Mathematical Proof

Blue (2026) criticizes Ash and Clarke-Doane (2025). Our thesis is that the justification of mathematical axioms relies on reflective equilibrium applied to data about which there is reasonable disagreement, as in philosophy. Blue responds with a survey of the case for Definable Determinacy and a speculative scenario involving Baire category principles, arguing that the analogy breaks down. But Blue’s response rests on a conflation that we took pains to flag -- between agreement over what follows from what and agreement over (...) what non-logical axioms are true. Our concern is emphatically with the latter. Conditional agreement is cheap. Given agreement over logic, one can achieve it in any regimented area, from ethics to astrology. The case that Blue focuses on establishes that a wide variety of sufficiently strong theories imply Projective Determinacy. But getting from those conditional results to the conclusion that Projective Determinacy is true requires appeal to theoretical virtues (naturalness, unification, proof compression) that do not admit of proof, and whose application is reasonably disputed. In this note, I argue that Blue’s paper is, in fact, a detailed case study in the thesis that it attacks. Every element of the argument that he develops -- the crosschecks, theoretical virtues, “intended interpretations,” feedback loop between theorems and philosophical ideas, and even his classification of axiom disputes as “philosophical” or “mathematical” -- exhibits the dependence on non-deductive, non-provable, reasonably disputed considerations that Ash and I argue underwrite foundational inquiry. Blue’s mistake is to think that because these considerations are good --responsive to deep mathematics -- they cease to be philosophical. (shrink)

The incompressible Navier–Stokes equations on T³ exhibit a structural asymmetry: the spatial domain inherits the compact geometry of R³/Z³, while the temporal axis remains unbounded and analytically unconstrained. Classical approaches treat time as a neutral parameter, a clock labeling solution states without participating in the analytic structure. On periodic domains, this separation forfeits geometric constraints that the lattice structure naturally provides. We construct a coupled system (U, φ) via a bounded vorticity-response functional and prove that the Beale–Kato–Majda and Prodi–Serrin regularity (...) criteria are invariant under this bounded temporal lifting. Numerical validation on grids up to 256³ confirms invariance to machine precision across Reynolds numbers spanning 10³ to 10⁸. Published in The Scholarly Journal of Post-Biological Epistemics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2026). DOI: 10.63968/post-bio-ai-epistemics.v2n1.013. ISSN 3069-499X. Preprint: DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2510.09805. (shrink)

This paper studies how spatial thinking interacts with simplicity in [informal] proof, by analysing a set of example proofs mainly concerned with Ferrers diagrams (visual representations of partitions of integers) and comparing them to proofs that do not use spatial thinking. The analysis shows that using diagrams and spatial thinking can contribute to simplicity by (for example) avoiding technical calculations, division into cases, and induction, and creating a more surveyable and explanatory proof (both of which are connected to simplicity). In (...) response to one part of Hilbert's 24th problem, the area between two proofs is explored in one example, showing that between a proof that uses spatial reasoning and one that does not, there is a proof that is less simple yet more impure than either. This has implications for the supposed simplicity of impure proofs. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The notion of ‘simple proof’ - Hilbert's 24th problem’. (shrink)

Carnap introduced his notion of explication to arrive at concepts that are precise enough for scientific purposes. As Carnap wants to precisify concepts, his notion of explication targets less precise concepts so that explications within mature mathematics are not possible. We argue that explications of mature mathematical concepts are both possible and widespread. We focus on foundational work, especially as done in the context of interactive theorem proving. Taking foundational work seriously necessitates explicit decisions which are generally ignored in mathematical (...) practice - and such developments are not captured by our usual notions of explication. To see this, we introduce Carnapian and Quinean explication and argue that they are not capable of accounting for intra-mathematical conceptual changes. We argue that these changes are best understood as explications and so need a different notion of explication. We suggest one candidate, called tolerant explication, and sketch how it handles the intra-mathematical cases. (shrink)

Presentation of the translation of Paolo Mancosu's entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Mathematical Style," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

We prove the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture for elliptic curves over the rational numbers. Specifically, we establish that for any elliptic curve E over Q, the rank of the Mordell-Weil group E(Q) equals the order of vanishing of the L-function L(E,s) at s=1. The proof proceeds in three main steps. First, we use the Arthur-Selberg trace formula to express the rank as the dimension of a spectral eigenspace. Second, we apply the Satake isomorphism and strong multiplicity one theorem to isolate (...) the automorphic representation π_E associated to E via modularity. Third, we employ a spectral-Weil identification using Riesz representation theory to connect the spectral dimension to the L-function vanishing order. This approach adapts techniques from spectral analysis of the Riemann zeta function, extending the spectral-Weil identification from GL_1 to GL_2. The key innovation is recognizing that Weil's explicit formula, combined with the Arthur trace formula and Riesz uniqueness theorem, provides an unconditional connection between spectral measures and L-function zeros. The proof is unconditional and applies to all ranks without restriction. (shrink)

In this work I present what may be the first complete construction of quantum gravity describing the real universe via the celestial holographic conformal field theory dual to Einstein gravity in asymptotically-flat 4D spacetime. The theory is rigorously constructed as the shadow-invariant, purely spin-2 sector of holomorphic Chern–Simons theory on twistor space PT ≃ CP³ with gauge group the quantomorphic group Quant(PT). Primary fields are the celestial graviton operators O^{±2}Δ(z, z̄) with Δ ∈ 1 + iR and J = ±2. (...) Three-point functions are determined by the Penrose transform and reproduce the MHV and anti-MHV amplitudes of general relativity, including the vanishing of parity-odd and mixed-helicity couplings. Higher-point amplitudes arise from OPEs with analytically continued principal-series contours; loop integrands emerge as double discontinuities across shadow poles, which I verify explicitly for the scalar box integrals computed via this novel shadow discontinuity method, demonstrating analytically that they match Feynman diagram calculations for the scalar box, with numerical verification for the graviton box matching to 11+ decimal places. The construction satisfies extended BMS₄ ⋉ shadow symmetry with vanishing Virasoro central charge, also explicitly demonstrated via five independent and mutually reinforcing and rigorous arguments to be c = 0 to 10+ significant figures. I prove a rigidity theorem establishing that any 2D CFT with only spin ±2 primaries, the above symmetries and three-point data, and local inverse-Mellin-transformed correlators, is uniquely determined to be isomorphic to this quantomorphic twistor theory. Combined with the proof that crossing symmetry is a necessary consequence of bulk locality (not an independent axiom), this establishes that Einstein gravity in asymptotically-flat spacetime is the unique consistent theory of a single massless spin-2 particle. The quantomorphic gauge group structure provides a non-perturbative foundation, with perturbative scattering amplitudes emerging as the first residues of the holographic algebra. The first breakthrough insight that enabled and facilitated this construction was the realisation that the "shadow symmetry" of the boundary CFT—the map Δ ↔ 2 − Δ on conformal dimensions—is the restriction to null infinity of the Jost involution Θ of axiomatic quantum field theory, the operator independently constructed by Jost (1957) that coincides with the product C ∘ P ∘ T only in theories where all three factors individually exist as symmetries. At null infinity, where the metric is degenerate along the null generator, the distinction between temporal and spatial inversion collapses: the Jost involution is irreducible and reduces to time reversal T alone (Theorem 8.1). This provides an elegant resolution to the 40+ year "googly problem" in twistor theory by unifying self-dual and anti-self-dual helicity sectors through the shadow transform as representing discrete T-symmetric involution across the boundary, with the Einstein field equations derived from boundary Ward identities and crossing symmetry. All quantum mechanical foundations emerge from the Haar measure structure underlying this framework with no additional postulates: the five Wightman axioms are derived from the Peter–Weyl theorem on representation spaces, the Born rule P = |⟨n|ψ⟩|² is proven as the unique probability measure compatible with Haar structure on quantum state spaces, and wave function collapse is derived as Haar projection onto gauge singlets. This same identification reveals that the celestial conformal dimension is related to the Riemann zeta variable by Δ = 2s, so that the shadow involution Δ ↔ 2 − Δ becomes s ↔ 1 − s, the functional equation of the Riemann zeta function—establishing that the functional equation, shadow symmetry, and time reversal are three manifestations of one underlying self-duality. The entire holographic framework grows from a single root: self-dual Haar measure on (R⁺, ×), the simplest non-trivial locally compact group, whose self-duality already contains the functional equation and critical line. Three Cayley–Dickson doublings R → C → H → O produce the holographic chain R⁺ → S² → M⁴ → Gr(2,4)_C, with shadow symmetry at each level corresponding to the conjugation involution at that doubling step. The Grassmannian Gr(2,4) is the canopy of this holographic tree. The same Haar-invariant measure on the Grassmannian Gr(2,4) that determines the graviton spectrum also addresses three Millennium Prize problems through a unified geometric mechanism (Haar self-duality, functional equation symmetry, and Peter–Weyl compactness). The Riemann Hypothesis follows via 4 otherwise independent arguments and checks for circularity and consistency, and most fundamentally follows from three simultaneous constraints on the adelic quotient A×/Q× that form an overdetermined system whose unique solution forces Re(s) = 1/2 for all nontrivial zeros, with numerical verification of the first 10¹³ zeros on the critical line to machine precision using six independent tests. The Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture is argued to be proven for analytic rank ≤ 1 using identical Haar measure structure on GL₂(A_Q)/GL₂(Q): for elliptic curves with ord_{s=1} L(E,s) ≤ 1, the same three-fold constraint described above, combined with the Gross–Zagier formula and Kolyvagin's Euler system descent, establishes ord_{s=1} L(E,s) = rank E(Q) and the parity conjecture (−1)^{rank} = w_E is proven for all curves from Haar self-duality. The framework also identifies the precise obstruction to proving the conjecture at higher rank (algebraic cycles from the Beilinson–Bloch–Kato conjectures). The Yang–Mills mass gap is established through a complete celestial holographic construction: the Wess–Zumino–Witten model at Kac–Moody level k on S², mapped to four-dimensional Schwinger functions by inverse Mellin transform, with reflection positivity proven via the shadow-reflection bridge, the remaining Osterwalder–Schrader axioms verified explicitly, and the Wightman theory reconstructed by the OS theorem—yielding mass gap M = 2N/(k+N) · Λ_QCD > 0 from the Sugawara formula and confinement from Haar orthogonality as a rigorously proved theorem. The construction introduces no lattice, takes no continuum limit, and imposes no infrared regulator. Spacetime itself emerges from the Grassmannian via Penrose twistor correspondence (M⁴ ↔ Gr(2,4) (Penrose 1967). The division algebra tower determines the Standard Model: the symmetry breaking chain Spin(8) → G₂ → SU(3) → SU(2) × U(1) produces the gauge group; three fermion generations follow from Weyl anomaly cancellation, Plücker partitions, and Spin(8) triality; sin²θ_W = 3/8 at the GUT scale is the Dynkin index ratio, equivalently dim(Im(H))/dim(O). Physical constants are arithmetic invariants: CP violation from the Jacobi sum J(χ₄⁽⁵⁾, χ₃⁽⁷⁾) = e^{iπ/6}; down-type quark mass ratios m_d : m_s : m_b = 2:5:9 from SU(3) Casimir eigenvalues; the spin-statistics connection η(4)/ζ(4) = 7/8 from the p = 2 Euler factor; the lightest neutrino mass m_{ν₁} = 0 exactly from Bott periodicity—in independent agreement with Boyle–Finn–Turok (PRL 121, 251301, 2018); and the three dimensional constants ℏ, c, G corresponding to the three Cayley–Dickson doubling steps. Strong CP angle θ = 0 exactly from Haar self-duality (consistent with experimental bound |θ| < 10⁻¹⁰), and the construction provides right-handed neutrinos as geometric dark matter candidates in agreement with Boyle–Turok (CP)T-symmetric cosmology, which integrates with uncanny precision into my T-symmetric, thermodynamically cyclic quantum cosmology. The T-anti-symmetric unification of a unified bipartite self-dual universe resolves the matter-antimatter asymmetry as a selection effect. Total baryon number B_total = 0 with embedded observers observing identical physics on either side due to being thermodynamic in nature, naturally aligning their arrows of time in the direction of increasing entropy, which on either side of the boundary flows in opposing directions. The Feynman-Stueckelberg interpretation of antimatter means antimatter is equivalent to matter moving backwards in time, which combined with the reversal in T of the direction of entropy increases means observers only ever observe the B > 0 (matter) sector, with the B < 0 (antimatter) sector always being the hidden sector from the perspective of any temporally-embedded observer that respects thermodynamics, as from any observer's perspective their time moves forward, their atomic nuclei have a positive electrical charge, electrons have negative electric charge, and the standard model has left handed doublets and right-handed singlets, with a weak force that appears left-chiral. To observe the antimatter would require an observer to reverse their arrow of time, which is thermodynamically not possible as consciousness and memory are thermodynamic processes that happen only in the direction of increasing entropy. Shadow geometry and right-handed neutrinos provide dark matter. The Grassmannian spinor bundle splits each fermion representation across the T boundary: right-handed neutrinos reside in the shadow sector, coupling to the observable sector only gravitationally. The dark matter density profile ρ(r) = ρ₀/(1+(r/r_c)²) with core radius r_c ≈ 9.98 kpc is derived from the shadow kernel by Abel inversion with zero free parameters, resolving the core cusp problem of dark matter distribution and addressing several further cosmological anomalies (the S₈ tension, Hubble tension, DESI dark energy evolution, JWST early galaxies, CMB hemispherical asymmetry, CMB dipole anomaly, axis of evil, overmassive early black holes, rotation curve diversity, etc.) from a single geometric source. Time's arrow emerges as a consequence of T-symmetric boundary conditions with entropy always increasing away from the conformal boundary in opposing temporal directions. The horizon and flatness problems are naturally resolved by this framework as the celestial CFT is globally defined at the conformal boundary. The framework generates falsifiable predictions including no primordial gravitational waves (tensor-to-scalar ratio r → 0, definitively falsified if r > 0.01 detected by CMB-S4), m_{ν₁} = 0 (KATRIN, JUNO), r_c ≈ 9.98 kpc (Euclid), glueball mass ratios matching the Sugawara spectrum, GUE statistics in the vacuum noise spectrum of gravitational wave detectors (LIGO/Virgo/KAGRA), and right-handed neutrino dark matter coupling only through gravity. Over 155 independent computational tests with zero free parameters confirm the framework to machine precision. Part 1 contains an introductory overview of the several subframeworks involved in this synthesis explaining their interrelations in the wider framework, part 2 contains the constructions and rigorous proofs of all major results, Part 3 contains extensions and other corollaries. Part 4 continues with comparisons to other approaches and discussion regarding foundational contributions without which this work would not have been possible follows, followed by testable predictions and a chapter addressing falsifiability, and Part V delivers a philosophical analysis of the implications suggested by the mathematics of this framework. This work unifies quantum mechanics and general relativity via the celestial holography program while revealing deep connections between number theory and physics: the identification Δ = 2s means the same self-dual Haar-invariant measure structure constraining the Riemann zeros to the critical line in the complex plane where Re(s) = 1/2 simultaneously constrains the conformal dimensions of graviton operators to the principal series where Re(∆) = 1, the same compactness that forces the Yang–Mills mass gap forces the discrete zeta spectrum, and the same functional equation symmetry that governs L-functions governs the shadow transform of the celestial CFT—suggesting geometry and arithmetic share a common logos rooted in self-dual Haar measure on (R⁺, ×) and flowering in the Grassmannian Gr(2,4). (shrink)

We prove that all non-trivial zeros of the Riemann zeta function ζ(s) lie on the critical line Re(s) = 1/2. We establish this result via three independent proofs using different mathematical frameworks: (1) Geometric: Three structural properties—Haar self-duality, functional equation symmetry, and Peter-Weyl compactness—uniquely determine σ = 1/2 as the only value permitting L² integrability. (2) Spectral: Meyer's unconditional spectral realization combined with Stone's theorem and Haar measure self-duality; (3) Probabilistic: The Biane-Pitman-Yor identification of ξ(s) with the Kuiper distribution, showing (...) off-line zeros would violate probability axioms. Each pathway is rigorous, complete, and unconditional. (shrink)

We show that the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is independent of ZFC, Pi1 sound and true in the standard model of arithmetic and prove RH in ZFC + minimal axiomatic extensions. -/- Independence of ZFC is established using the Lambda Irreducibility Principle, a foundational framework introduced and developed in this work. The Lambda principle detects intrinsic semantic obstruction arising from round-trip translation between inequivalent representational paradigms. We formalize two paradigms intrinsic to number theory: a linear arithmetic paradigm, governing first-order arithmetical definability (...) and computation, and a curved analytic--spectral paradigm, encoding the global analytic and spectral structure of the Riemann zeta function. We prove that RH is $\Lambda$-irreducible with respect to these paradigms. As a consequence, RH admits no faithful uniform representation within any single formal system internal to ZFC, and is therefore undecidable in ZFC. -/- We then establish the truth of RH in the standard model of natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$. Exploiting the $\Pi^0_1$ character of RH together with its ZFC-independence, we show that any hypothetical counterexample would constitute a finite arithmetical witness, and hence would be detectable within ZFC itself. The absence of such a witness implies that RH already holds in $\mathbb{N}$. This yields a proof of the Riemann Hypothesis in natural arithmetic, derived from semantic reflection rather than from additional axiomatic strength. -/- Next we present the Large Cardinal Theorem of Analytic Completeness, under which the $\Lambda$-obstruction collapses and RH becomes provable in an extension of ZFC. Taken together, these results establish that RH is independent of ZFC yet true in the standard model of arithmetic, with its truth established in the standard model of arithmetic and in ZFC + LCAC (Large Cardinal Analytic Completeness). -/- We finally present a third geometric proof of RH in extended foundational settings based on global phase rigidity of the Riemann phase bundle. Interpreting zeros of the completed $\xi$–function as localized holonomy defects of a natural logarithmic connection, we show that sufficient analytic rigidity excludes such defects and forces all nontrivial zeros onto the critical line. This argument clarifies why spectral and Hilbert–Pólya–type approaches require additional foundational strength, and provides a geometric realization of the analytic obstruction identified by the Lambda Irreducibility Principle. -/- Together these proofs successfully resolve the Clay-Millenium problem of proving the Riemann hypothesis. (shrink)

A proof is a successful demonstration that a conclusion necessarily follows by logical reasoning from axioms which are considered evident for the given context and agreed upon by the community. It is this concept that sets mathematics apart from other disciplines and distinguishes it as the prototype of a deductive science. Proofs thus are utterly relevant for research, teaching and communication in mathematics and of particular interest for the philosophy of mathematics. In computer science, moreover, proofs have proved to be (...) a rich source for already certified algorithms. This book provides the reader with a collection of articles covering relevant current research topics circled around the concept 'proof'. It tries to give due consideration to the depth and breadth of the subject by discussing its philosophical and methodological aspects, addressing foundational issues induced by Hilbert's Programme and the benefits of the arising formal notions of proof, without neglecting reasoning in natural language proofs and applications in computer science such as program extraction. (shrink)

Marcus Giaquinto presents an investigation into the different kinds of visual thinking involved in mathematical thought, drawing on work in cognitive psychology, philosophy, and mathematics. He argues that mental images and physical diagrams are rarely just superfluous aids: they are often a means of discovery, understanding, and even proof.

These questions arise from any attempt to discover an epistemology for mathematics. This collection of essays considers various questions concerning the nature of justification in mathematics and possible sources of that justification. Among these are the question of whether mathematical justification is _a priori_ or _a posteriori_ in character, whether logical and mathematical differ, and if formalization plays a significant role in mathematical justification.

The philosophy of mathematical practice (PMP) looks to evidence from working mathematics to help settle philosophical questions. One prominent program under the PMP banner is the study of explanation in mathematics, which aims to understand what sorts of proofs mathematicians consider explanatory and what role the pursuit of explanation plays in mathematical practice. PMP researchers have recently turned to corpus analysis methods as a promising alternative to small-scale case studies. Such methods stand to benefit, it would seem, from the sophisticated (...) text-comprehension capabilities of today's frontier large language models (LLMs). This paper reports the results from such a corpus study making use of Google's Gemini 2.5 Pro. Based on a sample of 5000 mathematics preprints, the experiments yielded a dataset of hundreds of useful annotated examples. Its aim was to gain insight on questions like the following: How often do mathematicians make claims about explanation in the relevant sense? Do mathematicians’ explanatory practices vary in any noticeable way by subject matter? Which philosophical theories of explanation are most consistent with a large body of non-cherry-picked examples? How might philosophers make further use of AI tools to gain insights from large datasets of this kind? As the first PMP study making extensive use of LLM methods, it also seeks to begin a conversation about these methods as research tools in practice-oriented philosophy and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of current models for such work. (shrink)

These involved theorems on sweeping nets, saddle maps and complex analysis are a thorough examination of the method an its fundamental mechanics. The basic foundation of this analytical method is useful to any artificer of mechanical programs or development of software applications that involve computer vision or graphics. These methods will have application to further theories and methods in string theory and cosmology or even approximation of environmental factors for machine learning.

In contemporary epistemology, fallibilism has become the universally presupposed stance. This trend is not confined to empirical knowledge; in recent years, it has also been extended to mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I argue against the fallibilist view on mathematical justification, and advocate infallibilism. Specifically, I examine the fallibilist account offered by De Toffoli (2021), which is the most developed version in the literature. This account proposes a distinctive characterisation of mathematical justification, which is fallibilistic. To counter this, I will (...) demonstrate that De Toffoli’s argument is unsuccessful. From the objections emerges the positive view that I go on to develop and defend, which is a bi-level theory of mathematical epistemology. In my theory, I distinguish between first-level justification, which concerns mathematical beliefs, and second-level justification, which pertains to judgments about the justificational states of those mathematical beliefs. I will argue that while second-level justification is fallible, first-level justification is infallible, and it is this first-level justification that constitutes mathematical justification. Based on my picture, I then advocate an infallibilist view of mathematical justification. (shrink)

A proof of a theorem can be said to be pure if it draws only on what is 'close' or 'intrinsic' to that theorem. In this Element we will investigate the apparent preference for pure proofs that has persisted in mathematics since antiquity, alongside a competing preference for impurity. In Section 1, we present two examples of purity, from geometry and number theory. In Section 2, we give a brief history of purity in mathematics. In Section 3, we discuss several (...) different types of purity, based on different measures of distance between theorem and proof. In Section 4 we discuss reasons for preferring pure proofs, for the varieties of purity constraints presented in Section 3. In Section 5 we conclude by reflecting briefly on purity as a preference for the local and how issues of translation intersect with the considerations we have raised throughout this work. (shrink)

If you have enjoyed any of the 7 (seven) other books I have published over 20 years, including literally thousands of pages of mathematical and topological concepts, Python programs and conceptually expanding papers, please consider buying this book for $20.00 on google play books. -/- Introduction: -/- Though the following pages provide extensive exposition and dedicated descriptions of the phenomenological velocity formulas, theory and mystery, I thought it appropriate to write this introduction as a partial explanation for what phenomenal velocity (...) is, and describe, briefly its theory and applications. Phenomenological Velocity is a method for solving for something that ought cancel out with itself, but there are specific implicit forms for this thing that, “ought cancel out with itself,” namely the Lorentz coefficient ought cancel out with itself when applied to the height of a cone derived from the difference between the circumferences of two circles applied to the Pythagorean Theorem, or, more generally, the height implied by application of the Pythagorean theorem to the difference between two arc lengths’ equaling a third arc length. These difference equations are essential to conceptualizing differentiation, and in these further chapters, I demonstrate that the phenomenological velocity is, indeed the conditional derivative in the chapter, “Conditional Integral of Phenomenological Velocity.” The phenomenological velocity algebraic solution to the velocity within the Lorentz coefficient when applied to the height function in such a way that it ought cancel out with itself is both constructive mathematics and it employs the concept of, “bracketing,” - first introduced by Edmund Husserl in his writings on the phenomenological reduction. Phenomenological Velocity’s algebraic solution from the difference between two arc lengths applied to the Pythagorean Theorem to solve for a theoretical height (which is a projected distance in space), employs bracketing, because we, “set aside,” the existence of an undefined solution, namely due to the presence of necessitated complex analytical forms by the architecture of the equation, or the “mathetecture,” of the algebraic form. -/- With respect to theology, the phenomenological velocity is somehow symbolic of the creation itself; symbolic of creation due to the fact that we find the canceling out of the Lorentz coefficient as, “impotent,” non-existent or non-effecting to the mathetecture of the height function. However, via the modus-ponens work around to phenomenological velocity, which in itself does not require the complex field, but embeds implied complex field solutions to the equation while maintaining logical consistency, we find existence from non-existence. This is directly linguistically applicable to the concept of the big-bang, the resurrection of Yeshua the Messiah, and opens analogies for us to draw relationships between the, “fall,” of Adam and Eve as the generation of error, or the introduction of paradox, as we see the phallus representing paradox topologically. -/- The phenomenological velocity is a gestalt concept, relevant to cosmology, because we find that it is the perfect language-form for discussing dark matter. It does, however, require the reader to re-conceive or re-frame rather, some of the fundamental aspects of assumed physical reality like time, experience, solidity of dark matter, etc. We find the hidden dimension of phenomenological velocity to have been an overlooked aspect of mathematical physics by the researchers of Bell’s theorem and undoubtedly a host of other theorems. Thus, raising awareness about the real existence and necessitated reality of phenomenological velocity is in no way an endeavor deserving further procrastination by the scientific community, for doing so would be intellectually dishonest and further the propagation of incomplete or misleading theories on reality. -/- This work details how the Lorentz coefficient, when applied to the height of a cone in such a way as to cancel out with itself, permits the velocity variable to have a solution to it anyway, even though it ought cancel out with itself. This mathe-tecture, so to speak has consequences for complex analysis, and pave the way for, "transcendental relativity," building an adaptive framework for consciousness and physical reality. (shrink)

These involved theorems on sweeping nets, saddle maps and complex analysis are a thorough examination of the method an its fundamental mechanics. The basic foundation of this analytical method is useful to any artificer of mechanical programs or development of software applications that involve computer vision or graphics. These methods will have application to further theories and methods in string theory and cosmology or even approximation of environmental factors for machine learning. -/- .

This comprehensive monograph is a cornerstone in the area of mathematical logic and related fields. Focusing on Gentzen-type proof theory, the book presents a detailed overview of creative works by the author and other 20th-century logicians that includes applications of proof theory to logic as well as other areas of mathematics. 1975 edition.

Mathematicians routinely pass judgements on mathematical proofs. A proof might be elegant, cumbersome, beautiful, or awkward. Perhaps the highest praise is that a proof is right, that is, that the proof fits the theorem in an optimal way. It is also common to judge that one proof fits better than another, or that a proof does not fit a theorem at all. This paper attempts to clarify the notion of mathematical fit. We suggest six criteria that distinguish proofs as being (...) more or less fitting, and provide examples from several different mathematical fields. (shrink)

According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mathematics, direct inferential justification for mathematical propositions (that are not axioms) requires proof. I challenge this view while accepting that mathematical justification requires arguments that are put forward as proofs. I argue that certain fallacious putative proofs considered by the relevant subjects to be correct can confer mathematical justification. But mathematical justification doesn’t come for cheap: not just any argument will do. I suggest that to successfully transmit justification an argument (...) must satisfy specific standards, some of which are social. I contrast my view with Huemer’s inferential conservatism, which makes mathematical justification too easy to get. Although in this article I focus on mathematical inferential beliefs, the view on offer generalizes to other inferential beliefs. (shrink)

Computational tools might tempt us to renounce complete cer- tainty. By forgoing of rigorous proof, we could get (very) probable results for a fraction of the cost. But is it really true that proofs (as we know and love them) can lead us to certainty? Maybe not. Proofs do not wear their correct- ness on their sleeve, and we are not infallible in checking them. This suggests that we need help to check our results. When our fellow mathematicians will be (...) too tired or too busy to scrutinize our putative proofs, computer proof assistants could help. But feeding a mathematical argument to a computer is hard. Still, we might be willing to undertake the endeavor in view of the extra perks that formalization may bring—chiefly among them, an enhanced mathematical understanding. (shrink)

A new approach to informal rigorous mathematical proof is offered. To this end, algorithmic devices are characterized and their central role in mathematical proof delineated. It is then shown how all the puzzling aspects of mathematical proof, including its peculiar capacity to convince its practitioners, are explained by algorithmic devices. Diagrammatic reasoning is also characterized in terms of algorithmic devices, and the algorithmic device view of mathematical proof is compared to alternative construals of informal proof to show its superiority.

If we want to understand why mathematical knowledge is extraordinarily reliable, we need to consider both the nature of mathematical arguments and mathematical practice as a social practice. Mathematical knowledge is extraordinarily reliable because arguments in mathematics take the form of deductive mathematical proofs. Deductive mathematical proofs are surveyable in the sense that they can be checked step by step by different experts, and a purported proof is only accepted as a proof by the mathematical community once a number of (...) experts have checked the proof. Hence, the reliability of the body of mathematical knowledge is in part obtained through the surveyability of proofs and the social process of proof validation. This chapter reviews work relating to (1) the norm in the mathematical community of only counting as argument deductive mathematical proof, and (2) the norm of only counting as deductive mathematical proof an argument that has been confirmed to be a deductive mathematical proof by a number of experts. The chapter also presents cases of unusual mathematical proofs or arguments that challenge these norms. (shrink)

Emphasizing the creative nature of mathematics, this conversational textbook guides students through the process of discovering a proof as they transition to advanced mathematics. Using several strategies, students will develop the thinking skills needed to tackle mathematics when there is no clear algorithm or recipe to follow.

The Nuts and Bolts of Proofs: An Introduction to Mathematical Proofs, Fifth Edition provides basic logic of mathematical proofs and shows how mathematical proofs work. It offers techniques for both reading and writing proofs. The second chapter of the book discusses the techniques in proving if/then statements by contrapositive and proofing by contradiction. It also includes the negation statement, and/or. It examines various theorems, such as the if and only-if, or equivalence theorems, the existence theorems, and the uniqueness theorems. In (...) addition, use of counter examples, mathematical induction, composite statements including multiple hypothesis and multiple conclusions, and equality of numbers are covered in this chapter. The book also provides mathematical topics for practicing proof techniques. Included here are the Cartesian products, indexed families, functions, and relations. The last chapter of the book provides review exercises on various topics. Undergraduate students in engineering and physical science will find this book accessible as well as invaluable. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the art of doing mathematical proofs. Proofs are the glue that holds mathematics together. They make connections between math concepts and show why things work the way they do. This book teaches the art of proofs using familiar high school concepts, such as numbers, polynomials, functions, and trigonometry. It retells math as a story, where the next chapter follows from the previous one. Readers will see how various mathematical concepts are tied, will see mathematics is (...) not a pile of formulas and facts, but has an orderly and beautiful edifice. The author begins with basic rules of logic, and then progresses through the topics already familiar to the students: numbers, inequalities, functions, polynomials, exponents, and trigonometric functions. There are also beautiful proofs for conic sections, sequences, and Fibonacci numbers. Each chapter has exercises for the reader. (shrink)

Paying attention to the inner workings of mathematicians has led to a proliferation of new themes in the philosophy of mathematics. Several of these have to do with epistemology. Philosophers of mathematical practice, however, have not (yet) systematically engaged with general (analytic) epistemology. To be sure, there are some exceptions, but they are few and far between. In this chapter, I offer an explanation of why this might be the case and show how the situation could be remedied. I contend (...) that it is only by conceiving the knowing subject(s) as embodied, fallible, and embedded in a specific context (along the lines of what has been done within social and feminist epistemology) that we can pursue an epistemology of mathematics sensitive to actual mathematical practice. I further suggest that this reconception of the knowing subject(s) does not force us to abandon the traditional framework of epistemology in which knowledge requires justified true belief. It does, however, lead to a fallible conception of mathematical justification that, among other things, makes Gettier cases possible. This shows that topics considered to be far removed from the interests of philosophers of mathematical practice might reveal to be relevant to them. (shrink)

The notion of proof is central to mathematics yet it is one of the most difficult aspects of the subject to teach and master. In particular, undergraduate mathematics students often experience difficulties in understanding and constructing proofs. Understanding Mathematical Proof describes the nature of mathematical proof, explores the various techniques that mathematicians adopt to prove their results, and offers advice and strategies for constructing proofs. It will improve students’ ability to understand proofs and construct correct proofs of their own. The (...) first chapter of the text introduces the kind of reasoning that mathematicians use when writing their proofs and gives some example proofs to set the scene. The book then describes basic logic to enable an understanding of the structure of both individual mathematical statements and whole mathematical proofs. It also explains the notions of sets and functions and dissects several proofs with a view to exposing some of the underlying features common to most mathematical proofs. The remainder of the book delves further into different types of proof, including direct proof, proof using contrapositive, proof by contradiction, and mathematical induction. The authors also discuss existence and uniqueness proofs and the role of counter examples. (shrink)

How the concept of proof has enabled the creation of mathematical knowledge. The Story of Proof investigates the evolution of the concept of proof--one of the most significant and defining features of mathematical thought--through critical episodes in its history. From the Pythagorean theorem to modern times, and across all major mathematical disciplines, John Stillwell demonstrates that proof is a mathematically vital concept, inspiring innovation and playing a critical role in generating knowledge. Stillwell begins with Euclid and his influence on the (...) development of geometry and its methods of proof, followed by algebra, which began as a self-contained discipline but later came to rival geometry in its mathematical impact. In particular, the infinite processes of calculus were at first viewed as "infinitesimal algebra," and calculus became an arena for algebraic, computational proofs rather than axiomatic proofs in the style of Euclid. Stillwell proceeds to the areas of number theory, non-Euclidean geometry, topology, and logic, and peers into the deep chasm between natural number arithmetic and the real numbers. In its depths, Cantor, Gödel, Turing, and others found that the concept of proof is ultimately part of arithmetic. This startling fact imposes fundamental limits on what theorems can be proved and what problems can be solved. Shedding light on the workings of mathematics at its most fundamental levels, The Story of Proof offers a compelling new perspective on the field's power and progress. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the narrative structure of mathematical proofs and why mathematicians communicate that way, drawing examples from classic literature and employing metaphors and imagery.

An Introduction to Proof via Inquiry-Based Learning is a textbook for the transition to proof course for mathematics majors. Designed to promote active learning through inquiry, the book features a highly structured set of leading questions and explorations. The reader is expected to construct their own understanding by engaging with the material. The content ranges over topics traditionally included in transitions courses: logic, set theory including cardinality, the topology of the real line, a bit of number theory, and more. The (...) exposition guides and mentors the reader through an adventure in mathematical discovery, requiring them to solve problems, conjecture, experiment, explore, create, and communicate. Ultimately, this is really a book about productive struggle and learning how to learn. This is a print version of the popular open-access online text by Dana C. Ernst. (shrink)

This textbook is designed for an Introduction to Proofs course organized around the themes of number and space. Concepts are illustrated using both geometric and number examples, while frequent analogies and applications help build intuition and context in the humanities, arts, and sciences. Sophisticated mathematical ideas are introduced early and then revisited several times in a spiral structure, allowing students to progressively develop rigorous thinking. Throughout, the presentation is enlivened with whimsical illustrations, apt quotations, and glimpses of mathematical history and (...) culture. Early chapters integrate an introduction to sets, logic, and beginning proof techniques with a first exposure to more advanced mathematical structures. The middle chapters focus on equivalence relations, functions, and induction. Carefully chosen examples elucidate familiar topics, such as natural and rational numbers and angle measurements, as well as new mathematics, such as modular arithmetic and beginning graph theory. The book concludes with a thorough exploration of the cardinalities of finite and infinite sets and, in two optional chapters, brings all the topics together by constructing the real numbers and other complete metric spaces. Designed to foster the mental flexibility and rigorous thinking needed for advanced mathematics, Introduction to Mathematics suits either a lecture-based or flipped classroom. A year of mathematics, statistics, or computer science at the university level is assumed, but the main prerequisite is the willingness to engage in a new challenge. (shrink)

Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions. Moreover, when they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs. In this paper, I examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that (...) diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability. I then consider whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear. (shrink)

An account of mathematical understanding should account for the differences between theorems whose proofs are “easy” to discover, and those whose proofs are difficult to discover. Though Hilbert seems to have created proof theory with the idea that it would address this kind of “discovermental complexity”, much more attention has been paid to the lengths of proofs, a measure of the difficulty of _verifying_ of a _given_ formal object that it is a proof of a given formula in a given (...) formal system. In this paper we will shift attention back to discovermental complexity, by addressing a “topological” measure of proof complexity recently highlighted by Alessandra Carbone ( 2009 ). Though we will contend that Carbone’s measure fails as a measure of discovermental complexity, it forefronts numerous important formal and epistemological issues that we will discuss, including the structure of proofs and the question of whether impure proofs are systematically simpler than pure proofs. (shrink)

This paper aims to bring together the study of normative judgments in mathematics as studied by the philosophy of mathematics and verbal hygiene as studied by sociolinguistics. Verbal hygiene (Cameron, 1995) refers to the set of normative ideas that language users have about which linguistic practices should be preferred, and the ways in which they go about encouraging or forcing others to adopt their preference. We introduce the notion of mathematical hygiene, which we define in a parallel way as the (...) set of normative discourses regulating mathematical practices and the ways in which mathematicians promote those practices. To clarify our proposal, we present two case studies from 17th century France. First, we exemplify a case of mathematical hygiene proper: Descartes’ algebraic geometry and Newton’s subsequent criticism of it, a case of (im)purity in mathematics. Then, we compare Descartes’ and Newton’s mathematical hygiene with verbal hygiene from this period, as exemplified by the work of the grammarian Claude Favre de Vaugelas (Ayres-Bennett, 1987). We argue that these early modern normative discourses on mathematics and language respectively can be seen as emanating from a common socio-political program: the development of a new bourgeois intellectual class. We conclude that the study of mathematical hygiene has the potential to yield new understandings of the social aspects of mathematical practice, and that similarities between mathematical and verbal hygiene at certain time periods, such as 17th century France, open up a new area of inquiry at the borders of linguistics and the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Proof requires a dialogue between agents to clarify obscure inference steps, fill gaps, or reveal implicit assumptions in a purported proof. Hence, argumentation is an integral component of the discovery process for mathematical proofs. This work presents how argumentation theories can be applied to describe specific informal features in the development of proof-events. The concept of proof-event was coined by Goguen who described mathematical proof as a public social event that takes place in space and time. This new meta-methodological concept (...) is designed to cover not only “traditional” formal proofs but all kinds of proofs and inference steps, including incomplete or purported proofs. Our approach attempts to make proof-events more comprehensive to express the complete trajectory of a mathematical proof-event until the ultimate validation of the proving outcome. Thus, we advance an extended version of proof-event calculus which is built on argumentation theories designed to capture the internal and external structure of collaborative mathematical practice and highlight the relationship between proof, human reasoning, and cognitive processes. In addition, another area in which argumentation can make a significant contribution is dealing with the defeasible knowledge of the Web which is a product of its open and ubiquitous nature. This approach seems to be sufficient for the presentation of Web-based proving processes as manifested in the case of the Mini-Polymath 4 project. (shrink)

In his 1978 paper “Mathematical Explanation”, Mark Steiner attempts to modernize the Aristotelian idea that to explain a mathematical statement is to deduce it from the essence of entities figuring in the statement, by replacing talk of essences with talk of “characterizing properties”. The language Steiner uses is reminiscent of language used for proofs deemed “pure”, such as Selberg and Erdős’ elementary proofs of the prime number theorem avoiding the complex analysis of earlier proofs. Hilbert characterized pure proofs as those (...) that use only “means that are suggested by the content of the theorem”, a characterization we have elsewhere called “topical purity”. In this paper we will examine the connection between Steiner’s account of mathematical explanation and topical purity. Are Steiner-explanatory proofs necessarily topically pure? Are topically pure proofs necessarily Steiner-explanatory? Answers to these questions will shed light on the general question of the relation between purity and explanatory power. (shrink)

Syllogistic Logic and Mathematical Proof chronicles and analyzes a debate centered on the following question: does syllogistic logic have the resources to capture mathematical proofs? The history of the attempts to answer this question, the rationales for the different positions, their far-reaching implications, and the description of the cast of major and minor mathematicians and philosophers who made contributions to it, has hitherto never been the subject of a unified account. Aristotle had claimed that scientific knowledge, which includes mathematics, is (...) given by syllogisms of a special sort, “scientific” (“demonstrative”) syllogisms. Thus, it is puzzling that in ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages the claim that Euclid’s theorems could be recast syllogistically was accepted without further scrutiny. And yet Galen had early on already noticed the importance of relational reasoning for mathematics. More critical voices will emerge in the Renaissance and the topic will attract more sustained attention in the next three centuries when, supported by detailed analyses of Euclidean theorems, one finally encounters attempts at extending logical theory to include relational reasonings, arguments purporting to reduce relational reasoning to syllogisms, and philosophical proposals to the effect that mathematical reasoning is heterogeneous with respect to logical proofs. The latter position was famously defended by Kant and the philosophical implications of the debate discussed in the book are at the very core of Kant’s account of synthetic a priori judgments. We know today that syllogistic logic is not sufficient to account for the logic of mathematical proof. Yet, the history and the analysis of this debate, spanning from Aristotle to de Morgan and beyond, is a fascinating and crucial aspect of the relationship between philosophy and mathematics. (shrink)

In this paper, we elaborate a framework theory of mathematical proof, which is not based on the traditional concepts of mathematical fact and truth, but on the concept of proof-event or proving, introduced by Goguen. Proof-events are described as the activity of a multi-agent system. Agents enact different roles; the fundamental roles are those of the prover and the interpreter. These agents interact with each other at various levels, forming an ascending hierarchy: communication, understanding, interpretation, and validation. Proof-events are problem-centred (...) spatiotemporal processes; thus, they have a history and form sequences of proof-events that evolve over time. With the aid of these concepts, we can examine the question of change and continuity of mathematical knowledge in a new setting. We attempt to model certain temporal aspects of proof-events, using the language of the calculus of events. (shrink)

The classification of algebraic surfaces by the Italian School of algebraic geometry is universally recognized as a breakthrough in 20th-century mathematics. The methods by which it was achieved do not, however, meet the modern standard of rigor and therefore appear dubious from a contemporary viewpoint. In this article, we offer a glimpse into the mathematical practice of the three leading exponents of the Italian School of algebraic geometry: Castelnuovo, Enriques, and Severi. We then bring into focus their distinctive conception of (...) rigor and intuition. Unlike what is often assumed today, from their perspective, rigor is neither opposed to intuition nor understood as a unitary phenomenon – Enriques distinguishes between small-scale rigor and large-scale rigor and Severi between formal rigor and substantial rigor. Finally, we turn to the notion of mathematical objectivity. We draw from our case study in order to advance a multi-dimensional analysis of objectivity. Specifically, we suggest that various types of rigor may be associated with different conceptions of objectivity: namely, objectivity as faithfulness to facts and objectivity as intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Euler famously used diagrams to illustrate syllogisms in his Lettres à une princesse d’Allemagne [1]. His diagrams are usually seen as suffering from a fatal “ambiguity problem” [11]: as soon as they involve intersecting circles, which are required for the representation of existential statements, it becomes unclear what exactly may be read off from them, and as Hammer & Shin conclusively showed, any set of reading conventions can lead to erroneous conclusions. I claim that Euler diagrams can, however, be used (...) rigorously, if they are read in conjunction with the premises they are supposed to illustrate. More precisely, I give rigorous “heterogeneous” inference rules (in the sense of Barwise and Etchemendy) – rules whose premises are a sentence and a diagram and whose conclusion is a sentence – which allow to use them safely. I conclude that one should abandon the preconception that diagrams can only be used rigorously if they can be given a context-independent semantics. Finally, I suggest that context-dependence is a widespread feature of diagrams: for instance, Mumma [12] noticed that what may be read off from a Euclidean diagram depends not only on the diagram’s appearance, but also on the way it was constructed. (shrink)