Free Will and Physics

The classical debate on free will presents a seemingly exhaustive triage: determinism, compatibilism, or randomness. This paper argues that this framework is not merely incomplete but fundamentally obsolete, its categories rendered incoherent by the physical requirements of conscious binding. Building upon the Quantum Binding Argument (QBA)—which deduces that gamma synchrony and thus conscious unity require quantum non-locality—we formalize three corollaries that systematically dismantle the traditional landscape. First, we demonstrate that determinism is falsified by its ontological commitment to local causality, which (...) is violated by the non-locality essential for consciousness. Second, we show that compatibilism, as a thesis defined by its compatibility with determinism, logically collapses with determinism’s falsification. Third, we prove that the “randomness objection”—the false dilemma that the only alternative to determinism is incoherent chance—commits a category error, conflating classical randomness with non-local quantum correlation. The conclusion is not a new answer within the old debate, but its termination. The question of volition must be reformulated entirely within a non-deterministic, non-local physics of mind. (shrink)

The classical free will debate is paralyzed by a false triage: determinism, compatibilism, or randomness. This framework, a philosophical consequence of classical local physics, is obsolete. The Quantum Binding Argument (QBA) and its corollaries demonstrate that volition is metaphysically possible and must be non-local, thereby systematically eliminating these three options. This paper argues that this cleared conceptual space forces a radical reconception of volition itself. Building on the identity thesis from Non-Local Relationalism—where consciousness (C) is identical to operational non-local correlation (...) (NLC)—we infer that volition (V) is not a separate faculty. Instead, volition is the first-person phenomenology of conscious causation; it is what operational NLC feels like from the inside. This identity unifies will and experience, dissolving the traditional consciousness/volition dichotomy. Volition is thus universalized from a rare executive choice to the constant, dynamic activity of being a conscious system. We demonstrate how this framework accounts for physical constraints and graded agency, is validated by clinical neurology, and resolves the problem of mental causation by revealing it as a category error. The conclusion is not a new answer within the old debate, but the inauguration of a non-deterministic, non-local physics of volition. (shrink)

If I take a free decision, how does this express itself physically? If God acts in this world, how does he do so? The answers to those two questions may be different or the same. Here we sketch a typology of possible answers, including Transcendent Compatibility. It turns out that in an open universe, freedom is the timewise mirror image of causality.

The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist (...) solution. The ontologically emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to system limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. In the perspective of a modified definition of free will, the character of the physical interactions of the brain's neural system is subsequently studied. As an ontologically open system, it is asserted that its future states are undeterminable in principle. We argue that this leads to freedom of the will. (shrink)

This paper defends a libertarian account of free will grounded in the phenomenological structure of live decision episodes. Such episodes instantiate an i-structure, a center–periphery organization in which a focal node represents the decision situation as a whole and a periphery represents alternatives, reasons, and constraints. There is an “up-to-me” region in which the situation’s identity is fixed while what will be done remains open. I argue that the best interpretation of this up-to-me phenomenology, when taken as serious evidence about (...) agency, is global metaphysical openness: even given the total state of the world and the total laws at a time, more than one future action is nomically possible. I make this explicit through a strengthened Psychophysical Openness Thesis (POT): psychophysical laws are probabilistic and sensitive to i-structures, constraining and biasing outcomes without deterministically fixing them. I then define authored indeterminacy as underdetermined settling whose explanatory stopping point is the agent’s reasons-integrating act rather than an independent chancemaker. Luck objections are addressed by conceding that global libertarianism entails irreducible bruteness and chance within the agent while arguing that responsibility does not require eliminating chance but locating irreducible settling within the agent’s evaluative act. (shrink)

We develop a modern interactive libertarian dualism of physical and mental events using the concept of probability.

While the free will debate tends to focus primarily on the implications of determinism for freedom, a long line of philosophers have also argued that free will would not be compatible with indeterminism either. These arguments typically take the form of a so-called Luck Objection: a family of related arguments which all seek to show, roughly, that if an action is not causally pre-determined then it must be a sort of random happening, over which the agent lacks the control required (...) for free will. If successful, these arguments are fatal for libertarian accounts of free will, which are committed to the view that free actions must be both undetermined and under the agent’s control. In this paper, we defend libertarian free will against this challenge from luck. We argue that most formulations of the Luck Objection presuppose a conceptual model of indeterministic decision-making that is not well aligned with recent advances in the natural sciences; specifically, we argue that they make assumptions about the nature of indeterminacy and about the causal structure of decision-making, which libertarians have good empirical reason (from both physics and neuroscience) to reject. We develop a more empirically plausible model of agential decision-making and apply this to the problem of luck. We argue that, under such a model, it is entirely natural to think of an agent’s actions as both ‘undetermined’ (in the sense of being under-determined) and under their own control. We conclude that indeterminism poses no threat to a more naturalistic version of libertarian free will. (shrink)

This note presents a minimal mathematical model intended to clarify the logical compatibility of three often-tensioned ideas: (1) a block universe conception of spacetime, (2) ordinary experience of temporal flow, and (3) a form of free will understood as genuine openness of future alternatives at the level of experience. The aim is not to offer a physical theory, but to show that these notions are not structurally inconsistent.

The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable for (...) formal analysis. It is argued that the mind is an ontologically open system; a causal high-level system, the future of which cannot be reduced to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, not even if it is rendered physically closed. A positive answer to the question of free will is subsequently outlined. (shrink)

Mind-body problemet analyseras i ett reduktionistiskt perspektiv. Genom att kombinera emergensbegreppet med algoritmisk informationsteori visas i ett tankeexperiment att ett starkt epistemiskt emergent system kan konstrueras utifrån en relativt enkel, ickelinjär process. En jämförelse med hjärnans avsevärt mer komplexa neurala nätverk visar att även medvetandet kan karakteriseras som starkt epistemiskt emergent. Därmed är reduktionistisk förståelse av medvetandet inte möjlig; mind-body problemet har alltså inte en reduktionistisk lösning. Medvetandets ontologiskt emergenta karaktär kan därefter konstateras utifrån en kombinatorisk analys; det är därmed (...) principiellt oreducerbart till lägre-nivå-fenomen. I perspektivet av en modifierad definition av fri vilja diskuteras den fysiska växelverkan som äger rum i hjärnans neurala system. Trots att enskilda neurala lägre-nivå-processer är deterministiska, kan globala processer visas vara icke- deterministiska i ontologisk mening. Vi argumenterar för att detta leder till viljans frihet. (shrink)

In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in (Koch 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of (...) ruling over matter independently of the causal past. But what, then, can free will be ? We propose a compatibilist account that resonates well with neurobiology and physics, and that highlights that free will comes in degrees – degrees which vary with the conscious grasp the ‘free’ agent has over his actions. Finally, we analyze the well-known Libet experiment on free will through the lens of our model. We submit this interdisciplinary investigation as a typical case of naturalized philosophy: in our theorizing we privilege assumptions that find evidence in science, but our conceptual work also suggests new avenues for research in a few scientific disciplines. (shrink)

Artikkeli tarkastelee Émilie du Châtelet’n vuonna 1737 kirjoittamaa ja pitkään unohduksissa ollutta käsikirjoitusta Vapaudesta (Sur/De la liberté), jonka Voltaire lähetti Preussin kruununprinssi Fredrikille omissa nimissään. Artikkeli rekonstruoi tekstin syntyhistorian, sen filosofiset ja poliittiset kontekstit sekä analysoivat sen tahdonvapauskäsitystä suhteessa aikakauden keskeisiin ajattelijoihin, kuten Christian Wolffiin, Leibniziin, Locke’en ja Samuel Clarkeen. Teksti puolustaa tahdon ja tekojen vapautta viittä argumenttia vastaan, mutta ei sitoudu yksiselitteisesti kompatibilistiseen tai libertarianistiseen kantaan. Kirjoittajat osoittavat, että du Châtelet’n ajattelu heijastelee erityisesti Wolffin intellektualistista tahdonvapausoppia, mutta myös hänen (...) pyrkimystään välttää pietistien kritisoimaa ennalta säädetyn harmonian oppia. Vapaudesta näyttäytyy näin filosofisesti rikkaana ja historiallisesti merkittävänä tekstinä, jonka unohtuminen liittyy sekä sen monimutkaiseen syntyprosessiin että du Châtelet’n näkymättömyyteen Voltairen varjossa. Artikkeli tuo esiin tekstin uudelleenlöytämisen merkityksen sekä sen potentiaalin rikastuttaa käsitystämme 1700-luvun valistusfilosofiasta ja naisten roolista sen muovaajina. (shrink)

The first paper of a series about the rigorous and ontomathematical definition of postmodernity reinterprets Hegel's dialectics and dialectic logic. His "synthesis", "change", "development", "time" is represented as the third dimension of Hilbert space where the two others correspond to the initial and final state of whether developing "idea" or changing "object" (after Marx's "dialectical/ historical materialism") generating a complete description of reality therefore excluding any hidden variables in principle: after the Kochen-Specker theorem (1967) or forcing a unique probability measure (...) after the Gleason theorem (1957). That approach is obviously geometric rather than logical, thus rather ontomathematical than ontological. Speaking loosely, dialectic logic is not logic in a formal sense: it means only the following negative result after the transition from two-to three-dimensional Hilbert space. The orthomodular lattice of subspaces (projective operators) allowing for a local (i.e., depending on a locally defined context of measurement) Boolean lattice being omnipresently homomorphic (i.e., independent of any locally defined context of measurement) in the two-dimensional case for the Hilbert meta-space of human experience, however, does not allow the same (i.e., both local and universal) Boolean lattice after complementing it by the third dimension of "time", "synthesis", "development", etc. So, dialectic logic is only the "antithesis" of classical logic, but their "synthesis" is not (and fundamentally cannot be) logical, but only geometrical (furthermore originating from Hegel's own understanding of "synthesis": to generate a new quality). Dialectical logic is neither "ontology of change", nor "ontology of time", nor "ontology of contradiction": it is ontomathematics implied by the third dimension, thus beyond logic, but within geometry. It is rather "geometry of reality" than "logic of reality" and quantum mechanics rather than Marx's materialism is what it needs. Speaking loosely, reality starts from the third dimension after the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems. Then, Postmodernity versus Modernity can be rigorously and mathematically defined to replace the fundamental metapostulate about the two-dimensionality (e.g., "mindbody"; "objectsubject"; "Self environment"; etc.) of human experience with its three-dimensionality. As that was in fact realized for the first time by Hegel (in a proper philosophical insight since quantum mechanics did not exist in his age), he can be reasonably called the "first postmodern philosopher". The USSR and other socialistic countries' history and their "Marxism-Leninism" provide numerous examples (or counterexamples) for that ontomathematical interpretation of dialectics. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the project of naturalising agency, where agency can be broadly understood as the ability to choose and control one's actions on the basis of one's own purposes, goals, or reasons. Such agency is central to the basic phenomenology of our everyday existence as human beings, to how we come to understand ourselves and the world around us, and to the social, moral and legal practices that structure our societies. It is also (...) fast becoming a critical concept for addressing emerging issues in the ethics of artificial intelligence and animal rights. -/- Yet, despite its profound existential, societal and ethical importance, we still lack a robust understanding of the concept of agency from the perspective of the natural sciences. Part of the reason for this is a widespread and long-standing belief that agency - and related concepts such as freedom, purpose, and meaning - carry with them certain metaphysical commitments that are fundamentally incompatible with the picture of the world as it is given to us by science (what is sometimes known as a naturalistic worldview or metaphysics). This belief has led many scientists and philosophers to conclude that our concept of agency is, in fact, an illusion - a non-natural, unscientific notion that exists in our phenomenology, but not in the 'real world'. -/- In this thesis, I push back on these conclusions by developing an empirically grounded account of biological agency. I show how several of the core features (or types) of agency that are commonly claimed to be mysterious and unscientific are in fact perfectly consistent with a modern scientific worldview. To do this, I consider a series of challenges for agency that have emerged out of the philosophy of action, behavioural neuroscience, and the philosophy of free will. Each challenge targets the scientific credibility of a particular feature of agency: specifically, (i) macroscopic, agent-level control, (ii) purposive or mental causation, and (iii) the ability to 'do otherwise' and make genuine choices. I draw on recent empirical work from across the natural sciences to argue that these features are in fact supported by modern science. I do this by developing an empirically grounded framework for thinking about living systems and their behaviour (within each of the specified contexts) which, I argue, provides an entirely naturalistic and non-mysterious account of the relevant feature of agency. That is, I argue for a novel view of naturalistic metaphysics that appears to resolve many of the existing scientific concerns about the concept of agency. I then end by considering some recent attempts to extend a similar concept of agency into the domains of developmental and evolutionary biology. I argue that, in their current form, these attempts are not successful. (shrink)

The philosophical problem of free will has endured through centuries of enquiry. There is reason to believe that new factors must be integrated into the analysis in order to make progress. In the current physicalist approach, emergence and the physical limits of information representation are found to play crucial roles in the ontological dependence of volitional processes on their neural basis. The commonly invoked characterization of free will as 'being able to act differently' is shown to be problematic and is (...) reframed as a more precise explicatum conducive to formal analysis. Subsequently, it is found that the mind operates as an ontologically open system — a causal high-level entity whose dynamics resist reduction to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, even under conditions of physical closure. An affirmative stance on free will for conscious agents is outlined. (shrink)

Let us assume that human behavior is subject to laws of nature. These are either deterministic or indeterministic. Prima facie in both cases our behavior appears to be excused. For it seems as if, in the case of deterministic laws, we cannot behave differently than we actually do. In the case of indeterministic laws, it seems as if we are not the originators of this behavior, because how we behave depends on chance. There is a tension between the scientific characterization (...) of the world on the one hand and the characterization of people who are responsible for their behaviour on the other. The book examines how the answer to the question of whether people are responsible for their behavior depends on what is meant by determinism, causality, laws of nature and (perhaps somewhat surprisingly) reduction. (shrink)

The Muʿtazilites were a group of Islamic theologians who believed in human free will and moral responsibility. However, they did not share the same opinion about how God relates to natural events or how humans generate their actions and resulting effects. This paper explores the theory of primary and secondary causes in the Bahšamīya branch of the Muʿtazilites of Baṣra. First, it discusses how these Muʿtazilites explain the process of becoming and passing away in the world without resorting to occasionalism. (...) Second, it introduces the theory of tawallud, which holds that human actions are not determined by the laws of nature or God, but rather humans generate effects through secondary causes. Finally, it examines the arguments presented by ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, as a Muʿtazilite from the Bahšamīya school, against the theory of divine habit (ʿādah) in volume IX of the book ‚al-Muġnī fī abwāb at-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl‘ and proposes his idea of secondary causality as a necessary connection between events in nature that can be traced back to God as the primary cause. (shrink)

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

I outline a heretofore neglected difference between manipulation scenarios and merely deterministic ones. Plausible scientific determinism does not imply that the relevant prior history of the universe is independent of us, while manipulation does. Owing to sensitive dependence of physical outcomes upon initial conditions, in order to trace a deterministic history, a microphysical level of analysis is required. But on this level physical laws are time-symmetrically deterministic, and causality, conceived asymmetrically, disappears. I then consider a revised scenario to resurrect the (...) threat of manipulation even in the presence of time-symmetry and sensitive dependence upon initial conditions. To do so we posit a Designer-manipulator containing all the information of the manipulated and time-symmetrically related to him. The new scenario violates special relativity, but even waiving that objection, the scenario cannot meet its requirements. I argue that the Designer lacks agency enough to manipulate the target, both because her information lacks the robustness required to constitute knowledge of what she does, and because it leaves no room for desires for specific results. (shrink)

I outline a heretofore neglected difference between manipulation scenarios and merely deterministic ones. Plausible scientific determinism does not imply that the relevant prior history of the universe is independent of us, while manipulation does. Owing to sensitive dependence of physical outcomes upon initial conditions, in order to trace a deterministic history, a microphysical level of analysis is required. But on this level physical laws are time-symmetrically deterministic, and causality, conceived asymmetrically, disappears. I then consider a revised scenario to resurrect the (...) threat of manipulation even in the presence of time-symmetry and sensitive dependence upon initial conditions. To do so we posit a manipulator containing all the information of the manipulated and time-symmetrically related to him. The new scenario violates special relativity, but even waiving that objection, the scenario faces a dilemma. I argue that the manipulator either lacks agency enough to manipulate the target, or can integrate thoughts separated by long time spans into a single decision. In the latter case, the 'manipulated agent' disappears into the manipulator, making it the story of just one agent. (shrink)

Although there are several monistic and dualistic approaches to the mind-body problem on the basis of classical or quantum mechanics, thus far no consensus exists about a solution. Recently, the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) has been developed: this corresponds with a fundamentally new disciplinary matrix for the study of physical reality. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the mind-body problem within this newly developed disciplinary matrix. The main finding is that the idea of a duality of body (...) and mind has to be rejected as an incomplete representation of reality: in the universe of the EPT, man hás to be a trinity of body, spirit and soul, where ‘body’, ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ are names for distinct physical things. The mind is then a mere idea that arises from (self-)experience, but without onto-logical connotation. In addition a mechanism for mental causation, which implies a principle of choice, is rigorously formulated. The main conclusion is that a fundamentally new physicalist approach to the mind-body problem, according to which man has a free will, has been formulated strictly within the language of the EPT. Further physical research is then required to describe how the interaction between body, spirit and soul is to be understood in terms of fundamental interactions. In addition, further philosophical-theological research has to establish whether the presently discussed trinity and the trinities of body, spirit and soul mentioned in the Bible and the Vedic texts are one and the same thing. Edit: a revised version of this preprint has been published as a book chapter. (shrink)

Determinism is frequently understood as implying the possibility of perfect prediction. This possibility then functions as an assumption in the Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Yet this assumption is mistaken. As a result, arguments that rely on it fail to show that determinism would rule out human free will. We explain why determinism does not imply the possibility of perfect prediction in any world with laws of nature like ours, since it would be impossible for (...) an agent to predict with certainty any future event that is causally influenced by events outside her own backward light cone yet inside the backward light cone of the future event. This is the _light-cone limit_ and it undermines the Manipulation Argument or limits what this argument can tell us about the relevance of determinism to free will. We also respond to objections that the light-cone limit is irrelevant to the Manipulation Argument. (shrink)

Whether or not we are able to do x is on many philosophical accounts of our moral practice relevant for whether we are responsible for not doing x or for being excusable for not having done x. In this paper I will examine how such accounts are affected by whether a Humean or non-Humean account of laws is presupposed. More particularly, I will argue that (on one interpretation) Humean conceptions of laws, while able to avoid the consequence argument, run into (...) what might be called “the problem of radical freedom”: Humean laws fail to constrain what we can do. By contrast, non-Humean laws (and Humean laws on a second interpretation) avoid the problem of radical freedom but have no easy way out of the consequence argument. (shrink)

The aim of this expository paper is to give an informal overview of a plausible naturalistic case for free will. I will describe what I take to be the main naturalistically motivated challenges for free will and respond to them by presenting an indispensability argument for free will. The argument supports the reality of free will as an emergent higher-level phenomenon. I will also explain why the resulting picture of free will does not conflict with the possibility that the fundamental (...) laws of nature are deterministic, and I will address some common objections. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus that Emilie Du Châtelet’s challenging essay “On Freedom” defends compatibilism. I offer an alternative, libertarian reading of the essay. I lay out the prima facie textual evidence for such a reading. I also explain how apparently compatibilist remarks in “On Freedom” can be read as aspects of a sophisticated type of libertarianism that rejects blind or arbitrary choice. To this end, I consider the historical context of Du Châtelet’s essay, and especially the dialectic between various (...) strands of eighteenth-century libertarianism and compatibilism. (shrink)

Compatibilist libertarianism claims that alternate possibilities for action at the agential level are consistent with determinism at the physical level. Unlike traditional compatibilism about alternate possibilities, involving conditional or dispositional accounts of the ability to act, compatibilist libertarianism offers us unqualified modalities at the agential level, consistent with physical determinism, a potentially big advance. However, I argue that the account runs up against two problems. Firstly, the way in which the agential modalities are generated talks past the worries of the (...) incompatibilist in the traditional free will problem. As such, it fails to dispel the worries that determinism generates for the incompatibilist. Secondly, in spite of the ingenious use of the supervenience thesis and multiple realizability, the position still allows us to generate the old worry that determinism at the physical level would mean no alternate possibilities at the level of agency. In particular, I develop a new example, the ‘atomic slit case’ that demonstrates how physical level information is salient to what is possible at the agential level, motivating incompatibilism. (shrink)

Capacity of conscious agents to perform genuine choices among future alternatives is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Determinism that pervades classical physics, however, forbids free will, undermines the foundations of ethics, and precludes meaningful quantification of personal biases. To resolve that impasse, we utilize the characteristic indeterminism of quantum physics and derive a quantitative measure for the amount of free will manifested by the brain cortical network. The interaction between the central nervous system and the surrounding environment is shown to (...) perform a quantum measurement upon the neural constituents, which actualize a single measurement outcome selected from the resulting quantum probability distribution. Inherent biases in the quantum propensities for alternative physical outcomes provide varying amounts of free will, which can be quantified with the expected information gain from learning the actual course of action chosen by the nervous system. For example, neuronal electric spikes evoke deterministic synaptic vesicle release in the synapses of sensory or somatomotor pathways, with no free will manifested. In cortical synapses, however, vesicle release is triggered indeterministically with probability of 0.35 per spike. This grants the brain cortex, with its over 100 trillion synapses, an amount of free will exceeding 96 terabytes per second. Although reliable deterministic transmission of sensory or somatomotor information ensures robust adaptation of animals to their physical environment, unpredictability of behavioral responses initiated by decisions made by the brain cortex is evolutionary advantageous for avoiding predators. Thus, free will may have a survival value and could be optimized through natural selection. (shrink)

Determinism, causality, chance, free will and divine providence form a class of interlaced problems lying in three domains: philosophy, theology, and physics. Recent article by Dariusz Łukasiewicz in Roczniki Filozoficzne (no. 3, 2020) is a great example. Classical physics, that of Newton and Laplace, may lead to deism: God created the world, but then it goes like a mechanical clock. Quantum mechanics brought some “hope” for a rather naïve theology: God acts in gaps between quanta of indetermination. Obviously, any strict (...) determinism jeopardizes the existence of free will. Yes, but only if human mind follows the laws of physics and only if nothing exists outside the physical limits of space and time. We argue that human action lies in-between two worlds: “earth” and “heavens” using the language of Genesis. In that immaterial world, outside time and space constraints, there is no place for the chain of deterministic events. We discuss, in turn, that the principle of causality, a superior law even in physics, reigns also in the non-material world. Though, determinism in the material universe and causality in both worlds seem to be sufficient conditions, to eliminate “chaotic”, or probabilistic causes from human (and divine) action. (shrink)

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or (...) not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up. (shrink)

Human freedom is in tension with nomological determinism and with statistical determinism. The goal of this paper is to answer both challenges. Four contributions are made to the free-will debate. First, we propose a classification of scientific theories based on how much freedom they allow. We take into account that indeterminism comes in different degrees and that both the laws and the auxiliary conditions can place constraints. A scientific worldview pulls towards one end of this classification, while libertarianism pulls towards (...) the other end of the spectrum. Second, inspired by Hoefer, we argue that an interval of auxiliary conditions corresponds to a region in phase space, and to a bundle of possible block universes. We thus make room for a form of non-nomological indeterminism. Third, we combine crucial elements from the works of Hoefer and List; we attempt to give a libertarian reading of this combination. On our proposal, throughout spacetime, there is a certain amount of freedom that can be interpreted as the result of agential choices. Fourth, we focus on the principle of alternative possibilities throughout and propose three ways of strengthening it. (shrink)

Making room for agency in a physical world is no easy task. Can it be done at all? In this article, I consider and reject an argument in the negative.

In the last few decades, the relevance of quantum mechanics to the free-will debate has been discussed at length, especially in relation to the prospects of libertarianism. Basing his interpretation on Anscombe’s seminal work, Putnam argued in 1979 that, given that quantum mechanical indeterminacy is holistic at the macrolevel—i.e., it is not traceable to atomistic events such as quantum jumps of single atoms—it can provide libertarians with the kind of freedom they seek. As shown in this article, however, Putnam ultimately (...) reached the conclusion—together with the other author of this article—that his argument was wrong due to problems with the way it appealed to the Uncertainty Principle.**. (shrink)

If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world shares the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly a certain goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which the aim can be achieved or not by the one who determines the target. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, (...) the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. Quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world involving a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors (Conway and Kochen 2006; 2009). Any quantum system either a human or an electron or whatever else has always a choice: Its behavior is not predetermined by its past. This is a physical law. It implies that a form of information, the quantum information underlies all existing for the unit of the quantity of information is an elementary choice: either a bit or a quantum bit (qubit). (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property people possess when (...) they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will. (shrink)

Fisikak duen munduaren ulerkera eta askatasuna (edo nork bere burua gobernatzeko gaitasuna) uztartu daitezkeela defendatu nahi du Ismaelek liburuan. Askatasuna ez dago modan, ordea. Fatalismoa da nagusi. Alde handia dago bizi dugun munduaren eta fisikak deskribatzen duenaren artean, eta ohikoa da “Bizi duguna fisikak ilusioa dela erakusten du” eta horrelakoak entzutea. Beste askori, askatasunaren defentsa metafisikoa lekuz kanpokoa irudituko zaio. Horiek, askatasuna orain eta hemen behar dela defendatuko dute. Ez duela inongo zentzurik askatasuna termino horietan pentsatzeak.

The abstract concept of indeterministic free will is distinguished from the phenomenon of free will. Evidence for the abstract concept is examined and critically compared with various designs of automata. It is concluded that there is no evidence to support the abstract concept of indeterministic free will, it is inconceivable that a test could be constructed to distinguish an indeterministic agent from a complicated automaton. Testing the free will of an alien visitor is introduced to separate prejudices about who has (...) free will from objective experiments. The phenomenon of free will is modelled with a deterministic decision making agent. The agent values ‘independence’ and satisfies a desire for independence by responding to ‘challenges’. When the agent generates challenges internally it will establish a record of being able to do otherwise. In principle a computer could be built with a free will property. The model also explains false attributions of free will (superstitions). (shrink)

Introduction to a special issue on the Philosophy and Science of Mind.

It is hard to interpret quantum mechanics. The most surprising, but also most parsimonious, interpretation is the many-worlds, or quantum-multiverse interpretation, implying a permanent coexistence of parallel realities. Could this perhaps be the appropriate interpretation of quantum mechanics? This book collects evidence for this interpretation, both from physics and from other fields, and proposes a subjectivist version of it, the clustered-minds multiverse. The author explores its implications through the lens of decision making and derives consequences for free will and consciousness. (...) For example, free will can be implemented in the form of vectorial choices, as introduced in the book. He furthermore derives consequences for research in the social sciences, especially in psychology and economics. (shrink)

This essay discusses the concepts of entropy and negentropy used by Vilém Flusser in his philosophy of photography to delineate connections between science and art. If the act of finding order within chaos has always been a quality specific to human beings, the overwhelming role machines hold in our society casts shadows on human agency. Since the Enlightenment, humankind has carried on a regimentation of nature with the goal of finding a way of theorizing everything within it. In the same (...) way, empirical sciences have studied and portrayed the world of phenomena according to the laws of the moment. Shifting from prejudice to prejudice, however, they have never succeeded in finding an all-inclusive theory. Their way of systematization was adapted to all other areas of life, imposing itself through the norms of capitalism and production, leaving little space for human beings. In this scenario, human beings become puppets or tools. In this context, the arts are called upon to develop viable strategies to counteract the overwhelming power of social and technological control. (shrink)

The Free Will Theorem of Conway \& Kochen on the one hand follows from uncontroversial parts of modern physics and elementary mathematical and logical reasoning, but on the other hand seems predicated on an undefined notion of free will. Although Conway and Kochen informally claim that their theorem supports indeterminism and, in its wake, a libertarian agenda for free will, inferring the former from the Free Will Theorem is a \emph{petitio principii}. Of course, this also considerably weakens the case for (...) the latter. A recent reformulation of the Free Will Theorem due to Cator and the author uses a mathematically precise formulation of the idea that experimentalists freely choose their settings even in a deterministic world, and thence construes the theorem as providing constraints on determinism. In the present paper we argue that the concept of free will used in this version of the theorem is essentially the one proposed by Lewis, also known as `local miracle compatibilism'. To do so, we give a mathematical reformulation of this idea, which we believe to be well within its spirit and which may be of independent interest. On this double reformulation the Free Will Theorem shows that local miracle compatibilism contradicts the parts of modern physics used in its assumptions. Therefore, although the intention of Conway and Kochen was to support free will through their theorem, what they actually achieved is the opposite: a well-known, philosophically viable version of free will now turns out to be incompatible with physics! (shrink)

A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions; you have no choice but to do what you are destined to do. Although this way of thinking has intuitive appeal, and a long history, it has recently began to gain critical attention. A number of (...) arguments have been raised in defense of the idea that our will could be genuinely free even if the universe is governed by deterministic laws of physics. Determinism and free will have been argued to be compatible before, of course, but these recent arguments seem to take a new step in that they are relying on a more profound and concrete view on the central elements of the issue, the fundamental laws of physics and the nature of causal explanation in particular. The basic idea of this approach is reviewed in here, and it is shown how a careful analysis of physics and causal explanation can indeed enhance our understanding of the issue. Although it cannot be concluded that the problem of free will would now be completely solved (or dissolved), it is clear that these recent developments can bring significant advancement to the debate. (shrink)

This is a joint review of Jenann Ismael's 'How physics makes us free' (OUP).

The theoretical reliability of determinism. A review from the proposal of Mariano Artigas This article has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the theory of determinism, which claims to be based on the principles of experimental science, cannot be considered as an explanation compatible with such sciences. To do this, we use some ideas of Mariano Artigas on the explanatory power of scientific theories and their reliability from his book The Mind of the Universe. Through this process we (...) seek to achieve the second objective: to show the importance of the work of Artigas to dissolve complex contemporary debates, such as the current discussion about the existence of human freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.

In this paper we critically analyze the situation of quantum mechanics in discussions on free will. It starts describing how the uncertainty principle and the measurement problem pose a challenge to determinism. Next, we present positions supporting and rejecting correlation between quantum phenomena and free will. Finally, we will place all these issues into the context of five key questions set out by Robert Kane: the Compatibility, Significance, Intelligibility, Existence and Determinist Questions.

This paper argues that nonphysical souls would violate fundamental physical laws if they were able to influence brain events. Though we have no idea how nonphysical souls might operate, we know quite a bit about how brains work, so we can consider each of the ways that an external force could interrupt brain processes enough to control one’s body. It concludes that there is no way that a nonphysical soul could interact with the brain—neither by introducing new energy into the (...) physical world, nor by borrowing existing energy from it—without apparently violating one or more basic laws of physics, such as the law of conservation of energy. And despite widespread appeals to quantum mechanics to give interactionism an air of scientific respectability, the essential randomness of quantum processes prohibits the distinctly nonrandom influence that a nonphysical soul must have on brain events in order to control the body, and quantum mechanical uncertainty is not great enough to allow neurons to fire action potentials. -/- 1. Introduction -- 2. How the Brain Works -- 3. Mind-Brain Interaction Mechanisms - 3.1 Opening Sodium Channels - 3.2 Altering Voltage Gradients - 3.3 Synaptic Transmission - 3.3.1 The Presynaptic Neuron - 3.3.2 The Post-Synaptic Neuron - 3.3.3 The Beck and Eccles Models - 3.4 Neuronal Modulation - 3.5 Self-Generation of Action Potentials by Neurons -- 4. Harnessing Energy -- 5. How Many Action Potentials for a Volitional Act? -- 6. Input: From Brain to Nonphysical Mind -- 7. Discussion -- Appendix A: Opening Gates on Membrane Channels - A.1 Directly Opening Gates - A.2 Changing Voltage Across the Membrane -- Appendix B: The Biochemical Approach. (shrink)

When dealing with a certain class of physical systems, the mathematical characterization of a generic system aims to describe the phase portrait of all its possible states. Because they are defined only up to isomorphism, the mathematical objects involved are “schematic structures”. If one imposes the condition that these mathematical definitions completely capture the physical information of a given system, one is led to a strong requirement of individuation for physical states. However, we show there are not enough qualitatively distinct (...) properties in an abstract Hilbert space to fulfill such a requirement. It thus appears there is a fundamental tension between the physicist’s purpose in providing a mathematical definition of a mechanical system and a feature of the basic formalism used in the theory. We will show how group theory provides tools to overcome this tension and to define physical properties. (shrink)

It is not known whether consciousness can affect the physical world, as a result of a free will action or in some other way. To do so, it must be able to produce physical changes that cannot be accounted for by physical laws, an ability we will refer to as causal action, and several issues relevant to this possibility are discussed. 1) Until recently it was thought that the conservation laws of physics would prohibit causal action. It has now been (...) found that such is not the case, but other problems remain. 2) Observations of brain activity show that most of the process for determining a decision is done by the brain. However, the question of whether the final determination is done by mind or the brain is still open. The issue then arises that given the large amount of processing the brain can do, why would mind do this final step and if it does, why would the amount done by mind be so small? (shrink)