and how attention is distributed, stabilized, and redirected over time. -/- The book introduces a Unified Model of Attention in which awareness unfolds across two interacting fields: an external field of perception and an (...) internal field of memory, imagination, and affect. Within this dual-field architecture, conscious activity emerges through the continuous transaction of impressive processes, which capture attention, and expressive processes, which deploy focus voluntarily. From this foundation, the work develops a system of interlocking sub-models that together describe the structure and dynamics of conscious control. These include the Constellation Model of Focus, which formalizes distributed attention across concurrent nodes; the Valve, a dynamic gating mechanism regulating cross-field flow; Subconscious Suggestion, describing structured influence of implicit cognition from the periphery of awareness; and the Impressive–Expressive Action Framework, which characterizes the rhythmic interaction between involuntary capture and volitional direction. -/- Building on this architecture, the book proposes a two-threshold account of volition, distinguishing the emergence of intention from the commitment of decision as distinct transitions in focal organization. Classical debates from Aristotle’s account of voluntary action to modern readiness-potential experiments are reinterpreted through a unified operational lens where the management of attention is the functional locus of agency. -/- The work concludes with a formal philosophical synthesis, “An Argument for Focō, ergo volō,” which articulates a performative axiom of agency, asserting that the act of focusing presupposes the exercise of will. In this way, the framework extends the Cartesian trajectory beyond the certainty of being toward a structured account of agency, without reliance on metaphysical exemptions or indeterministic assumptions. -/- By integrating phenomenology, cognitive science, and formal models of attention, this work proposes one of the first comprehensive attempts to articulate a unified operational architecture of attention capable of grounding discussions of free will, decision-making, agency, and conscious control within a single coherent framework. (shrink)

This paper discusses a deflationary theory of human action developed by John Hyman. His theory of human action comprises two central claims, one about the general nature of action, another about the mark of human agency. An action is the causing of a change by a substance. A human action, as opposed to sub-personal actions, is one that results from the integrated operations of our cognitive and motor systems. Taken together these two claims offer a minimalist theory of human action (...) that does not appeal to intention, the will or the power to choose. The first claim is by now familiar in the literature, not so the second one. This paper offers a critical discussion of this second claim. I shall argue that it sits uncomfortably with certain kinds of mental action. As a fix, I argue that we should appeal to the functional role of the executive system to specify the relevant kind of integration characteristic of human action. I proceed to show how the revised proposal shares the appeal of Hyman’s view while avoiding its difficulties. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a perceiver’s contributions to perception can substantially affect what objects are represented in perceptual experience. To capture the scalar nature of these perceiver-contingent contributions, we introduce three grades of subject-dependency in object perception. The first grade, “weak subject-dependency,” concerns attentional changes to perceptual content like, for instance, when a perceiver turns their head, plugs their ears, or primes their attention to a particular cue. The second grade, “moderate subject-dependency,” concerns changes in the contingent features (...) of perceptual objects due to action-orientation, location, and agential interest. For instance, being to the right or left of an object will cause the object to have a corresponding locative feature, but that feature is non-essential to the object in question. Finally, the third grade, “strong subject-dependency,” concerns generating perceptual objects whose existence depends upon their perceivers’ sensory contributions to perception. For this final grade of subject-dependency the adaptive perceptual system shapes diverse representations of sensory information by contributing necessary features to perceptual objects. To exemplify this nonstandard form of object perception we offer evidence from the future-directed anticipation of perceptual experts, and from the feature binding of synesthetes. We conclude that strongly subject-dependent perceptual objects are more than mere material objects, but are rather a necessary combination of material objects with the contributions of a perceiving subject. (shrink)

With this contribution I explore the relationship between attention development in modern archers and attention as a cognitive requirement for ancient bow hunting – a techno-behaviour that may have originated sometime between 80 and 60 thousand years ago in sub-Saharan Africa. Material Engagement Theory serves as a framework for the inextricable interrelatedness between brain, body and mind, and how practicing to use bimanual technologies shapes aspects of our cognition, including our ability to pay attention. In a cross-disciplinary approach, I use (...) cognitive-motor neuroscience to demonstrate the role of attention in modern archery and highlight brain regions that are activated or ‘pressured’ during aiming with attention. One of these areas, the precuneus together with the default mode network, serves as neurological hub for accurate bimanual material engagement practiced over a distance. The likely development of the precuneus, in tandem with the unique globularisation of the human skull, can be traced in the Homo sapiens fossil record since about 160 thousand years ago, reaching the modern range by around 100 thousand years ago within a continuum of brain modification. Variation in human neuro-genetic adaptations since our split from the Denisovan and Neanderthal groups further suggest differences in attention as a cognitive trait between recent big-brained humans. I suggest that these observations may serve as bridging theory for understanding how some aspects of the sapient ability to pay attention was developed. (shrink)

Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a (...) sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como finalidad explorar la complementariedad de dos propuestas narrativas contemporáneas sobre la vida y acción humanas, a través del concepto de «vulnerabilidad corporal». Por una parte, se encuentran las ideas de Hans Urs von Balthasar sobre las polaridades espíritu-cuerpo, hombre-mujer, e individuo-comunidad y su posible unidad metafísica y antropológica. Por otra parte, presentamos los planteamientos del filósofo moral Alasdair MacIntyre que se desarrollan desde la teleología, en el marco de los fines naturales que brindan la vulnerabilidad (...) y la dependencia del ser humano. Así, en el primer apartado analizamos las ideas del teólogo suizo sobre las polaridades indicadas, en el contexto metafísico que él mismo propone siguiendo a Tomás de Aquino, y dentro de su visión de la dramática de la vida humana en su relación con Dios. Posteriormente, siguiendo los planteamientos tomistas de MacIntyre, consideramos los problemas de la dialéctica de la Modernidad para comprender adecuadamente la integración de tales polaridades en la narrativa vital humana, especialmente en el marco una teleología insertada en la vulnerabilidad corporal. Finalmente, llevamos a cabo una descripción de cada polaridad antropológica y presentamos, esquemáticamente, unas conclusiones, que resaltan cómo la vulnerabilidad del ser humano permite una lectura narrativa unitaria de la vida abierta a la libertad como búsqueda del bien. (shrink)

While research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has traditionally focused on cognitive and behavioral deficits, there is increasing interest in exploring possible resources associated with the disorder. In this paper, we argue that the attention-patterns associated with ADHD can be understood as expressing an alternative style of inquiry, or “zetetic” style, characterized mainly by a lower barrier for becoming curious and engaging in inquiry, and a weaker disposition to regulate curiosity in response to the cognitive and practical costs associated (...) with inquiry. Exploring this zetetic style from an epistemological perspective, we show that it is often epistemically rational and can be advantageous in important respects. We close by suggesting that the very aspects of the zetetic style that might at times render it disadvantageous from the point of view of individual subjects with ADHD, will often confer epistemic benefits to the social group that the subjects are part of. (shrink)

Why are some people better at generating creative ideas than others? This paper focuses on memory as an unexpected source of creative ideas, i.e., ideas that are both novel and useful. According to my account, highly creative people are able to use memory gists to guide their memory search. Memory gists are memory contents that represent more abstract or qualitative features extracted from the specific, surface-level features in memory contents. Using memory gists in memory search involves a mode of attention (...) that is the internal analog of diffuse attention in perception. Just as diffuse attention in perception has been recognized for its distinctive benefits for processing global targets, I argue that its internal analog directed towards contents in memory and cognition also comes with its own distinctive benefits. Using memory gists allows creative individuals to activate disparate contents that share abstract features despite their superficial differences. My account therefore sheds new light on the underlying mechanisms of creative thinking. (shrink)

Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive scientist studies it. That is, selection for action pulls empirical and folk‐psychology together. Accordingly, (...) philosophers who take seriously either source have reason to work with selection for action as their starting conception of attention. This conception provides a way to bridge empirical and philosophical concerns where attention is central. The theoretical advantages of selection for action have been obscured by the common opinion that it is easily refuted. I defend the position against many of the published objections and then deploy it to provide a foundation for the intuitive, but inchoate, idea of attention being gradable, something of which there can be more or less. An analysis of the gradability of attention is then applied to consider recent work on the harms due to a surplus of attention. (shrink)

This article argues that every performance of habit‐driven action requires attention. I begin by revisiting the conception of habit‐driven actions as reducible to automatically performed responses to stimuli. On this conception, habitual actions are a counterexample to Wayne Wu's action‐centered theory of attention. Using the biased competition model of attention, and building on findings from affective cognitive neuroscience, I challenge this position. I claim that the performance of a habitual action requires experiential history to be exerting an influence that is (...) best understood as implicit selection‐biasing. It follows from this that habit‐driven action is compatible with Wu's theory. (shrink)

This paper examines the phenomenon of joint attention and its relevance in understanding the modes of awareness of the presence of God. It explores the perspectives of Eleonore Stump and Andrew Pinsent, as well as the challenge raised by Donald Bungum, with the aim of reaching a better understanding of a distinct way of being ‘moved by God in a divine way’. According to Stump and Pinsent, joint attention can deepen our understanding of our relationship with God, emphasizing the importance (...) of sharing attention with Him and making better sense of the way humans may be moved in a divine way. However, Bungum challenges this view by suggesting the possibility of closeness without explicit awareness. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of awareness and the presence of God in our spiritual lives, for our connection with God can manifest in diverse ways different from traditional accounts of explicit awareness. We suggest that a view of joint attention centered in action may be more suitable for an attempt to make sense of what ‘to be moved in a divine way’ amounts to. (shrink)

Two views claim to account for the origins of great ape gestural forms. On the Leipzig view, gestural forms are ontogenetically ritualised from action sequences between pairs of individuals. On the St Andrews view, gestures are the product of natural selection for shared gestural forms. The Leipzig view predicts within- and between-group differences between gestural forms that arise as a product of learning in ontogeny. The St Andrews view predicts universal gestural forms comprehensible within and between species that arise because (...) gestural forms were a target of natural selection. We reject both accounts and propose an alternative “recruitment view” of the origins of great ape gestures. According to the recruitment view, great ape gestures recruit features of their existing behavioural repertoire for communicative purposes. Their gestures inherit their communicative functions from visual (and sometimes tactile) presentations of familiar and easily recognisable action schemas and states and parts of the body. To the extent that great ape species possess similar bodies, this predicts mutual comprehensibility within and between species – but without supposing that gestural forms were themselves targets of natural selection. Additionally, we locate great ape gestural communication within a pragmatic framework that is continuous with human communication, and make testable predications for adjudicating between the three alternative views. We propose that the recruitment view best explains existing data, and does so within a mechanistic framework that emphasises continuity between human and non-human great ape communication. (shrink)

Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...) a model that aligns the roles of mind‐wandering in planning with empirical evidence and the sustained stability of intentions. (shrink)

Despite its importance in different occupational and everyday contexts, vigilance, typically defined as the capacity to sustain attention over time, is remarkably limited. What explains these limits? Two theories have been proposed. The Overload Theory states that being vigilant consumes limited information-processing resources; when depleted, task performance degrades. The Underload Theory states that motivation to perform vigilance tasks declines over time, thereby prompting attentional shifts and hindering performance. We highlight some conceptual and empirical problems for both theories and propose an (...) alternative: the Strategic Allocation Theory. For the Strategic Allocation Theory, performance on vigilance tasks optimizes as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, including metacognitive factors such as the expected value of effort and the expected value of planning. Limited capacities must be deployed across task sets to maximize expected reward. The observed limits of vigilance reflect changes in the perceived value of, among other things, sustaining attention to a task rather than attending to something else. Drawing from recent computational theories of cognitive control and meta-reasoning, we argue that the Strategic Allocation Theory explains more phenomena related to vigilance behavior than other theories, including self-report data. Lastly, we outline some of the testable predictions the theory makes across several experimental paradigms. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophers have identified a number of moral and psychological harms associated with the attention economy (Alysworth & Castro, 2021; Castro & Pham, 2020; Williams, 2018). Missing from many of these accounts of the attention economy, however, is what exactly attention is. As a result of this neglect of the cognitive science of attention, many of these accounts are not empirically credible. They rely on oversimplified and unsophisticated accounts of not only attention, but self- control, and addiction as (...) well. Of note are accounts of the attention economy that rely on the ‘brain disease’ rhetoric of addiction and subsequent control failures (Aylsworth & Castro, 2021; Bhargava & Velasquez, 2021), accounts that rely on a strict dichotomy of top-down vs. bottom-up attention (Williams, 2018; Aylsworth & Castro, 2021), and accounts that construe attention as a limited resource (Williams, 2018). -/- Drawing on recent work from the neuroscience and psychology of attention, I demonstrate the shortcomings of these accounts and sketch a way forward for an empirically grounded account of the attention economy. These accounts tend to uphold strict dichotomies of voluntary control (e.g., compulsion versus choice, dual-process models of self-control, and top-down versus bottom-up) that cannot account for the complexities of attentional control, mental agency, and decision-making. As such, these empirically and conceptually impoverished accounts cannot adequately address the current so-called crisis of attention. To better understand the harms associated with the attention economy, we need an empirically responsible account of the nature and function of attention and mental agency. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

How do individuals guide their activities towards some goal? Harry Frankfurt once identified the task of explaining guidance as the central problem in action theory. An explanation has proved to be elusive, however. In this paper, I show how we can marshal empirical research to make explanatory progress. I contend that human agents have a primitive capacity to guide visual attention, and that this capacity is actually constituted by a sub-individual psychological control-system: the executive system. I thus illustrate how we (...) can explain exercises of individual-level guidance by appeal to its sub-individual constitution. This opens up a new avenue for explicating agency. (shrink)

Drawing on recent work in psychology, I argue that there are not one but several distinct virtues pertaining to willpower or strength of will: (1) the disposition to exercise willpower; (2) a distinctively volitional kind of modesty, or moderation in exposing oneself to volitional strain; and (3) a distinctively volitional kind of confidence, or proper inattention to the possibility of volitional failure. A multiple-virtue conception of willpower, I argue, provides a useful framework for cultivating a good relationship to one’s own (...) volitional limitations; resists an unhealthy emphasis on ‘powering through’ volitional obstacles; and avoids controversial empirical assumptions without giving up on making progress in ethical thought about willpower. I answer objections that the latter two virtues are incompatible, and that they add little of value to hope or belief in success. I then argue that combining these virtues requires a kind of flexible attention which, while difficult, is both psychologically possible and desirable. (shrink)

This paper develops a mechanistic account of basic mental agency by identifying similarities between two of its major exemplars: endogenous attention and imagination. Five key similarities are identified: i) that both capacities are driven by currently prioritised goals that are either person-level or apt to become person-level. ii) that both deliver their outputs to the working memory iii) that both range across all and only conceptual contents; iv) that both proceed under the guidance of norms and/or habits; and v) that (...) both directly activate rather than inhibit content. These five features are consolidated by proposing that basic mental agency is essentially the power to call for conceptual content and hold it within our working memories. (shrink)

Habits figure in action‐explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one (...) can do something out of habit and from deliberation, before going on to defend The Familiarity View. (shrink)

This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention (...) is defective. Instead it reconstrues the explanatory relationship between attention and the processes that constitute it, in a way that is illustrated here by considering the relationship between attention and the processes that are identified by the biased competition theory. After considering some of the ways in which an adverbialist approach might be developed, the article concludes by suggesting some possible solutions to a problem concerning distraction, by which prominent adverbialist theories of attention have been dogged. (shrink)

Practical knowledge, in the sense made famous by G. E. M. Anscombe, is “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions”. This knowledge is very ordinary, but philosophically it is not easy to understand. One illuminating approach is to see practical knowledge as a kind of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. I offer an enrichment of this approach, by (1) exploiting Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of heeding (that is, paying attention), in particular paying attention to one’s own intentional action, and (2) (...) constructing and applying a practical analogue of Kant’s apperceptive “I think”. Combining (1) and (2), I offer an argument for my main claim—paying attention to what one is doing is an exercise of practical self-consciousness – it is how practical self-consciousness gets “schematized”. (shrink)

The nineteenth century saw the development of reductive views of attention. The German philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) proposed an original reductive view according to which attention is nothing but interest and interest itself is a positive feeling. Stumpf’s view was developed by Francis Bradley (1846-1924), George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916), but has been overlooked in the recent literature. In this paper, I will expound Stumpf’s view of attention, trace it back to its Aristotelian roots and (...) defend the version offered by Stout and Royce. In this version a new kind of feeling, feelings of interest, and value, intellectual value, take centre stage. (shrink)

This chapter applies the structure of action to introspection of conscious perceptual experience. Introspection is foundational in the theory of consciousness by providing crucial data. However, there are no adequate psychological theories of introspection. Since introspecting one’s experience is an action, it involves attention. Introspective attention is explained. Two forms of introspection of perceptual experience are identified: a simple form based on just the experience targeted and a complex form based on additional factors that the agent attends to. Conditions identifying (...) when the simple form is reliable are derived, based on introspection’s psychological structure. Complex introspection is revealed as the primary form of introspection in the theory of consciousness but is often unreliable. The ability of introspection to resolve disputes about consciousness is questioned. Case studies regarding inattentional blindness and visual experience in peripheral vision and visual blur are discussed. Suggestions as to how to calibrate introspection are provided. (shrink)

Intention is identified as a type of practical memory. In intending to act, the subject remembers what she is aiming to do. Since such memory is put to work to produce action, intention functions like working memory as theorized in cognitive science. Mnemonic actions of remembering, keeping in mind, and recalling are fit to the structure of action. Empirical theories of working memory are discussed and the function of working memory in setting attention through its central executive component is highlighted. (...) This function is the subpersonal reflection of the role of intention in setting attention. Accordingly, it is argued that working memory is the substratum of intention, specifically proximal intentions ready to initiate action and intentions-in-action that regulate action as it is done. The functions of intention in establishing vigilance, a readiness to attend to action-relevant targets, and in maintaining steadfastness, the keeping of the agent on task, are explained. (shrink)

This chapter investigates intending as action that involves continued practical reasoning as the agent acts. It is demonstrated that coherent action requires that the agent remember what she is doing, a memory constituted by her ongoing intention-in-action to act. This memory must track action in real time else the agent will lose track of what she is doing. Accordingly, practical remembering in ongoing intention requires that the intention be updated, a process that involves practical reasoning to further refine the content (...) of the intention. The dynamics of such reasoning are revealed in the dynamics of working memory. This provides the biological and psychological basis for how the agent can directly access what she is doing by reporting on her remembering to act, for how the agent can keep time with her action, and for her sensitivity to changes in the world she acts in. (shrink)

Three phenomena of attention are identified: (1) attending as action, (2) attention as what guides action, and (3) vigilance as a readiness to attend, hence to act. These phenomena are shown to exemplify the form of attention described in William James’ definition of attention which emphasizes that attention is the mind’s selection of a target in order to deal with, that is to act on, it. This idea of attention as selection for action is revealed to be foundational to the (...) methodology of experiments on attention, so it is endorsed, as a practical requirement, in scientific practice. Relevant biological models are discussed and a unified theory of attention is outlined. The Jamesian idea merges the science and the philosophy to provide a systematic theory of attention as the agent’s guiding her action. The central role of intention in setting attention is revealed, and the pervasive automaticity of attention is noted and examined. (shrink)

This chapter provides an _a priori_ argument for a specific psychological structure of every action. The structure emerges through solving a Selection Problem, namely the problem agents must solve when confronted with more than one possible action where action requires “selection” of one possibility among others. Action occurs in each case due to bias that exerts pressure on how the Selection Problem is solved. Intentional action distinctively involves intention as a bias. When the agent acts intentionally, she responds in light (...) of how she takes things, given a specific intention. Further, intention establishes control as a contrast to the automatic features of action, with control and automaticity precisely defined. Solving the Selection Problem is connected to its biological implementation in primate agents, and the biological data is reviewed to show how solutions to the Selection Problem are implemented in our world. (shrink)

This chapter applies the structure of action to understanding reasoning in deduction. It examines both semantic and syntactic aspects of deduction. On semantic aspects, it shows that in deducing, a subject focuses cognitive attention in moving from premises to conclusion. Cognitive attention narrows. Psychological theories are drawn on to support a shift in cognitive attention during reasoning. On syntactical aspects, it shows that reasoners, through learning that focuses attention, become sensitive to logical form and respond by attending to said form (...) in order to draw the correct conclusion. In both cases, deduction involves shifts of cognitive attention. Learning to construct proofs involves joint attention that leads to the acquisition of schemas, knowledge structures that provide a bias on solving the Selection Problem during reasoning. Carroll’s paradox is addressed by showing how the concept of a bias can resolve the paradox. (shrink)

Movements of the Mind is about what it is to be an agent. Focusing on mental agency, it integrates multiple approaches, from philosophical analysis of the metaphysics of agency to the activity of neurons in the brain. Philosophical and empirical work are combined to generate concrete explanations of key features of the mind. The book should be relevant and accessible to philosophers and scientists interested in mind and agency.

This chapter applies the structure of action to understanding what is called implicit bias but which is reconceptualized as automatic bias. Specifically, since attention guides action, attention biases action toward specific targets, and the outcome can be positively, negatively, or neutrally biased behavior. The concept of a bias as a basis for solving the Selection Problem is revealed as a driver of biased behavior through biased attention. These automatic biases have disparate sources. Positive biases in medical attention as seen in (...) radiologists is described, revealing how excellence in learning sets biases that shift a novice toward expertise. Negative biases in vision and memory that have negative social consequences are explained through biased attention due to inadequate upbringing (learning). Some proposals regarding how we might better understand automatic bias so as to mitigate them are explored. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the idea of a biology of agency that includes philosophical analysis and which is the outlook of the book’s investigation. It summarizes the book’s main ideas. Chapter 1 discusses the structure of action. Chapter 2 presents the theory of attention and attending as action. Chapter 3 explicates intention as a type of practical memory. Chapter 4 discusses intending as an action that involves continued practical reasoning while intentional action unfolds. Chapter 5 examines biases on attention that yield (...) actions of ethical and epistemic concern. Chapter 6 examines deduction as a form of cognitive attention. Chapter 7 discusses two forms of introspection of perceptual consciousness and investigates their reliability in core cases. (shrink)

What is salience? This collection addresses this neglected question by considering the role of salience in a wide variety of areas. All 13 chapters are specially commissioned, and written by an international team of contributors.

In paradigm exercises of agency, individuals guide their activities toward some goal. A central challenge for action theory is to explain how individuals guide. This challenge is an instance of the more general problem of how to accommodate individuals and their actions in the natural world, as explained by natural science. Two dominant traditions–primitivism and the causal theory–fail to address the challenge in a satisfying way. Causal theorists appeal to causation by an intention, through a feedback mechanism, in explaining guidance. (...) Primitivists postulate primitive agential capacities in their explanations. The latter neglect to explain how primitive capacities integrate with findings from natural science. The former do not explain why some feedback mechanism’s activity amounts to the agent’s guidance. In this paper I argue that both traditions should acknowledge a capacity to guide, as actually constituted by the executive system. I argue that appeals to this empirically discovered psychological system explain how individuals guide in a way that integrates with explanations from cognitive science. Individuals’ capacity to guide is embedded in the natural world through the activity of its constituent (mechanistic) components. (shrink)

Most elpistologists now agree that hope for a specific outcome involves more than just desire plus the presupposition that the outcome is possible. This paper argues that the additional element of hope is a disposition to focus on the desired outcome in a certain way. I first survey the debate about the nature of hope in the recent literature, offer objections to some important competing accounts, and describe and defend the view that hope involves a kind of focus or attention. (...) I then suggest that this account makes sense of the intuitive thought that there are moral and pragmatic norms on hope that go beyond the norms on desires and modal presuppositions. I conclude by considering some key questions. (shrink)

Assertions are often accepted without being understood, a phenomenon I call stupefying. I argue that stupefying can be a means for conversational manipulation that works through at-issue content, in contrast with the not-at-issue and back-door speech act routes identified by others. This shows that we should reject a widely assumed connection between attention and at-issue content. In exploring why stupefying happens, it also emerges that stupefying has important cooperative uses, in addition to its manipulative ones, and so should not be (...) avoided altogether. (shrink)

Mental control refers to the ability we have to control our own minds. Its primary expression—attention—has become a popular topic for philosophers in the past few decades, generating the need for a primer on the concept. It is related to self-control, which typically refers to the maintenance of preferred behavior in the face of temptation. While a distinct concept, criticisms of self-control can also be applied to mental control, such as that it implies the existence of an unscientific homunculus-like agent (...) or is not a natural kind. Yet, as this Element suggests, a scientifically-grounded account of mental control remains possible. The manuscript is organized into five main sections, which cover 1) the concept of mental control, 2) the relationship between mental control and attention, 3) the phenomena of meditation and mindwandering, 4) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and 5) emergence-based accounts of mental control, including an original account by the author. (shrink)

What precisely does a distraction threaten? An agent who spends an inordinate amount of time attending to her smartphone – what precisely is she lacking? I argue that whereas agency of attention is the agent’s non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to, autonomy of attention is the agent, through her second-order desires, effectively interfering with her non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to. Freedom of attention is the agent’s possibility to hold or switch her focus of (...) attention without fixating on any specific focus against her will or without distraction from chosen foci. This conceptual work provides resources to track manipulations that diminish a person’s freedom of attention. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 282-294, April 2022.

The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing (...) on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging. (shrink)

This paper argues that intelligence can be approximated by the ability to produce accurate predictions. It is further argued that general intelligence can be approximated by context dependent predictive abilities combined with the ability to use working memory to abstract away contextual information. The flexibility associated with general intelligence can be understood as the ability to use selective attention to focus on specific aspects of sensory impressions to identify patterns, which can then be used to predict events in novel situations (...) and environments. The argumentation synthesizes Godfrey-Smith’s environmental complexity theory, adding the notion of niche broadness as well as changes concerning the view of cognition and control, and Hohwy’s predictive mind theory, making explicit the significance of accuracy as a composite of trueness and precision where the nervous system acts as a distributed controller motivating actions that keep the body in homeostasis. (shrink)

The use and acquisition of knowledge appears to be influenced by what humans pay attention to. Thus, looking at attention will tell us something about the mechanisms involved in knowledge (usage). According to the present review, attention reflects selectivity in information processing and it is not necessarily also reflected in a user’s consciousness, as it is rooted in skill memory or other implicit procedural memory forms–that is, attention is rooted in the necessity of human control of mental operations and actions. (...) The main assumption is that what is true of processing in general is also true of knowledge: Its usage cannot be understood, unless we have the means to study all mechanisms involved, including knowledge hidden from direct introspection and knowledge that participants are not willing to share with interrogators. Reviewing work done in this context, I argue that experimental research on selectivity and bias in human information processing is a promising road to learn about the principles governing knowledge (usage) and to reflect upon them. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

Skilled action typically requires that individuals guide their activities toward some goal. In skilled action, individuals do so excellently. We do not understand well what this capacity to guide consists in. In this paper I provide a case study of how individuals shift visual attention. Their capacity to guide visual attention toward some goal (partly) consists in an empirically discovered sub-system – the executive system. I argue that we can explain how individuals guide by appealing to the operation of this (...) sub-system. Understanding skill and skilled action thus requires appreciating the role of the executive system. (shrink)

Peak human performance—whether of Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners, or you cooking the best dish you’ve ever made—depends on skill. Skill is at the heart of what it means to excel. Yet, the fixity of skilled behavior can sometimes make it seem a lower-level activity, more akin to the movements of an invertebrate or a machine. Peak performance in elite athletes is often described, for example, as “automatic” by those athletes: “The most frequent response from participants when describing the execution (...) of a peak performance was the automatic execution of performance”. While the automaticity of skilled behavior is widely acknowledged, some worry that too much automaticity in skill would challenge its ability to exhibit human excellence. And so two camps have developed: those who focus on the automaticity of skilled behavior, the “habitualists,” and those who focus on the higher-level cognition behind peak performance, the “intellectualists.” We take a different tack. We argue that skilled behavior weaves together automaticity and higher-level cognition, which we call “pluralism.” That is, we argue that automaticity and higher-level cognition are both normal features of skilled behavior that benefit skilled behavior. This view is hinted at in other quotes about automaticity in skill—while expert gamers describe themselves as “playing with” automaticity, expert musicians are said to balance automaticity with creativity through performance cues: “Performance cues allow the musician to attend to some aspects of the performance while allowing others to be executed automatically”. We describe in this paper three ways that higher-level cognition and automaticity are woven together. The first two, level pluralism and synchronic pluralism, are described in other papers, albeit under different cover. We take our contribution to be both distinguishing the three forms and contributing the third, diachronic pluralism. In fact, we find that diachronic pluralism presents the strongest case against habitualism and intellectualism, especially when considered through the example of strategic automaticity. In each case of pluralism, we use research on the presence or absence of attention to explore the presence or absence of higher-level cognition in skilled behavior. (shrink)

Perhaps the central question in action theory is this: what ingredient of bodily action is missing in mere behavior? But what is an analogous question for mental action? I ask this: what ingredient of active, goal-directed thought is missing in mind-wandering? My answer: attentional guidance. Attention is guided when you would feel pulled back from distractions. In contrast, mind-wandering drifts between topics unchecked. My unique starting point motivates new accounts of four central topics about mental action. First, its causal basis. (...) Mind-wandering is a case study that allows us to tease apart two causes of mental action––guidance and motivation. Second, its experiential character. Goals are rarely the objects of awareness; rather, goals are “phenomenological frames” that carve experience into felt distractions and relevant information. Third, its scope. Intentional mind-wandering is a limit case of action where one actively cultivates passivity. Fourth, my theory offers a novel response to mental action skeptics like Strawson. (shrink)