Mereology

A Clarification of the "Theory of Anything". The model is assigned the name Ex Combinatorial Relational Pluralism.

I examine five principles about the metaphysics of properties, each of which has been defended in the literature: (1) the sum of properties is their corresponding conjunctive property, (2) the mereology of properties is classical, (3) properties are individuated by necessary co-instantiation, (4) sums of objects belonging to different categories do not belong to the category of any of their parts, and (5) there is at least a property necessarily instantiated by every individual. I prove that this package of views (...) entails that there is exactly one property. Since this conclusion is highly implausible, I will discuss some ways of modifying the package in order to avoid it. (shrink)

Alberic of Paris was one of the leading philosophers of the 12th century. He was the main rival to Peter Abelard and, according to John of Salisbury, “a most fierce opponent of the nominalist school.” But although he was an important figure in his time, Alberic is almost completely unknown today. -/- This collection of essays is the first ever dedicated to exploring and contextualizing the views of Alberic and his followers, the Albricani. It discusses topics such as universals, time, (...) mereology, divine foreknowledge, fallacies, and modal logic, and shows that Alberic was an original thinker in a vibrant intellectual milieu. -/- Contributors are Andrew W. Arlig, Enrico Donato, Sten Ebbesen, Charles Girard, Heine Hansen, Peter King, John Marenbon, Sofia Orsino, Boaz Faraday Schuman, Caterina Tarlazzi, Paul Thom, and Wojciech Wciórka. (shrink)

Hylomorphism provides an explanation of material composition: the material parts, the Xs, will compose a whole, a Y, belonging to a given natural kind, when those parts are characterized by a substantial form. While there are a number of those who hold that each human person is identical with a human animal – ‘animalists’ – most of these are not hylomorphists. One could worry that hylomorphism contributes little unique to debates about personal identity, collapsing into either a form of property (...) dualism or substance dualism. What I aim to do is apply a robust and classical hylomorphic account of persons (derived from Thomas Aquinas) to two contemporary problems, illustrating the way in which hylomorphic metaphysics can offer elegant solutions to tricky situations posed against animalists. Specifically, I will propose that hylomorphic animalism can help provide principled resolutions to worries that seem to undermine animalist intuitions which are raised by ‘brain transplant’ or ‘remnant person’ scenarios. Hylomorphism can capture the advantages of ‘hybrid’ animalist responses without the cost of denying a singular, biological criterion of personal identity. Further, hylomorphism provides a distinctive upshot for Christian theologians and the moral positions that they want to affirm by rendering morally anodyne apparent epistemic difficulties in identifying personal identity over time. (shrink)

In this book I articulate a new view about fundamental reality, an alternative to the familiar opposition between monism and pluralism. On this view, what’s metaphysically fundamental is neither the universal whole nor certain subcosmic entities, but the plurality of all entities, i.e. all entities taken collectively. I call it collective allism. Using higher-order resources, I systematically develop the view and give shape to the robust realism about plurals and the unorthodox ideology of fundamentality upon which it rests. I argue (...) that collective allism is tenable and merits serious consideration in current debates about fundamental reality—it’s a worthy rival to monism and pluralism given considerations about quantum entanglement, mereological infinitism, natural laws, and relations. -/- . (shrink)

Contemporary debates about the metaphysics of material composition occur within the framework set by the Special Composition Question, as proposed famously by Peter van Inwagen. This question asks what one must do, what conditions must be satisfied, for some things to compose one object as proper parts. Hylomorphism is a theory that has regained prominence in contemporary metaphysics, explaining the unity of composite material objects by appealing to a special metaphysical part of those objects: structure or form. My book defends (...) hylomorphism as a meaningful and significant answer to questions about the composition of material objects. Specifically, I propose that, if it is false that substances can have other substances as parts, hylomorphism can be shown not only to be a plausible theory but that all consistent accounts of restricted composition can be shown to be hylomorphist. After introducing and summarizing the trajectory of the book, I turn to reviewing and responding to objections from my interlocutors for this symposium. (shrink)

Drawing on recent work on the theory of location, we first develop a general theory of omnipresence, and then apply it to the particular but historically paradigmatic case of divine omnipresence.

I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do everything that we think of composite objects as doing - and thus that composite objects are (...) to be identified with pluralities ofmicrophysical particles. Along the way I rebut the objections that pluralities of particles don’t display the right emergent, ‘lingering’, or modal properties to be good candidates for identification with higher-level objects. In the second argument I claim that microphysical manyism is uniquely able to capture a compelling and widespread physicalist intuition concerning the intimate nature of the relationshipbetween higher-level, composite objects and the microphysical world. (shrink)

Philosophers often rely on the notion of conceptual containment and apply mereological terminology when they talk about the parts or constituents of a complex concept. In this paper, I explore two historical approaches to this general notion. In particular, I reconstruct objections Bernard Bolzano puts forward against a criterion that played a prominent role in the history of philosophy and that was endorsed, among others, by Leibniz. According to this criterion, a concept that represents objects contains all and only the (...) concepts that represent properties the objects must have in order to be represented by the former concept. Bolzano offers several counterexamples and arguments against the criterion. I argue that while some of them presuppose a strongly mereological understanding of containment, which Leibniz is not committed to, one of them also succeeds without relying on demanding mereological principles. (shrink)

For an object to be multilocated is for it to wholly occupy disjoint spatial regions simultaneously. If multilocation is possible, it is possible that a multilocated particle is wholly located at 1080 distinct locations, such that it constitutes a particle-for-particle duplicate of the actual universe. Such a universe would presumably be perceptually identical to the actual universe. If we take multilocation as possible, we are thus presented with two accounts between which our perceptual evidence cannot adjudicate: one wherein the universe (...) is constituted by many particles and another wherein it is constituted by one radically multilocated particle. Parsimony concerns dictate that the latter is the more rational to accept. Since this is absurd, we should reject that multilocation is possible. Mooney responds to the problem by arguing that distinct location is evidence of non-identity, even if acceptance of the possibility of multilocation entails that this evidence is not decisive. If this is right, then the evidence favors a theory featuring many particles. In this paper, I contend that our commitment to taking distinct location as evidence of nonidentity is motivated by a more fundamental intuition that does not apply in the relevant context. (shrink)

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

This article is based on my mereological reconstruction of the Daoist metaphysical sys- tem, as presented in the Daodejing. I conceptualize the Dao and you relationship as a relationship between Unrestricted Composition (for any entities, there is a composition that they make) and Restricted Composition (what is an entity is determined by finite composition rules) respectively. This conceptualization, among other things, makes it possible to address the way in which Dao is described as wu—nothingness or non-be- ing. In this article, (...) I will show that Dao as the ultimate reality in Daoist metaphysics is not an ontological nothingness and discuss how this “nothingness characteristic” can be mereologically reconstructed and explained. I will discuss the interpretation of Dao in terms of Mereological Nihilism (according to which there are only mereological simples that do not have parts and are not parts of any complex entities), Unrestricted Composition, and consider an option in which mereology is confined exclusively to relationships between parts. I will also discuss how the nothingness aspect of Dao can be viewed from a stuff ontology perspective, which questions the ontological standing of parts. (shrink)

Objects have, and themselves are, parts. If we endorse a sufficiently liberal notion of object, anything is an object and anything, excluding the universe, is a part of some larger one. If we think that the universe, too, is an object, then any object is a part of it. What is it, then, for an object to be a part? Contra the orthodoxy, in my dissertation I argue that to be a part is no more a relation than to exist (...) is a property. In fact, to be a part is just to be the value of a variable in the range of a quantifier whose interpretation has been extended. When I say that, for instance, my hand is a part of my body, I am not making the claim that two objects in the domain of quantification my hand and my body—stand in a certain relation of ordering—being a part of—to one another. Rather, I am making the claim that the domain of quantification, which used to include my body but not my hand, has been expanded and now includes my hand. For the hand to be a part (of my body, but most importantly of the universe) is for it to exist in an expansion of the quantification domain. As I construe it, the operation of re-interpreting the quantifiers—and, so, of individuating parts of objects—is both modal (the interpretations of the quantifiers are indefinitely extensible) and actuality-bound (the modality at play operates across interpretations, rather than across possible worlds). In the resulting ontology, the universe itself (i.e. effectively, the actual world) is the only object that exists before we start individuating its parts—that is to say, before we start expanding our domain. As such, individuating parts is an operation that is generative (with each re-interpretation, the domain includes new objects, which replace the previous ones, and its cardinality is higher than that of the domains associated with previous, less extended interpretations); maximally general (any new object is a part); and world-bound (every new object is a part of the universe). Insofar as it is indefinitely extensible, the interpretation of our quantifiers can always be extended, but does not need to be. Insofar as individuating the parts of any object is expanding the domain of quantification, the universe, which is the only object that exists in the non-expanded domain, is itself part-less, albeit extended. Similarly, the objects existing at further levels of expansions are, too, themselves part-less, for individuating their parts is, once again, expanding the domain. Mereological complexity is, strictly speaking, quantificational complexity. The dissertation is written as three papers. In the first paper, “Composition as Analysis: The Meta-Ontological Origins and Future of Composition as Identity” I argue that a non-trivial formulation of the claim that a composite object is the same as its parts requires that we construe parthood quantificationally. I then suggest that we construe the system of domain expansions as an information ordering and interpret the corresponding many-one identity statements as metaphysically informative. In the second paper, “Parthood Without Mereology,” I present an antinomic result for parthood: that we cannot both construe coincident objects as numerically distinct and mereologically indiscernible while also claiming that absolutely every object coincides with at least one other object. I blame a relational account of parthood for this result and argue that switching to a quantificational account is needed both to make sense of the problem and to find a solution. In the third and last paper, “To be said of as a quantifier: quantity, parts, and the invention of ontology in Aristotle’s Categories,” I take on an interpretive challenge from Aristotle’s Categories and show that the challenge could be met by appreciating that Aristotle has a non-relational notion of parthood and re-thinking his account of quantity on that basis. (shrink)

Ridder presents a set-theoretical semantical account of a fragment of Lesniewski's Ontology, the so called "Elementary Ontology", together with a sketched proof of the soundness and the completeness of this system relative to the proposed semantic. The syntax of the system is formulated in the language of first order logic and the completeness proof is accomplished in Henkin-style.

If possible worlds are conjunctions of states of affairs, as in David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory, then is the empty world to be thought of as the null conjunction of states of affairs? The proposal seems plausible, and has received support from David Efird, Tom Stoneham, and Armstrong himself. However, in this paper, it is argued that the proposal faces a trilemma: either it leads to the absurd conclusion that the actual world is empty; or it reduces to a familiar representation (...) of the empty world in which the concept of a null conjunction plays no role; or it needs to make room for the null individual of certain non-classical mereologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed “Mereological Anti-Conservatism.” This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories—Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves (...) several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of common sense; and (iii) it offers a more plausible perspective than Conservatism when considering the vast scale of possible worlds with differently segmented realities. Ultimately, we contend that if Anti-Conservatism is deemed implausible, then Conservatism must be as well, for structurally similar reasons. (shrink)

Dans le présent article, Maurice et Orensanz dialogueront sur quelques thèmes clés de l’œuvre de Bunge. L’objectif de ce dialogue est de faire avancer le programme métascientifique. Les principaux points abordés peuvent être présentés sous la forme d’une série de questions : est-il possible de prouver que le monde extérieur existe ? Qu’est-ce que la matière ? La relation partie à tout est-elle transi-tive ? Quelle est la différence entre les systèmes et les assortiments ? Les objets fictifs ont-ils une (...) fonction dans l’ontologie ? Bien qu’il s’agisse des sujets princi-paux, plusieurs autres points seront abordés tout au long de cet échange. (shrink)

The present volume is the first comprehensive reference work for research on part-whole relations--or better... a substantive part of such a project. The guiding idea, developed by Burkhardt and Seibt more than a decade ago, was to offer an inclusive presentation of contemporary research on part-whole relations that would draw out systematic, historical, and interdisciplinary trajectories, show the subject's fecundity, and inspire future explorations. In particular, the editors wants to impress that mereology is much more than the study of axiomatized (...) reasoning systems. The relationship between part and whole is one of the most basic schemata of cognitive organization; it is not only a phenomenon at the level of language processing and propositional thought, but also at the level of sensory input processing, especially visual and auditory. In all research disciplines, part-whole relations organize all three core components of research: data domains, methods, and theories. In short, part-whole relations play a fundamental role in how we perceive and interact with nature, how we speak and think about the world and ourselves, as societies and as individuals.--From publisher. (shrink)

Disjointism is the view that co-located objects do not share any parts. A human-shaped statue is composed from a torso, head and limbs; the co-located lumpof clay is only composed from chunks of clay. This essay discusses the tenability of this relatively neglected view, focusing on two objections. The first objection is that disjointism implies co-located copies of microphysical particles. I argue that it doesn’t imply this and that there are more plausible disjointist views of tiny parts available. The second (...) objection is that disjointism is at a loss to explain how material objects can be co-located and why the weights of co-located objects don’t add up. The standard pluralist account appeals to the fact that co-located objects stand in mereological relations and this account is not available to the disjointist. I sketch an alternative account that appeals to a notion of ‘material identity’: the statue is taken to be the same matter as the lump of clay. The resort to a new theoretical primitive may seem to invite a quick rejection on grounds of unnecessary theoretical complexity but I argue that an abductive comparison with rival forms of pluralism shows that such a rejection is misguided. (shrink)

This book presents a novel metaphysics of concrete entities. The author uses the theory developed to address three major topics in the metaphysics of concreta: fundamentality, persistence over time, and phenomenal consciousness. The book provides a new theory of what "bundles" particular property instances, or tropes, into material property bearers. The theory is based on two new ideas. The first is that the primitive nature of one sui generis monadic property called markedness bears on the bundling of other properties' tropes. (...) The second idea is that the geometric and topological features of a given markedness trope help to determine which tropes it bundles. The author argues that this new markedness bundle theory determines all property co-instantiation at the levels of both type and token, positioning markedness tropes as the fundamental concreta. The theory also explains bundling across time, yielding an advantageous account of material persistence. Finally, markedness tropes operate as de facto panprotopsychist property instances: fundamental non-consciousness tropes that uniquely explain where and why consciousness properties are exemplified. The book solidifies the case for markedness through sustained critical analysis of competing theories of fundamentality and persistence, focusing in part on their inability to account for unending mereological and plural structures. Concrete Particulars will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

What follows is a dialogue between Maurice and Orensanz, in which they will discuss some key topics stemming from Bunge’s oeuvre. The objective of this dialogue is to advance the metascientific program even further. The main points that will be discussed can be presented as a series of questions: Is it possible to prove that the external world exists? What is matter? Is the part-whole relation transitive? What is the difference between systems and assortments? Do fictional objects have a function (...) in ontology? Although those are the main topics, several other points will be discussed throughout this exchange. (shrink)

This article is a response to Martin Orensanz’s argument that object-oriented ontology ought to accept the existence of matter as both a sensual and a real object. That matter can exist as a sensual object is a point immediately granted, since “sensual object” is such a broad term that nothing could be excluded from this designation. Yet I argue that this is not the case with respect to real objects, which must exist independently of any other entity that might encounter (...) them. This leads to a related debate on whether parthood is transitive, in which Orensanz takes up a recent argument of Daniel Korman while I defend the modified Aristotelian position that only the proximate parts of an object can be said to belong to it in the strict sense. (shrink)

In 2013, Bennett proposed a mereological theory in which the parthood relation is defined on the basis of two primitive relations: a is a part of b iff a fills a slot owned by b. However, this theory has issues counting how many parts an entity has. We explore the various counting problems and propose a new theory to solve them. Keeping the core idea of Bennett’s slots, this theory introduces mereological relations between slots. This theory enables us to solve (...) all known counting problems and to go beyond the limits of Bennett’s theory by theorising expected features of mereological theories: supplementation principles and mereological sum and fusion. The theory is illustrated on ontological issues on the nature of structural universals and informational entities. (shrink)

This Element is a systematic study of the question of whether classes are composed of further parts. Mereology is the theory of the relation of part to whole, and we will ask how that relation applies to classes. One reason the issue has received attention in the literature is the hope that a clear picture of the mereology of classes may provide further insights into the foundations of set theory. We will consider two main perspectives on the mereology of classes (...) on which classes are indeed composed of further parts. They, however, disagree as to the identity of those parts. Each perspective admits more than one implementation, and one of the purposes of this work is to explain what is at stake with each choice. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to present the genesis of Stanisław Leśniewski’s mereology. Although ‘mereology’ comes from theword ‘part’, mereology arose as a theory of collective classes. That is why we present the differences between the concepts of being a distributive class and being a collective class. Next, we present Leśniewski’s original mereology from 1927, but with a modern approach. Leśniewski was inspired to create his concept of classes and their elements by Russell’s antinomy. To face it, Leśniewski had to (...) define the concept of being an element of based on the concept of being part of. Leśniewski showed that in his theory, there is no equivalent to Russell’s antinomy. We will show that his solution has nothing to do with the original approach because, in both cases, we are talking about objects of a different kind. Russell’s original antinomy concerned distributive classes, and Leśsniewski’s considerations concerned collective classes. (shrink)

Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse monism, it has an illustrious history – stretching back to Bradley, Spinoza and Parmenides. In this paper, I show that plausible assumptions about the higher-order logic of property identity entail that monism is true. Given the higher-order framework I operate in, this argument generalizes: it is also possible to establish that there is a single property, proposition, relation, etc. I then show why this form of monism (...) is inconsistent; because all propositions are identical, p is identical to ~p – and so they have the same truth-value. At least one of the assumptions that generate higher-order monism must be rejected. (shrink)

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is only one basic object: the entire cosmos. Priority monists often take this to be a metaphysically necessary thesis. I explore the consequences of modalizing the priority monist thesis. I argue that, modulo some assumptions, the modalized thesis entails the necessary existence of the actual cosmos. I further argue that, if the modalized thesis is true, and the actual cosmos necessarily exists, then the only possible concrete objects are the actually existing ones.

This article motivates and develops a reductive account of the structure of certain physical quantities in terms of their mereology. That is, I argue that quantitative relations like "longer than" or "3.6-times the volume of" can be analyzed in terms of necessary constraints those quantities put on the mereological structure of their instances. The resulting account, I argue, is able to capture the intuition that these quantitative relations are intrinsic to the physical systems they’re called upon to describe and explain.

My interest in this chapter is to investigate this crossroad as applied to mental properties, considered powers. In particular, I scrutinize the possibility of taking the phenomenal property of feeling pain as a complex power or disposition. This possibility comes in handy in discussing panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, which would ground physical properties as well.

The gist of the many-subjects argument is that, given physicalism, it’s hard to avoid the absurd result that there are many conscious subjects in your vicinity with more-or-less the same experiences as you. The most promising ways of avoiding this result have a consequence almost as bad: that there are many things in your vicinity that are in a state only trivially different from being conscious, a state with similar normative significance. This paper clarifies and defends three versions of the (...) many-subjects argument. One version poses the threat of conscious parts. Its key premise is that if physicalism is true, then not only you, but also certain parts of your body, are conscious. These parts might include your brain, your head, all-of-you-except-your-left-pinky, all-of-your-brain-except-one-neuron, or your left cerebral hemisphere. A second version poses the threat of conscious coinciders, things that currently occupy the same spatial region as you and share all your matter. Its key premise is that if physicalism is true, then not only you, but also some things that currently coincide with you, are conscious. These might include your body or the aggregate of particles of which you are currently composed. A third version poses the threat of conscious person candidates, the many human-body-shaped material objects in your vicinity that mostly overlap one another, differing only in a few peripheral atoms. This version claims that if physicalism is true, then there are many conscious person-candidates in your vicinity. (shrink)

Recently, much attention has been given to Buddhism as a precursor to contemporary holistic theories, and more specifically to the Huayan school’s radical holistic metaphysics (often given the metaphorical name of The Net of Indra), as well as to Huayan’s most elaborate theoretician, Fazang. Nevertheless, contemporary interpretations of Fazang have been weighted by either too strict an adherence to atomistic logic or by unfortunate translations. In this paper, I present new translations of the key passages of Fazang’s The Rafter Dialogue, (...) as well as a philosophical commentary that his departure from atomism. I then proceed to argue that the six characteristics Fazang attributes to a whole that cannot be reduced to its parts are both sufficient and necessary for holism. (shrink)

What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or something else? In this book, Andrew Brenner argues that there are principled obstacles to our discovering the answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. The main competing accounts of personal ontology hold that we are either souls (or composites of soul and body), or we are composite physical objects of some sort, but, as Brenner shows, arguments for either of these options can be parodied and transformed into their opposites. Brenner (...) also examines arguments for and against the existence of the self, offers a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios - resurrection, reincarnation, and mind uploading -- and considers whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us to agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death. (shrink)

Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, “Socrates is running”, you begin by uttering the subject term ("Socrates"), before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding predications in thought also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard’s account. (...) I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic’s school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to our latest thinking about propositions. I highlight this by presenting recent accounts of two philosophers with radically different outlooks: Jeffrey King and Peter Hanks. Both their accounts take many of the same things for granted, as the Alberican criticisms make plain. (shrink)

Do powers have parts? Mereological thinking is typically guided by two different metaphors: building versus carving. The building picture treats wholes as constructed from fundamental bits; the carving treats wholes as the result of carving some interconnected space. After considering some suggestions for how to view powers as built from other components, this chapter opts for the carving picture and suggests that a mereology of powers can be generated by carving the underlying space of an interconnected web of fundamental powers. (...) The space of powers is a network of manifestation/triggering connections that can be modelled graph-theoretically where the identity of a fundamental power is importantly tied up with its position in the overall structure. This chapter considers the idea that powers are completely identified by their position in the structure (as pandispositionalists have thought), which then places limits on the sorts of structures that powers theorists can help themselves to. This chapter also considers another novel suggestion on the identity of powers borrowed from non-well-founded set theory. It shows how to identify principles governing ‘carving’ the web into groups of closely connected powers, such that one group can naturally be called ‘part’ of another group, and explore the resulting mereology. (shrink)

The debate between ontological reductionists and emergentists in chemistry has revolved around quantum mechanics. What Franklin and Seifert (BJPS 2020) add to the long-running dispute is an attention to the measurement problem. They contend that all three realist interpretations of the quantum formalism capable of resolving the measurement problem also obviate any need for chemical emergence. I push their argument further, arguing that the realist interpretations of quantum mechanics actually subvert the basis for reduction as well, by undercutting the idea (...) that fundamental physical particles are actual parts of molecules. With both reduction and traditional synchronic emergence pictures ruled out, the only option for realists about quantum chemistry is strong Thomistic emergence. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

This essay offers an original interpretation and defense of the doctrine of flux, as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus. The methodology of the paper’s analysis is in the style of rational reconstruction, and it is highly analytic in scope, in the sense that I will focus on the text itself, and only on certain parts of it too, while ignoring the rest of Plato’s extensive corpus, and without worrying about whether, how, and to what extent the interpretation of the (...) view coheres well with the other elements of the secret doctrine view discussed in the dialogue, as well. In the first part of the essay, I’ll offer my interpretation of the doctrine. Then, in the second part of the essay, I’ll examine two potential criticisms of the doctrine, including Socrates’s infamous linguistic paradox, and show how my interpretation of Heraclitean flux metaphysics is able to circumvent both. (shrink)

The objective of this article is twofold. First, it investigates mereology in medieval Islamic theology, particularly the theologians’ claim that the whole is identical to its parts and accordingly that at least some attributes common to the parts must by extension be attributed of the whole. This claim was refuted by philosophers and, from the eleventh century onwards, an increasing number of theologians. Second, it offers a new interpretation of the standard theological proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo, to (...) which this problem was central. A wide range of early, classical and later theological and philosophical sources are consulted. (shrink)

Mereology deals with the study of the relations between wholes and parts. In this work we will discuss different developments and open problems related to the formulation of a quantum mereology. In particular, we will discuss different advances in the development of formal systems aimed to describe the whole-parts relationship in the context of quantum theory.

This chapter explores a potential analogy between mereological principles and laws of nature. Against a backdrop of what Marmodoro has termed ‘power structuralism’ (and a rejection of a Humean worldview), the connection between parthood and modality may be richer than has hitherto been considered. Mereological principles delineate possibilities for parts and wholes, and putting powers at the centre of a discussion about parthood can furnish a novel conception of mereological laws, much as dispositionalism has done so for natural laws; namely, (...) these principles express connections between fundamental dispositional properties. By extending dispositionalism to comprehend mereology in this way, we can help fulfil its promise to provide a foundational, naturalistic metaphysics, as foundational mereological debates then begin to mirror those relating to dispositionalist views of laws of nature: we may treat natural and mereological laws in tandem, as holding either necessarily or contingently, with associated strategies for dealing with supposed counterexamples to one’s preferred set of mereological principles. We can thus bring new life to the debate over whether questions of composition admit of contingent or only necessary answers. (shrink)

Two world-renowned philosophers debate the nature of reality.