Science and Values

How ought scarce health research resources be allocated, where health research spans basic, translational, clinical, health systems and public health research? In this article, I first outline a previously suggested answer to this question: the ‘fair-share principle’ stipulates that total health research funding ought to be allocated in direct proportion with suffering caused by each disease. Second, I highlight a variety of problems the fair-share principle faces. Like other resource allocation frameworks, the principle needs to address the aggregation and distribution (...) of harms and consider cost-effectiveness. Moreover, to make resource allocation recommendations, the principle has to be used in conjunction with real-world estimates of ‘suffering’, usually provided by the Global Burden of Disease Study. These estimates are disease-centric and only take ‘proximal’ causes of health loss into account. Applying the principle based on such estimates disregards ‘distal’ causes, including social determinants of health, thus skewing resource allocation towards biomedical research and away from public health research. Since public health research aims at improving population health while reducing health inequalities, the principle leads to inequitable priority-setting. The fair-share principle can only become equitable when due consideration is also given to ‘distal’ causes that are amenable to public health research and interventions. (shrink)

In this paper, we present technical review practices in High-Energy Physics (HEP) as a collaborative mechanism for managing epistemic risks in the design and upgrade of large-scale detectors. Building on the concept of phronetic risk, which encompasses the epistemic consequences of practical decisions in science-engineering contexts, and drawing on empirical research conducted at the ATLAS collaboration at CERN, we show that technical review facilitates collective deliberation over non-epistemic values, thereby shaping which experimental directions are deemed pursuitworthy. Our analysis highlights an (...) organizational approach to risk management in scientific practice, challenging the predominant focus on individual decision-making in the philosophical literature on values in science. (shrink)

This paper identifies two challenges for science-based policymaking in representative democracies and argues that both require institutional rather than individual solutions. The first arises when seeking to align value-laden choices embedded in scientific research with democratically endorsed values. The value-laden choices in different pieces of research interact once combined and can compound or offset each other. Therefore, alignment with democratically endorsed values must be assessed holistically at the level of the total body of evidence before policymakers. Since individual scientists cannot (...) foresee or coordinate these interactions, we need institutional mechanisms to manage values at the point where advisory bodies integrate evidence from multiple sources. The second challenge emerges from the incentives of advisory body members and policymakers to shape the evidence informing policy in ways that undermine democratic accountability. Addressing this requires a realistic approach to advisory process design that accounts for actors’ incentives and constraints. Taken together, these challenges show that integrating scientific advice into policymaking in ways that uphold democratic commitments requires an institutional approach. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate the use of non-epistemic values in the communication of scientific information. We examine how values, by way of the precautionary principle, have been used to move from a deeply uncertain scientific concept, climate tipping points, to a metaphor which promotes political action. We argue that the precautionary principle has been used to produce a metaphor which idealizes the tipping point context. The idealization highlights specific features that are relevant for decision-making, including the potential for catastrophe, (...) while omitting others, such as the deep uncertainty related to specific climate tipping points. We discuss the negative impacts of using precautionary principle-like reasoning when communicating about tipping points, highlighting the potential to (1) mischaracterize the uncertainty present within the decision-making context, and (2) further politicize a scientific debate to the point of hyperpolarization. We conclude that when communicating about deeply uncertain events the precautionary principle ought to be used as a meta-principle directed at the research community, the more-research-needed argument, rather than as a decision-making principle for policy. (shrink)

Eating Disorders (EDs) raise significant challenges from a diagnostic and nosological perspective. Much of this is due to the extensive overlap among diagnostic criteria, with symptoms being shared by several conditions and subtypes. This nosological uncertainty is further exacerbated by two additional features of EDs, which will be the focus of this paper, namely diagnostic crossover and recovery. First, patients who acquire or lose one or more symptoms over time (symptom shifting) often transition to a new diagnostic category (crossover). Second, (...) researchers working on EDs have recently underscored a problematic lack of inclusion of patients’ perspective on diagnostic and recovery processes, which results in an incomplete understanding of key aspects of EDs. Drawing on theoretical frameworks and concepts from Dynamical Systems Theory and epigenetics, we present a dynamic characterization of EDs that allows us to tackle the challenges of crossover and recovery. In our framework, different conditions represent robust endpoints in individuals’ developmental trajectories that are nonetheless flexible in certain circumstances. Thinking about EDs in diachronic terms also prompts us to significantly reframe our notion of recovery, not so much as the return to health but as the generation of future healthy trajectories, to be pursued in compliance with patients’ self-perception and aims. Indeed, the key role of patients’ values in determining their future trajectories testifies how psychiatric categories are not merely descriptive but constitutive, influencing both self-understanding and clinical practice. (shrink)

Die Entwicklungen im Bereich der Open Science (OS) versprechen bereits seit einiger Zeit Lösungen für Schwierigkeiten im Kontext des elektronischen Publizierens und der damit einhergehenden Metrisierung wissenschaftlicher Expertise. Im Beitrag wird dieses Lösungsversprechen kritisch in den Blick genommen. Was wird eigentlich unter ‚Open Science‘ (OS) verstanden? Und mit welchen Herausforderungen sehen sich Initiativen in diesem Umfeld konfrontiert? In der Analyse wird ausführlich auf Sabina Leonellis Kritik an der derzeitigen OS-Bewegung eingegangen, die unter ‚Offenheit‘ v.a. ein ‚Teilen von Ressourcen‘ verstehe. Demgegenüber (...) postuliert sie epistemische Diversität und Gerechtigkeit als Leitprinzipien für künftige OS-Initiativen. Die Diskussion zeigt auf, dass die Problembehebung tatsächlich nicht, wie Leonelli meint, eine Neukonzeptionierung von OS erforderlich macht, sondern vielmehr in der gegenwärtigen Wissenschaftskultur selbst zu suchen ist. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die These vertreten, dass gerade hier die wesentliche Stellschraube für gelingende OS-Initiativen zu finden ist, welche das Potential haben, dysfunktionalen Entwicklungen wie dem Datentracking durch Informationsanalysten nachhaltig entgegenzuwirken. (shrink)

A widely respected posture in contemporary scientific and technological culture claims that metaphysics is optional—that serious inquiry concerns models, predictions, and engineering results, not ontological speculation. This essay argues that such neutrality is impossible. Every research program presupposes some account of what exists, what counts as evidence, and what kinds of explanation are admissible. Declaring oneself “beyond metaphysics” does not eliminate ontology; it renders it invisible and unexaminable. In practice, what passes as neutrality is usually unexamined physicalism—silently constraining which questions (...) appear legitimate, which hypotheses receive funding, and which evidence counts as real. The costs are concrete: they shape science, distort AI alignment research, and narrow our understanding of what minds and worlds can be. This essay does not advocate for a particular metaphysical system. It argues that metaphysics is inescapable, that pretending otherwise is epistemically irresponsible, and that intellectual honesty requires making ontological commitments explicit and revisable. (shrink)

Measurement of racial populations is commonplace in many social sciences, and metaphysical accounts for the reality of race implicitly assume race is real because measurements of racial populations are successful, and therefore are best explained by a realist account of race. This paper challenges the first premise in this implicit argument: measurements of race in the social sciences are not successful due to a number of epistemic issues with the use of race in social-scientific survey instruments. The paper concludes by (...) pointing towards a metaphysical solution that does not assume that empirical measures of race are coherent. (shrink)

According to 4E cognitive science, our cognitive capacities depend on, and have been transformed by, the environments we have made. Most early works of 4E cognitive science tend to focus on the upside of agent-environment interactions: they have made us smarter and allowed us to do more, despite the same, limited brain (and body) power. However, the recent critical turn focuses on the downsides of agent-environment interactions. Critical 4E cognitive science, as we call this emerging research program, adopts the 4E (...) frameworks and concepts but with a critical lens: questioning its hidden assumptions and leveraging its theoretical resources for social criticism. In particular, we distinguish two kinds of normative critique that bring out the downsides of agent-environment interactions. Prudential critiques focus on how agent-environment interactions can shape an agent’s cognition to undermine their own interests. Political critiques focus on how agent-environment interactions can shape an agent’s cognition to contribute to the reinforcement and exacerbation of unjust social forces. (shrink)

This feature reports on the first meeting of the Milano Logic and Philosophy of Science Network, held at Politecnico di Milano (12 March 2025). It focusses on the contributions investigating the roles of values and uncertainty in contemporary scientific practice. The five contributions presented by the authors are summarized, spanning climate science, medicine, measurement theory, and scientific classification.

Intelligence is one of the most influential yet contested constructs in psychology. Psychometric research, beginning with early intelligence testing and the proposal of a general factor of intelligence, established influential models that continue to shape scientific and applied work. Yet competing theories, challenging the focus on abstract reasoning, highlight ongoing disputes about the nature of intelligence and the assessment of intellectual differences among individuals. Central debates concern the relationship between measurement and theory and the ontological status of the g factor (...) - particularly whether intelligence is reducible to neurocognitive processes or must be treated as an emergent phenomenon. Contemporary research is marked by ontological and epistemological pluralism, reflecting divergent explanatory aims and practical needs. This pluralism also carries normative implications, as different conceptions of intelligence guide educational practices, inform policy, and shape broader societal understandings of human cognitive abilities. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a rational reconstruction of Hasok Chang’s (2012) “active normative epistemic pluralism” (ANEP). I identify the main conceptual resources Chang uses to define and support ANEP, and I assess the extent to which those resources vindicate his claim that the view both avoids relativism and yields a beneficial plurality of scientific “systems of practice” (Chang, The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2009, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(3): 205–221, 2011, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(2): (...) 103–122, 2017f, Reasoning in measurement. Routledge, pp. 25–38, 2017i). On the basis of this reconstruction, I argue that Chang assumes, rather than demonstrates, that ANEP can exclude from its remit inquisitive arrangements that are widely regarded as scientifically suspect, such as astrology. I then formulate desiderata for any version of ANEP that aims to non-arbitrarily exclude practices commonly labelled “pseudo-scientific” or “non-scientific”. I argue that these desiderata are difficult to satisfy not only for ANEP, but for any epistemic pluralism that relies on epistemic values or epistemic contexts to constrain what counts as “science” or “scientific”. The core difficulty is to non-arbitrarily assess the comparative legitimacy of different interpretations of familiar epistemic values, such as predictive power and explanatory strength, when those interpretations are grounded in distinct meta-epistemic commitments. I support this diagnosis with an exploratory argument that draws on recent work in hinge epistemology (Coliva, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 79–96, 2016, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10(3–4): 346–366, 2020; Kusch, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 120–142, 2016). (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to overcome the opacity of black box systems, i.e., to make them understandable to suitable stakeholders. In this chapter, I investigate how understanding depends on how much is at stake in a context. I support the intuition that understanding is sensitive to the stakes with a pair of cases. I further use this pair of cases to spell out how exactly the stakes affect understanding, particularly, outright understanding why. To do so, I connect discussions of (...) the concept of understanding with debates on pragmatic encroachment and on inductive risk. I zoom in on one necessary condition on understanding specifically, viz. the epistemic justification condition, according to which the beliefs involved in understanding have to be supported by sufficient evidence and have to cohere sufficiently well. I argue that, where the stakes are high, there are more stringent standards for sufficient evidence and coherence, and that this explains the stakes-sensitivity of understanding. (shrink)

This chapter aims to be a comprehensive (yet non-exhaustive) overview of the ways the concept of race appears across medical practice - including historical uses, patient–physician interactions, pharmaceutical development, the use of machine learning tools in clinical settings, the recording of medical statistics, the controversial and continued use of race norming in medicine, and the ways in which racism affects patient diagnoses and outcomes. The focus on the ways that the concept is used in medical practice is to illustrate that (...) an anti-realist ontological position (rather than a biological realist or a social constructionist one) is the best way to have a logically consistent position that can accommodate the empirical examples discussed in the chapter. The chapter concludes with a sketch of how to best deal with these issues with an eye toward future developments in medicine. (shrink)

How are we to understand situations where science fails on its own terms? Scientists have blamed perverse incentives for systematic epistemic failures like non-replicability and publication bias, but the exact relationship remains an open question. Let’s assume they are right to blame the (social) system. This paper presents a novel framework for understanding how features of the social organization of science are implicated in collective epistemic failures: the material theory of values in science (MTV). This project is inspired by and (...) follows in the tradition of feminist philosophers of science who have called attention to the need for explanations of systemic, specifically antifeminist, biases in science and for embodied models of scientists as epistemic agents. In the first part, I discuss the replication crisis as involving a particular type of collective action problem: a no-win standoff. The next part introduces the MTV and the explanation it supplies for this phenomenon. In the third section, the MTV is compared to several alternative explanatory strategies, including from the contemporary literature values in science and social epistemology, specifically agent-based computational models. I argue for why my approach is preferable and describe an important revision it entails for the general Mertonian sociological picture invoked in discussions of incentives in science. By way of conclusion, I summarize the philosophical task of the MTV, which is to take seriously the sociological and material conditions constituting scientists’ epistemic agency. (shrink)

An aspect of the Indigenous struggle against colonial oppression is the struggle for the inclusion of their knowledge in policymaking. Perceived as epistemically inferior to science, Indigenous knowledge and subsequently interests are systematically excluded in science-based policy. This article advances an anti-colonial political philosophy of science. As Indigenous knowledge feeds into the necessary political value judgments in policy-relevant science, Indigenous knowledge inclusion, I contend, should be treated as a political, not solely epistemic, matter. I further argue that Indigenous peoples, not (...) just scientists, should have the power to make such political value judgments given the politics of representation under coloniality. (shrink)

Essay review on Chrysostomos Mantzavinos’ The Constitution of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024, 214 pp., €31,54 (Paperback), ISBN: 978-1-009-50917-6; Forthcoming at Journal for General Philosophy of Science .

At first sight, measurement might appear to be a natural candidate for a scientific practice that is value-free. This chapter reviews prominent arguments supporting the opposite view, i.e., that values play significant roles in measurement practices. Some of the arguments reviewed concern background assumptions underlying the pursuit of measurement and shaping its character. Other arguments focus on the various socially significant consequences of measurement practices (or aspects thereof), while still others focus on the content of the concepts being measured and (...) how scientists specify such contents. In discussing these arguments, the chapter aims to demonstrate the importance of greater engagement between the values-in-science literature and the historical-philosophical literature on measurement. (shrink)

Considerations of realism and pluralism pervade Feyerabend’s later works, as they do in his earlier corpus. However, Conquest of Abundance and surrounding papers mark Feyerabend’s first sustained foray into metaphysics. Specifically, he hypothesizes a pluralist realism that incorporates Kantian and constructivist elements. This work was composed when the ‘metaphysical disunity’ hypothesis was fashionable among members of the ‘Stanford School’. After building on previous explorations of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics (‘abundance realism’), we compare Feyerabend’s later works to prominent formulations of metaphysical pluralism (...) in the Stanford School. We point to overlaps and divergences between Feyerabend’s later metaphysical pluralism and the formulations in the Stanford School. Despite significant intellectual overlap, the historical connections between Feyerabend’s later work and the Stanford School remain minimal. We argue that this is largely due to Feyerabend’s self-isolation from academic philosophy in the 1980s and his radical antiscientism. Moreover, we argue that Feyerabend’s metaphysics naturally extend from his attempts to situate science in diverse, democratic societies with hints of his later metaphysics in earlier writings, suggesting that Feyerabend’s “metaphysical turn” represents a shift in emphasis rather than a substantive change of position. (shrink)

In recent decades, a complex regime of national, regional, and global climate assessments has emerged to apprehend the vast body of evidence on climate change and deliver authoritative reports to policymakers. Focusing on the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, this chapter synthesises insights across recent philosophy of science, together with the broader findings of “assessment studies”, to outline the many ways in which social, ethical, and political values impinge on climate assessment reports. Notably, the chapter demonstrates how (...) entrenched social-epistemic features of assessment – features that remain stable despite changes in authorship – constrain the agency of authors and the decisions that can be entertained in assessment. These features include the institutionalisation, political constitution, synthesis-orientation, curatorial nature, and agenda-setting power of assessments. Thus, the chapter provides an institutional analysis of values in climate assessment reports that does not reduce to tracking the psychological states or moral compasses of authoring scientists. (shrink)

In this chapter, we identify four specific subtypes of epistemic injustice that target Indigenous knowledge systems, practices, products, and methods of transmission. These four subtypes of epistemic injustice are: cultural-methodological epistemic injustice, epistemic diminishment, epistemic cultural disruption, and epistemic biophysical disruption. These subtypes identify avenues for the framework of transformative justice targeting these epistemic injustices and their harms. We provide three case studies from the Salish Sea, in British Columbia, Canada, of epistemic transformative justice, described as responses to these subtypes (...) of epistemic injustice. The first involves Indigenous archaeological work on marine resource use over long spans of history. The second involves a Squamish First Nation-led collaborative herring monitoring initiative. The third is about work on revitalizing Straits Salish reef net fishing technology. (shrink)

The idea that political debate should be resolved through knowledge —by deferring to those with more knowledge— recurs persistently in discussions of governance. In these turbulent times, in which democracy faces increasing skepticism, it is worth critically examining the proposals that “epistemize” democracy. In this contribution, I discuss epistemological as well as philosophy of science arguments against epistocracy, defending that democracy remains superior even on purely epistemic terms. In doing so, I also highlight the surprising parallels between technocracy and so-called (...) populism. On the basis of a good understanding of scientific pluralism and the role of values in the sciences, we can elaborate an alternative to epistocracy, technocracy and populism: one that calls for a deeper democratization of both science and policymaking. This approach revitalizes political, democratic debate as a space where competing interests, values, and visions for society are deliberated and weighed —rather than framing societal problems as mere knowledge deficits to be solved through more knowledge and expertise. In an attempt to make the best possible use of (scientific) knowledge in shaping policy, epistocrats overlook a fundamental feature of democratic politics: the clash of worldviews and the necessity of negotiating provisional compromises among divergent values and interests. (shrink)

Matt Brown’s Science and Moral Imagination (2020) offers a groundbreaking pragmatic pluralist theory of values, challenging the traditional value-free ideal in scientific inquiry. Drawing from American pragmatism and feminist philosophy, Brown argues for the cognitive status and evidential warrant of values in science. Despite its many virtues, in this chapter, I highlight some issues faced by this account, stemming from Brown’s focus on individual scientists and the significant impact of the commercialization of science on research practices. The transition to privately (...) funded research has influenced methodological choices and the integrity of scientific values, leading us to a dilemma. We could acknowledge that scientific practice has notably evolved to align with the commercial objectives of private companies, potentially necessitating a redefinition of scientific values. Alternatively, we could assert that commercialized science is dysfunctional, questioning the integrity of a vast quantity of contemporary scientific research. I conclude by pressing for the inclusion of the broader social context of science and its commercial influences in order to address the dilemma and develop a comprehensive theory of values in science. (shrink)

Digital philosophy of science has split into a normative, model-driven first wave and a descriptive, text-driven second wave. This paper argues for a synthesis of these traditions. We propose a framework grounded in normative naturalism for evaluating scientific norms based on their role in solving local, context-specific problems. This framework is advanced through three complementary digital methods: tracking norm effectiveness, computational modeling research systems, and analyzing scientific discourse. To demonstrate our approach, we conduct a detailed analysis of how reviewers use (...) the term “pseudoscience” in a large corpus of open peer review reports. This case study shows how combining quantitative methods with close reading can uncover the operative, and often implicit, norms that guide scientific communities. Our approach suggests that digital philosophy of science, by systematically examining scientific communication, can open new possibilities for empirically-informed normative guidance in practice. (shrink)

Wieviel Ethik braucht der Mensch, wieviel Ethik braucht die Wissenschaft? Vor dem aktuellen Hintergrund einer gewandelten Wissenschaftsgesellschaft von hoher Entwicklungsdynamik geht es darum, Anleitung zu ethischer Selbst- und Situationsreflexion zu geben. Denn die spektakulären Errungenschaften nicht nur im Bereich der Biomedizin haben jedenfalls vorübergehend Zonen von moralischer und ethischer Ratlosigkeit geschaffen. Sie eröffnen Spielräume, von denen nicht sicher ist, ob sie genutzt werden dürfen und sollten. Die Empfindlichkeit gegenüber den Nachteilen und Risiken der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation ist jedenfalls dort, wo die (...) Möglichkeiten verfügbar sind, so weit gestiegen, dass sich ihre praktische Nutzung längst nicht mehr von selbst versteht. Auch das Recht ist derzeit weder auf der nationalen noch auf der internationalen Ebene in der Lage, überzeugende Handlungsanleitung zu geben. Welche Ziele und Mittel mit den neuen Möglichkeiten aber verfolgt werden dürfen, ist in der Tat eine Frage nach der Legitimität von Bedürfnissen und der Angemessenheit der Mittel. Nicht zuletzt appelliert sie (die Empfindlichkeit gegenüber den Errungenschaften der wissenschaftlich-technischen Gesellschaften?) potentiell auch an die Tugend der Selbstbeschränkung, die vielleicht dort noch wirksam wird, wo andere Steuerungsmechanismen versagen oder zu schwach sind. Diese komplexe Problemlage bei der Suche nach einer neuen Wertordnung an den Grenzen der Anwendung von Forschung und Wissenschaft hat der Ethik derzeit eine unerwartete Konjunktur beschert. (shrink)

NASA and the CNSA have both released plans for lunar human exploration. This paper reviews those plans through the lens of strategic capability development. It examines the history of NASA’s development of bioregenerative space habitation systems and shows how past research and policy decisions, including funding cuts and program discontinuations, have led to critical gaps in current NASA capabilities. These gaps pose a strategic risk to US leadership in human space exploration that must be addressed urgently to sustain international competitiveness. (...) It concludes with recommendations for program investments crucial for the deployment of mature bioregenerative technologies in the coming decade. (shrink)

That science is value-dependent has been taken to raise problems for the democratic legitimacy of scientifically-informed public policy. An increasingly common solution is to propose that science itself ought to be ‘democratised.’ Of the literature aiming to provide principled means of facilitating such, most has been largely concerned with developing accounts of how public values might be identified in order to resolve scientific value-judgements. Through a case-study of the World Health Organisation’s 2009 redefinition of ‘pandemic’ in response to H1N1, this (...) paper proposes that this emphasis might be unhelpfully pre-emptive, pending more thorough consideration of the question of whose values different varieties of epistemic risk ought to be negotiated in reference to. A choice of pandemic definition inevitably involves the consideration of a particular variety of epistemic risk, described here as ontic risk. In analogy with legislative versus judicial contexts, I argue that the democratisation of ontic risk assessments could bring inductive risk assessments within the scope of democratic control without necessitating that those inductive risk assessments be independently subject to democratic processes. This possibility is emblematic of a novel strategy for mitigating the opportunity costs that successful democratisation would incur for scientists: careful attention to the different normative stakes of different epistemic risks can provide principled grounds on which to propose that the democratisation of science need only be partial. (shrink)

Advocates for open science argue that it democratizes access to and benefits from scientific knowledge. However, large-scale infrastructures such as public scientific databases are typically managed by closed organizations not subject to public democratic governance and that rely on a mix of volunteering, philanthropy, and service revenue alongside public funds. We argue that organizations are fruitful and overlooked objects of study for setting and implementing policies for open science to achieve just and equitable benefits. To this point, we show how (...) social science theories of organizational path dependence and cumulative advantage predict that commonly adopted organizational policies will lead to negative outcomes under a wide range of conditions. In particular, we focus on epistemic oppression, which Kristie Dotson defines as persistent epistemic exclusion from knowledge production. We use examples from biodiversity science to illustrate how our theoretical inferences can apply to current practices. While advocates of open science highlight its intended benefits for justice, we hypothesize that openness will generally exacerbate oppression without additional measures to change the governance of the organizations involved. (shrink)

Many scientists, philosophers, and commentators of science have argued that science ought to made responsive to the public, or ought to be “democratized”. This chapter begins by showing that the case for making science responsive to the public compares favorably to the case for making other critical institutions - such as a society’s educational or health care system - responsive to the public. It then shows several ways that science is not currently responsive to the public. It concludes by discussing (...) three unresolved philosophical questions that must be answered in order to determine what it would mean for science to be appropriately responsive to the public. The first comes from the importance of looking at science as a complex system; the second and third arise from considering diversity within the public and within the scientific community, respectively. (shrink)

We humans are diverse. But how to understand human diversity in the case of cognitive diversity? This Element discusses how to properly investigate human behavioural and cognitive diversity, how to scientifically represent, and how to explain cognitive diversity. Since there are various methodological approaches and explanatory agendas across the cognitive and behavioural sciences, which can be more or less useful for understanding human diversity, a critical analysis is needed. And as the controversial study of sex and gender differences in cognition (...) illustrates, the scientific representations and explanations put forward matter to society and impact public policy, including policies on mental health. But how to square the vision of human cognitive diversity with the assumption that we all share one human nature? Is cognitive diversity something to be positively valued? The author engages with these questions in connection with the issues of neurodiversity, cognitive disability, and essentialist construals of human nature. (shrink)

This book in the philosophy of law and risk assessment is concerned with the topic of the standards of evidence in legal proceedings and regulatory decisions regarding the toxicity of chemicals. The book argues that the scientific and statistical criteria usually used to determine whether substances are toxic are too rigorous and time-consuming for evidentiary purposes in tort cases and for regulation. The result is the under-regulation of toxic substances and the under-compensation of plaintiffs in tort cases. The book proposes (...) the evidential standards now used should be evaluated with the purposes of the law in mind. (shrink)

Discussions of science and values in risk management have largely focused on how values enter into arguments about risks, that is, issues of acceptable risk. Instead this volume concentrates on how values enter into collecting, interpreting, communicating, and evaluating the evidence of risks, that is, issues of the acceptability of evidence of risk. By focusing on acceptable evidence, this volume avoids two barriers to progress. One barrier assumes that evidence of risk is largely a matter of objective scientific data and (...) therefore uncontroversial. The other assumes that evidence of risk, being "just" a matter of values, is not amenable to reasoned critique. Denying both extremes, this volume argues for a more constructive conclusion: understanding the interrelations of scientific and value issues enables a critical scrutiny of risk assessments and better public deliberation about social choices. The contributors, distinguished philosophers, policy analysts, and natural and social scientists, analyze environmental and medical controversies, and assumptions underlying views about risk assessment and the scientific and statistical models used in risk management. (shrink)

Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s (Science in a democratic society, Prometheus Books, Amherst, 2011) takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of (...) what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)

_Ethics of Science_ is a comprehensive and student-friendly introduction to the study of ethics in science and scientific research. The book covers: * Science and Ethics * Ethical Theory and Applications * Science as a Profession * Standards of Ethical Conduct in Science * Objectivity in Research * Ethical Issues in the Laboratory * The Scientist in Society * Toward a More Ethical Science * Actual case studies include: Baltimore Affair * cold fusion * Milikan's oil drop experiments * human (...) and animal cloning * Cold War experiments * Strategic Defence Initiative * the Challenger accident * Tobacco Research. (shrink)

This paper proposes a fundamental hypothesis: the basic reality of the universe is not constituted by passive matter and fixed physical laws, but by a universally existing "Intrinsic Agency" (IA). This agency is considered to be prior to and constitutive of the basis for the physical laws we observe, and the cornerstone for the existence, evolution, and maintenance of order in non-equilibrium structures within the universe. While traditional physics tends to exclude value and purpose from its core descriptions, this paper (...) argues that introducing the concept of Intrinsic Agency can reintegrate an "intrinsic evaluation mechanism," based on existence and order, into the foundational framework of physics. Within this framework, stable physical quantities and laws are regarded as relatively stable and recurring behavioral patterns or "tools" formed by this intrinsic evaluation mechanism during cosmic evolution. This paper will explore the potential explanatory power of this hypothesis for existing physical concepts (such as quantum fluctuations, symmetry breaking, non-equilibrium thermodynamics) and envision its profound implications for updating physical laws, bridging the fact-value gap, and understanding complex phenomena (such as the origin of life and consciousness). Concurrently, the paper will also examine the immense conceptual challenges faced by this hypothesis and potential future research directions. (shrink)

In this book Shrader-Frechette reveals how politicians, campaign contributors, and lobbyists--and their power over media, advertising, and public relations--have conspired to cover up environmental disease and death.

In this reply, we address a comment on our paper “Combining probability with qualitative degree-of-certainty metrics in assessment” (Helgeson et al. Clim Change 149(3):517–525, 2018). Our original paper proposes an incremental systematization of confidence and likelihood language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Our goals were to improve consistency across findings and support use of confidence judgments in decision making. The comment critiques our proposal and recommends against its adoption. We argue that this recommendation is based on (...) two misunderstandings. The first concerns trading off confidence against the precision of a finding (our proposal endorses and systematizes the practice). We defend this practice and attribute opposition to an overzealous Bayesianism inapt for the IPCC context. The second misunderstanding concerns our purported commitment to a specific procedure for producing confidence judgements. We clarify that our proposal makes no such commitment. We also note, contrary to the comment’s claim, that a version of the procedure in question has been used in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report. (shrink)

The core of Vincent's ‘Interrogating Incongruence’ is critical of the appeal to the concept of incongruence in DSM-5 and ICD-11 characterisations of trans people, a critique taken to be groundclearing for more trans-positive, psychiatrically-infused medical interventions. I concur with Vincent's ultimate goals but depart from the view developed in the paper on two fronts. The first is that I remain sceptical about the overall prospects for truly trans-positive psychiatry. Trans should follow homosexuality and other categories of sexual orientation that have (...) been abandoned rather than reformed as constituents of psychiatric diagnosis and categorisation. The second is that I think that Vincent's central criticisms of the appeal to incongruence are misplaced. (shrink)

Is it epistemically vicious to be attached to a specific scientific paradigm? Such attachment clearly violates a norm of _impartiality_ that is associated with the value-free ideal of science. I will argue that what Samuel Scheffler (2022) calls ‘evaluative attachment’ is not always epistemically vicious. In section 1, I will present Kuhn’s account of paradigms as embodying not just theoretical positions but also a ‘constellation of group commitments’, that Kuhn came to call a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (2012/1962, postscript). Section 2 evaluates (...) Popper’s and Davidson’s criticisms of Kuhn, drawing on the work of Pablo Melogno (2020). Section 3 evaluates the claim that _impartiality_ is a significant source of the value we accord to science. Section 4 appeals to Samuel Scheffler’s (2022) concept of evaluative attachment to argue that partiality to a specific framework or paradigm is not an epistemic vice. I conclude with brief observations, to be elaborated in future work, on how this argument applies to science in particular. (shrink)

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large class of chemicals, whose carbon-fluorine bonds allow a wide range of industrial applications but also make them highly persistent. Since there is evidence about only a few of them and their properties may vary, one of the pressing issues regarding PFAS is how to group them for different purposes. In this paper, I aim to show how a recent panel of experts about grouping PFAS was co-opted in a way that favor the (...) fluorine industry. The panel consisted of eleven experts, including authors renowned for views in conflict with fluorine industry regulatory approaches, answering questions through an online application. Its main results along with the experts’ answers were published in 2022 in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Through a detailed analysis of all the material published and in dialogue with the literature about industry-funded research, I will present how choices in the design of the panel (e.g., which kind of consensus the exercise could capture, the ways questions were framed or even changed), in textual analysis (e.g., criteria for assembling opinions) and in the communication of the findings (e.g., what gets included or excluded) were made in an industry friendly way affecting two specific grouping approaches. I conclude with some lessons about this kind of influence of industry funding. (shrink)

Philosophers have become increasingly aware of the difficulties that plague accounts of kinds with objectively determined boundaries, and generally recognise that scientific taxonomies are shaped by human pragmatic interests and non-epistemic values. Against this trend, we propose an account of kinds conceived as dynamic entities, characterised by qualitatively distinct and robust trajectories originating from bifurcation events in the development of complex systems. We argue that the Homeorhetic Dynamic Kinds account (HDK) can be applied to systems investigated in a variety of (...) disciplinary contexts, ranging from biology, medicine, and the social sciences. Shifting the focus from a synchronic (homeostatic) to a dynamic and processual (homeorhetic) perspective, we show that HDK allows a better characterisation of discontinuities among kinds. We then outline its implications for pluralism, particularly how HDK can help us understand how scientific categories are shaped both by ontological aspects of developmental trajectories and by pragmatic, value-laden considerations. (shrink)

This paper examines trust in science in relation to public health and decisions affecting different groups. I employphilosophical work on trust and distrust, particularly how the perpetuation of injustices leads to warranted distrust, andliterature on science and values to argue that trust in science can increase if justice and equity are taken into account in thedecision-making process. As illustration, I discuss the case of lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, and protectingmaternal and fetal health from metylmercury poisoning by removing fish from (...) the diet. Both examples involve measures thattake a disproportionate toll on the most vulnerable: the economically less-off and historically discriminated groups. More just,and thus trust conducive, decisions would consider the provision of additional support for those affected, alongsideincorporating broader concerns about welfare, or environmental safety. (shrink)

In the United States, when an individual commits a criminal act, there are due processes to assess their responsibility and respective punishment. However, if that individual was unable to conform to the necessary standards due to symptoms caused by a mental illness, they may be excused or exempt from standard legal punishment. While we may not want to hold certain individuals responsible, or in some courtrooms, “not guilty by reason of insanity,” how should they be punished? Should they be considered (...) not legally responsible, but still morally responsible? -/- In this chapter, I explore how to navigate legal and moral responsibility, how the insanity defense operates in a few different contexts in the U.S. legal system, and most importantly, how individuals with mental illnesses are mistreated in the U.S. justice system. I demonstrate that present practices in fact exacerbate the challenges faced by individuals with mental illnesses rather than alleviate them through rehabilitation. It is my hope to contribute to the call for action amongst scholars, clinicians, and arbitrators of the law to work towards more equitable treatment of mental illness inside and beyond the courtroom. (shrink)

Scientists often refer to their experiments, theories, images and instruments as beautiful and report that their scientific work is a source of aesthetic experiences. How do such aesthetic values affect scientific activities, and can aesthetic values play a cognitive role in science? In this chapter, I identify the different levels at which aesthetic values shape scientific products and processes, reflect on how philosophers have justified the cognitive role of such aesthetic values, and draw insights from recent discussions on the aesthetics (...) of scientific practice for the values in science debate. (shrink)

The cognitive sciences are facing questions of how to select from competing theories or develop those that suit their current needs. However, traditional accounts of theoretical virtues have not yet proven informative to theory development in these fields. We advance a pragmatic account by which theoretical virtues are heuristics we use to estimate a theory’s contribution to a field’s body of knowledge and the degree to which it increases that knowledge’s ability to solve problems in the field’s domain or problem (...) space. From this perspective, properties that are traditionally considered epistemic virtues, such as a theory’s fit to data or internal coherence, can be couched in terms of problem space coverage, and additional virtues come to light that reflect a theory’s alignment with problem-having agents and the context in a societally embedded scientific system. This approach helps us understand why the needs of different fields result in different kinds of theories and allows us to formulate the challenges facing cognitive science in terms that we hope will facilitate their resolution through further theoretical development. (shrink)

Climate risks are growing. Research is increasingly important to inform the design of risk-management strategies. Assessing such strategies necessarily brings values into research. But the values assumed within research (often only implicitly) may not align with those of stakeholders and decision makers. These misalignments are often invisible to researchers and can severely limit research relevance or lead to inappropriate policy advice. Aligning strategy assessments with stakeholders' values requires a holistic approach to research design that is oriented around those values from (...) the start. Integrating values into research in this way requires collaboration with stakeholders, integration across disciplines, and attention to all aspects of research design. Here we describe and demonstrate a qualitative conceptual tool called a values-informed mental model (ViMM) to support such values-centered research design. ViMMs map stakeholders' values onto a conceptual model of a study system to visualize the intersection of those values with coupled natural-human system dynamics. Through this mapping, ViMMs integrate inputs from diverse collaborators to support the design of research that assesses risk-management strategies in light of stakeholders' values. We define a visual language for ViMMs, describe accompanying practices and workflows, and present an illustrative application to the case of flood-risk management in a small community along the Susquehanna river in the Northeast United States. (shrink)