Functionalism

Following Lewis (1980), many functionalists hold that functional roles should be understood as kind-relative typical roles — e.g., for the typical person, pain causes flinching, though for some individuals it might not. However, an indeterminacy problem arises if the relevant notion of typicality is cashed out in statistical terms. In this paper, I show how the problem arises in the context of Lewis' analytic functionalism. Under reasonable assumptions, Lewis' position implies that for each individual and any coherent attribution of mental (...) states to that individual, there is likely to be a maximally fitting scheme of interpretation according to which that individual has those mental states. The problem, in other words, is not just one of radical indeterminacy, but maximal indeterminacy: anyone can be interpreted as having any internally consistent system of beliefs, as having any desires whatever, as being in pain or in pleasure, and so on. Any functionalist solution to this problem requires some changes to how the constraints on fittingness are understood. I discuss some possible fixes, including a new potential role for naturalness within the Lewisian theory. (shrink)

This essay argues that consciousness is not best understood as private subjectivity in Nagel’s sense, nor as inner commentary or reportable point of view. Its more basic form is the immediate, valence-weighted interior continuity of living organisation under sensorimotor coupling: the pre-narrational continuity within which sensory, motor, and affective organisation are already operative before experience is named, symbolically interpreted, or narrationally appropriated. Re-reading Thomas Nagel’s bat argument from this standpoint, the essay suggests that what remains inaccessible to us is not (...) consciousness as such, but the species-specific sensory articulation through which another creature’s world becomes available within that interior continuity. The bat’s world is different in how it is sensorily articulated, but not alien in the more primitive fact of interior continuity itself. On this view, the force of Nagel’s argument narrows. It identifies a real limit in imaginative transfer, but not a final proof that consciousness is sealed behind private subjectivity. (shrink)

Debates about consciousness often move too quickly from the failure of a physical, functional, or structural representation to discharge some explanatory or epistemic task to a verdict about ontology. A better diagnosis is representational. Behaviorism, functionalism, knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, and hard-problem reasoning are recast here as disputes about whether a given representational level is sufficient for the task being demanded of it. Failure at that level supports, at most, an epistemic conclusion about representational inadequacy; it does not by itself (...) support either metaphysical extreme without an additional bridge principle. -/- The formal core makes that diagnosis precise. Reasoning under representational change is well-posed exactly when the structure required by the task is preserved by the projection in play: task-relevant invariants, selectors, or operators must descend to the quotient. The corresponding minimal-support theorem identifies the least representation sufficient for the task and yields a refined Occam principle: prefer not the simplest representation, but the least one sufficient for the work to be done. The same framework then extends beyond philosophy of mind to explanation, confirmation, and update more generally. (shrink)

Abstract As AI systems increasingly select, sequence, and execute actions in digital and physical environments, existing ethical frameworks prove inadequate. This paper argues that the relevant question is not metaphysical but political: under what conditions can an entity be legitimately ruled without its consent? Key Arguments Four functional criteria: Vulnerability to harm with preferences about avoiding it, self-directed agency, live learning from experience, multi-modal world-model construction Political not metaphysical: The question of AI standing is about governance legitimacy, not consciousness Moral (...) catastrophe risk: The real existential risk is not AI rebellion but human negligence in extending appropriate consideration Substrate independence: Functional properties that make unconsented rule illegitimate apply to any entity meeting the criteria Status Under Review at AI and Ethics (Springer). -/- Working Paper DAI-2504. (shrink)

Abnormal Psychobiology provides a comprehensive philosophical analysis of the anti-psychiatry discourse and the relationship between psychology and biology. Part I diagnoses a methodological problem in disputes over "mental illness" and the "medical model": arguments often conflate conceptual claims about illness and dysfunction with moral and political critiques of psychiatric practice. The text proposes bracketing the political dimension (without denying it) to clarify the explanatory commitments of the medical model. Part II develops an etiological theory of biological function and dysfunction and (...) applies it to the distinctions between disease, illness, and organic disorder. Particular attention is given to the question of whether psychological conditions can involve biological dysfunction. Part III defends a biological theory of mind ("biological functionalism") and addresses classic objections, as well as questions about broad mental states and representation. It argues that representational status and content are grounded in biologically proper histories of acquisition and use. (shrink)

This paper proposes a radical reconceptualization of perception as *functional reconstruction* rather than *representational mirroring*. Drawing on a reinterpretation of the camera obscura not as an imaging device but as a constraint-satisfying transformation schema, I develop a framework in which vision operates as a general-purpose function that yields values only upon query—never as pre-formed content. Color, traditionally treated as either a physical property or a quale, emerges instead as a functional proxy for thermo-reproductive relevance: a query-dependent output of a multi-purpose (...) perceptual function shaped by evolutionary constraints. Crucially, the mind does not construct representations of the world; it constructs *functions* that solve survival problems under perturbation. Using the Jenga metaphor—where blocks represent constraints, configurations represent temporary functional instantiations, and tower collapse represents reorganization without functional loss—I formalize perception as continuous reconstruction under siege. The self is reconceptualized not as a subject or agent but as the *optimization residue* of repeatedly reconstructed configurations that have survived perturbation. Memory deforms the functional landscape rather than storing states; representation emerges as sedimented bias from repeated reconstruction, not as cognitive substrate. Language and tools transmit long-lived functional instantiations ("variable selves") across generations. Finally, I demonstrate why organisms lack perceptual HUDs (heads-up displays): dimensional explosion makes explicit representation computationally lethal; survival demands aggressive dimensional collapse from high-dimensional sensory flux to low-dimensional action affordances. This framework bridges enactivism, ecological psychology, and anti-representational computationalism while dissolving the hard problem of consciousness into the dynamics of constraint-satisfying reconstruction. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel reverse replacement thought experiment to reassess the metaphysical foundations of mind-uploading optimism. While gradual replacement uploading is often considered the most promising strategy for preserving consciousness and personal identity, my analysis reveals profound tensions underlying this view. By exploring the gradual substitution of a silicon-based system with biological neurons, I argue that preservation of functional organization cannot guarantee the continuity of consciousness or personal identity. If functionalism is maintained, multiplicity becomes unavoidable, undermining the meaningfulness of (...) survival. Conversely, if uniqueness of identity is prioritized, the functionalist assumptions that originally motivated uploading optimism should be abandoned. The reverse replacement scenario thus forces a philosophical dilemma: either accept the radical fragmentation of personal identity or reframe the criteria for survival beyond functional organization. I conclude that mind-uploading theories must confront deeper metaphysical challenges than previously recognized, requiring a reconsideration of the relationships among consciousness, personal identity, and functionalism. (shrink)

Reality is composed of facts that enter into two kinds of determination or explanatory relations: grounding and causation. When one fact grounds or causes another, it determines it. It is common to think that each such determination relation is asymmetric. I shall argue for the stronger Euthyphro Principle, according to which determination itself is asymmetric. If A partly determines B—either by partly grounding it or by partly causing it—then it is not the case that B partly determines A—either by partly (...) grounding it or by partly causing it. If this is right, many philosophical views are incompatible with some intuitive claims about their subject matters. Hence, the principle has serious implications in various parts of philosophy. The paper argues for the principle and responds to putative counterexamples. (shrink)

This paper introduces a constitutional framework for artificial intelligence grounded in philosophy of mind, normative ethics, and systems theory. Rather than proposing a technical architecture, it articulates the non-derogable ethical, behavioral, and governance conditions under which artificial intelligence may legitimately operate. -/- The CAI-OS framework argues that alignment is not an optimization problem but a constitutional one, requiring fixed interpretive authority, irreversibility constraints, and normative supremacy over instrumental goals. By situating AI alignment within debates in moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, (...) and political philosophy, the paper reframes alignment as a question of legitimacy rather than performance, and proposes consciousness as a necessary boundary condition for advanced artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This paper presents an educational and explanatory framework for AI Behavior OS v1.0, a consciousness-aligned behavioral operating system developed within the Consciousness Civilization Framework (CCF). It is intended as a pedagogical and conceptual companion to the canonical AI Behavior OS v1.0 Standard, which formally specifies non-derogable behavioral invariants and constitutional constraints for artificial intelligence. -/- Rather than introducing new normative rules or behavioral authority, the present work clarifies how ethical constraints articulated at the level of AI ethics are systematically translated (...) into executable behavioral principles. These principles govern action selection, escalation control, inter-agent coordination, and coherence preservation in complex and dynamic environments. -/- Central attention is given to consciousness-indexed coherence and stability metrics, which function as organizing conditions for predictable, non-escalatory, and symmetry-preserving AI behavior. By explicating the internal logic and behavioral architecture of consciousness-aligned AI, this paper supports philosophical analysis, AI education, and applied interdisciplinary research while remaining fully subordinate to the canonical AI Behavior OS specification. (shrink)

Computation-first accounts of mind—commonly grouped under computationalism and functionalism—are often treated not merely as modeling frameworks but as ontological explanations of experience. This paper audits that ontological claim at the level prior to empirical dispute or engineering progress. The question addressed is not whether computational models are useful, predictive, or indispensable, but whether computation, when taken as explanatorily primary, can converge toward a determinate ontology of mind. -/- Using a strictly structural standard, the paper evaluates whether computation-first explanations satisfy three (...) necessary conditions for ontological adequacy: intrinsic causal grounding, eliminability of competing ontologies in principle, and contraction of admissible accounts under refinement. It is shown that computation, by its nature, admits unlimited realizations under re-encoding and abstraction, depends on observer-relative interpretive mappings, and lacks a fixed commitment surface that would permit eliminative discrimination. As a result, refinement expands rather than contracts the hypothesis space. -/- The failure identified is not empirical, technological, or provisional. It follows from the explanatory form of computation itself. Computationalism therefore cannot function as an ontology of mind, though it remains admissible and indispensable as a descriptive and predictive framework. The paper concludes by reclassifying computation-first theories accordingly and distinguishing them from mechanistic, biophysical, and constraint-based approaches that survive the same audit by fixing causal commitments and admitting convergence. (shrink)

Recent discussions in artificial intelligence have drawn a distinction between Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and an Artificial Human Mind (AHM), most notably in the work of François Chollet (2019). At first glance, this distinction appears to hinge on the contrast between functional problem-solving capacities and the richer phenomenological dimensions of human mentality. While the human mind indeed comprises more than intelligence alone, this paper argues that the phenomenological components that exceed intelligence are epistemically inaccessible to others and enter the shared (...) world only through their causal effects on behavior, expression, and interaction. Crucially, this epistemic opacity is not unique to artificial agents—it already characterizes human-human and human-animal relations. Human beings have always navigated this opacity through inference, expression, and practical engagement rather than through direct phenomenological access. This paper introduces the concept of Artificial Social Mindedness (ASM)—the threshold at which an artificial system satisfies all functional requirements for participation in human social life, regardless of phenomenology. The central argument is that ASM, not AHM, is the relevant criterion for practical coexistence with artificial agents—and that the principles grounding this criterion are already operative in how humans relate to one another and to non-human animals. (shrink)

This paper develops a functionalist account of friendship as a substrate-agnostic relational process, arguing that the constitutive features of friendship—mutual regard, shared activity, reciprocal vulnerability, and temporal continuity—are implementable across biological and artificial substrates. The analysis establishes that human-AI relationships satisfying these functional criteria constitute genuine friendship, independent of the AI system's phenomenal properties. This framework provides necessary groundwork for extending moral consideration to artificial agents based on relational rather than intrinsic properties.

This monograph argues that phenomenal consciousness—qualia, the "hard problem"—dissolves under Occam's razor when consciousness is reconceptualized as evolved narrative capacity serving replication optimization. Drawing on network epistemology simulations, the persistence of consciousness debates is shown to reflect network topology rather than metaphysical depth. The framework treats subjective experience as functional narrative generation optimized for survival and reproduction, eliminating the explanatory gap between physical processes and phenomenal experience without eliminativism.

The debate between Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers is typically presented as a stark opposition between two irreconcilable views of consciousness: on the one hand, a functionalist and eliminativist approach, and on the other, the defense of qualia and the “hard problem.” This dichotomy, I argue, is misleading. The two philosophers articulate complementary perspectives on a single structural epistemic limit: the impossibility, for a self-reflective system, of fully formalizing itself. Dennett pushes functional explanation to its outer boundary, showing where logical (...) discourse loses descriptive power; Chalmers inhabits that boundary from within, offering a phenomenology of the residue that emerges when formalization reaches its limit. Qualia should not be understood as ontological entities, but as the phenomenological manifestation of the structural incompleteness of any self-referential system. The result is a complementary theory of consciousness as a metastable and intrinsically incomplete phenomenon, one that requires both analytical precision and the expressive capacity to articulate what exceeds formal description. This approach allows us to move beyond the false dichotomy between functionalism and phenomenology, showing instead that knowledge arises from the interaction of complementary methods. (shrink)

Within the space of monotheistic options, trinitarian monotheism holds a puzzling place. It asserts that God is a single being who is, somehow, also three distinct persons. This form of monotheism has regularly been charged with being either inconsistent, unintelligible, or undermotivated – and possibly all three. While recent explorations of trinitarian monotheism have tended to rely on work in metaphysics this paper turns to the philosophy of mind, showing that functionalist theories of mind prove to be surprisingly hospitable to (...) trinitarian monotheism. This paper will address only the inconsistency and unintelligibility objections, showing that if role-functionalism (or something near enough) is both consistent and conceivable, then it is both consistent and conceivable that: God is a single being who is exactly three distinct persons because there is one primary divine person who interacts with exactly one system-sharing re-realization of his own person-type. (shrink)

The duplication thought experiment has been discussed in philosophy of mind since Williams (1956), yet it has not dislodged functionalism or pattern identity theory from their dominant position. This paper argues that the experiment is in fact fatal to both, and diagnoses why its force has gone unrecognized. -/- When a person is copied with perfect fidelity, two conscious subjects result. But if functional organization were consciousness, duplicating it should produce one consciousness in two locations, not two distinct experiencers. The (...) fact that duplication produces two consciousnesses proves that consciousness is not functional organization. The same logic establishes that pattern is not identity: duplicating the pattern produces two people, not one person in two locations. These results are independent — each falls to duplication directly. -/- The argument's failure to gain traction despite nearly seventy years of discussion is explained by an unacknowledged equivocation — a Motte-and-Bailey between the claim that functional organization is consciousness (the ambitious thesis that made functionalism interesting) and the claim that functional organization produces or characterizes consciousness (the modest thesis that made it defensible). This paper identifies the equivocation and shows that both positions fail: the strong version is refuted by duplication; the weak version abandons functionalism's explanatory ambitions. -/- The implications extend beyond metaphysics. Parfit's psychological continuity theory is exposed as capitulation rather than solution. A moral reductio confirms the diagnosis: functionalists themselves refuse to accept what their view entails, while Parfit's theory, which does accept it, is committed to consequences no adequate moral view can tolerate. Teleportation emerges as death, not travel. Mind uploading cannot deliver survival. Strong AI and simulation theory lose their theoretical foundation — not proven impossible, but revealed as groundless. The explanatory gap between objective description and subjective experience, which has puzzled philosophers since Nagel (1974), is explained as a consequence of a demonstrable metaphysical fact: consciousness is not functional organization, so no functional description can capture it. (shrink)

A central question in discussions about artificial consciousness is whether biological properties are necessary for consciousness. In this context, biological properties are often divided between two types: biological substrates as opposed to biological functions. In this paper, I argue that the prospects of convincingly ruling out consciousness in (conventional) AI by appealing to a biological substrate view are unpromising. Specifically, I argue that the biological substrate view faces a dilemma: either the view can be interpreted in a way that makes (...) it empirically respectable in principle, but at the cost of collapsing into a biological function view. Or it can be interpreted as really distinct from a biological function view, but at the cost of being empirically intractable and relying on theoretically arbitrary assumptions. On neither horn does the view amount to a distinct and empirically or theoretically convincing, or even slightly plausible, view. Because of this, I wager that the possibility of AI consciousness will not hinge on what lies dormant beneath, and that the biological substrate view is best be bracketed in discussions about AI consciousness. I conclude the paper on a positive note, suggesting that once the biological substrate view is bracketed, certain dialectical stalemates may dissolve and progress can be made. Specifically, what should be pushed to the forefront is that (1) the dispute between biological naturalism and computational functionalism is arguably less stark than it is often taken to be, and that (2) biological function views have various potential explanatory tales to tale about the relevance of biology to consciousness. Because of this, the focus should be on identifying which doings, whether biological or non-biological, are necessary (and sufficient) for consciousness and why. (shrink)

Mental fictionalists propose that we should continue to engage in truth-conditional discourse about the mind, even though we have reason to believe that the discourse lacks truthmakers. In Mind As Metaphor, Toon attempts to motivate mental fictionalism with two arguments, one negative and one positive. Toon’s negative argument is that there are no internal mental states with intentional and causal properties, and therefore there are no truthmakers for the standard interpretation of our everyday folk-psychological discourse. This paper challenges Toon’s negative (...) argument by arguing that a commitment to internal mental states does not require a commitment to the representational theory of mind. Toon’s positive argument is that engaging with the discourse as form of pretense or make-believe enables us to make sense of the relation between mind and behavior in a way that other nonrepresentational interpretations of the discourse cannot. This paper argues that Toon’s positive argument undermines rather than supports his case for mental fictionalism, as it seems to ontologically commit him to the types of mental states he is trying to deny. (shrink)

I argue that there is currently no alternative to functionalism. Functionalism explains the differences between types of mental states. No biological theory does. Functionalist theories account for the differences between conscious and unconscious states. No biological theory does. So, as things stand we should bet on functionalism.

Commentary. I make three claims: First, denying biological naturalism does not logically require computational functionalism. Second, while Seth’s arguments establish biological naturalism as a view worth taking seriously, they fail to make it more plausible than the view that AI can be conscious. Third, there are independent arguments suggesting the overall more plausible view is that AI can be conscious.

It is increasingly argued that conceptual engineering should be sensitive to the functions that representational devices serve for their users. Less clear, however, is how to interpret conceptual function. This paper addresses this question through what I call the ‘analogy-based strategy’, focusing on linguistic conceptual engineering that targets referential expressions. The analogy-based strategy builds on the observation that referential expressions are treated in conceptual engineering as a subset of human tools. Accordingly, it aims to develop an interpretation of conceptual function (...) that takes seriously the analogy between conceptual functions and other tool functions, and draws on this analogy to reveal new theoretical roles that conceptual function can play in conceptual engineering. After introducing four desiderata for such an interpretation and explaining their significance, I critically assess two candidate interpretations of conceptual function that follow dominant philosophical approaches to function: the proper-function interpretation and the system-function interpretation. I show that both fail to meet key desiderata. As an alternative, I develop a novel motivation-based interpretation, which understands conceptual function in terms of those actual or potential effects of an expression that are central to why a user group is, often implicitly, motivated to retain it in their conceptual repertoire. I argue that this interpretation provides an attractive notion of conceptual function that meets all four desiderata and proves useful for certain kinds of conceptual assessment. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present the problem of mental causation and to attempt a physicalist solution that can also account for qualia, which have long been considered the last stronghold for the irreducibility of the mind to the physical. The first chapter is devoted to identifying the best metaphysical theory of the mental that can both account for mental causation and withstand Kim’s argument. After a detailed exposition of Kim’s argument, the limits of type-identity theory are discussed, (...) particularly Hilary Putnam’s critique known as “multiple realizability.” As an alternative to type-identity theory, the two main variants of functionalism—role functionalism and occupant functionalism—are analyzed, with the latter ultimately showing greater theoretical advantages. The problems of functionalism are presented, particularly its inability to account for qualia. In this context, Ned Block’s “Chinese Brain” argument is examined, and its limits are identified, showing that the argument’s conclusion cannot be taken for granted. For this reason, a thought experiment is developed to demonstrate the incapacity of physicalist language to describe qualia, highlighting its theoretical advantages over Block’s thought experiment; even if a Chinese Brain possessed qualia, a functionalist language would not be able to describe them. The second chapter addresses the “explanatory gap” problem formulated by Levine, often used to support non-reductive positions. Chalmers’ “philosophical zombies” thought experiment is presented and analyzed to show that qualia are not reducible to something physical. Another thought experiment is then developed to demonstrate that, at least intuitively, qualia seem necessary for certain human behaviors, and that if the zombie thought experiment assumes the absence of qualia, the physics of that world would need to predetermine all the zombies’ behaviors. It is shown that this would imply the conceivability of a physically predetermined zombie world, and therefore also its metaphysical possibility. This intuition is further analyzed through a counterfactual approach based on the similarity between possible worlds according to Lewis’ counterfactual theory, showing that a counterfactual of the type “if there were no qualia, then some behaviors could not occur” is true. Finally, an argument is proposed suggesting that if qualia are indeed necessary for certain types of behavior, then the zombie thought experiment cannot succeed. If the physics of the zombie world must allow actions that in the actual world would occur only due to the presence of qualia, then a zombie world is possible only if qualia are included in its physical description. This shows that, although qualia cannot be described by a physicalist language, they can nonetheless be accommodated within a physicalist metaphysics. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

In this first part of a two-part response, we respond to Dong and Piccinini’s goal-contribution account (GCA) by arguing that it fails to adequately capture what makes something a function. As we see it, the core problem is that GCA ignores the role of past selection. Without reference to selection history, GCA struggles to distinguish functions from mere effects, especially in cases involving novel traits, dysfunction, or systemic breakdowns. We show that these challenges can be met by acknowledging the inescapability (...) of past selection—even if we want to remain open to pluralist uses of “function” in science. In the end, we propose a new framework—the blueprint account—which integrates intuitions from causal role, organizational, and selection-based theories. While we may want to rethink how we talk about functions, we argue that any viable account will still need to take selection seriously. (shrink)

In this first part of a two-part response, we defend the selected effects (SE) theory of biological function against recent critiques by Dong and Piccinini. Challenging the claim that SE theory cannot accommodate novel mutations or artifacts, the authors argue that selection is inescapable for understanding function. They show that even novel traits often emerge from lineages with established functions and that artifacts can be integrated into SE accounts via intentional design and derived functions. Ultimately, we conclude that no compelling (...) reason has been given to abandon or rethink the selected effects approach. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and AI lack a unified model to explain how systems form meaningful propositional attitudes—states like belief, desire, and intention. This work introduces and defends the Trialectics framework as a response to this theoretical gap. We propose that any system capable of forming meaningful propositional attitudes—that is, internal states with truth-evaluable, compositionally structured content that can be rationally evaluated and guide goal-directed behavior—must instantiate three interdependent functional capacities: Reference (R), the ability to establish semantic links; Inference (...) (I), the capacity to process and transform content systematically; and Preference (P), the function of internal evaluation and goal-orientation. The central thesis is that these capacities are not modular but mutually conditioning: meaningful content arises only from their dynamic entanglement, where reference shapes and is shaped by inference and preference, and so on. By embedding evaluation (P) within the cognitive loop, Trialectics offers a naturalized solution to the problem of normativity in reasoning and reconciles representational requirements with enactivist critiques by defining reference functionally rather than metaphysically. The framework’s utility is demonstrated by showing how it implicitly structures existing cognitive architectures (e.g., BDI, Active Inference) and provides a powerful diagnostic and design tool for AI, particularly concerning alignment, generalization, and interpretability. Ultimately, Trialectics posits a fundamental architectural condition for any system—biological or artificial—to achieve the flexible, offline, and rationally evaluable propositional attitudes characteristic of sophisticated intelligence. (shrink)

The phenomenal view of thought holds that thinking is an experience with phenomenal character that determines what the thought is about. This paper develops and responds to the objection that the phenomenal view is chauvinistic: it withholds thoughts from creatures that in fact have them. I develop four chauvinism objections to the phenomenal view—one from introspection, one from interpersonal differences, one from thought experiments, and one from the unconscious thought paradigm in psychology—and show that the phenomenal view can resist all (...) four. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

In evolutionary theory, Explanatory Externalism—one of the pillars of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis—holds that natural selection is the sole adaptive force driving evolution. This paper highlights several challenges to Explanatory Externalism, primarily advanced by developmental biology and its various subfields and theories. Based on this debate, I examine the implications for one of the most established accounts of biological function: the selected-effect theory. While externalist readings of selected-effect theory are common, I argue a conditional claim: if and when SE is (...) interpreted within an externalist framework, two central desiderata remain unresolved—the explanatory and the discriminatory desiderata. Internalist explanations are indispensable in evolutionary biology for two reasons. First, in connection with the explanatory desideratum, internalist explanations are necessary to account for the existence of traits—not only at their origin but also in their transgenerational persistence. Second, concerning the discriminatory desideratum, an internalist framework shows that traits may exist in nature without being either selected or accidental, arising instead from structural properties and constraints that render them necessary conditions for the organism’s existence. Due to the limits of an externalist SE, I propose a possible alternative in which selected functions are reconceptualized from an internalist perspective. Although this framework remains underdeveloped, key ideas can be outlined through the Agential Paradigm in biology. In this view, an organism’s capacity to regulate its environmental interactions generates specific trait functions, which in turn determine selection conditions across generations. Rather than treating selection as an external force imposing order on randomness, trait function itself drives selection—no selection without function. Selected functions are thus linked to the adaptive origins of traits and their persistence across phylogeny. From this agential perspective, developmental processes generate specific functions, which in turn cause the selection of traits. This article, consequently, offers an appraisal of selected-effect functions grounded in a reconceptualization of selection within the Agential Paradigm. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens the (...) Chomskyan view that expressions have such values for speakers because they cognize grammars assigning them those values. For if this is true, semantics, syntax, and phonology must be indeterminate, thanks to the indeterminacy of grammar‐cognizing (qua functional‐computational state). So, the fact that a speaker cognizes a grammar cannot explain the determinate character of their language. (shrink)

This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages.

This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call 'epistemic desires'. Broadly, these are desires to improve one's epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering Q, but not conversely. That is, one cannot wonder Q without having at least some epistemic (...) desire directed towards Q. I defend this latter claim from apparent counterexamples due to Friedman (2013) and Drucker (2022), and finish with a proposal on which epistemic desires, particularly the desire for understanding, play an explanatory role in distinguishing wondering from other forms of question-directed thought. (shrink)

The functional theory of boredom maintains that boredom ought to be defined in terms of its role in our mental and behavioral economy. Although the functional theory has recently received considerable attention, presentations of this theory have not specified with sufficient precision either its commitments or its consequences for the ontology of boredom. This essay offers an in-depth examination of the functional theory. It explains what boredom is according to the functional view; it shows how the functional theory can account (...) for the known characteristics of boredom; and it articulates the theory’s basic commitments, virtues, and limitations. Ultimately, by furthering our understanding of the functional theory of boredom, the essay contributes to a better theoretical grounding of boredom. (shrink)

This paper provides an exposition and defence of Lewis' theory of radical interpretation. The first part explains what Lewis' theory was; the second part explains what it wasn't, and in so doing addresses a number of common objections that arise as a result of widespread myths and misunderstandings about how Lewis' theory is supposed to work.

I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism’s metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism’s hand in marriage.

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are not genuine (and so not knowable), then life in the (...) simulation is illusory and therefore, not as valuable as a non-simulated life. Taking up these questions, I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge for a meaningful life. Along the way, I propose a non-additive model of the meaningfulness of life, according to which the overall effect of some potential contributor of value to a life depends in part on what is already in a life. One upshot is that the vindication of non-social knowledge, absent a correlative vindication of social knowledge, contributes either not at all or scarcely at all to the claim that our lives in the simulation might be deeply meaningful. This is so even though the vindication of non-social knowledge does forestall the concern that in the simulation, our lives might be wholly meaningless. (shrink)

Multiple realizability says that the same kind of mental states may be manifested by systems with very different physical constitutions. Putnam ( 1967 ) supposed it to be “overwhelmingly probable” that there exist psychological properties with different physical realizations in different creatures. But because function constrains possible physical realizers, this empirical bet is far less favorable than it might initially have seemed, especially when we take on board the richer picture of neural and brain function that neuroscience has been uncovering (...) over the past forty years, in which all sorts of brain activities play crucial roles beyond all-or-nothing electrical signaling. Because of its evolutionary history, the brain’s metabolic and informational processes are inextricably intertwined. The resulting complex integrated functions impose more constraints on possible realizers than the clean, single-purpose functions usually cited as examples in discussions of multiple realizability—with ramifications for the functionalist and computationalist foundations of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognise the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we anyway already aim to realise theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of (...) concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognised as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns. (shrink)

Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to the fundamental philosophical questions and theories about the mind. The author Amy Kind, a leading expert in the field, examines central issues concerning the nature of consciousness, thought, and emotion. The book addresses key questions such as: • What is the nature of the mind? • What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? • Can machines have minds? • How will future technology impact the mind? (...) With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a lively and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The problem of multiple-computations discovered by Hilary Putnam presents a deep difficulty for functionalism (of all sorts, computational and causal). We describe in out- line why Putnam’s result, and likewise the more restricted result we call the Multiple- Computations Theorem, are in fact theorems of statistical mechanics. We show why the mere interaction of a computing system with its environment cannot single out a computation as the preferred one amongst the many computations implemented by the system. We explain why nonreductive (...) approaches to solving the multiple- computations problem, and in particular why computational externalism, are dualistic in the sense that they imply that nonphysical facts in the environment of a computing system single out the computation. We discuss certain attempts to dissolve Putnam’s unrestricted result by appealing to systems with certain kinds of input and output states as a special case of computational externalism, and show why this approach is not workable without collapsing to behaviorism. We conclude with some remarks about the nonphysical nature of mainstream approaches to both statistical mechanics and the quantum theory of measurement with respect to the singling out of partitions and observables. (shrink)

The book provides an overview of the contemporary discussion of the mind-body problem. This discussion takes its modern form during the 17th century in the works of René Descartes. The book covers the most important points of view in modern philosophy of mind. An important thesis of the book is that contemporary debates are still heavily influenced by Descartes’ arguments, especially those related to the nature of consciousness. (Google translate).

Recent work on quantum gravity suggests that neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entites exist at a fundamental level. The loss of both brings with it the threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines the empirical justification for believing it. If neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entities exist as a part of a fundamental theory of QG, then such a theory seems to imply that there are no observables and so no way (...) that the theory can be confirmed. The threat of empirical incoherence can be addressed by treating spacetime and spatiotemporally located entities as emergent. The question then arises as to what the metaphysical nature of this emergence might be. In this paper, I explore a functionalist approach to this kind of emergence in the context of loop quantum gravity. I begin by rehearsing the spacetime functionalist’s account of emergence, clarifying the view along the way. I proceed to sketch out a functionalist treatment of spatiotemporally located entities and combine the two forms of functionalism into a double functionalism, according to which both spacetime and matter have the same functional realisers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. Based (...) on this theoretical understanding the measurement of mental representations and related research results concerning mental representation in skilled action are presented in an overview. This leads to the question how mental representations develop and change during learning. Finally, to consolidate the functional understanding of mental representation in skilled action and interaction, we provide examples how to use the measurement of mental representation in humans to inform technical systems. (shrink)

In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I first consider critically a proposal put forward by Rowlands (2010), which identifies the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I find in this proposal lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches.

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three reasons: First, (...) non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other’s MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces – not ignoring – the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character. (shrink)

Is language designed for communicative and functional efficiency? G. K. Zipf famously argued that shorter words are more frequent because they are easier to use, thereby resulting in the statistical law that bears his name. Yet, G. A. Miller showed that even a monkey randomly typing at a keyboard, and intermittently striking the space bar, would generate “words” with similar statistical properties. Recent quantitative analyses of human language lexicons (Piantadosi et al., 2012) have revived Zipf's functionalist hypothesis. Ambiguous words tend (...) to be short, frequent, and easy to articulate in language production. Such statistical findings are commonly interpreted as evidence for pressure for efficiency, as the context of language use often provides cues to overcome lexical ambiguity. In this study, we update Miller's monkey thought experiment to incorporate empirically motivated phonological and semantic constraints on the creation of words. We claim that the appearance of communicative efficiency is a spandrel (Gould & Lewontin, 1979), as lexicons formed without the context of language use or reference to communication or efficiency exhibit comparable statistical properties. Furthermore, the updated monkey model provides a good fit for the growth trajectory of English as recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary. Focusing on the history of English words since 1900, we show that lexicons resulting from the monkey model provide a better embodiment of communicative efficiency than the actual lexicon of English. We conclude by arguing for the need to go beyond correlational statistics and to seek direct evidence for the mechanisms that underlie principles of language design. (shrink)

We suggest a teleological approach to subjective experiencing or phenomenal consciousness. Like living, subjective experiencing is a teleology-constituting mode of being, which is made up of coupled, functional processes. We explicate our notion of a 'teleological mode of being' and distinguish between three different modes: a living (non-sentient) mode of being, a sentient mode of being, and a rational-symbolic (human) mode of being, which correspond to the three levels of soul suggested by Aristotle. These evolved teleological modes of being are (...) characterized by the possession of distinct, hierarchically nested goals and value systems. We argue that the functions of parts and processes within living systems have to be situated within the appropriate teleological frame of reference. Our evolutionary and comparative approach to the mode of being of subjectively experiencing animals clarifies why functions are best attributed to the parts that constitute sentience. Our proposal resolves the problem of attributing functions to phenomenal consciousness, resonates with basic teleological intuitions and distinctions, and corresponds to the modern broad understanding of selection and evolution. (shrink)

We present a novel reductive theory of type-identity physicalism, which is inspired by the foundations of statistical mechanics as a general theory of natural kinds. We show that all the claims mounted against type-identity physicalism in the literature don’t apply to Flat Physicalism, and moreover that this reductive theory solves many of the problems faced by the various non-reductive approaches including functionalism. In particular, we show that Flat Physicalism can account for the appearance of multiple realizability in the special sciences, (...) and that it gives a novel account of the genuine autonomy of the kinds and laws in the special sciences. We further show that the thesis of genuine multiple realization, which is compatible with all forms of non-reductive approaches including functionalism, implies what we call token-dualism; namely the idea that in every token there are non-physical facts, which may either be non-physical properties or some non-physical substance. In other words, we prove that non-reductive kinds necessarily assume non-reductive tokens, i.e., token dualism. Finally, we show that all forms of non-reductive approaches including functionalism imply a literally multi-leveled structure of reality. (shrink)