Speech Reports

Special quantifiers are quantifiers like 'something', 'everything', and 'several things'. They are special both semantically and syntactically and play quite an important role in philosophy, in discussions of ontological commitment to abstract objects, of higher-order metaphysics, and of the apparent need for propositions. This paper will review and discuss in detail the syntactic and semantic peculiarities of special quantifiers and show that they are incompatible with substitutional and higher-order analyses that have recently been proposed. It instead defends and develops in (...) formal detail a semantic analysis of special quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers. On this analysis, special quantifiers involve both singular objectual quantification and implicit on non-singular (higher-order, plural, or mass) quantification. The analysis rests on a range of recent insights and proposals in generative syntactic theory, in particular the recognition of '–thing' as a light noun and a potential classifier as well as recent views of the decomposition of attitudinal and locutionary verbs in syntax. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the parameters that come into play when assessing the truth conditions of say reports and contrast them with belief attributions. We argue that these conditions are sensitive in intricate ways to the connection between the interpretation of the complement of say and the properties of the reported speech act. There are three general areas this exercise is relevant to, besides the immediate issue of understanding the meaning of say: (i) the discussion shows the need to (...) go beyond the simplest view of propositional attitudes, which treats them as restricted quantifiers over worlds; (ii) the complex connections that must exist between the say report and its source speech act show that one has to be able to differentiate between various layers of meaning for the antecedent sentences; (iii) finally, this paper is a small step towards a typology of propositional attitudes that allows us to uncover the complex web of relationships that grammatical mood is sensitive to. (shrink)

The Nez Perce counterparts of `I', `you', and `here' show "shifty" behavior in attitude reports. I argue that this is not the result of mixed quotation or binding, and should be analyzed via Anand and Nevins-style context shift with Kaplanian monsters.

In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...) in direct speech. In our experiment, we compare children’s interpretation of the pronouns 'I', 'you' and 'he', in both direct and indirect reported speech, and in both addressee and eavesdropping situations. We tested 71 five-year-olds, 63 nine-year-olds, and 52 adults in a referent-selection task and found a clear de se effect for children when directly addressed: they performed better with 'you' than with 'I'/'he' in indirect speech, but worse with 'you' than with 'I'/'he' in direct speech. We explain the latter finding in terms of the attraction of the de se interpretation strategy, which leads addressees to automatically self-ascribe 'you' even in a direct speech report. (shrink)

Recenzja: Saul Kripke, Kłopoty filozoficzne, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2023. Review of the Polish-language edition of Saul Kripke's Philosophical Troubles, vol. 1.

This chapter gives a general description of the ontological and semantic views developed in the book against the background of standard views of propositional attitudes and modals. It motivates the ontology of modal and attitudinal objects intuitively, contrasting it with the familiar ontology of propositions and of events and states. It presents well-known problems for propositions as abstract objects as well as recent theories of cognitive propositions and shows how attitudinal objects avoid those problems given their mind-dependence and the fact (...) that they play a different role in the semantics of attitude reports than as arguments of attitudinal relations. It points out convergences of the semantics of modal sentences based on modal objects with recent ‘localized’ approaches to modals. It critically discusses recent semantic analyses that take clausal complements to be predicates of the Davidsonian event argument of attitude verbs. (shrink)

This chapter introduces truthmaker semantics as developed by Kit Fine (‘sentence-based truthmaker semantics’) and extends it to attitudinal and modal objects as ‘object-based truthmaker semantics’. It presents specific motivations for satisfiables having a truthmaker-based content, rather than a content based on possible worlds. It argues that satisfiables of possibility differ from satisfiables of necessity by not having violators and shows that possible-worlds semantics, unlike truthmaker semantics, is unable to provide a unified meaning of sentences as properties of satisfiables of both (...) sorts. It gives an account of different types of satisfaction conditions as distinguished in Chapter 2, making use of the notion of directions of fit. Truth is treated as a non-action-guiding norm of objects with a word/mind-to-world direction of fit; objects with a world-to-word/mind direction of fit impose a norm on actions that are potential satisfiers. In an appendix, the chapter critically discusses the deflationist view of truth. (shrink)

This chapter applies object-based truthmaker semantics to the semantics of modals. It gives the general logical form of modal sentences in which both the modal and the prejacent or scope of the modal are treated as predicates of a modal object. It applies object-based truthmaker semantics to performative modals in independent and embedded contexts. It gives an account of the notion of a modal base against the background of the ontology of modal objects. It applies object-based truthmaker semantics to deontic (...) modal sentences and in particular the distinction between weak and strong permissions. It shows how inferences with modal sentences are better accounted for within object-based truthmaker semantics rather than possible-worlds semantics, and it gives a comparison with Fine’s sentence-based truthmaker semantics of deontic modals. Finally, it indicates how object-based truthmaker semantics can be applied to other modals and obtains further motivations, for example, when essences are considered modal objects. (shrink)

This is a prepublication version of my book Objects and Attitudes (please cite the pbished version!). The book develops a novel semantics of attitude reports, modal sentences, and quotation based on the view that sentences semantically act as predicates of various attitudinal and modal objects, entities like claims, requests, promises, obligations, and permissions, rather than standing for abstract propositions playing the role of objects. The approach develops truthmaker semantics for attitudinal and modal objects and has a wide range of applications (...) to issues in philosophy of language, semantics, and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This chapter extends the semantics of attitude reports based on attitudinal objects to verbs of saying and quotation. It does so by positing objects that correspond to Austin’s hierarchy of speech acts: phonetic, phatic, locutionary, and locutionary objects. It argues for the semantic importance of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary objects and shows that _that_-clause complements of verbs of saying act as predicates of locutionary objects, not illocutionary objects. It argues that pure quotations have primarily the status of predicates, (...) predicated phatic of objects. Direct quotes are analyzed as predicates of illocutionary objects as well as of the phatic objects on which the locutionary objects are based. The chapter gives a semantic analysis of special quantifiers with verbs of saying, including _words_-NPs (_a few words_). It outlines a novel compositional semantics of quotation based on a syntactic structure that includes lower-level linguistic structures as input to semantic interpretation. (shrink)

This chapter gives the general semantics of basic attitude reports, attitude reports with verbs like _claim_, with which the complement clause acts as a predicate of the described attitudinal object. It introduces background attitudinal objects for the purpose of the semantics of presuppositions. It elaborates the compositional semantics of attitude reports, pursuing the view that simple attitude verbs like _claim_ are syntactically derived from complex predicates of the form light verb-attitudinal-object noun (_make claim_). It gives a compositional semantics of special (...) quantifiers like _something_ based on the view that such quantifiers involve the light noun _thing_ acting as a numeral classifier. It also gives an analysis of harmonic modals. In one appendix, it proposes an account of opacity with the theory; in a second appendix, it discusses whether clausal complements give only a partial content of the attitudinal or modal object to which they apply. (shrink)

This chapter extends object-based truthmaker semantics to predicates with which clauses do not have the function of predicates predicated of the attitudinal or modal object described by the embedding predicate. It distinguishes clauses that have a predicative function from nominal clauses based on a range of criteria. There are three types of predicates that take nominal clauses: predicates that apply to facts, predicates that apply to states of affairs, and predicates that apply to ‘thin assertions’. Facts and states of affairs (...) are both construed as modal objects, thin assertions as abstractions from ordinary assertions. The chapter addresses the question whether predicates may take truthmakers of clauses as arguments, which seems plausible for verbs of occurrence such as _happen_ and _occur_. But it argues that verbs of occurrence in fact take states of affairs as arguments denoted by nominal clauses. Finally, it discusses verbs like _explain_ that take both a topic argument (a fact) and a clause providing the content of the described attitudinal object. It gives a new account why some clausal complement-taking verbs such as _remark_ do not allow for any NP complements, not even special quantifiers like _something_. (shrink)

This chapter elaborates the ontology of attitudinal and modal objects, and more generally the ontology of ‘satisfiable objects’, or ‘satisfiables’, which include intensional objects like debts and searches. It distinguishes different types of attitudinal objects and discusses modal and intensional objects as entities both similar to and distinct from attitudinal objects. It introduces the characteristic properties of satisfiables, properties of concreteness and three content-related properties: having satisfaction conditions, having a part structure based on partial content, and entering similarity relations on (...) the basis of being the same in content. It distinguishes different types of satisfaction conditions that different types of satisfiables come with. It clarifies the ways in which satisfiables differ from corresponding actions (claims vs. acts of claiming, assumptions vs. acts of assuming), distinguishing products from results of acts. It distinguishes state-related attitudinal objects (e.g., beliefs) from the corresponding states (belief states). It critically discusses Twardowski’s distinction between actions and products. (shrink)

This chapter summarizes the main features of the approach developed in the book. It relates the overall view to Michael Devitt’s motto ‘metaphysics first’ and contrasts it with that of ‘descriptive metaphysics first’. It lists a range of issues that invites further elaboration of both philosophical and linguistic sorts. On the philosophical side, they concern the ontology of attitudinal and modal objects, which displays both features of concreteness and abstractness as well as a particular connection to normativity. On the linguistic (...) side, they concern the need of accounting for the semantics of other types of clausal complements than _that_-clauses, such as infinitival clauses and interrogative clauses, as well as the need to develop proper syntactic theories within which the analyses can be cast that in the book were formulated within what has been called ‘simplified syntax’. (shrink)

There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...) or from how the speaker chooses to express themselves (even if there is nothing wrong with their mental states). So-called ‘Moore-paradoxical’ utterances are but one example of the phenomenon, and the explanation of what is wrong about them is subsumed under a more general explanation here—one that captures also the twisted-ness of utterances whereby questions are raised or intentions expressed. (shrink)

This paper highlights a small selection of cases where crosslinguistic insights have been important to big questions in the theory of semantics and the syntax/semantics interface. The selection includes (i) the role and representation of Speaker and Addressee in the grammar; (ii) mismatches between form and interpretation motivating high-placed silent operators for functional elements; and (iii) the explanation of semantic universals, including universals pertaining to inventories, in terms of learnability and the trade-off between informativeness and simplicity.

Epistemic terms of various syntactic categories can uniformly be used to do the same thing—to hedge. This essay clarifies hedging as a phenomenon and explains how hedging happens by advancing the positional theory. The guiding idea is that, in uttering declaratives, speakers signal what their epistemic position is towards the content put into play by the declarative. The default signal is that the speaker knows. But when an epistemic term hedges, the term overrides the default. The non-default signal sent is (...) that the speaker or someone else occupies the position indicated by the term. To make that idea precise, the positional theory treats hedging as a discourse function. Terms hedge because of how a declarative containing an epistemic term is situated within a discourse. (shrink)

This article presents a semantic analysis of indirect speech reports. The analysis aims to explain a combination of two phenomena. First, there are true utterances of sentences of the form α said that φ which are used to report an utterance u of a sentence wherein φ's content is not u's content. This implies that in uttering a single sentence, one can say several things. Second, when the complements of these reports (and indeed, these reports themselves) are placed in conjunctions, (...) the conjunctions are typically infelicitous. I argue that this combination of phenomena can be explained if speech reports report (perhaps contingent) parts of the contents of the sentences reported. (shrink)

Pragmatic modulation makes contextual information necessary for interpretation. This poses a problem for homophonic reports and inter-contextual communication in general: of co-situated interlocutors, we can expect some common ground, but non-co-situated interpreters lack access to the context of utterance. Here I argue that we can nonetheless share modulated contents via homophonic reports. First, occasion-unspecific information is often sufficient for the recovery of modulated content. Second, interpreters can recover what is said with different degrees of accuracy. Homophonic reports and inter-contextual communication (...) are often successful because the reporting context does not demand full accuracy. (shrink)

This book marks the first publication of celebrated philosopher Donald Davidson's 1970 Locke Lectures. In detailing his work on the theory of meaning, the role of a truth theory, the ontological commitments of a truth theory, and the notion of logical form, these lectures offer a rare insight into Davidson's thought at a key moment in his career.

Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either (...) Carla passed the exam or pandas are cute. This paper offers an analysis of speech reports that distinguishes weakenings of what the speaker expressed that yield true reports from weakenings that do not. According to this analysis, speech reports are not only sensitive to the informational content of what the speaker expressed, but also to the possibilities a speaker raises in making an utterance. As I argue, this analysis has significant advantages over its most promising competitors, including views based on work by Barwise and Perry : 668–691, 1981), views appealing to recent work on the notion of content parthood by Fine :199–226, 2016) and Yablo, and Richard’s : 605–616, 1998) proposal appealing to structured propositions. (shrink)

This dissertation argues for Semantic Variance, the thesis that nearly every utterance is such that there is no proposition that more than one languge user takes to be that utterance's truth-conditional content. I argue that Semantic Variance is problematic for standard theories concerning the nature of communication, the epistemic significance of ordinary disputes, the semantics of speech reports, and the nature of linguistic competence. In response to the problems arising from the truth of Semantic Variance, I develop new accounts of (...) the transmission of relevant information, ordinary disputes, and the semantics of speech reports. Towards the end of the dissertation I outline a pluralistic account about the nature of communication and linguistic competence. (shrink)

Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...) combine with independently plausible principles about the logic of belief to imply that subjects can achieve omniscience about what exists from the armchair. Although we are not committed to the view that ultra-liberal reports are false, in the final part of the paper we discuss the prospects of pursuing a line according to which the acceptability of such reports ought not be taken at face value. We conclude by arguing that those who are sympathetic with this move might have reason to doubt the truth of an even broader class of acceptable de re attitude reports, namely those that have been taken to undermine orthodox accounts of de re attitude ascriptions. (shrink)

This paper addresses the notion of accuracy in reported content in direct and indirect speech by focusing on the use of masculine and feminine forms in Japanese. By analyzing naturally-occurring examples of direct reports, the paper suggests that direct speech is similar to indirect speech in that the reported content is transformed and thus “inaccurate” in similar ways to indirect speech. The analysis also shows that reporters use contextual clues to signal to the hearer that the direct reports are not (...) to be taken literally. These clues include incongruous indexical expressions used in the reporting and reported contexts as well as mitigation expressions that approximate the accuracy of the reported content used with reporting verbs. The study provides supportive evidence that distinctions between direct and indirect speech are less clearcut than traditionally believed and that these distinctions may be based on the functions and contexts in which each form is used rather than verbatim report for direct report and inclusion of the reporter’s voice in indirect report. (shrink)

Many languages have logophoric pronouns which refer to the person whose speech, thoughts or feelings are being reported, and some languages also have antilogophoric pronouns. This paper investigates logophoricity in the pronominal system of Finnish, in particular in reported speech and free indirect discourse. I first show that the referential patterns exhibited of two types of third person pronouns in Finnish – the human third-person pronoun hän and the non-human third person pronoun se, which can also be used for human (...) antecedents in certain contexts – seem to be very different in reported speech vs. FID contexts. However, I argue that the hän/se variation can be derived from a basic generalization – namely that hän refers to SELF New reflections on grammaticalization. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, pp 327–344, 2002) – as long as we take into account the size of the logophoric domain and the different defaults of standard Finnish and colloquial Finnish. Furthermore, I suggest that we do not need to posit an additional association between se and NON-SELF, because the referential behavior of se can be derived from the size of the logophoric domain and the register defaults. In addition, once we look at how these two pronominal forms interact with the demonstrative pronoun tämä in Finnish, it becomes clear that theories of reference resolution need to consider both logophoricity and salience. (shrink)

I explain a mechanism I call “incorporation,” that I think is at work in a wide range of cases often put under the heading of “scare-quoting.” Incorporation is flagging some words in one’s own utterance to indicate that they are to be interpreted as if uttered by some other speaker in some other context, while supplying evidence to one’s interpreter enabling them to identify that other speaker and context. This mechanism gives us a way to use others’ vocabularies and contexts, (...) thereby extending our expressive capacities on the fly. -/- Explaining incorporation involves explaining intra-sentential shifts in lexicon and in context. Shifts of the former sort are familiar to linguists under the heading of “code-switching.” Shifts of the latter sort have been less explored; accordingly I explain how to modify Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives to allow for such shifts. -/- I compare the incorporation account of scare-quoting with accounts offered by Brandom, Recanati, Geurts and Maier, Benbaji, Predelli, and Shan. Finally I note a possible implication concerning the speech act of assertion: that you can properly assert a content you do not believe, let alone know, because part of it is expressed with words you do not understand. (shrink)

According to Schiffer, a proposition has the relativity feature “provided it’s an x-dependent proposition the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of x in different ways” (2005). He argues that the fact that many of the things we assert seem to have this feature threatens traditional accounts of propositional content, as no Russellian or Fregean proposition can possibly exhibit such relativity. In this paper, I develop a response on behalf (...) of the proponent of Fregean propositions that seeks to explain away the appearance of the relativity feature. As we will see, however, accommodating the mere appearance of the relativity feature requires a significant departure from the traditional Fregean account. In particular, I argue that a proponent of the Fregean metaphysics of belief should hold that the things we assert, and the referents of that-clauses, are not Fregean propositions, but rather kinds thereof. (shrink)

Inspired by Schlenker's (2003) seminal 'Plea for Monsters', linguists have been analyzing every occurrence of a shifted indexical by postulating a monstrous operator. My aim in this paper is to show that Kaplan's (1989) original strategy of explaining apparent shifting in terms of a quotational use/mention distinction offers a much more intuitive, parsimonious and empirically superior analysis of many of these phenomena, including direct--indirect switches in Ancient Greek, role shift in signed languages, free indirect discourse in literary narratives, and mixed (...) quotation. Format: . (shrink)

Arguably the biggest challenge in analyzing English tense is to account for the double access interpretation, which arises when a present tensed verb is embedded under a past attitude—e.g., "John said that Mary is pregnant". Present-under-past does not always result in a felicitous utterance, however—cf. "John believed that Mary is pregnant". While such oddity has been noted, the contrast has never been explained. In fact, English grammars and manuals generally prohibit present-under-past. Work on double access, on the other hand, has (...) either disregarded the oddity (e.g., Abusch 1997: 39) or treated it as a reflex of a particular dialect (e.g., Kratzer 1998: 14). The goal of the paper is to argue—based on a corpus study—that a present-under-past sentence is grammatical, but modulated by two, interacting pragmatic phenomena: cessation and parentheticality. (shrink)

The central aim of this book is to assess two crucial issues in the contemporary history of Spain: the Francoist dictatorship (1936–75), which certainly contained fascist elements, and the subsequent workings of its propaganda machine. This machine sought to create a favourable international attitude towards Francisco Franco Bahamonde and to disseminate a longstanding myth concerning the protection of the Jews in Franco’s Spain. With the work under review here, the Centre d’Estudis Històrics Internacionals (CEHI) at the University of Barcelona shows (...) its commitment to the publication of documents that are practically unknown or lie dormant in inaccessible archives. Such documents await rescue so that they can challenge myths perpetuated in the national and international collective imaginary. On this occasion, Luciano Casali and Lola Harana have rescued the Francoist pamphlet L’Espagne et le juifs (Spain and the Jews) from oblivion, and presented it here in the form of a critical edition with an introduction and 147 footnotes. Casali is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Bologna with more than forty years of academic experience. In recent years, he has focused his research on Spanish fascism from a comparative point of view. Harana is a project coordinator at the CEHI, as well as a doctoral student in the Department of Contemporary History at the University of Barcelona... (shrink)

The interpretation and the indirect reporting of a speaker’s communicative intentions lie at the crossroad between pragmatics, argumentation theory, and forensic linguistics. Since the leading case Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., in the United States the legal problem of determining the truth of a quotation is essentially equated with the correctness of its indirect reporting, i.e. the representation of the speaker’s intentions. For this reason, indirect reports are treated as interpretations of what the speaker intends to communicate. Theoretical considerations, (...) aimed at establishing the pragmatic meaning of an utterance and differentiating between presumptive and non-presumptive interpretation, are thus interwoven with the practical legal need of distinguishing a correct indirect report from an indirect one or a misquotation. An incorrect report or a misquotation has the dialectical effect of attributing to the misquoted party commitments that he never held, which the latter needs to rebut. This shifting of the burden of persuasion can be increased by using strategically the conflict between the presumptive interpretation of an utterance and the non-presumptive one, i.e. the different types of pragmatic ambiguity. When an interpreter is confronted with an utterance taken out of its dialogical context, his interpretative process is not guided by the actual context or intention, but rather the most frequent or prototypical dialogical setting or the most typical individual purpose that it could have served to achieve. This presumptive reconstruction can be used to provide a prima facie case that the other party needs to reject. The stronger the interpretative presumptions a speaker needs to rebut, the more effective the misquotation strategy. The conflict between the systematic and the presumptive process of interpretation can be represented as an argumentative mechanism of reconstruction of the individual intention, which allows one to assess the reasonableness of the interpretative reasoning. (shrink)

In ancient Greek the line between direct and indirect discourse appears blurred. In this essay I examine the tendency of Greek writers to slip from indirect into direct speech. I explain the apparent difference between modern English and ancient Greek speech reporting in terms of a development from orality to literacy.

I argue that free indirect discourse should be analyzed as a species of direct discourse rather than indirect discourse. More specifically, I argue against the emerging consensus among semanticists, who analyze it in terms of context shifting. Instead, I apply the semantic mechanisms of mixed quotation and unquotation to offer an alternative analysis where free indirect discourse is essentially a quotation of an utterance or thought, but with unquoted tenses and pronouns.

Bradwardine’s solution to the the logical paradoxes depends on the idea that every sentence signifies many things, and its truth depends on things’ being wholly as it signifies. This idea is underpinned by his claim that a sentence signifies everything that follows from what it signifies. But the idea that signification is closed under entailment appears too strong, just as logical omniscience is unacceptable in the logic of knowledge. What is needed is a more restricted closure principle. A clue can (...) be found in speech act pluralism, whereby indirect speech reports are closed under intersubstitutivity of co-referential terms. The conclusion is that solving the semantic paradoxes does not require revision of logic, thus saving logic from paradox. (shrink)

This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...) recommends nor with one of his key assumptions regarding the inadequacy of a kind of semantic theory he rejects. (shrink)

The most distinctive, and probably the most striking, assumption of Donald Davidson's well known ‘paratactic’ analysis of the logical form of saying ascriptions is that the “that”-clause that, in such an ascription, specifies the content of the ascribed act of saying, is neither syntactically nor semantically part of the sentence effecting the ascription. The present paper identifies a neglected problem that this assumption engenders for the Davidsonian analysis. The problem arises in connection with instances of saying ascriptions that are both (...) self-verifying and self-referential, and consists in the fact that, given the Davidsonian assumption, these ascriptions must be assigned logical forms that misrepresent their logically relevant properties. (shrink)

Abstract: This chapter discusses speakers’ conceptions of reported entities as evident in reporting practices. Pragmatic analyses will be offered to explain the diversity of permissible reporting practices. Several candidate theses on speakers’ conceptions of reported entities will be introduced. The possibility that there can be a unified analysis of direct and indirect reporting practices will be considered. Barriers to this unification will be discussed with an emphasis on the cognitive abilities speakers use in discerning the entities referred to in reporting (...) contexts. (shrink)

This paper contributes to two debates: (i) the debate about whether or not ancient Greek has Free Indirect Discourse (FID), and (ii) the debate about how we should analyze FID semantically. We do this by showing that there is a distinction between FID and what we call Unembedded Indirect Discourse (UID). The semantic analysis that we develop for the latter shows that the two phenomena, though superficially similar, are semantically fundamentally different. We conclude that UID would have been more deserving (...) of the title ‘free indirect discourse’ than the more quotative and direct discourse-like narrative technique that is now confusingly called so. 1. (shrink)

Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands (...) current empirical scrutiny. (shrink)

Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...) hard to see how we could reasonably be confident in a counterfactual whose consequent can be true only if a certain very finely tuned microphysical configuration obtains. This essay develops the foregoing puzzle and explores several possible solutions. (shrink)

In this paper I present a linguistic investigation of the literary style known as free indirect discourse within the framework of formal semantics. I will argue that a semantics for free indirect discourse involves more than a mechanism for the independent context shifting of pronouns and other deictic elements. My argumentation is fueled by literary examples of free indirect discourse involving what I call language shifts: -/- Most of the great flame-throwers were there and naturally, handling Big John de Conquer (...) and his works. How he had done everything big on earth, then went up tuh heben without dying atall. Went up there picking a guitar and got all de angels doing the ring-shout round and round de throne...that brought them back to Tea Cake. How come he couldn’t hit that box a lick or two? (Hurston 1937, Their Eyes Were Watching God) -/- Free indirect discourse combines elements of both, but it seems decidedly closer to direct discourse. I examine the reigning semantic analysis of free indirect discourse, a variant of the demonstrative account of direct discourse featuring “double context dependence” (Banfield 1982,Schlenker 2004). After showing that this type of account has fundamental difficulties with language shift data like (1), I close with a brief sketch of an alternative analysis based on “mixed quotation.”. (shrink)

According to semantic minimalism, context-invariant minimal semantic propositions play an essential role in linguistic communication. This claim is key to minimalists’ argument against semantic contextualism: if there were no such minimal semantic propositions, and semantic content varied widely with shifts in context, then it would be “miraculous” if communication were ever to occur. This paper offers a critical examination of the minimalist account of communication, focusing on a series of examples where communication occurs without a minimal semantic proposition shared between (...) speaker and hearer. The only way for minimalists to respond to these examples is by restricting the scope of their account to intra-lingual communication. It can then be shown that the minimalist’s notion of a language shrinks to a point, such that practically no instances of communication will fall under that account, and that the retreat to intra-lingual communication is in any case self-defeating, since the only way for minimalists to account for the individuation of languages is by resort to precisely the kinds of contextual considerations they abjured in the first place. In short, if, as minimalists allege, contextualism founders because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a context, it can now be seen that minimalism faces a parallel problem because it renders communication contingent on speaker and hearer sharing a language. I end by arguing that the possibility of communication cannot, as minimalists assume, be grounded in shared semantic conventions; rather, successful communication must precede the establishment of any particular set of semantic conventions. (shrink)

The Japanese particle 'to' serves as a quotative marker, either indicating the content of speech or thought, or serving related functions. The particle 'tte' is frequently identified as an informal variant of 'to', serving identical or nearly identical functions. Scholars have suggested the two forms may have different distribution or function, but to date there has been little empirical work to distinguish the forms using broad-based corpus methods. This study of a corpus 129 informal conversations suggests that both particles are (...) used in informal contexts. The particle 'tte' tends to occur with verbs indicating speech, or with no verb; the particle 'to' tends to occur with verbs indicating thought. Discussion also reveals some difficulties inherent in the use of morphological parsers for large-scale corpus study. Over-specifying the morphological contexts in which a form may occur risks only finding instances that support current models of grammar. (shrink)

In this chapter I deal with indirect reports in terms of language games. I try to make connections between the theory of language games and the theory of indirect reports, in the light of the issue of clues and cues. Indirect reports are based on an interplay of voices. The voice of the reporter must allow hearers to ‘reconstruct’ the voice of the reported speaker. Ideally, it must be possible to separate the reporter’s voice from that of the reported speaker. (...) When we analyze the language game of indirect reporting, we ideally want to establish which parts belong to the primary voice and which parts belong to the reporter’s voice. In this paper I apply considerations on language games by Dascal et al. and I explore the dialectics between abstract pragmatics principles and considerations about situated uses that are sensitive to cues and clues. (shrink)

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says (...) “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said , is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. (shrink)

Davidson's paratactic account of indirect speech exploits the fact that ‘that’ can be either a demonstrative pronoun or a subordinating conjunction. Davidson thinks that the fact that it is plausible to think that it inherited the latter function from the former lends support to his account. However, in other languages the two functions are performed by unrelated words, which makes the account impossible to apply to them. I argue that this shows that, rather than revealing the underlying form of indirect (...) reports, the account reflects only a quirk of English. (shrink)

Manipulation of quotation, shown to be a common tactic of argumentation in this paper, is associated with fallacies like wrenching from context, hasty generalization, equivocation, accent, the straw man fallacy, and ad hominem arguments. Several examples are presented from everyday speech, legislative debates and trials. Analysis using dialog models explains the critical defects of argumentation illustrated in each of the examples. In the formal dialog system CB, a proponent and respondent take turns in making moves in an orderly goal-directed sequence (...) of argumentation in which the proponent tries to persuade the respondent to become committed to a conclusion by asking questions and offering arguments. Analyzing quotation by using the notion of commitment in dialog, it is shown (a) how an arguer’s previous assertions can be brought to light in the course of a dialog to deal with problems arising from misquotation, (b) how the profile of dialog model allows a critic to analyse the fundamental effects misquotation brings about in a dialog, and (c) how the critic can use such an analysis to correct the problem. (shrink)