Argument

Philosophers often appeal to Bayesian confirmation theory to render speculative metaphysical arguments more rigorous. But can a probabilistic framework designed for empirical data decide questions of metaphysics? This paper argues that Huemer’s Bayesian “existence → immortality” inference fails on two independent grounds. First, the comparison tacitly shifts the content of the evidence across the competing identity theories: treating “I exist now” as a different event under a restrictive view than under a permissive view. So, the Bayesian evidence is ill-defined. Second, (...) if we hold the evidence fixed as the single indexical proposition E = “I exist now”, the key question is the relative likelihoods of E under each hypothesis. Once standard constraints on background verses evidence and on self-locating information are respected, there is no non-question-begging route to a Bayes factor that favors the permissive view of personal identity. Thus, mere existence does not confirm reincarnation. I remain agnostic on the correct theory of personal identity. (shrink)

The standard definition of “argument” is satisfied by any series of statements in which one (of the statements) is marked as the conclusion of the others. This leads to the counter-intuitive result that “I like cookies, therefore, all swans are white” is an argument, since “therefore” marks “all swans are white” as the conclusion of “I like cookies”. This objection is often disregarded by stating that, although the previous sequence is an argument, it fails to be a good one. However, (...) when we compare our previous argument with a definitely bad argument like “this swan is white, therefore, all swans are white”, we see that there is an important difference between them. Whereas the former fails to fulfil our intuition of what an argument is, the latter does qualify as an argument, but as a bad one. In this talk, I will sketch a definition that better captures this feature of our intuition of what an argument is in three steps. Following Díez and Moulines (1999), I first reduce inductive validity to deductive validity through what we may call the method of deductivisation. Second, through epistemic predicates (cf. Thompson 2002), I introduce a broader concept of validity that accounts not only for deductive and inductive validity, but also for a weaker type of validity that may be called pseudo-validity. I show that these pseudo-valid arguments can also be deductivised with the help of the above-mentioned epistemic predicates. Finally, I re-define the concept of argument as any series of statements that is at least pseudo-valid, which leaves the “cookies argument” outside of this definition. (shrink)

This work is aimed at providing an Islamic perspective on few selected informal logical fallacies. It serves an introduction to the theme of critical thinking and opens ways of reflecting on it, which is the main portion of critical thinking as a subject. Informal logical fallacies are numerous in number and for the sake of convenience they are very often categorized under three classifications: relevance, presumption, and ambiguity. This work discusses few fallacies. The methods applied in this research are descriptive, (...) analytical, conceptual, and critical. In short, in the beginning, the background of the subject and the basic concepts such as argument, fallacy, and critical thinking are briefly mentioned. Subsequently, fallacies are defined, conceptually analyzed, and then appraised according to Islamic perspective. (shrink)

For years, the European world saw millions of swans, and all of them without exception were white. If inductive reasoning is valid, one may conclude that all swans are white. However, this would be incorrect: in 1667 Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh observed black swans in Australia, falsifying the hypothesis that all swans are white. While often used as a cautionary tale for the use of induction, such as with Popper’s falsification principle, I want to explore a slightly different idea: (...) does the existence of fabricated or otherwise failed accounts of Black swans give me a reason to ignore future arguments or doubt their existence? I argue that while faulty or fabricated reports do not give us a logical reason to reject a claim, they can give us a practical one for refusing to consider future arguments. This practical vs logical distinction gives an inductive reason for believing that future arguments will be invalid, but keeps one from being able to necessarily deny the claim in question without further argumentation. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of an absolute—understood as an ultimate, self-sufficient, non-relational foundation of truth, knowledge, or reality—cannot be sustained even in principle. The failure is not empirical and does not depend on human cognitive limits. It is structural: the absolute is asked to be both fully independent of all relations and simultaneously capable of grounding truth, justification, or meaning. These demands are incompatible. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it states minimal conditions under which the notion (...) of truth retains an epistemic function: recognizability in principle, relationality, and distinguishability from error or fiction. Second, it shows that an absolute, defined as non-relational and criterion-free, cannot satisfy these conditions without ceasing to be absolute. Third, it demonstrates that any attempt to rescue absolute closure generates an infinite hierarchy of meta-levels: each claim of finality produces a further claim that must itself be included and justified. This yields a general theorem: no system can be both absolute and epistemically true. The paper concludes with practical implications for domains that repeatedly reintroduce absolutes in new forms, including artificial intelligence, “theory of everything” projects, and solipsistic epistemologies. Formal details and responses to common objections are provided in appendices. (shrink)

The burden of proof is widely used in argumentation theory, philosophy of science, and legal reasoning, but its logical basis is often left unclear. It is commonly treated as a dialogical rule, a procedural convention, or a norm of fair debate. Such approaches explain how the burden of proof operates within particular contexts, but they do not explain why it must be allocated asymmetrically in the first place. This paper argues that the asymmetry follows from a simple logical relation between (...) claims, independent of dialogical, procedural, or pragmatic considerations. When one claim is logically stronger than another—by entailing it without being entailed in return—it im- poses additional restrictions on what may be accepted. Accepting these restrictions without justification is therefore logically arbitrary. From this relation it follows that the burden of proof must rest on the logically stronger claim. This result is not proposed as a norm of debate or a procedural rule, but as a minimal logical constraint on non-arbitrary reasoning. Making this constraint explicit helps to clarify why disputes over the burden of proof recur across different domains and why attempts to reverse the burden typically lead to stalemate. (shrink)

The human condition in the city, tell by an self-made eremit, houseling toughts and stragenin' domestications.

In the present article, the author deals with the role of the middle term in the four figures of conjunctive syllogism. In this regard, he refers to the views of logicians such as Ibn Sina, Fakhr al-Din Razi, Muhaqqiq Tusi, Urmawi, Athir al-Din Abhari as well as Mulla Sadra. The author is of the view that many difficulties in syllogisms arise out of linguistic deficiencies.By resorting to Mulla Sadra's view, the author concludes that we are not compelled to divide the (...) syllogism to its traditional four forms, for on the basis of the Sadrian view, the only condition for the productivity of all forms of syllogism is the repetition of the middle term. Therefore, with regard to the mechanical deduction of the conclusion of premises, it seems unneccessary for us to distinguish the figures of a syllogism from each other. (shrink)

According to the mischaracterization objection developed by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen, philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their judgments about thought experiment cases, but rather argue for their case judgments. Although Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies in support of this claim, the reception of the mischaracterization objection has been surprisingly negative so far. In this paper, I will first clarify and elaborate the mischaracterization objection, explain its metaphilosophical significance, and then argue that all extant (...) replies to it fail. The mischaracterization objection is therefore much stronger than it is widely assumed to be, with potentially far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for the restrictionist challenge from experimental philosophy and the philosophical import of intuitions about hypothetical cases. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

In the wake of 9/11 and the assessment of Iraq's WMD, several inquiries placed the blame primarily on the Intelligence Community. Part of the reform that followed was a codification of analytic tradecraft standards into Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and the appointment of an analytic ombudsman in the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence charged with monitoring the quality of analytic products from across the intelligence community. In this paper we identify three assumptions behind ICD203: (1) (...) tradecraft standards can be employed consistently; (2) tradecraft standards sufficiently capture the key elements of good reasoning; (3) good reasoning leads to more accurate judgments. We then report on two controlled experiments that uncover operational constraints in the reliable application of the ICD203 criteria for the assessment of intelligence products. Despite criticisms of the post-9/11 and post-Iraq reform, our results highlight that ICD203, properly applied, holds potential to improve precision and accountability of intelligence processes and products. (shrink)

The established view about regress problems has it that they, roughly speaking, come in only one variety. This view is mistaken. Two types of problems are typically subsumed under the label of regress problems – stopping problems and starting problems. Both problem types share the same surface structure in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but their deeper founding structure reveals some key differences. Stopping problems rely on a regress clause, raise the question whether infinite chains are possible, and present (...) terminatism, infinitism, and nihilism as potential solutions. In contrast, standard starting problems, which many regress problems are, rely on a founding clause and not on a regress clause, do not raise questions about the possibility of infinite chains, and offer only two potential solutions, terminatism and nihilism. Non-standard starting problems also allow for infinitism as a viable solution, but nevertheless they differ structurally in various aspects from stopping problems. (shrink)

Lately, many have pointed out or proposed ways that arguments may be narrative and narratives may be argumentative. This chapter discusses the six basic possibilities: (1) argument in nonfictional or (2) fictional narrative; (3) nonfictional or (4) fictional narrative in argument; (5) argument by nonfictional or (6) fictional narrative. Possibilities 1-4 indicate a proper subset relation between the argument and narrative, whereas 5 and 6 indicate complete overlap. These possibilities cover such kinds of discourse as anecdotes, thought experiments, fables, and (...) novels. Not all of the possibilities are of equal interest. Possibility 6 is the most intriguing if not suspicious—how can fiction argue for the truth of something?—and so, is accorded the most space. (shrink)

Normative argumentation theory is a field dedicated to the normative study of argumentation in real-life contexts and to the development of norms meant to guide arguers in the attempt to argue well. Among argumentation theorists, there exist two widespread assumptions. First, the assumption that ideally, arguers ought to explore the reasons relevant to the topic of their interpersonal arguing without constraints. And second, the assumption that the norms of argumentation should be designed to contribute to the realization of this ideal. (...) In this paper, I question those assumptions. I show that argumentative norms meant to realize the ideal of free exploration, freedom-to-explore norms, reliably clash with morally valuable standing norms that protect privacy, autonomy and legitimate authority. When they so clash, they generate epistemic and other morally relevant harms. I argue that normative argumentation theory ought to resolve this problem by acknowledging the potential legitimacy of standing norms even during argumentation. I show how such a change would impact fallacy theory with respect to the ad hominem and poisoning the well fallacies. (shrink)

This article presents the epistemic or, more precisely, epistemological theory of argument. According to this theory, the standard aim of arguments is to lead an addressee to an epistemologically justified and acceptable belief in the thesis. The article provides an instrumentalist justification of this approach (arguments are good instruments for guided knowledge acquisition), presents other functions of arguments, and offers an analysis of how arguments work. This analysis then serves as the basis for developing criteria for various good types of (...) argument (deductive, probabilistic, practical, etc.) and for general criteria for epistemologically good arguments. A final outlook provides an overview of contributions from epistemological argumentation theorists on standard topics in argumentation theory: interpretation of arguments, (cooperative) argumentative dialogues, critical thinking, argumentation pedagogy. (shrink)

Research-based learning (RBL), promoting an enhanced research-teaching nexus, is a pedagogical approach that has been gaining ground in universities worldwide since the 1990s. What arguments could be used to convince university teachers to RBL into their teaching? In this paper, we try to provide answers by introducing the Cascade Model for justifying RBL, which links RBL to research on epistemic cognition. The model is based on a synthesis of findings from a research network on RBL in the context of higher (...) education reforms in Germany. These findings indicate that a mere focus on teaching formats is not sufficient for the successful implementation of RBL. Rather, the research must be meaningful to those involved - students and faculty alike. The Cascade Model for justifying RBL provides meaningful perspectives on RBL by distinguishing epistemic values that faculty might accept to justify RBL. The model suggests an argumentation cascade of possible references to four epistemic values: scientific, professional, skilled, and social. In this cascade, the link between teaching and scholarly research is progressively decreasing. We applied the Cascade Model to an interview study with 40 university teachers. The model’s categories could be reliably assigned to the responses, with “scientific” being the most frequently cited epistemic value. The ranking of values can be empirically substantiated. As predicted, “higher” levels of justification (i.e., closer to “scientific”) correlate with more RBL teaching. (shrink)

《道德经》是中国哲学史上被误解最深的经典之一。自汉代以来，主流解读多将其视 为宇宙论、政治哲学乃至神秘主义著作，认为老子旨在探讨宇宙本源、天地生成与治 国方略。本文以 “一源多元论”“玄弦论”“三相感”“各归其正” 为原创理论框架，对《道 德经》核心命题进行系统性文本还原与义理重构。研究指出：《道德经》虽大量使用道 生万物、天地、自然、谷神、玄牝等宇宙论表述，但其本质并非研究无情世界的物理 规律，而是以宇宙现象为喻，揭示人心本然之规律与修心路径。老子所言 “道法自 然”，并非道效法自然界，而是人心当遵循自身本然之理，不妄为、不执着、不违逆本 心；“无为” 并非消极不作为，而是不违背规律、不强行造作；“柔弱胜刚强” 并非物理 原理，而是心性修养与处世智慧。后世将老子的 “宇宙语言” 误读为宇宙论，混淆心性 领域与物理领域的存在层次，属于根本性方法错位。本文提出修正路径：心归心（《道 德经》本质为心性论），物归物（物理规律由科学研究），经典解读回归文本还原与义 理贯通。这一分析既还原老子本意，也为道家思想的当代转化提供方法论启示。.

This book explores some of the most pressing existential problems of our times, from climate change and social injustice, to the challenges of balancing personal needs against the needs of others. Pushing back against the tendency to think of dilemmas as clear-cut binary choices, anthropologist Michael Jackson shows us the ingenious ways dilemmas are addressed in non-Western traditions, as well as how they are reimagined and circumvented in a variety of contemporary settings. Each chapter examines a particular dilemma--from the apparent (...) contradictions between history and myth, fact and fiction, science and religion, to the land rights struggles of Indigenous peoples, to migrants from the Global South trying to sustain ties with their homelands while improving their lives abroad. Combining personal reflections with insights from a vast array of interlocutors, Jackson argues that the ways in which people endure dilemmas are as meaningful as the ways they attempt to resolve them"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

Public debates over the morality of new or emerging technologies tend to devolve into false dichotomies of optimism versus pessimism. Playing God with Emerging Technologies: How to Avoid the Traps of Techno-Optimism and Techno-Pessimism provides a conceptual apparatus for engaging in such debates in a critical manner through the constructive lens of “playing God” arguments. Moti Mizrahi sketches a conceptual framework consisting of an argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments along with Critical Questions. This framework can be used to analyze (...) and evaluate “playing God” arguments as they are made in debates over the ethical development and deployment of new and emerging technologies, such as solar geoengineering, Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, autonomous weapons, and more. Mizrahi argues that “playing God” arguments allow us to assume an intermediate, critical attitude between the extremes of hype and panic as well as to approach the governance of new or emerging technologies in ways that might help to increase our control over, improve our understanding of, and prevent our misuse or abuse of such technologies. (shrink)

This paper argues that the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice constitutes an elaboration of the Socratic search for truth by question-and-answer adversary argument, which led Wittgenstein to develop new methods for uncovering and resolving deep disagreements. On a methodological level, it is argued that this Socratic method (known as Socratic elenchus) is essentially a search for deep disagreement and necessarily raises philosophical questions concerning morality.

In situations of disagreement in a polarized social world, rational argument is not always successful in persuading those who do not share our beliefs. Narratives of personal experiences have empirically shown to help bridge divides between disagreeing interlocutors, though this raises the question of how particular, personal narratives relate to the universal appeal of argumentation. It also leads us to reflect upon the dangers of these narratives functioning as a type of propaganda that bypasses reason. In this paper, I discuss (...) how understanding narratives as ways to build common ground using standpoint-informed knowledge (hereafter: standpoint knowledge) can explain the empirical belief-changing potential of narratives. Additionally, viewing deliberation in the public sphere as a communal constitution of common ground may alleviate worries of narratives functioning as propaganda and explain how narratives foster perceived rationality, respect and humanity. On this account, our shared history is constantly shaped by narratives that we build together, which also allows for criticism of these narratives in a pluralist public sphere. (shrink)

I contend that certain non-verbal paintings such as Picasso’s GUERNICA make (simple) arguments. The modern study of visual argument has mostly focused on partially verbal media such as ads, posters, and cartoons, rather than non-verbal, classic art forms like painting. If a painting’s argument is reasonably good, it would be a source of cognitive value. My analogical approach is to show how pertinent features of viable literary cognitivism can be applied to non-verbal painting.

Computational models have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents as they approximate epistemic rationality. This paper provides further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but it does not depend on limitations that extant models rely on, such as memory restrictions or biased evaluation of other agents’ testimony. Instead, deliberation is modelled through agents’ purposeful introduction of arguments and their rational reactions to introductions of others. This process induces polarisation dynamics on its (...) own. A second result is that the effect size of polarisation dynamics correlates with particular types of argumentative behaviour. Polarisation effects can be soothed when agents take into account the opinions of others as premises, and they are amplified as agents fortify their own beliefs. These results underpin the relevance of argumentation as a factor in social-epistemic processes and indicate that rising issue polarisation is not a reliable indicator of epistemic shortcomings. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for (...) the associated premises, rules whose compliance implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. Finally, on the basis of the most suitable approach, namely the epistemological one, such systems of rules for the required types of arguments are presented that fulfil the conditions mentioned. (shrink)

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...) doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. (shrink)

This paper develops a measure of the influence of individual arguments in abstract argumentation frameworks. By applying ideas from power indices in coalitional game theory, the proposed measure—called admissibility impact value—quantifies the impact that individual arguments have on the set of admissible extensions of a given argumentation framework. It improves on existing impact measures in that it is more fine-grained and sensitive to small differences in the attack relations of argumentation frameworks. Special consideration is given to well-founded frameworks, where the (...) improvements are particularly pronounced. (shrink)

[Winner of the American Philosophical Association’s 2024 Journal of Value Inquiry Prize.] My thesis is that certain non-verbal paintings such as Picasso’s GUERNICA make (simple) arguments. If this is correct and the arguments are reasonably good, it would indicate one way that non-literary art can be cognitively valuable, since argument can provide the justification needed for knowledge or understanding. The focus is on painting, but my findings seem applicable to comparable visual art forms (a sculpture is also considered). My approach (...) largely consists of identifying pertinent features of viable literary cognitivism and then showing how they or close analogues can be applied to non-verbal painting. The two main features are the requirements, first, that the relevant knowledge is provided significantly in virtue of the distinctive essential feature of literary fictions, i.e., their fictionality, and second, that the knowledge stems primarily from the content of the work, not from what the auditor brings to the work. Some ways that literary fiction has been taken to be argumentative are explained, and striking similarities are found between argumentative literary fiction and argumentative painting. Potential objections are addressed, and I examine a proposed way to express, in a schematized format, both the power of an argumentative painting and its relatively simple associated propositional content. (shrink)

I contend that certain non-verbal paintings such as Picasso’s GUERNICA make (simple) arguments. The modern study of visual argument has mostly focused on partially verbal media such as ads, posters, and cartoons, rather than non-verbal, classic art forms like painting. If a painting’s argument is reasonably good, it would be a source of cognitive value. My analogical approach is to show how pertinent features of viable literary cognitivism can be applied to non-verbal painting.

This chapter presents a typology of the different kinds of inductive inferences we can draw from our evidence, based on the explanatory relationship between evidence and conclusion. Drawing on the literature on graphical models of explanation, I divide inductive inferences into (a) downwards inferences, which proceed from cause to effect, (b) upwards inferences, which proceed from effect to cause, and (c) sideways inferences, which proceed first from effect to cause and then from that cause to an additional effect. I further (...) distinguish between direct and indirect forms of downwards and upwards inferences. I then show how we can subsume canonical forms of inductive inference mentioned in the literature, such as inference to the best explanation, enumerative induction, and analogical inference, under this typology. Along the way, I explore connections with probability and confirmation, epistemic defeat, the relation between abduction and enumerative induction, the compatibility of IBE and Bayesianism, and theories of epistemic justification. (shrink)

Default positions, predetermined starting points that aid in complex decision-making, are common in clinical medicine. In this article, we identify and critically examine common default positions in clinical ethics practice. Whether default positions ought to be held is an important normative question, but here we are primarily interested in the descriptive, rather than normative, properties of default positions. We argue that default positions in clinical ethics function to protect and promote important values in medicine—respect for persons, utility, and justice. Further, (...) default positions in clinical ethics may also guard against harm. Where default positions exist, there are epistemic burdens to overturn them. The person wishing to reject the default position, rather than the person endorsing it, bears this burden. The person who bears the burden of meeting the epistemic requirements must provide evidence proportional to the degree of harm the default position protects against. Default positions that protect against significant harm impose significant epistemic requirements to overturn. This asymmetry not only makes medical decision-making more economical but also serves to promote and protect certain values. The identification and analysis of common and recognizable default positions can help to identify other default positions and the conditions under which their associated epistemic requirements are met. The article concludes with considerations of potential problems with the use of default positions in clinical ethics. (shrink)

Several important philosophical problems (including the problems of perception, free will, and scepticism) arise from antinomies that are developed through philosophical paradoxes. The critical strand of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as practiced by J.L. Austin, provides an approach to such ‘antinomic problems’ that proceeds from an examination of ‘ordinary language’ (how people ordinarily talk about the phenomenon of interest) and ‘common sense’ (what they commonly think about it), and deploys findings to show that the problems at issue are artefacts of (...) fallacious reasoning. The approach is capable, and in need of, empirical development. Proceeding from a case-study on Austin’s paradigmatic treatment of the problem of perception, this paper identifies the key empirical assumptions informing the approach, assesses them in the light of empirical findings about default inferences, contextualisation failures, and belief fragmentation, and explores how these findings can be deployed to address the problem of perception. This facilitates a novel resolution of the problem of perception. Proceeding from this paradigm, the paper proposes ‘experimental critical OLP’ as a new research program in experimental philosophy that avoids apparent non-sequiturs of OLP, extends and transforms experimental philosophy’s ‘sources program’, and provides a promising new strategy for deploying empirical findings about how people ordinarily talk and think about phenomena, to address longstanding philosophical problems. (shrink)

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional (...) but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds from the standard picture of the relation between intuitions and experimental philosophy: the alleged evidential role of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and experimental philosophy’s challenge to these judgments, based on their variation with philosophically irrelevant factors. I will survey some of the main defenses of this standard picture against the x-phi challenge, most of which fail. Concerning the most popular defense, the expertise defense, I will draw the bleak conclusion that intuitive expertise of the envisaged kind is (...) largely a myth. Next, I will consider the mischaracterization objection, which has mainly been developed by Deutsch and Cappelen on the basis of textual evidence: that philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their case judgments, but instead argue for them. This would render the x-phi challenge mostly irrelevant, due to its focus on intuitions about hypothetical cases. I will then consider a few instructive replies to the mischaracterization objection, which are all unconvincing on further inspection. Finally, I will discuss some potential normative consequences of the mischaracterization objection, and I will argue that it recommends a shift away from the excessive focus on intuitions about cases in metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy, towards more work on the role of argumentation in the method of cases. More speculatively, I claim that philosophers should always argue for their case judgments, even if they have strong intuitions about them, because an argument-based methodology would be more transparent and philosophically fruitful than one that mainly relies on intuition. (shrink)

In recent years, two competing methodological frameworks have developed in the study of the epistemology of philosophy. The traditional camp, led by experimental philosophy and its allies, has made inferences about the epistemology of philosophy based on the reactions, or intuitions, people have to works of philosophy. In contrast, multiple authors have followed the lead of Deutsch and Cappelen by setting aside experimental data in favor of inferences based on careful examination of the text of notable works of philosophy. In (...) other words, the debate is split between authors focusing on philosophy’sconsumptionand those focusing on philosophy’sproduction. This paper examines the motivation for focusing on original texts and other evidence of philosophy’s production and finds it lacking. Drawing upon Hills’ distinction between propagation and transmission, I argue that the social epistemology of philosophy does not justify the recent focus on original texts of philosophy. Because the philosophical knowledge of consumers of philosophy is likelyinspiredby producers of philosophy, as opposed to epistemically grounded in the producers’ epistemic states, experimental philosophy had it right all along—if we want to know the epistemic standing of philosophy, we need to look to philosophy’s consumers. (shrink)

The Legacy of Aristotelian Enthymeme provides a historical-logical analysis of Aristotle's rhetorical syllogism, the enthymeme, through its Medieval and Renaissance interpretations. Bringing together notions of credibility and proof, an international team of scholars highlight the fierce debates around this form of argumentation during two key periods for Aristotle's beliefs.Reflecting on medieval and humanist thinkers, philosophers, poets and theologians, this volume joins up dialectical and rhetorical argumentation as key to the enthymeme's interpretation and shows how the enthymeme was the source of (...) a major interpretive conflict. As a method for achieving the standards for proof and credibility that persist across diverse fields of study today including the law, politics, medicine and morality, this book takes in Latin and Persian interpretations of the enthymeme and casts contemporary argumentation in a new historical light. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...) of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation. (shrink)

The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of (...) rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles. (shrink)

Drawing on the epistemology of logic literature on anti-exceptionalism about logic, we set out to investigate the following metaphilosophical questions empirically: Is philosophy special? Are its methods (dis)continuous with science? More specifically, we test the following metaphilosophical hypotheses empirically: philosophical deductivism, philosophical inductivism, and philosophical abductivism. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we searched through a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (N = 435,703) to find patterns of (...) argumentation. The results of our quantitative, corpus-based study suggest that deductive arguments are significantly more common than abductive arguments and inductive arguments in philosophical texts overall, but they are gradually and steadily giving way to non-deductive (i.e. inductive and abductive) arguments in academic philosophy. (shrink)

We develop a novel argument scheme tailored to debates surrounding public votes on a state action. It can be used to propose reasons for voting “yes” or “no” and allows for natural reconstructions of such debates. These reconstructions are of particular use to voters trying to weigh the pros and cons of the proposed state action. The scheme for proposing reasons helps answering two questions: What changes will the proposed state action bring with it? And are these changes good or (...) not? Using the scheme, we derive a three-layered structure of public debates surrounding votes that aides in constructing systematic and comprehensive overviews. The scheme for proposing reasons also lends itself to concise summaries for voter information and can be incorporated into more general deliberation dialogues. (shrink)

This book addresses the question of how to properly handle Dōgen’s texts, a core issue that became critical during the Meiji period in which the philosophical appropriation of Dōgen became apparent inside and outside of the monastery. In present day Dōgen studies, most scholarship is informed by a number of factions representing Dōgen. The chapters herein address: the Zennist (j. zenjōka) emphasising practice, the Genzōnians (j. genzōka) shifting the attention to the close reading of Dōgen’s texts, the laity movement opening (...) up both the texts and the practice to people in modern society, and the Genzō researchers (j. genzō kenkyūka) searching for the authenticity and truth of Dōgen’s writings. The book aims to clarify the rightful place of Dōgen: in the monastery, in denominational studies, or in modern academic philosophy? It brings forth various viewpoints on Dōgen, and analyzes the relations of these viewpoints from the premodern to modern times. The collected volume appeals to students and researchers in the field while establishing hermeneutic standards of reading and proposing new, original, and critical interpretations of Dōgen’s texts. Chapter From Uji to Being-time (and Back): Translating Dōgen into Philosophy is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer. com. (shrink)

We present an interdisciplinary approach to argumentation combining logical, probabilistic, and psychological perspectives. We investigate logical attack principles which relate attacks among claims with logical form. For example, we consider the principle that an argument that attacks another argument claiming A triggers the existence of an attack on an argument featuring the stronger claim [Formula: see text]. We formulate a number of such principles pertaining to conjunctive, disjunctive, negated, and implicational claims. Some of these attack principles seem to be prima (...) facie more plausible than others. To support this intuition, we suggest an interpretation of these principles in terms of coherent conditional probabilities. This interpretation is naturally generalized from qualitative to quantitative principles. Specifically, we use our probabilistic semantics to evaluate the rationality of principles which govern the strength of argumentative attacks. In order to complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical perspective, we present an experiment with students of the TU Vienna ([Formula: see text]) which explores the psychological plausibility of selected attack principles. We also discuss how our qualitative attack principles relate to well-known types of logical argumentation frameworks. Finally, we briefly discuss how our approach relates to the computational argumentation literature. (shrink)

I show that in our theoretical representations of argument, vicious infinite regresses of self-reference may arise with respect to each of the three usual, informal criteria of argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. They arise needlessly, by confusing a cogency criterion with argument content. The three types of regress all are structurally similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous regress, which involves quantitative extravagance with no explanatory power. Most attention is devoted to the sufficiency criterion, including its (...) relation to the view au courant that inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking her premises to support her conclusion. I contend that this view is mistaken and likewise that arguments make no such assumption or inference claim as that the premises support the conclusion. The core of the positive alternative model I propose is that there is commitment to, but not claiming, the proposition that the premises support the conclusion. (shrink)

This paper argues that the proponents of epistemological scientism must take some stand on scientific methodology. The supporters of scientism cannot simply defer to the social organisation of science because the social processes themselves must meet some methodological criteria. Among such criteria is epistemic evaluability, which demands intersubjective access to reasons. We derive twelve theses outlining some implications of epistemic evaluability. Evaluability can support weak and broad variants of epistemological scientism, which state that sciences, broadly construed, are the best sources (...) of knowledge or some other epistemic goods. Since humanities and social sciences produce epistemically evaluable results, narrow types of scientism that take only natural sciences as sources of knowledge require additional argumentation in their support. Strong scientism, which takes sciences as the only source of knowledge, also needs to appeal to some further principles since evaluability is not an all-or-nothing affair. (shrink)

We investigate the impact of informal arguments on judgments about thought experiment cases in light of Deutsch and Cappelen’s mischaracterization view, which claims that philosophers’ case judgments are primarily based on arguments and not intuitions. If arguments had no influence on case judgments, this would seriously challenge whether they are, or should be, based on arguments at all—and not on other cognitive sources instead, such as intuition. In Experiment 1, we replicated Wysocki’s (Rev Philos Psychol 8(2):477–499, 2017) pioneering study on (...) a Gettier-style case, and we confirmed that the informal arguments used by him had no significant effect. However, we also included an improved argument for ascribing knowledge, which did have a significant effect even in Wysocki’s original design. We therefore followed up with Experiment 2 on three Gettier-style cases, where we used a more natural dialogical format for presenting both case descriptions and informal arguments. Overall, we found a clear impact of prima facie good pro and con arguments on case judgments. The issue of argument impact is thus no obstacle to arguing about thought experiments. (shrink)

This chapter argues that a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of populism and offer some lines of response. Virtue theories of argumentation emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices. One variety of argumentation of particular relevance to democratic decision-making is group deliberation. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for maintaining that intellectual (...) humility is pivotal to the practice of group deliberation. Several factors to which the rise of populism has been attributed may be understood as failures of the virtues of argumentation in general, and intellectual humility in particular. (shrink)

In “Is Philosophy Exceptional? A Corpus-Based, Quantitative Study” (2022), Moti Mizrahi and Michael Adam Dickinson use corpus methods to determine the kinds of arguments that turn up in philosophical writing. They use the results to contribute to debates on philosophy’s “specialness” or “exceptionality”. To what extent is philosophy interestingly unlike other knowledge-making disciplines? Specifically, does it deploy different forms of argument than the sciences or other disciplines? -/- These questions are interesting, and Mizrahi and Dickinson’s methodological approach is impressive. Nonetheless, (...) we have concerns about the approach. In this short reply, we argue there are reasons to worry about the accuracy of the results that the authors report and reasons to wonder how their results, even if accurate, shed light on questions about philosophy’s specialness. We end with some thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses of the project and some suggestions for next steps for those interested in moving this project (and others of its ilk) forward. (shrink)