Critical Thinking

This document is designed as a resource for undergraduate students in introductory-level philosophy courses. It provides explanations and techniques for identifying arguments in prose passages, understanding them, and evaluating the quality of their reasoning. Some of the common topics covered include conditional statements, validity and soundness, the counterexample method, and common argument forms.

This essay identifies a neglected kinship between Karl Marx and Ayn Rand: both reject the supernatural, thereby minimizing fundamental human tendencies and constraining individual autonomy in one of humanity’s oldest domains. While their ideological opposition has been extensively documented, scholarship has overlooked how their shared secular absolutism aligns them in limiting freedom. By situating this denial of transcendence and lived experience as a common thread, the essay destabilizes—and ultimately collapses—three major pillars of modern thought: Marxism, Objectivism, and materialist secularism. -/- (...) November 2025. (shrink)

This work is aimed at providing an Islamic perspective on few selected informal logical fallacies. It serves an introduction to the theme of critical thinking and opens ways of reflecting on it, which is the main portion of critical thinking as a subject. Informal logical fallacies are numerous in number and for the sake of convenience they are very often categorized under three classifications: relevance, presumption, and ambiguity. This work discusses few fallacies. The methods applied in this research are descriptive, (...) analytical, conceptual, and critical. In short, in the beginning, the background of the subject and the basic concepts such as argument, fallacy, and critical thinking are briefly mentioned. Subsequently, fallacies are defined, conceptually analyzed, and then appraised according to Islamic perspective. (shrink)

This book serves as an introduction to mathematical logic for STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) students, written for undergraduates (in particular, 1st and 2nd year undergraduates). A focus on this book is on logical thinking, not simply rote memorization, with a focus on examples and analogies relevant to students aimed at becoming technical leaders and problem solvers. This book includes propositional logic, set theory, functions and relations, and more, with coding examples provided in the Python programming language.

The vast majority of grading exams that contain true-false and multiple choice questions encourages students to guess. This leads to two issues: the first is it incentivizes students to be overconfident rather than honestly quantify their level of belief and the second is that instructors cannot see which questions students are certain about versus these where students guess. This paper explores how Probabilistic Grading solves these issues, encouraging students to be honest about their true beliefs and discouraging them from guessing. (...) Probabilistic Grading evaluates both cognition and metacognitive reflection simultaneously, teaching students to become aware of the sources of their uncertainty and encouraging them to be self-directed learners. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of an absolute—understood as an ultimate, self-sufficient, non-relational foundation of truth, knowledge, or reality—cannot be sustained even in principle. The failure is not empirical and does not depend on human cognitive limits. It is structural: the absolute is asked to be both fully independent of all relations and simultaneously capable of grounding truth, justification, or meaning. These demands are incompatible. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it states minimal conditions under which the notion (...) of truth retains an epistemic function: recognizability in principle, relationality, and distinguishability from error or fiction. Second, it shows that an absolute, defined as non-relational and criterion-free, cannot satisfy these conditions without ceasing to be absolute. Third, it demonstrates that any attempt to rescue absolute closure generates an infinite hierarchy of meta-levels: each claim of finality produces a further claim that must itself be included and justified. This yields a general theorem: no system can be both absolute and epistemically true. The paper concludes with practical implications for domains that repeatedly reintroduce absolutes in new forms, including artificial intelligence, “theory of everything” projects, and solipsistic epistemologies. Formal details and responses to common objections are provided in appendices. (shrink)

Debates in epistemology and philosophy of science often proceed as if any well-formed claim were, in principle, eligible for empirical confirmation or refutation. Disagreements are then framed in terms of evidence, interpretation, or methodology. This paper argues that such debates presuppose a logically prior condition that is rarely made explicit: not all claims qualify as candidates for empirical or epistemic evaluation at all. The central thesis is that if a purported epistemic claim does not admit of conditions under which it (...) could count as confirmed, disconfirmed, or mistaken, then empirical inquiry into that claim is logically excluded. This is not an empirical failure, but a structural one. The paper distinguishes between empirical falsification and structural ineligibility, and argues that the latter precedes and constrains the former. Building on a minimal, non-metaphysical analysis, the paper identifies basic logical preconditions that any epistemic claim must satisfy in order to enter empirical assessment. Claims that fail to meet these conditions are not rejected as false; they are excluded as epistemically ineligible. In this sense, the analysis is eliminative rather than constructive: it does not defend a particular theory of cognition, but articulates criteria for determining what can meaningfully be discussed, tested, or disputed within empirical inquiry. The reference to Kant in the title is methodological rather than doctrinal. Whereas Kant investigated the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present work examines the logical conditions under which claims qualify as candidates for cognition in the first place. The result is a criterion of epistemic eligibility that applies prior to empirical testing and independent of substantive metaphysical commitments. (shrink)

Carol Dweck's growth mindset framework has transformed educational and organizational approaches to learning and development by emphasizing persistence and effort over fixed ability beliefs. However, systematic analysis reveals a critical structural flaw: the framework creates potentially endless feedback loops with no explicit exit conditions or reflective mechanisms to evaluate when persistence becomes counterproductive. This paper identifies what we term the "Growth Mindset Paradox" - how a framework designed to liberate learners from fixed thinking can itself become a form of cognitive (...) entrapment. Through flowchart analysis and case study examination, we demonstrate that growth mindset implementation often lacks essential components: structured off-ramps for recognizing when approaches are ineffective, reflective reasoning loops for metacognitive evaluation, and criteria for distinguishing productive persistence from pathological continuation. These omissions create a psychological double-bind where individuals experience moral failure for abandoning effort and practical failure for continuing ineffective strategies. Drawing on semantic containment theory and truth evaluation boundary principles, we argue that the growth mindset framework represents a semantically enclosed system that cannot evaluate its own effectiveness without external reference points. The paper proposes four critical enhancements: time-bound reflection triggers, progress-to-effort ratio assessments, well-being indicators, and strategy diversification protocols. Our analysis extends beyond critique to systematic framework improvement, demonstrating how educational and organizational interventions can preserve growth mindset benefits while preventing the psychological harm that emerges when persistence becomes divorced from effectiveness evaluation. The findings have implications for educational psychology, organizational behaviour, and the design of any framework intended to promote adaptive learning and development. (shrink)

In Chapter 5 of Transparency and Reflection, Matthew Boyle examines an “anti-Egoist” challenge to my reflective knowledge that I am thinking, which says all I really know is that thinking is occurring. Boyle replies that I know something more, namely that a subject is thinking. Even so, he concedes that traditional Egoists like Descartes go too far in claiming reflective knowledge that an object is thinking. However, these comments argue that there is no stable middle ground between Cartesian Egoism and (...) Anti-Egoism. If I know that I am thinking, then I know that an object is thinking. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze how coherence should be addressed in critical thinking courses. Our starting point is the fact that, while coherence seems important for rationality and critical thinking, several studies now suggest that thinkers with conspiracy worldviews give more importance to coherence than other criteria. However, conspiracy worldviews do not (fully) embrace the ideals of rationality and critical thinking. This suggests that some desiderata of rationality or critical thinking can, in isolation, be counterproductive. In response to this puzzle, (...) we first argue that coherence can’t be separated from other desiderata of critical thinking. Becoming more coherent doesn’t necessarily matter if one is unresponsive to the evidence, fails to reason on the basis of justified attitudes, and so forth. Then, we turn to the concrete actions that can be implemented in critical thinking courses that would reflect this. Articulating the relationships between the various desiderata of rationality can be difficult in introductory critical thinking courses, since they usually carry different objectives. Still, simple measures can be put in place to give students some guidance regarding this. We illustrate our point with marking grids. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impact of Large Language Model (LLM)-assisted writing on reflective thinking, building on existing adaptations of Albert Borgmann’s device paradigm to Don Ihde’s postphenomenology. Academic writing can facilitate engagement with our beliefs and pre-judgments, making it highly conducive to reflective thinking. However, generative AI tools, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft Word Copilot, may undermine such meaningful engagement as they ‘disburden’ users of the effort inherent in reflective writing. Still, we fall short when we leave unexamined the (...) kinds of uses each writing app inclines its users to pursue. Despite using the same LLM, a cross-comparison reveals that the user interface (UI) design of ChatGPT and Word Copilot affords distinct forms of interaction: ChatGPT’s UI design may, in principle, facilitate reflective engagement through conversational interactions, prompting users to formulate and engage with their beliefs on a given topic. In contrast, Word Copilot emphasizes automated document production, making a similar kind of engaging use unviable. As a conceptual basis for the argument, this paper extends Ihde’s history of writing ‘technics’ and brings it together with recent conceptual developments in postphenomenology by discussing the apps in terms of ‘quasi-materiality’ of application UIs and the affordances they offer as part of ‘multistabilities’. This paper concludes with a call for academic writers to critically assess how their tools mediate academic writing and thinking processes, arguing that choosing a writing tool for academic writing has ceased to be a matter of personal preference and has become one of academic ethos. (shrink)

Several decades of work in both philosophy and psychology acutely highlights our limitations as individual inquirers. One way to recognize these limitations is to defer to experts: roughly, to form one’s beliefs on the basis of expert testimony. Yet, as has become salient in the age of Brexit, Trumpist politics, and climate change denial, people are often mistrustful of experts, and unwilling to defer to them. It’s a trope of highbrow public discourse that this unwillingness is a serious pathology. But (...) to what extent is this trope accurate? Answering this requires us to settle both a normative question—under exactly what conditions ought we to defer to experts?—and an empirical question—under what conditions are people willing to defer to experts? The first question has been investigated primarily by philosophers; the second, primarily by psychologists. Yet there is little work integrating these literatures and putting together their results. The aim of this review article is to begin this task, enabling us to begin reaching conclusions about how much real practices of deference diverge from the ideal. We present an opinionated guide to relevant work from both philosophy and psychology, and note places where the literature has important gaps. (shrink)

Perspective is a fundamental element in the construction of human meaning. Although the term appears simple, its significance varies depending on the disciplinary field from which it is approached. This article proposes an integrated analysis from philosophical, psychological, mathematical, and psychosocial perspectives, articulated through a structural framework based on the operators of parity, duality, and transformation. The objective is to show how perspective operates as a universal mechanism that organizes individual and collective interpretation of phenomena, and how its development in (...) the social being emerges from dynamic processes of interaction and reflection. (shrink)

Critical thinking is supported by a rich and diverse literature, with particularly close ties to argumentation theory and informal logic. It has often been presented in terms of a set of skills and dispositions, with the latter exemplified through the figure of an ideal critical thinker. These accounts of the relevant dispositions are intuitive and tend to emphasize openness, clarity, and a concern for truth. Seemingly running against this impression, it is argued here that an ideal critical thinker can willfully (...) engage in fallacious argumentation. This surprising possibility is grounded in the distinction between thinking and arguing, with the literature on critical thinking being implicitly and rightly limited to the former. The argument draws on an established account of critical thinking dispositions, a simple supporting view of the nature of dispositions, and analogies to familiar phenomena like lying. The result complements existing work on the subject in terms of what a critical thinker should do, contributing to our understanding of the conceptual boundaries of critical thinking and argumentation proper. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to answer the question: „If to think rationally is to think right, then can we learn how to think rationally?“. I attempt to find an answer by providing a commentary on Rosen Lutskanov’s recent book – „A Handbook of Critical Thinking“ (2024). My central claim is that Lutskanov’s exposition clearly shows that thinking right is a matter of skill which can be exercised, educated, and expertized (EEE) and that it is subjected to rigorous logical (...) rules, epistemic norms and pragmatic norms. In my analysis, I will presume that Lutskanov’s understanding of critical thinking allows us to use the conceptual apparatus of social epistemology and to examine critical thinking as closely related to peer disagreement. At the end of my paper, I propose some critical comments on the examined concept of critical thinking that concern the role of perceptual knowledge, the right order of reasons in an argument, and the wisdom of crowds. (shrink)

Many studies find reflective thinking predicts less belief in God or less religiosity — so-called analytic atheism. However, the most widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy, some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country, experimentally encouraging reflection makes some non-believers more open to believing in God, and one of the most common sources of online research participants seems to produce lower data quality. So analytic atheism may be less than universal or (...) partially explained by confounding factors. To test this, we developed better measures, controlled for more confounds, and employed more recruitment methods. All four studies detected signs of analytic atheism above and beyond confounds (N > 70,000 people from five of six continental regions). We also discovered analytic apostasy: the better a person performed on reflection tests, the greater their odds of losing their religion since childhood — even when controlling for confounds. Analytic apostasy even seemed to explain analytic atheism: apostates were more reflective than others and analytic atheism was undetected after excluding apostates. Religious conversion was rare and unrelated to reflection, suggesting reflection’s relationships to conversion and deconversion are asymmetric. Detected relationships were usually small, indicating reflective thinking is a reliable albeit marginal predictor of apostasy. (shrink)

The daily increase of authoritarian leaders, totalitarian reforms, and nationalistic sen timent worldwide creates an imperative even for those typically confined to the realm of theory to search for practicable solutions. With his characteristic flare for inconsistency and ostensible pessimism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau strikes even careful readers as a dead-end in this regard. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s writings on civic education and civil religion provide an as-yet untapped resource, offering both a prescient diagnosis of our current predicament and realistic prescriptions as to how (...) we might counteract it. And he is not alone: hitherto all but ignored by scholars, Rousseau’s thoughts on education bear a strik ing resemblance to those of John Dewey regarding experimental inquiry and Paolo Freire’s concerning liberatory pedagogy. For, though hailing from different continents and disparate traditions, all three emphasize that the slide towards tyranny is either en sured or prevented based on a people’s (in)ability to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism. (shrink)

Dieser Sammelband bietet eine interdisziplinäre und kritisch fundierte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Toulmin-Schema als Modell der Argumentationsanalyse und -förderung in Schule und Hochschule. Das Toulmin-Schema ist in vielen Fachdidaktiken etabliert und dient dort als Werkzeug, um Argumentationsstrukturen sichtbar zu machen und argumentative Kompetenzen gezielt zu fördern. Zugleich zeigt sich eine wachsende Kluft zwischen seiner prominenten Rolle in der Unterrichtspraxis und der kritischen Bewertung in der aktuellen argumentationstheoretischen Debatte. Vor diesem Hintergrund versammelt der Band Beiträge aus der Philosophie-, Deutsch- und Geographiedidaktik, die (...) das Toulmin-Schema aus verschiedenen fachlichen Blickwinkeln beleuchten, seine Potenziale und Grenzen analysieren sowie Alternativen aufzeigen. Die Beiträge gehen dabei unterschiedlichen Fragen nach: Welche Argumentationsmodelle sind für den Unterricht geeignet? Inwiefern lässt sich das Toulmin-Schema didaktisch anschlussfähig operationalisieren? Wie wird mit argumentativen Strukturen in unterrichtlichen Kontexten tatsächlich gearbeitet? Neben systematischen Analysen werden konkrete Beispiele aus der Unterrichtspraxis diskutiert, etwa zur Rekonstruktion alltagsweltlicher oder literarästhetischer Argumentationen. Gemeinsam ist den Beiträgen der Anspruch, eine differenzierte, kontextbewusste und theoretisch informierte Perspektive auf das Argumentieren im Fachunterricht zu eröffnen. (shrink)

The concept of ‘centre and periphery’ has become ubiquitous in the study of higher education, especially in an international context. Through an engagement with the recent scholarly literature, we argue that simultaneously this concept has been decontextualised and naturalised. Its origins were largely forgotten and centre and periphery started to be descriptive of ‘the way the world is’. This article argues for the de-naturalisation of this concept, through an exploration of its genealogy, and a critical analysis of the role concepts (...) play in any theoretically grounded engagement with reality. To achieve that, we develop a heuristic of the critical cycle and we show alternative and powerful ways to engage with the concept ‘centre and periphery’. We argue that critique of the concept should lead to alternative projects for higher education. (shrink)

Following Trump’s time soon to come, critical thinking (CT) has become more important than ever. However, CT faces a challenge: excessive debates about it have obfuscated its meaning. This study adopts an eclectic application of Greco-Roman philosophies by first using Aristotle’s fourfold causality to clarify CT’s current schools and debates, allowing us to move beyond evaluating the pros and cons of each CT approach. The main challenge of CT involves its domestication and absorption within the structured education system and social (...) governance, which trivialize the distance that a critical learner should keep from others and themselves. As a solution to the challenges associated with CT, this study suggests repositioning CT as a Greco-Roman spiritual exercise, offering a way for individuals to mediate the expected distance for criticality. Such antique CT is not teachable, but teachers should lead students to practice such spiritual exercises to interrupt the discourses of dark times. (shrink)

Les conceptions que les étudiants en sciences ont de la nature des modèles scientifiques conduisent à une image inexacte de ceux-ci, notamment lorsque les modèles sont vus comme de simples copies de la réalité. Outre le fait qu’elle en-tretient une conception fausse de la nature de la science, cette façon de se figurer les modèles peut constituer un obstacle pédagogique à l’apprentissage. Objec-tifs : Nous évaluons l’épistémologie de Mario Bunge afin de déterminer si elle peut contribuer à résoudre les problèmes (...) liés à la nature des modèles dans un contexte d’enseignement des sciences. Approche : Après avoir identifié les principales ca-tégories des modèles chez Bunge, nous les employons pour examiner divers as-pects du développement historique des modèles atomiques, puis nous appli-quons le cadre théorique ainsi obtenu aux problèmes liés aux diverses concep-tions des modèles en enseignement des sciences. Participants : En raison de la nature théorique de cette recherche, cette étude ne fait pas appel à des partici-pants autres que les chercheurs des recherches mentionnées. Collecte et analyse des données : Nous avons effectué une analyse comparative constante afin d’identifier les schémas de signification communs au cas historique et au cadre théorique. Résultats : Les caractéristiques attribuées aux modèles par Bunge ont été identifiées dans le cas des modèles atomiques. Ces caractéristiques forment un point de vue cohérent et permettent d’aborder, dans le contexte de l’enseignement des sciences, plusieurs questions liées aux diverses conceptions des modèles. (shrink)

In questo articolo, seguendo la critica di Rahel Jaeggi alle forme di vita, sostengo che per identificare un autentico pensiero critico dovremmo partire da un'analisi della natura normativa delle forme di vita come costituenti di base del mondo sociale. In questa visione, il pensiero critico può essere visto come un comportamento critico. Mentre le genuine forme di vita possono riconoscere e considerare la varietà di situazioni concrete e diverse, al contrario la razionalità critica delle forme di vita non funzionanti comprende (...) la norma come applicata dall'esterno. In questo caso la norma, erroneamente intesa come un principio neutrale e universalmente applicabile, come la razionalità economica, non è in grado di considerare la particolarità delle forme di vita come beni in sé. Difendo l'idea che un'educazione al pensiero critico deve basarsi sulla razionalità genuina e funzionale che caratterizza gli esseri umani in un mondo sociale. (shrink)

Che cosa sono il pensiero critico e l’ingiustizia epistemica? E cosa hanno a che vedere con l’educazione e la riduzione delle disuguaglianze? Secondo una concezione molto diffusa il pensiero critico è un pensiero ragionevole finalizzato a decidere cosa credere e come agire. Tuttavia, come intendere questa ragionevolezza? Affrontare questa questione, nell’ottica del nostro convegno, richiede la considerazione di un altro aspetto noto come ‘ingiustizia epistemica’. L’ingiustizia epistemica è un fenomeno che genera oppressione relativamente a questioni legate alla conoscenza. Ciò accade (...) quando non si ascolta una persona e non si presta attenzione al suo pensiero o al suo giudizio, poiché ritenuti irrilevanti o ingiustamente non competenti, a causa di un pregiudizio. Questi pregiudizi possono essere l’appartenenza del parlante a una diversa classe sociale, a una determinata etnia, o genere o gruppo sociale. Tuttavia, esistono varie forme di ingiustizia epistemica. La conoscenza, infatti, comporta l’interscambio e la partecipazione al dialogo, alla discussione ai gruppi di ricerca. La partecipazione ad un dibattito non richiede solo uno scambio di informazioni, bensì anche la presentazione di domande e la considerazione di possibilità alternative. In questo caso l’ingiustizia epistemica avviene perché la partecipazione di un parlante, sebbene accreditato come competente, non viene presa in considerazione come un valido contributo al dibattito. L’idea di fondo di questo convegno è dunque che la filosofia per ragazzi, attraverso la discussione, nonché la trasmissione di contenuti e problematiche può contribuire all’abbattimento delle barriere che generano le disuguaglianze, favorendo lo sviluppo di una sensibilità critica e al tempo stesso etica. La sensibilità critica risulta funzionale a una forma di resistenza, vale a dire a un uso delle nostre risorse epistemiche e abilità che depotenziano e cambiano le strutture normative oppressive, quale tratto caratteristico della democrazia. Ciò significa concepire la democrazia come un processo dinamico di auto-correzione e apprendimento continui. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the challenges of implementing reflective thinking in engineering ethics education (EEE). It examines existing methods for teaching ethical reflection in EEE and argues that pedagogical activities aiming to foster ethical reflection need to be infused with dialogical interactions and, at a deeper level, informed by dialogism. Dialogism is understood as a relational approach to inquiry in which interactions between moral agents enable them to develop their own understandings through the process of finding shared meanings with the others (...) in activities such as sharing reasons and deliberation. Drawing on pragmatism and phenomenology, the authors conceptualize reflection as a mode of thinking that enables us to monitor and question our assumptions and values – and to synthesize experiences and situations continuously and iteratively. Classroom reflection is a nuanced practice that can be captured through experiential, first-person accounts. Given the centrality of the dialogical experiences in reflection, the assessment methods should focus on evaluating the process rather than the learning outcomes, by emphasizing self-awareness, transformation, and spontaneity in class interactions. In creating opportunities for reflection, instructors need to purposefully consider their choice of specific cases and scenarios used in instruction. Students should be guided to recognize and engage in ethical situations by considering their full, diverse, and complex contextual reality, their own assumptions, values, and experiences, and by promoting dialogical practices in the classroom. (shrink)

“That’s subjective!” People sometimes respond like this to claims about what’s true, what’s ethical, what others find beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, and more. -/- To call a claim “subjective” seems in part to say that something important about the claim depends on the subject—the person—making the claim. What this “something” is varies depending on the claim. -/- Are judgments like these truly “subjective”? What does “subjective” really mean? -/- This essay introduces different answers to these questions.

How might scholarly communities delimit harmonious interpersonal relations for the sake of truth-seeking, yet still aim to realize, within such constraints, the good of harmonious interpersonal relations? To address this question, I consider the resources offered by Japanese neo-Confucian philosopher Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714 CE) in his Taigiroku (Record of Great Doubts). In section I, I sketch the grounds on which Ekken identifies harmonious interpersonal relations with one’s teachers and colleagues as a good worth cultivating and sustaining. Against this background, I (...) explore the grounds on which Ekken nevertheless affirms the goodness of strong critical disagreement within scholarly communities. Thus, I consider his case for delimiting potentially greater interpersonal harmony to allow for certain kinds of adversariality. In section II, I sketch the grounds on which Ekken rejects a strong adversarialism (i.e., the thesis that interpersonal harmony in scholarly communities should be regulated by the good of acquiring and communicating certain kinds of truth, and that inquirers need not attempt to secure interpersonal harmony as far as possible). In section III, I examine how Ekken, while delimiting such interpersonal harmony for the sake of acquiring and communicating certain kinds of truth, nevertheless affirms the goodness of such harmony and incorporates it in his prescriptions. Thus, I sketch the basis on which Ekken endorses a moderate adversarialism (i.e., the thesis that harmonious interpersonal relations in scholarly communities should be regulated by the good of seeking and communicating the relevant truth, and that inquirers should still attempt, as far as possible, to secure interpersonal harmony). In section IV, I address worries that Ekken’s moderate adversarialism faces, and I conclude with final observations. (shrink)

The Really Big Down-Side of an Ultra-Connected Reality (Magical Thinking in General).

What distinguishes the philosophies of education advanced by pragmatists? Does pragmatism have something distinctive to offer contemporary philosophy of education? This paper applies these questions, which Randall Curren asks in “Pragmatist Philosophy of Education” (2009), to a more specific current debate in philosophy of education: the debate over educating for critical thinking, and/or for intellectual virtues. Which, if either, should be given priority in higher education, and why? This paper develops a Deweyan approach to these questions, inviting character content but (...) also offering specific ways for educators and institutions to stay alert to the pedagogical and indoctrination concerns with character education initiatives, including those for intellectual virtues specifically. (shrink)

Abstract‘You are overthinking that!’ The article argues against the popular idea that too much of the activity of thinking is bad for individuals. Wrong thinking, I argue, is what is bad or unhealthy, irrespective of the length of time it is done for. Wrong thinking can lead to worrying, stress, and impedes practical action. But if thinking is done right, then you can't have too much of it.

A large body of evidence suggests that the Personalized System of Instruction (PSI) improves learning. In courses that use PSI, the material is divided into units, students must pass a test on each unit before advancing to the next unit, there’s no group-level instruction, and students advance in the course at their own pace. While studies find that PSI improves learning outcomes in a wide range of settings, researchers haven’t studied the effectiveness of PSI in critical thinking classes. In this (...) paper, I argue that teaching critical thinking with PSI can effectively promote critical thinking skills. I describe a course that uses PSI to teach critical thinking and I present evidence from pre- and post-tests that indicates that students substantially improved their reasoning skills in this course. I also discuss the costs and drawbacks of using this method of instruction and consider ways of addressing these problems. (shrink)

A "good" arguer is like an architect with a penchant for civil and civic engineering. Such an arguer can design and present their reasons artfully about a variety of topics, as good architects do with a plenitude of structures and in various environments. Failures in this are rarely hidden for long, as poor constructions reveal themselves, often spectacularly, so collaboration among civical engineers can be seen as a virtue. Our logical virtues should be analogous. When our arguments fail due to (...) being uncivil and demagogic, since we inhabit the arguments we build, we are all crushed beneath our flawed reasoning. This mixed metaphor takes us to a self-referential analysis of argumentation, analogy, and humor. I argue that good argumentation strives to collaboratively convince rather than belligerently persuade. A convincing means toward this end is through humorous analogical arguments, whether the matter at hand is ethical, logical, theological, phenomenological, epistemological, metaphysical, political, or about baseball. (shrink)

After the financial crisis of 2008, many economists expressed dissatisfaction with the state of macroeconomics. They criticised deficiencies in the dominant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling approach and conceptions of good macroeconomic research behind that dominance. This paper argues that there is a deeper problem in macroeconomics, which remains unaddressed. I connect existing literature critical of the institutions of macroeconomics and of economics in general to the institutional preconditions of effective criticism outlined by the philosopher Helen Longino. I find that (...) as an epistemic community, macroeconomics does not function in a way that adequately supports critical evaluation of established beliefs, norms and practices. This failure may partly explain why many views on macroeconomic modelling, the tenability of which economists questioned after the crisis, were able to persist for so long. My analysis gives additional support to several recent proposals for institutional reforms in economics. (shrink)

This innovative text is psychologically informed, both in its diagnosis of inferential errors, and in teaching students how to watch out for and work around their natural intellectual blind spots. It also incorporates insights from epistemology and philosophy of science that are indispensable for learning how to evaluate premises. The result is a hands-on primer for real world critical thinking. The authors bring a fresh approach to the traditional challenges of a critical thinking course: effectively explaining the nature of validity, (...) assessing deductive arguments, reconstructing, identifying and diagramming arguments, and causal and probabilistic inference. Additionally, they discuss in detail, important, frequently neglected topics, including testimony, including the evaluation of news and other information sources, the nature and credibility of science, rhetoric, and dialectical argumentation. The treatment of probability uses frequency trees and a frequency approach more generally, and argument reconstruction is taught using argument maps; these methods have been shown to improve students’ reasoning and argument evaluation. (shrink)

In this paper, following Rahel Jaeggi’s critique of forms of life, I contend that to identify genuine critical thinking we should start from an analysis of the normative nature of forms of life as the basic constituents of the social world. In this view, critical thinking can be seen as a critical behaviour. While genuine forms of life can recognize and consider the variety of concrete and diverse situations, on the contrary non-functioning forms of life’s critical rationality understands the norm (...) as applied from outside of the form of life. In this case the norm, erroneously understood as a neutral and universally applicable principle, such as economic rationality, is not able to consider the particularity of forms of life as goods in themselves. I defend the meaning that an education in critical thinking must have, as a genuine and functional rationality characterising human beings in a social world. -/- . (shrink)

Argument maps represent some arguments more effectively than others. The goal of this article is to account for that variability, so that those who wish to use argument maps can do so with more foresight. I begin by identifying four properties of argument maps that make them useful tools for evaluating arguments. Then, I discuss four types of argument that are difficult to map well: reductio ad absurdum arguments, charges of equivocation, logical analogies, and mathematical arguments. The difficulties presented by (...) these four types appear unrelated to one another, but I show that, in each case, the difficulty can be traced back to the use of metalinguistic reasoning. The need to represent a transition between object language and metalanguage can undermine one or more of the benefits that argument map representation would otherwise confer. (shrink)

The method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) is a method of justification popularized by John Rawls and further developed by Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul, Folke Tersman, and Catherine Z. Elgin, among others. The basic idea is that epistemic agents have justified beliefs if they have succeeded in forming their beliefs into a harmonious system of beliefs which they reflectively judge to be the most plausible. Despite the common reference to MRE as a method, its mechanisms or rules are typically expressed in (...) a metaphorical or simplified manner and are therefore criticized as too vague. Recent efforts to counter this criticism have been directed towards the attempt to provide formal explications of MRE. This paper aims to supplement these efforts by providing an informal working definition of MRE. This approach challenges the view that MRE can adequately be characterized only in the negative as a set of anti-essentialisms. I argue that epistemic agents follow MRE iff they follow four interconnected rules, which are concerned with a minimalistic form of foundationalism, a minimalistic form of fallibilism, a moderate form of holism, and a minimalistic form of rationality. In the critical spirit of MRE, the corresponding working definition is, of course, provisional and revisable. In general, the aim is to contribute to a reflective equilibrium (RE) concerning MRE. If it is successful, this working definition provides a better grasp of the most basic elements of the method and thereby enhances our understanding of it. (shrink)

In a world filled with information overload and complex problems, the ability to think logically is a superpower. "A Little More Logical" is your guide to mastering this essential skill. This engaging and accessible open educational resource is perfect for students, teachers, and lifelong learners who want to improve their critical thinking abilities and make better decisions in all aspects of life. -/- Through a series of fun and interactive chapters, "A Little More Logical" covers a wide range of topics, (...) from the basics of constructing sound arguments to the application of logic in fields like ethics, science, and computing. You'll learn how to spot and avoid common fallacies, analyze real-world arguments, and use logical reasoning to solve problems and make informed choices. -/- But this book isn't just about abstract concepts – it's about the human story behind logic. You'll discover the fascinating lives and ideas of diverse thinkers, from ancient philosophers to modern-day pioneers, who have shaped the development of logical reasoning throughout history. With thought-provoking examples, engaging exercises, and plenty of humor along the way, "A Little More Logical" makes the study of logic both rigorous and entertaining. -/- Whether you're a student looking to ace your philosophy class, a teacher searching for high-quality educational resources, or a curious reader who wants to sharpen your mind, "A Little More Logical" is the perfect companion on your journey to becoming a more effective thinker. Unlock the power of logical thinking today with this one-of-a-kind open educational resource! (shrink)

An accessible introduction to critical thinking and argument mapping that can be imported directly into Canvas and Brightspace course sites. -/- Features: Over 30 exercises and 50 quiz questions per module, organized into question banks; Authentic examples, and examples drawn from diverse philosophical sources; Accessible: integration with the Argumentation argument mapping app allows readers to fully engage with argument maps with screen readers and key commands; Argumentation's inference boxes make possible novel explanations of inference objections, arguments for and against analogical (...) arguments, inference rules, and the distinction between co-premises and independent arguments; Ideal for the critical thinking component of a mixed critical-thinking/philosophy course; Uses argumentation[dot]io argument mapping app for efficient student submission and grading; Instructors can customize based on their individual preferences; Includes slides, assignment prompts, feedback quick comments, and other teaching materials. (shrink)

The paper analyses the thoughts of Paul Feyerabend in the context of the events and influences he experienced in his life. Drawing/reflecting on the broader context sheds further light on his oeuvre and personality.

The bullshit receptivity scale—a methodological tool that measures the level of profoundness that participants assign to a series of obscure and new-agey, randomly generated statements—has become increasingly popular since its introduction in 2015. Researchers that deploy this scale often frame their research in terms of Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit, according to which bullshit is discourse produced without regard for the truth. I argue that framing these studies in Frankfurtian terms is detrimental and has led to some misguided theorizing about (...) the mental processes implicated in bullshit receptivity. I argue that we should, instead, frame these studies in terms of what G.A. Cohen calls unclarifiable bullshit. After reviewing some recent theorizing about the psychology of bullshit receptivity, I show how reframing the bullshit receptivity scale in terms of unclarifiable bullshit generates plausible conjectures about the psychological factors responsible for bullshit receptivity. I draw from the literature on the illusion of explanatory depth and the misplaced meaning effect to develop a novel account of bullshit detection and receptivity. I consider some empirical support for my account and draw attention to ways that it can also be extended to account for results from studies that don’t use the bullshit receptivity scale. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and compare two concepts which tend to be treated as synonymous, and to show the difference between them: these are critical thinking and logical culture. Firstly, we try to show that these cannot be considered identical or strictly equivalent: i.e. that the concept of logical culture includes more than just critical thinking skills. Secondly, we try to show that Christian philosophers, when arguing about philosophical matters and teaching philosophy to students, should not (...) focus only on critical thinking skills, but rather also consider logical culture. This, as we argue, may help to improve debate both within and outside of Christian philosophy. (shrink)

En este trabajo, se propone una clasificación epistemológica teórica para el discurso astrológico a partir de evidencia empírica a fin de abordar el problema de cómo determinar específicamente qué es lo que lo hace ilegítimo. A partir de esta clasificación, se diseñó una intervención didáctica, enmarcada en el enfoque de Enseñanza de las Ciencias Naturales en Contexto (ECNC), con el objetivo de fomentar, en estudiantes de nivel secundario, la capacidad de distinguir enunciados cognoscitivamente ilegítimos -por infalsables o por falsos- respecto (...) de aquellos que pueden constituir genuino conocimiento científico. La secuencia didáctica se implementó con un grupo de 51 estudiantes de 14 a 17 años. Se evaluó su impacto por comparación entre un pretest y un postest. Los resultados mostraron que su capacidad de discernimiento entre enunciados falsables y no falsables se incrementó apreciablemente. (shrink)

Erarbeitet von Dominik Balg, Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, Aenna Frottier, David Lanius, David Löwenstein, Hanna Lucks, Kirsten Meyer, Donata Romizi, Katharina Schulz, Stefanie Thiele und Annett Wienmeister. -/- Die Entwicklung argumentativer Fähigkeiten ist ein zentrales Ziel des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts, ja überhaupt ein zentrales Bildungsziel. Wie aber kann das gelingen? In vielen verfügbaren Unterrichtsmaterialien werden argumentative Fähigkeiten eher vorausgesetzt als systematisch gefördert. Auch curriculare Vorgaben bleiben zumeist sehr unspezifisch. Lehrpersonen werden so weitgehend allein gelassen mit der Aufgabe, Lernende beim Erwerb (...) argumentativer Fähigkeiten zu fördern. Die vorliegende Aufgabensammlung soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schließen. Sie bietet Lehrpersonen reichhaltige Materialien für die spiralcurricular angelegte, systematische Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeit anhand exemplarischer Inhalte. Orientiert an klaren fachlichen Standards finden sich hier Aufgaben auf vier Niveaustufen, jeweils in Verbindung mit übersichtlichen Merkblättern. Die Aufgaben der beiden unteren Niveaustufen lassen sich bereits für jüngere Lernende der Sekundarstufe einsetzen, Aufgaben der obersten Niveaustufe richten sich an Lernende von Abschlussklassen oder der Studieneingangsphase. Für die Hand der Lehrpersonen werden die Aufgaben und Merkblätter durch fachliche und didaktische Kommentare sowie Lösungshinweise ergänzt. (shrink)

This paper analyses a hitherto unknown technique of using logic diagrams to create argument maps in eristic dialectics. The method was invented in the 1810s and -20s by Arthur Schopenhauer, who is considered the originator of modern eristic. This technique of Schopenhauer could be interesting for several branches of research in the field of argumentation: Firstly, for the field of argument mapping, since here a hitherto unknown diagrammatic technique is shown in order to visualise possible situations of arguments in a (...) dialogical controversy. Secondly, the art of controversy or eristic, since the diagrams do not analyse the truth of judgements and the validity of inferences, but the persuasiveness of arguments in a dialogue. (shrink)

Emily Thomas's seminal book The Meaning of Travel has brought the philosophy of travel back into the public eye in recent years. Thomas has shown that the topic of travel can be approached from numerous different perspectives, ranging from the historical to the conceptual‐analytical, to the political or even social‐philosophical perspectives. This article introduces another perspective, which Thomas only indirectly addresses, namely the argumentation‐theoretical perspective. It is notable that contemporary philosophy of travel lacks the nineteenth‐century approach of using diagrams and (...) maps to examine arguments for and against travel. Since this approach starts with Schopenhauer, we first introduce his argument maps, discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and argue that a modified version is suitable to visualize and analyze arguments for and against traveling as presented in Thomas's work. (shrink)

Kognitive Dissonanzen und Inkonsistenzen gehören zu den zentralen Charakteristika philosophischer Probleme. Gleichzeitig wird die Philosophie zurecht dafür gepriesen, dass sie wichtige Kompetenzen und Tugenden fördert – etwa begriffliche Klarheit, treffende Problemanalyse, gute Argumentation, Kritikfähigkeit, Offenheit und konstruktives Diskutieren. Eine wichtiges Anwendungsgebiet dieser Kompetenzen und Tugenden besteht ihrerseits darin, Auswege aus kognitiven Dissonanzen finden und argumentativ begründen zu können. Inkonsistenzen sind demnach eine wichtige Gelenkstelle zwischen den Themen und Fragen der Philosophie und den zentralen Kompetenzen und Tugenden, die im Philosophieren ausgeübt (...) und geschult werden. So zumindest die Arbeitshypothese, die in diesem Beitrag verfolgt werden soll, und die zum Teil und in unterschiedlichen Hinsichten an vorliegende Ansätze anknüpft. (shrink)

Der Sammelband umfasst Aufsätze zu den Grundfragen, Anwendungen und Grenzen des Unterrichts des Argumentierens, in allen Fächern und mit Fokus auf die Fächer Philosophie und Ethik. Dabei werden Fragen wie diese behandelt: Welchen Zielen dient das Argumentieren und welche verfolgt der Unterricht des Argumentierens? In welchem Verhältnis stehen diese zu anderen Zielen des Unterrichts? Welche Kenntnisse, Fähigkeiten und Tugenden des Argumentierens sollen eingeübt werden und wie? Die vorgeschlagenen Antworten sind nicht nur für Personen aus der Fachdidaktik, sondern auch aus der (...) Philosophie und der Schullehrpraxis aller Fächer interessant. Der Band trägt damit auch zur stärkeren Etablierung des Felds der Argumentationsdidaktik bei. (shrink)