Confucius

Fallibilism is a precondition for the conversation between culturally distinct philosophies that comparative philosophy tries to bring about. Without an acknowledgement that our own tradition’s claims may be incomplete or mistaken, we would have no reason to engage members of other communities. Were the early Confucians fallibilists? While some contemporary commentators have seen fallibilism as an essential characteristic of the Confucian tradition, others have argued that the tradition is characterized instead by an “epistemological optimism,” and must be substantially revised if (...) it is to meet the challenges of the modern world. What both sets of commentators have in common is that they see fallibilism as a kind of intellectual virtue. If, to adapt a statement from Peirce, fallibilism’s consequences are antagonistic to Confucianism, then so much the worse for Confucianism. In this paper, I want to look at the issue of fallibilism in the central text of Confucianism, the Analects. At the heart of this text I find a puzzle that complicates both of the above-mentioned views. Confucius’ teachings advocate personal humility, flexibility, and listening to others, on the one hand, while at the same time considering the central teachings themselves to be infallible. In the first half of the paper I look at some textual evidence that shows that Confucius advocates a fallibility of persons but not a full-fledged epistemic one, and in the second half I give an explanation of why this is the case. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of the theories of aesthetic value and agency in the Zhuangzi 莊子. The first section outlines two claims that articulate an aesthetics that can be found in the Analects: (1) there is a single ideal of aesthetic value, and (2) ideal aesthetic agents are those with the competence to access that ideal. The Zhuangzi rejects both claims. The second section argues, contra (1), that the Zhuangzi embraces a variety of pluralism about aesthetic value. This pluralism (...) is rooted in some of the text’s broader metaphysical commitments. The third section argues, contra (2), that the Zhuangzi portrays ideal aesthetic agents as those with the competence to access what it calls “utmost beauty” (zhimei 至美), the plurality of aesthetic values. As this ideal of aesthetic agency is beyond the reach of ordinary human beings, the concluding section of the paper argues that the Zhuangzi additionally recommends a modified ideal of aesthetic agency that is within our reach. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that care or virtues of care (such as love or compassion) are more central or fundamental than other virtues. What, exactly, does this mean? This question was once discussed at great length in Confucian virtue theory, especially by Zhu Xi (1130-1200 CE). In this paper, I will look closely at this long-neglected discourse in Neo-Confucian ethics, unpack some of the suggestive metaphors and examples that Zhu developed, and point to the key respects in which he takes (...) virtuous caring to be central. (shrink)

This chapter interprets Confucius' life of moral action as an expression of a kind of deep courage. This is the courage that sustains a steadfast commitment to a way of life in a world hostile to its values and aspirations. Confucius evinces at least two related aspects of deep courage: (i) the courage to pursue an assailed way of life and (ii) the courage to promote that way of life to other people. This deep virtuous courage is related to Confucius's (...) suffering due to his pursuit of an assailed way of life within a world increasingly hostile to his moral ideals. (shrink)

The paper discusses five conceptions of knowledge present in texts traditionally associated with the thought of such thinkers as Kongzi, Mozi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Hanfeizi. The first three maps onto conceptions of knowledge familiar to contemporary ears: skill knowledge (knowing-how), propositional knowledge (knowing-that) and objectual knowledge (knowing by acquaintance); while the next two map onto less commonly discussed conceptions of knowledge: motivational knowledge (knowing-to) and applied knowledge (knowing-how-to). The discussion aims to complement existing projects in the literature that (...) look at related issues more explicitly from the standpoint of the ‘native’ concepts. The paper concludes with some comments on the early Chinese philosophical concerns with knowledge and its relation to broader conceptions of ‘philosophical’ projects. (shrink)

Much is said about what Kongzi liked or cherished. Kongzi revered the rituals of the Zhou. He cherished tradition and classical music. He loved the Odes. Far less is said, however, about what he despised or held in contempt (wu 惡). Yet contempt appears in the oldest stratum of the Analects as a disposition or virtue of moral exemplars. In this chapter, I argue that understanding the role of despising or contempt in the Analects is important in appreciating Kongzi’s dao (...) in two related though distinct ways: 1) exemplary individuals (such as the nobleman) regularly despise people and and hold them in contempt, and 2) reflecting on the targets of contempt might help uncover some tacit worries that Kongzi had concerning his own teachings on self-cultivation. In the concluding section, I state more general reasons why we might consider certain negatively valenced emotions such as contempt to be morally laudable. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy is a collection of essays on important texts and figures in the history of Chinese thought. The essays cover both well-known texts such as the Analects and the Zhuangzi as well as many of the lesser-known thinkers in the classical and post-classical Chinese tradition. Most of the chapters focus on thinkers or texts in one of three important historical movements: Classical ("pre-Qin") Chinese philosophy, Chinese Buddhism, and the Confucian response to Buddhism ("neo-Confucianism" broadly construed).

The basic concepts we use to frame metaphysical discussions – our tools of metaphysics – profoundly influence how those discussions proceed. Much recent work in anglophone metaphysics has centred on a set of hyperintensional such tools: grounding, dependence, fundamentality, and essence. This topical collection will provide new perspectives on these debates by bringing them into contact with Asian metaphysical traditions.

Discussions of land management in contemporary analytic political philosophy often take place through the lens of environmental protection, wealth management, or climate change. Such scholarship overlooks the distinctly communal issues and benefits associated with land management that are brought out by a close analysis of the well-field system elaborated by the early Confucian Mengzi. Shared management of the land can help increase prosociality and reduce interpersonal and intercommunal fractiousness, and so help ameliorate political polarization. The chapter argues that, understood broadly, (...) such lessons are applicable to contemporary multicultural liberal democracies. This is true even though such polities diverge wildly from ancient China in terms of their economic, social, and political structures. (shrink)

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant to our (...) contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. -/- The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges. (shrink)

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, this chapter contends that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. (...) Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. (shrink)

Advocates for defunding police departments in the United States critique traditional policing methods as not only ineffective but also racist and oppressive. They call for funding alternative programs, such as quality healthcare, education, and other community vitalization initiatives, to address the social causes of crime. Sometimes, community policing is put forth as a possible middle ground between traditional policing and the Defund movement. Community policing, while promising, has serious theoretical and practical shortfalls as it is currently conceived. This chapter proposes (...) bolstering community policing by scaffolding it at both the theoretical and practical levels with Confucian resources drawn from early Chinese and contemporary Taiwanese policing practices. This Confucian-inspired approach to policing reconciles community policing with the more radical aims of the Defund movement by tying policing practices to the promotion of true community flourishing. (shrink)

Theoretically, the political structure of ostensibly liberal democracies makes the question of revolution obsolete. In practice, this structure has failed to bring about democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when a revolution in the United States would be justified. Prominent theories of revolution in the Western tradition all have serious theoretical and practical problems. This chapter proposes a Confucian-inspired account of revolution that promises to provide criteria for engaging in (...) revolution that avoid such problems. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables consideration not only of the role of government, the quality of the ruler, and the status of the governed but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. This account provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when a revolution would be justified in a contemporary liberal democracy like the United States. (shrink)

The question of the legal standing of robots is currently being worked out in legal systems worldwide through civil court cases. Are A.I.s subjects of the law or objects to be managed by the law? This subject-object binary is foundational to Western philosophy of law and underwrites both historical and contemporary legal oppression and anti-oppression movements. It also, among other things, leads philosophers to focus on the metaphysical question of robot personhood. This chapter argues that this is the wrong question (...) to ask. A Confucian approach to the question encourages a focus on how to produce and maintain sociopolitical order and harmony in a world that contains active non-human entities rather than a focus on determining metaphysical status and subsequent legal subjecthood or objecthood. Instead of looking to the courts to solve the social and political conundrum that robots represent, societies should instead look to their sociomoral resources. (shrink)

The practice of “controlling the narrative” is central to the contemporary political playbook since effective narrative deployment results in, among other things, increased perceptions of both legitimacy and competence of the governing by at least some the governed. Different political groups often present competing political narratives though, which can lead to increased political polarization within societies and overall distrust of governing groups. Rather than throw out the practice of constructing and presenting political narratives altogether, this chapter argues that political groups (...) ought to take up the normatively constrained approach to narrative construction adopted by the Chinese, Warring States–era thinker Mozi and his followers. When attempts to gain narrative control are properly aimed at constructive collaboration and providing justificatory reasons for policies, practices, and procedures, they can help maintain the foundations of civil society and promote peace. (shrink)

This article, based on the Analects and other texts related to Confucius, uses the concept of “cosmopolitanism,” which has a long history in Western cultural tradi­tions, as a point of reference. Through an examination of both Confucius’ thoughts and practices, it argues that Confucius was a cosmopolitan. On this basis, it further identifies the characteristics and significance of Confucius’ “rooted cosmopolitanism,” which not only embodies the core consensus of all forms of cosmopolitanism—transcending regional and ethnic boundaries— but also centers on (...) universal human values. It avoids the issues of extreme cosmopolitanism, which can become abstract, generalized, and detached, by maintaining a balance between “one principle” and “many manifestations.” -/- . (shrink)

Abstract The role of Kongzi 孔子, in the Zhuangzi, has been a compelling story. Can we read the stories about Kongzi as constituting a type of commentary on his teachings and the early development of Confucian philosophy in general? First, let us consider the way Zhuangzi has put his own teachings into the mouth of Kongzi because he was accepted to be a sage who understood how to live well. Then, I turn to the more problematic references to Kongzi as (...) being punished in Chapter 5 and his being a “condemned person” in chapter 6 to illustrate how these stories are taken to be forms of commentary or criticism of Kongzi’s project because he did not understand complete virtue. The role of Kongzi in the Zhuangzi can be read as a criticism-like commentary using Kongzi to criticize Kongzi. Keywords: Kongzi/Confucius; Zhuangzi; commentary; complete virtue. (shrink)

A crucial tenet of virtue-based or expertise-based theorizing about politics is that there are ways to identify and select morally and epistemically excellent people to hold office. This paper considers historical challenges to this task that come from within Greek and Confucian thought and political practice. Because of how difficult it is to assess character in ordinary settings, we argue that it is even more difficult to design institutions that select for virtue at the much wider political scale. Specifically, we (...) argue that the vast majority of proposals that purport to select for virtue are either (a) unlikely to be effective, (b) not implementable at the scale of most current nations, or (c) have already been incorporated into most democratic states. Thus defenders of meritocratic institutions should take more seriously the practical barriers that will almost certainly arise when trying to implement these proposals at scale. Historical proponents of meritocratic values were well aware of concerns about the feasibility of their political ideals, and we should be too. (shrink)

Exemplarism – the view that exemplary people, whom we admire, are the bearers of our moral concepts – presents considerable challenges to the (widely-assumed) place of moral theory in how we learn to be moral. Exemplarism has been garnered by Amy Olberding to articulate a Confucian approach to moral learning. This paper extends Exemplarism by considering how it may be put into practice, based on a seminal Confucian text, the Analects of Confucius. To date, the majority of discussions on Confucian (...) ethics that have brought Confucian philosophy to the attention of Anglophone scholars tend to focus on conceptually-based matters. There remain questions regarding how these values may be inculcated and embodied in our moral lives. Central to our proposal is the practice of reflective observation (guan 觀), comprised by three integrated components: observation, evaluation, and emulation. Observing, reflectively, is important not only for an individual’s acculturation to existing norms and practices but also for how they may subsequently exercise some latitude over their moral practices. Our reflections offer a practical approach to Confucian moral learning. In doing so, we demystify moral learning in Confucianism and open up avenues for future cross-tradition dialogues on moral education. (shrink)

What has Confucius got to do with a transatlantic quarrel and a post-truth epoch? As the Chinese past becomes an academic expression of a clash between superpowers, and as the question of Confucius’s realness, or not, echoes a rather ludicrous Sino- American rivalry for pseudo world hegemony, Jean Levi refutes the thesis of Confucius’s non-existence and contends that, in vogue among Sinologists across the pond, this thesis employs the same arguments as those of Holocaust deniers and which, above all, joins (...) a general tendency of de-realisation of reality. In this fearless pamphlet, as erudite as it is trenchant, Levi regards, with a clinical and wry eye, current academia as an ideological battle site and an image of our time. (shrink)

Confucio no sólo es el filósofo más conocido de la cultura China, sino que es, en cierto modo, el padre de su filosofía. Las Analectasde Confucio es el texto en el que la filosofía confuciana se expone con mayor claridad y concisión, la claridad de la narración y la concisión del lenguaje de máximas morales. Una perspectiva fecunda de análisis puede ser leerlas desde la Ética a Nicómaco y, en general, desde la perspectiva de los filósofos griegos fundadores de la (...) filosofía en nuestra cultura. (shrink)

Many scholars generally believe that Confucius thinks the observance of li to be instrumental in attaining ren. In this essay, it is argued that observing li is not the instrument for attaining ren in the Analects. If we endorse the instrumentalist's interpretation of li for attaining ren, four contradictions would be followed in the Analects. Besides, there is no clear and solid textual evidence for the instrumentalist's interpretation of li. By reinterpreting passage 12.1, where Confucius said "ke ji fu li (...) wei ren" 克己復禮為仁, it is argued that scholars are wrong to refer to it as a support for the instrumentalist's interpretation. In the Analects, Confucius presents a self-cultivation way to attain ren without relying on the observance of li. (shrink)

With selections from over 100 figures covering the 1560s to the 1960s, this two-volume work features writing from three continents, with sources including Voltaire, Benjamin Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Max Weber, Bertrand Russell, and Ezra Pound. Arranged chronologically, they represent methodologies that span philosophy, political science, religious studies, sociology, anthropology, economic theory, linguistics, missionary texts, and works of popular moralism. Together they reveal important ideological trends in Western attitudes toward China.

How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse (...) names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

What are the nature and status of moral norms? And what makes individuals abide by them? These are central questions in metaethics. The first concerns the nature of the moral domain—for example, whether it exists independently of what individuals or groups think of it. The second concerns the bindingness or practical clout of moral norms—how individuals feel impelled to abide by them. In this article, I bring two distinct approaches to these questions into dialogue with one another.

The teaching of Confucius, one of the doctrines built Chinese philosophy, is the movement of thought that has penetrated politics, education, manners and customs in East Asia for centuries. Reading the principles that advise wisdom and virtue through classical texts, we can find out normative moral knowledge. This teaching, in which ethical standards guiding human relations are regulative, promotes hierarchy as required by patriarchal and patrimonial regime. Social structure is grounded on discrimination between nobles and commons. Since the rights and (...) privileges granted to the aristocracy and bureaucracy humiliate citizens and force compliance, social inequality becomes obvious. Just as Confucius cites the idea of spiritual supremacy of rulers, he also bestows a privilege upon the noble class due to their eligibility. It is the people who are actively industrious in serve, deference and obedience. The problem of nepotism, which favors the closer and excludes the farther in relational words and actions, extends all areas from familial to managerial. Consequently, justice, the main canon of virtue, has been disregarded. In this paper, it firstly will be argued that Confucius practices hypocrisy by his paradoxical statements about behavioral norms. Secondly, positional duties, which subjugate people for the interests of the dynasty, does not correspond to liberal humanism, will be confirmed. (shrink)

Confucius (551–479 BCE) is the Latinized name of Kong Qiu, best known in Chinese as Kongzi (Master Kong). Only partially successful in his public career, Confucius' private teaching inaugurated an era of reflectiveness and helped to define core elements of Chinese civilization. Subsequent generations of students built on his initial formulations to develop one of the world's great philosophical traditions, which in English we call “Confucianism”; various terms are used in Chinese, including Ru jia (the Scholars' School) and Dao xue (...) (the Learning of the Way). While later Confucian thinkers would develop elaborate frameworks of metaphysics, mind, and epistemology, Confucius' own teachings concentrated on ethics, politics, social values, and personal improvement. These teachings and the key terms in which they are phrased remained touchstones for the tradition ever after, and the Confucian tradition became absolutely central to what it meant to be Chinese. Given the scope of China and its civilization, it is no exaggeration to say that Confucius is among the most influential of humanity's thinkers. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices in (...) aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

The question of possible moral conflict between commitment to family and to impartiality is particularly relevant to traditional Confucian thought, given the importance of familial bonds in that tradition. Classical Confucian ethics also appears to lack any developed theoretical commitment to impartiality as a regulative ideal and a standpoint for ethical judgment, or to universal equality. The Confucian prioritizing of family has prompted criticism of Confucian ethics, and doubts about its continuing relevance in China and beyond. This chapter assesses how (...) those sympathetic to the Confucian vision of the good life might respond. It first explores Confucian conceptions of love and the importance of familial love. Next, problems arising from this commitment to partiality are discussed, and how a modern Confucian ethics might respond. I explore what notions of impartiality—understood largely pragmatically, as a value that functions in everyday social life rather than as an explicit moral principle that guides deliberation or judgment—can be derived from an ethics that focuses on family commitments. (shrink)

This book contains translations of roughly fifty statements attributed to Confucius. Each statement is followed by an explanation and a reflection on how Confucius can continue to inspire, whether it's on the importance of learning or rituals, self-examination and self-improvement, or virtuous leadership.

「不動心」的本質是甚麼？ ─《孟子》〈知言養氣章〉的文理與義理 / 漢學研究 39.2 (2021): 1-37. Scholars have tended to focus on the implications of such philosophical terms as “flood-like qi” 浩然之氣 and “unperturbed mind-heart” 不動心 in Mencius 2A:2, but have failed to identify the common thread of this rather long chapter. This article argues that Mencius 2A:2 frequently alludes to Analects 2.4, and that this allusion is precisely the common thread holding 2A:2 together. According to Mencius’s interpretation, Confucius’s achievements in different ages as stated in Analects 2.4 are (...) all related to the political consideration of whether one ought to remain in a state and serve as its minister. In light of this, and with the support of other evidence from within the Mencius, it is argued that the question “would your mind-heart be perturbed?” at the beginning of the chapter can only mean “would your intention of leaving Qi 齊 be shaken by the fact that you had been appointed as its minister?” but not “would your intention of putting the Way into practice be shaken,” as suggested by Zhao Qi 趙岐 (?-210). Furthermore, it is shown that after the death of Mencius, his act of valor, namely leaving Qi despite having already been appointed as a Qi minister, had become a shared cultural memory of early Chinese intellectuals. Whenever mentioning “unperturbed mind-heart” in their works, early intellectuals consistently evoked Mencius’s unmoved determination to reject any inappropriate political appointment even though the position could bring them fame and material comfort. The rise of Zhao Qi’s misreading in his commentary to Mencius, however, has led to the loss of this cultural memory. -/- . (shrink)

For perhaps obvious reasons, reticence is not likely to recommend itself as a category with which to perform cross-cultural studies in philosophy. Again, to risk stating the obvious, the theme of reticence would in this context concern what philosophical arguments and texts leave unsaid as well as explicitly advise an audience to leave unsaid. By fixing our attention to gaps, silences, and times where the subject is changed as well as when any of the advice above is explicitly recommended, new (...) insights on how philosophical clarification and ethical cultivation are performed will come into view. That, at least, is the ambition of the present article on the Analects and Wittgenstein. The... (shrink)

After distinguishing three conceptions of virtue and its impact on ordinary attachments to external goods such as social status, power, friends, and wealth, this paper argues that the Confucian Analects is most charitably interpreted as endorsing the wholehearted internalization conception, on which virtue reforms but does not completely extinguish ordinary attachments to external goods. I begin by building on Amy Olberding’s attack on the extinguishing attachments conception, but go on to criticize her alternative, resolute sacrifice conception, on which the virtuous (...) retain their ordinary attachments to external goods but are able to master them and willingly settle for virtue. I argue that we should reject this view because, unlike the wholehearted internalization conception, it cannot capture the facts that virtue silences or attenuates attachment to viciously obtained external goods and that virtue grounds positive emotional and cognitive self-assessments that are incompatible with some ordinary attachments to external goods. (shrink)

Amy Olberding, The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility from Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2019, 183pp., $29.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780190880965. Reviewed byAndrew Lambert, City University of New York, College of Staten Island.

This paper discusses Confucius' conception of integrity by way of his view on hypocrites.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements (...) for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state. (shrink)

Sungmoon Kim’s pragmatic Confucian democracy tries to provide a mediating position between the instrumental model and the intrinsic model of democracy. However, this model of Confucian democracy is problematic because it fails to justify the unique role Confucianism plays in accommodating democracy when it is one among many comprehensive doctrines in East Asia. To be truly pragmatic about democracy is to hold a pluralistic attitude toward how people will come to terms with it. This article aims to push the pragmatic (...) tendency further and propose an alternative model of democracy that has a multivariate structure, a neutral state, and an active public role for Confucianism. This multivariate model represents a more promising future for democracy in East Asia. (shrink)

This paper aims to produce a defense of the ethical significance of Confucian ritual. An adequate defense must explain how these conventions are based in a culturally-neutral, objective ground. After a brief account of how Confucians view the relationship between rituals and moral goodness, I consider three sorts of justification. Mencian naturalism appeals to a conception of flourishing that is grounded in human nature. Xunzian consequentialism looks to how ritual brings about social order. I argue that both of these approaches (...) fail because they are unable to account for the normative fineness of rituals, which refers to the precision and detail of ritual propriety. Instead, I look to Xunzi for a justification of rituals in terms of their role in beautifying human nature. I argue that this view provides a sort of objective ground for ritual, while also preserving their normative fineness. I conclude with remarks on how Xunzian aestheticism may be useful for understanding other areas of moral life. (shrink)

What new points of connection can be forged between two traditions that will either enable us to learn more about one or the other tradition or enable us better to address the concerns underlying those connections when armed with the resources of both traditions? This is the main, underlying question of Foust's new book, Confucianism and American Philosophy. The perceived quality of his several answers to this question will likely depend on the comparative method that one takes into the pages (...) of the book. Fortunately, Foust offers an explicit, well-informed, and carefully considered account of his own method in the introduction to the book. Indeed, the book is worth reading on the strength of that introduction... (shrink)

This is an updated and expanded version of an article first published in Oriens Extremus 49 (2010).

Confucius and Aristotle both put a primacy on the task of ethical self-cultivation. Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes the instrumental value of legal punishment for cultivation’s sake, Confucius raises worries about the practice of punishment. Punishment, and the threat of punishment, Confucius suggests, actually threatens to warp human motivation and impede our ethical development. In this paper, I examine Confucius’ worries about legal punishment, and consider how a dialogue on punishment between Confucius and Aristotle might proceed. I explore how far apart (...) these thinkers actually stand, and examine the possibilities for a rapprochement between them. Doing so brings to light the self-cultivation perspective’s range of resources for thinking about punishment’s justification. (shrink)

Translated, with a philosophical introduction.

An examination of the tensions between different conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity, and impartiality and partiality, as they arise in epistemology, ethical theory, and metaethics. Resources from classical Chinese philosophy are leveraged throughout the work to showcase new alternative ways of resolving these tensions.

Confucian education is best captured by the programme described in the Great Learning. Education is presented first as the process of self-cultivation for the sake of developing virtuous character. Self-cultivation then allows for virtue to be cultivated in the familial, social and international dimensions. My central thesis is that Confucianism can serve as a universal framework of educating people for the common good in its promotion of personal cultivation for the sake of human progress. On this account the common good (...) specifically refers to the social order accomplished by the virtuous behaviour found in the members of society. In this paper I argue that the Confucian notion of “lesser learning” sheds light on the concept of general education and the notion of “greater learning” improves our understanding of liberal education. Under this analysis the necessity of general education is assured although its importance should not be overly exaggerated. Furthermore, the objectives of liberal education deserve greater emphasis due to their historical importance and enduring relevance to promoting the common good of universal humanity. (shrink)

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ (...) requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this chapter, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology. (shrink)

According to a venerable ideal, the core aim of philosophical practice is wisdom. The guiding concern of the ancient Greek, Indian, and Chinese traditions was the nature of the good life for human beings and the nature of reality. Central to these traditions is profound recognition of the subjection to adversities intrinsic to human life. I consider paradigmatic exemplars of wisdom, from ancient Western and Asian traditions, and the ways that experiences of adversity shaped their life. The suggestion is that (...) these exemplars, if any, will show how to live wisely in adversity. (shrink)