International Order

Imagine a soccer dominated society and life-world. No damn military and stupid land disputes. Sustainable Economy. Radical reconciliation with nature. Adopting to natural structures. Singular global acutely politically concentrated free market least exploitative and disruptive to nature beyond that only soccer-related. ------ As an emissary from political unconscious, I speak directly to political power eye-to-eye universally: legalize assisted suicide (I so much rather be dead than be dependent on others) AND self-destruction via artificial narcotics AND consumption of natural narcotics as (...) long as at any case no harm is inflicted on other people. -/- . (shrink)

what really needs to remain from the text at the end of the day is that which contains all there is to know about how to live the end (The Final Text). The most effective technique of acceleration to the summit of history is to forget all that needs to be forgotten. Perhaps languages must compete and merge for unification. One thing that for sure has to go is that who wrote what and when. Once the author is physically dead, (...) absolutely nothing benefits him posthumously. What matters is Total semiosis and internalization of terms of hegemonic anarchism constrained by zero violence and singular acutely politically concentrated free market. (shrink)

This paper focuses upon the challenge posed by the concept of ‘information’ to the new materialisms, viewed with reference to the multifaceted worldly phenomenon of informational conflict. ‘Informational conflict’ is a broad term designed to encompass the hi-tech ‘cyber’ operations of inter-state warfare as well as the informational actions of non-state actors, and is contingent not upon information technologies, as commonly understood, but upon ‘information’. Informational conflicts can be viewed as sociotechnical assemblages of humans and non-humans although information is a (...) problematic component of these assemblages, on account of its uncertain ontological status. This paper addresses the ontology of information and asks how the new materialisms might respond in the various ontological registers described. Drawing upon the natural sciences—especially physics—and the emerging ‘philosophy of information’ to outline the metaphysics of information and the differences that exist in its ontological characterisation, the paper outlines informational challenges to materialist perspectives. It concludes by examining two examples of how information and materiality are addressed in International Relations with respect to informational conflict. It concludes by noting the positive contributions the new materialisms can make to the study of information and informational conflict, but challenges them by asking: Information matters for conflict; does it matter for materialism? (shrink)

One of the main hurdles for theorizing the legitimacy of the huge variety of international governance institutions is identifying which features of institutions matter most for their legitimacy. I have argued that institutional function is the primary feature because to evaluate an institution’s legitimacy just is to evaluate whether we should treat it as if it has the standing it requires to function. For international institutions, then, we need a principled way of identifying institutional function that avoids the naïve options (...) of appealing to design intention or practitioner assertion. In this paper, I apply a causal role analysis to institutional function and argue that we must situate international institutions within a containing state system. By situating international institutions within the state system, we can identify particular institutions’ role in sustaining the state system’s ongoing operations. Playing this role is their function, explaining their persistence in the system and the shape their operations take. This function then gives us grounds for evaluating the institution’s legitimacy as belonging to a functional kind. I argue that this sort of analysis is already at play in Jean Cohen’s work on international law and the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council. (shrink)

This paper provides a realist analysis of the EU's legitimacy. We propose a modification of Bernard Williams' theory of legitimacy, which we term critical responsiveness. For Williams, 'Basic Legitimation Demand + Modernity = Liberalism'. Drawing on that model, we make three claims. (i) The right side of the equation is insufficiently sensitive to popular sovereignty; (ii) The left side of the equation is best thought of as a 'legitimation story': a non-moralised normative account of how to shore up belief in (...) legitimacy while steering clear of both raw domination and ideological distortions. (iii) The EU's current legitimation story draws on a tradition of popular sovereignty that sits badly with the supranational delegation and pooling of sovereign powers. We conclude by suggesting that the EU's legitimation deficit may be best addressed demoicratically, by recovering the value of popular sovereignty at the expense of a degree of state sovereignty. (shrink)

The liberal international legal order faces a legitimacy crisis today that becomes visible with the recent anti-internationalist turn, the rise of populism and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Either its authority or legitimacy has been tested many times over the last three decades. The article argues that this anti-internationalist trend may be read as a reaction against the neoliberal form taken by international law, not least over the last three decades. In uncovering the intricacies of international law’s legitimacy crisis, (...) the article uncovers the paradox of global constitutionalism: that its need to adopt a sectoral form of integration may cause a legitimacy gap/deficit because international authorities, resting their legitimacy primarily on instrumental grounds, may face problems in compensating for the legitimacy deficit caused by the erosion of domestic sovereignty and extending their legitimacy to non-instrumental grounds. This paradox has one necessary structural and two contingent content-related implications for domestic democracies: (1) it necessarily narrows down the regulatory space of nation-states; and this may in turn (2) impair democratic stability and solidarity, and (3) provide a fertile ground for populism. Drawing on Raz’s service conception, the article focuses on the interaction between international and domestic authorities and highlights the problematic aspects of the neoliberal constitutionalization of international law. (shrink)

This chapter rethinks the legitimacy of international law by challenging the assumption that legitimate authority must generate a moral duty to obey. It argues instead that legitimacy is better understood as a moral power to impose and enforce institutional obligations, rendering subjects liable to changes in their normative situation, rather than as the source of exclusionary reasons for compliance. The chapter criticizes the dominant service conception for producing a piecemeal account of international legal authority, particularly through subject fragmentation that undermines (...) equality and coordination. Furthermore, it struggles to guide action under conditions of reasonable disagreement and risks entrenching global power asymmetries. By contrast, the power-liability account shifts attention from obligations to obey particular directives to liability to be bound by an institutional order as a whole. This shift supports a systemic and relational approach to legitimacy, on which international legal authority cannot be assessed at the level of individual rules or institutions, but must be evaluated in light of the interdependencies among legal regimes, international institutions, and states. The chapter concludes that recent erosions of multilateralism, human rights protection, and constraints on the use of force point to a deeper legitimacy crisis of the international legal order. (shrink)

The article contends that Slavoj Žižek has moved from a daring theorist of radical universality to a more cautious, and internally inconsistent, political voice. Where he once framed emancipation as a disruptive force emerging from the excluded, he now treats migration as a problem of control, accepting borders and defending European stability. In doing so, he contradicts his own earlier insight that such limits are not neutral, but central to how capitalism organizes inequality. The result is a hollowing-out of his (...) radicalism: the philosopher retains the rhetoric of rupture, but retreats in practice, trading universal emancipation for a defensive, mostly Eurocentric politics. (shrink)

The article aims to outline the message of the concepts of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The text draws attention to the new conditions and criteria for membership of the European Union for the countries of the Western Balkan which they must fulfill in order to join EU. Their recovery and coping with the legacy of the severe wars from the 1990s have not yet come to an end. They first need to pass the stabilization and democratization processes and only (...) after that can be associated. The paper focuses on the European Union’s policy towards the Western Balkans since the launching of the Stabilization and Association Process in 1999 until the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018. Although all the progress during the last two decades in the countries of the Western Balkans they still don’t have enough achievements in some of the most important areas – democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority rights, competitive market. The willingness of the Western Balkans’ governments to join the Union is prominent but the European leaders are not taking yet any commitment to certain promise regarding the European integration of the region. Keywords: European idea, European Union, enlargement of the EU, Euro-Atlantic integration, Euro-Atlantic values, Western Balkans. (shrink)

Um die Legitimation des Völkerstrafrechts als eines Instruments des universalen Menschenrechtsschutzes zu stärken, ist es an der Zeit, dass sich das Völkerstrafrecht Diskursen öffnet, die sich mit den Implikationen kolonialen Denkens und kolonialer Praktiken beschäftigen. Diese Auseinandersetzung will der vorliegende Band voranbringen. Er erhält Beiträge von Vertreter:innen der Postkolonialen Theorie sowie von Vertreter:innen der Völkerstrafrechtswissenschaft, die die Herausforderungen und das Potential der postkolonialen Kritik für das Völkerstrafrecht ausloten.

Detta är ett bidrag till ett boksymposium om Torbjörn Tännsjös Från despoti till demokrati. Jag hävdar att Tännsjö inte har gett oss några skäl att betrakta en global despoti som en sannolik lösning på den globala upphettningens problem, samt kritiserar hans tes om överlapp mellan olika teorier om global rättvisa.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has intensified the global tension between digital inclusion, which advocates for equitable access to technology, and digital sovereignty, emphasizing national control over data and infrastructure. This article exam ines how Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) can reconcile these competing im peratives by embedding ethical principles, such as inclusivity, sustainability, precaution, and reflexivity, into technology governance. Through qualitative case studies in educa tion (e.g., Kenya’s eLimu and India’s DIKSHA platforms) and healthcare (e.g., WHO’s pandemic (...) data-sharing protocols), the study demonstrates that RRI fosters participatory design, balances sovereignty with global collaboration, and mitigates systemic biases. Findings reveal that rigid sovereignty policies often exacerbate inequalities, while RRI driven frameworks enable marginalized communities to co-create solutions, ensuring culturally relevant and ethically aligned technologies. The analysis highlights RRI’s po tential to transform geopolitical competition into equitable governance, advocating for its institutionalization through international mechanisms such as the UN’s Global Digital Compact. By prioritizing social justice, RRI redefines sovereignty as a stewardship obli gation, ensuring AI development uplifts, rather than undermines, vulnerable populations. The article concludes that integrating RRI principles into both global and local agendas is crucial for dismantling digital hierarchies and promoting inclusive innovation. (shrink)

Duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap, particularly amongst those populations most capable of bearing the financial burdens of fulfiling them. This motivation gap is explained, at least in part, by the structure of the state system, which facilitates group identification with fellow citizens to a greater extent than with outsiders. This structural feature of the state system gives states little incentive to further the cause of global justice. Yet, given that states are the most powerful actors (...) on the global stage today, a more just global order is likely predicated upon the development of more just states. In light of these realities, in this paper I make the case for an approach to furthering global justice which i call inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation calls for the initially modest structural transformation of domestic states, so as to make domestic governments and their constituents increasingly sensitive to their international obligations. Inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states' representatives. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. After outlining these functions, thereby showing the attraction of inward internationalisation, I argue for the strategic accessibility of inward internationalisation as a path to reform, by outlining the dynamics which might cause inward internationalisation to spread as a norm of governance amongst states. (shrink)

In her important book Promoting Justice Across Borders, Lucia Rafanelli offers a detailed account of ‘reform interventions’, seen as ‘any deliberate attempt to promote justice in a foreign society’. Such interventions, she argues, can and should be subject to ethical evaluation, including standards relating to toleration, legitimacy, and collective self-determination. While I am sympathetic to many of Rafanelli's arguments, in this essay I will argue that, for a large number of cases this complex moral machinery is not needed, because the (...) acts in question either are, or could be, morally indifferent when looked at from the perspective of interaction between members of the international community. In particular, I argue that many market or economic interactions between states fall into this morally indifferent zone, and so need not meet the standards set out by Rafanelli to be acceptable. (shrink)

Although there is now a large and sophisticated literature on ethical or moral matters relating to family immigration and immigration enforcement, the intersection of these topics has not been greatly explored. This is unfortunate, as particular and difficult normative issues arise in relation to immigration enforcement when applied to children and to families where some members are unauthorized migrants and others are citizens or authorized migrants (“mixed-status” families). This chapter addresses this deficit, explaining some of these special difficulties and providing (...) suggestions as to how they may be addressed. (the file below is a final pre-publication version. Please cite to the published version.). (shrink)

Consequentialism is often criticized as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection—the Demandingness Objection—as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response relying on the framework of institutional consequentialism we introduced in previous work. On this view, institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set (...) up and maintain institutions. We first describe the Objection, then clarify the theory of institutional consequentialism and show how it responds to the Objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential challenges. (shrink)

The moral status of negligent actions presents a unique quandary because these actions are prima facie unintentional, but preventable with due care. Legally culpable negligent acts occur without malicious intent but result in harm, and the agent owed care to the victim, but failed to act with the appropriate care due. In this essay, I argue that the moral status of negligent actions varies depending on whether the agent is an individual, or an organization or institution. I contend that while (...) negligence is often only minimally morally blameworthy for individual agents, it is significantly more blameworthy for an organization or institution. As agents, institutions are different in kind from individuals, partly due to their superior capacities, which give them the ability to shape their own character, and therefore the moral fault of their vices that lead to culpably negligent actions are morally weightier than those of individuals. (shrink)

This article critically assesses Patti Lenard’s conception of subjection, which lies at the heart of Democracy and Exclusion. My aim is to uncover and analyse the logic underlying this conception, and then to offer an objection to Lenard’s application of it. I will argue that Lenard’s account of subjection in contemporary border control is underinclusive: it fails to capture a set of outsiders who, by the logic of her conception, should count as subjected to the state’s legal order. Further, and (...) more controversially, I suggest that Lenard’s account is also overinclusive: it captures a set of insiders who, by the logic of her conception, should not count as such. (shrink)

Turkish Version Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana Orta Asya, günümüz jeopolitiğinde Çin, ABD, AB ve Rusya gibi küresel güçlerin ilgisini çeken kritik bir arena olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra bölgede yeni bir güç boşluğu ortaya çıkmış ve ABD, AB ve Çin gibi küresel güçler ikili ve çok taraflı ekonomik anlaşmalar yoluyla yavaş yavaş bölgeye dahil olmuşlardır. Bu tez, "Yeni Büyük Oyun" bağlamında Rusya ve Çin'in Orta Asya'ya yönelimleri üzerine kapsamlı ve karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma yürütmektedir. On dokuzuncu yüzyılda (...) imparatorluk Rusya'sı ile Büyük Britanya arasında Orta Asya'da nüfuz sahibi olmak için yaşanan rekabetin yerini alan "Yeni Büyük Oyun" terimi, ticaret yollarına, enerji kaynaklarına ve siyasi nüfuza erişim için yaşanan rekabet ile karakterize edilmektedir. Tez araştırması, küresel güçlerin Orta Asya'ya yönelim stratejilerini, dış politika motivasyonlarını ve sonuçlarını değerlendirmek için jeopolitik ve uluslararası ilişkilerden yararlanan çok disiplinli yaklaşımları içermektedir. Bu tez, küresel güçlerin Orta Asya'ya yönelişini karşılaştırmalı ve zıt bir şekilde inceleyerek, stratejilerinin yakınsak ve ıraksak yönlerini ve bunun bölgesel ve küresel güç dengesi üzerindeki sonuçlarını açıklamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, küresel güçlerin Orta Asya'ya yönelmesine vurgu yaparak Yeni Büyük Oyun'un jeopolitiğinin karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmesi, küresel güç rekabetinin değişen dinamiklerini anlamak açısından kritik önem taşımaktadır. Sonuçta bu karşılaştırmalı çalışma, Yeni Büyük Oyun'a ve onun 21. yüzyıldaki küresel politikaya etkilerine ilişkin bakışlara katkıda bulunmaktadır. English Version Since the end of the Cold War, Central Asia has emerged as a critical arena in contemporary geopolitics dragging the attention of the global powers such as China, U.S., EU and Russia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new power vacuum emerged in the region, and global powers like U.S., EU amd China gradually became involved in the region through bilateral and multilateral economic deals. This thesis conducts a comprehensive comparative study of Russia's and China's respective pivots to Central Asia in the context of the "New Great Game." Hence, the term "New Great Game" as the replacement of the old nineteenth-century rivalry between imperial Russia and Great Britain for the influence of Central Asia is characterized by the competition for access to trade routes, energy resources, and political influence. The thesis research involves multi-disciplinary approaches drawing on geopolitics and international relations to assess strategies, foreign policy motivation and outcomes of global powers pivot to Central Asia. Through a comparative and contrast study of global powers pivot towards Central Asia, this thesis explains the convergent and divergent aspects of their strategies and the consequential implications for the regional and global balance of power. Hence, the comaprative study of the geopolitics of the New Great Game, with an emphasis on global powers pivot to Central Asia, is critical to understanding the shifting dynamics of global power competition. Eventually, this comparative study contributes to our understanding of the New Great Game and its implications for global politics in the 21st century. (shrink)

The book takes a hard look at libertarian foreign policy doctrines, especially those of non-intervention, interstate federalism, and non-aggression, and applies new insights to these old doctrines. Classical liberal thinkers such as Vincent Ostrom, James Madison, and F.A. Hayek have all hinted at the idea of world governance from a libertarian standpoint. Yet today, “the libertarian position” on foreign policy is either non-intervention from the US side of the Atlantic or a halfhearted confederation from the European side of the Atlantic. (...) The themes that emerge in this volume (II) are whether or not libertarian alternatives to the status quo are workable and, if so, whatwould they look like. (shrink)

This article scrutinizes discourse surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war in Western nations, where, despite widespread support for Ukraine, a contingent advocates for peace by rejecting military aid. This “pacifist” stance gains traction through public demonstrations in European countries and political endorsement. However, by opposing military aid while advocating peace, these messages, while ostensibly altruistic, distort genuine efforts for establishing peace in Ukraine. The article argues that recent developments from the philosophy of language, combined with the realities of Russia’s invasion and main (...) war objectives, provide clarity on this phenomenon, making a case for considering such calls for peace as propagandistic, perverting the meaning of the word. (shrink)

Corruption is a ubiquitous problem. As Gillian Brock notes early on, it exists to one degree or another in all societies, no matter their stage of development, and is regularly identified by the public as one of the top problems in the world (2–3). Despite its importance and frequency, it hasn’t been a central topic for philoso- phers working on normative moral and political theory. This isn’t to say that it has been ignored, but it has mostly been seen as (...) a specialty topic in areas such as business ethics, criminal law theory focusing on white-collar crime, or certain sub- areas in democratic theory. However, as Brock points out, corruption has particular importance for questions of global justice, given that “corruption plays an enor- mous role in sustaining global injustice and hinders efforts aimed at remedying global deprivations” (17). This comes not only from the sort of large-scale corrup- tion by government officials that starves developing countries of funds needed to provide necessary services but also from more day-to-day corruption in the provi- sion of water, leaving many people without access to clean drinking water; in con- struction, where people must make do with substandard and unsafe buildings; in the provision of education and medical services; and so on. Despite the massive size of the global justice literature, Brock’s book is one of the first—perhaps the first— to focus specifically on corruption in relation to global justice. It would be an im- portant work for this reason alone, but it also has many other virtues which should make it the touchstone of the topic going forward. (shrink)

It is now widely expected that climate change will be serious enough that a very large number of people will be displaced from their homes because of events relating to or resulting from climate change. Such events may include rising sea levels (and resulting increased salination of ground water), stronger hurricanes and tropical storms, drought, floods, increased and more intense wildfires, and other extreme or (previously) unusual weather events. Although estimates vary widely, it seems very likely that many millions of (...) people—perhaps hundreds of millions if sufficient precautions are not taken—will be forced from their homes by these events related to climate change. In the public imagination, much of the attention has been on ‘climate refugees’, where this is taken to mean people who have crossed borders. However, there is good reason to believe that a very large percentage—probably a significant majority—of displacement resulting from climate change will be, or could be, internal. In this chapter I argue that there are likely to be a large number of cases where internal displacement related to climate change is of international concern, and where, therefore, states have significant moral reasons to provide assistance, either directly to those displaced, or else to the state in which the displacement has taken place. My claim is that internal displacement arising from climate change is of international concern and so grounds a duty of aid by states able to provide it, when this displacement threatens the basic human rights of those displaced, and when the local or domestic government cannot or will not take the necessary steps to meet the needs and protect the rights of those who are displaced. (The uploaded version of this paper is an uncorrected proof. Please cite and refer to the published version.). (shrink)

Grey zone attacks tend to paralyze response for two reasons. First, they present us with choice scenarios of inherently dilemmatic structure, e.g., Prisoners’ Dilemmas and games of chicken, complicated by difficult conditions of choice, such as choice under risk or amid vagueness. Second, they exploit our uncertainty about how much we do or should care about the things under attack¬—each attack is small in effect, but their effects accumulate: how should we decide whether to treat a given attack as something (...) meriting a serious response rather than a mere irritation to be ignored? This chapter brings standard decision theoretic tools to bear on the issues, tools such as the maximization of expected utility principle, and the precautionary principle. But it also develops three innovations. It shows that seeing it as possible to make choices not just of actions given our values, but also choices of values themselves, can extricate us from certain kinds of decision paralysis. It shows how we can rationally regard ourselves as having bright decision lines even when nothing in the circumstance of choice has these lines in its structure. And it shows how certain conflict escalation risks from the former two strategies can be managed by both parties seeing that cooperation can yield a sharable surplus of goods, and that cooperation can be rational upon a rationally defensible change in their values so that each comes to derive utility from the success of both parties. This yields cooperative solutions to what amount to Prisoners’ Dilemmas. The Cold War was prosecuted on the logic of strategic rationality and that part of game theory that is deterrence theory. We need a new logic from decision theorists for the games that constitute grey zone conflict. (shrink)

In the current geopolitical environment, liberal democracies vie for influence and prosperity with autocratic governments, such as those of China and Russia. While the great powers do not shy away from using aggressive force, much of their rivalry today takes place below the threshold of armed conflict, in a conceptual and practical 'grey zone' between war and peace. Autocratic states operate in this grey zone to target the vulnerabilities of liberal democracies, creating hybrid threats that rely on instruments ranging from (...) economic, diplomatic, legal, and informational pressure all the way to military coercion. -/- Law plays a critical role in this context. In the ethically and legally ambiguous grey zone, international law serves as a normative, yet malleable, framework within which geopolitical rivals compete. State and non-State actors invoke the law as the source of authority, while simultaneously hoping to shape the international legal order in their own strategic interests. -/- Hybrid Threats and Grey Zone Conflict offers the first in-depth assessment of the legal and ethical aspects of hybrid threats and grey zone conflict. It explores the responses available to democratic nations for countering hybrid and grey zone threats whilst adhering to liberal democratic values and the rule of law. Bringing together diverse scholarly and practitioner perspectives, the volume introduces readers to the conceptual and practical difficulties arising in this area, the rich debates the topic has generated, and the challenges that countering hybrid threats and grey zone conflict poses for liberal democracies. (shrink)

This article interrogates the widely held, but rarely defended, view that states wield legitimate power over potential immigrants when and because they refrain from violating their human rights. I reconstruct a strong argument for this view, which turns on a claim about the limited power states claim over migrants. Drawing on recent empirical work, I show how this argument is inapplicable to the border regimes of a set of wealthy democracies. These regimes are characterized by a practice that is coordinated (...) and extraterritorial in a way that undercuts the case for holding them to a minimal legitimacy standard. By participating in this practice, these states wield significant power over potential immigrants. I argue that this power exposes potential immigrants to novel risk, which in turn triggers a demand for the satisfaction of a higher standard of legitimation. (shrink)

Multiple states are at risk of becoming uninhabitable due to climate change, forcing their populations to flee. While the 1951 Refugee Convention provides the gold standard of international protection, it is only applied to a limited subset of people fleeing their countries, those who suffer persecution, which most people fleeing climate change cannot establish. While many journalists and non-lawyers freely use the term “climate refugees,” governments, and courts, as well as UNHCR and many refugee experts, have excluded most climate refugees (...) from the Convention as a matter of legal interpretation. In our 2015 paper, “Unable to Return in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, we sought to reopen the debate on “climate refugees” by arguing that some climate refugees qualify under the 1951 Convention as it is currently written (even if they are not persecuted): those who are stateless and are unable to return to their country of origin because climate change has rendered it uninhabitable. Our interpretation, however, has been rejected by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2021) and by Foster and Lambert (2019), which explicitly responds to our paper. Here, we address and respond to their arguments, and develop a new supplementary one, drawing on the principle of systemic integration, as enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (shrink)

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power of the Transnational Capitalist Class (...) as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)

Cosmopolitans typically argue that the realization of cosmopolitan ideals requires the creation of global political institutions of some kind. While the precise nature of the necessary institutions is widely discussed, the problem of the transition to such an order has received less attention. In this paper, we address what we take to be a crucial aspect of the problem of transition: we argue that it involves a moral coordination problem because there are several morally equivalent paths to reform the existing (...) order, but suitably placed and properly motivated political agents need to converge on a single route for the transition to be successful. It is, however, unclear how such a convergence can take place since the duty to create global institutions does not single out any coordination point. We draw on the so-called theory of hegemonic stability to address this problem and conceptualize what we call the hegemonic transition. From an explanatory point of view, we rely on the theory’s insights to explain how a hegemon may contribute to the creation of a rules-based international order by providing salient coordination points and accordingly, enabling coordination among states. From the normative point of view, we identify necessary conditions for the hegemonic transition to be morally permissible. To the extent that these conditions obtain, other states have pro tanto moral reasons to follow the salient coordination point provided by the leading state. (shrink)

Rather than making another attempt at proposing a single and unifying theory of global health justice, this timely collection brings together, instead, scholars from a range of traditions to frame the issue more broadly, highlighting not only different perspectives but also key topics and debates. The volume features chapters that offer both new theoretical approaches to global health justice, as well as fresh takes on existing frameworks. Others adopt a bottom-up approach to tackle specific problems, including the sexual rights of (...) children and adolescents, artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine, framing of neglected tropical diseases, securitization of health, and trademarks in global health. Brought together within one volume, the breadth of these chapters provides a unique and enlightening contribution to the wider Global Health field. This important volume will be a fascinating read for students and researchers across Global Health, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, and Global Development. (shrink)

The recent Covid-19 global health crisis not only brings into sharp relief the current problems afflicting the international intellectual property regime (IIPR) but also calls into question its legitimacy as an international authority. Against this backdrop, the article aims to launch an investigation into the legitimacy of the IIPR, as an international co-ordinative authority, designed to protect IP rights without prejudice to international trade norms. Drawing on Raz’s service conception of authority, it explores whether the IIPR lives up to its (...) promises by enabling co-ordination between states over IP rights without undermining the initial balance on which it is founded, struck between developing and developed countries, as well as between international protection of IP- cum-trade rights and domestic regulatory autonomy. It does so by classifying the historical evolution of the IIPR under three different phases: (i) its foundation, (ii) before, and (iii) after the TRIPS-plus. Upon showing the legitimacy challenges inherent in its undemocratic foundation, the article points to the success of the regime in finding a balance between conflicting interests before the TRIPS-plus era. Later, it underlines the many challenges that come with linking the IIPR to the investment regime and argues that the FTAs and frequent regime-shifting activities put further pressure on the authority and legitimacy of the regime. Stressing the importance of democratic participation for the legitimacy of any co-ordinative authority, the article casts doubt on the IIPR’s legitimacy and concludes by raising some points to overcome the ongoing legitimacy challenges. (shrink)

The international system of obligatory passports, as it exists today, was established at the beginning of the First World War. After the Armistice, the League of Nations tried to abolish it, but several governments delayed it. This article analyzes how the French press of the interwar period called for the abolition of passports. Seen as a "vexation", the passport was deemed "useless" after the war. So why wasn’t it abolished? Among the reasons for maintaining passports, we explore the hypothesis of (...) political “utility”: the regime of obligatory passports enabled governments to refuse passports and thus to control the transnational activity of political opponents. (shrink)

În ciuda faptului că nu contribuie la ordonarea cunoașterii actuale despre fascism, ci dimpotrivă, creează confuzie, lucrarea Madeleinei Albright are unele merite incontestabile. Primul dintre ele este capacitatea de a simplifica, într-o naraţiune scurtă, ușor de parcurs, ideile și faptele liderilor fasciști interbelici. Începând cu capitolul al doilea și până la cel de-al cincilea, istorisirea ar putea să fie folosită ca un foarte accesibil, viu și instructiv rezumat istoric pentru studenţi. Cu certitudine, experienţa profesorală a autoarei în învăţământul politic american (...) a ajutat-o să ajungă la acest nivel excepţional de persuasiune didactică. În al doilea rând, focalizându-și descrierile asupra personalităţii liderilor mai mult decât asupra fenomenelor social-economice, efectul imediat al lecturii este acela de a te face să reflectezi la cât de mult contează orgoliul și ambiţiile personale în alegerea drumului spre fascism. Portretele pe care cartea le schiţează sugerează că nu politician fascist modest și delăsător pur și simplu nu poate exista, așadar transmite cititorilor o intuiţie interesantă în sine. De asemenea, deși face destul de multe afirmaţii îndoielnice, Albright nu se abţine să enunţe unele adevăruri pe care politicienii de obicei le ocolesc. De exemplu, admiraţia lui Winston Churchill faţă de membrii cuplului fascist italo-german este ilustrată cu citate atât în capitolul despre ascensiunea lui Mussolini (p. 25), cât și în cel despre dobândirea puterii de către Hitler (p. 52). Este descris destul de clar și felul în care anticomunismul elitei liberale și conservatoare a contribuit decisiv la succesul politic al celor doi. În fine, cartea arată indirect cât de diferită este încercarea de a defini un fascist de aceea de a defini fascismul și că fascismul este mai mult decât suma credinţelor și acţiunilor adepţilor lui. (shrink)

States more or less universally claim discretionary rights to decide who may or may not cross their boundaries, and to use force and violence to ensure compliance with these decisions. The justification of these practices has received much attention, but I think there is an important underexplored element of this debate. I argue that, in order to provide a plausible justification, it is indispensable to ask questions about feasibility. Any plausible defence of anything like the kind of border control regime (...) actually in force will need to pay close attention to social scientific research into feasible alternatives. (shrink)

The EU's power is expanding, calling for reassessments of its normative legitimacy. This article proposes a novel criterion for assessing the EU's legitimacy: symmetry in the delegation of power. We illustrate the usefulness of this criterion through an analysis of the European border regime. Existing analyses of the border regime have tended to dismiss it as weak and intergovernmental. We show, to the contrary, that it is both strong and weak. The EU wields significant power in border control but lacks (...) power altogether in immigration policy. This asymmetry has rendered the EU incapable of discharging the moral responsibilities that arise in migration control, posing a novel legitimacy challenge. Finally, we argue that the symmetry criterion generalizes and can shed light on the EU's legitimacy beyond the area of migration. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed numerous weaknesses in pandemic preparedness and response, including underfunding, inadequate surveillance, and inequitable distribution of countermeasures. To overcome these weaknesses for future pandemics, WHO released a zero draft of a pandemic treaty in February, 2023, and subsequently a revised bureau's text in May, 2023. COVID-19 made clear that pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reflect choices and value judgements. These decisions are therefore not a purely scientific or technical exercise, but are fundamentally grounded in ethics. The latest (...) treaty draft reflects these ethical considerations by including a section entitled Guiding Principles and Approaches. Most of these principles are ethical—they establish core values that undergird the treaty. Unfortunately, the treaty draft's set of principles are numerous, overlapping, and show inadequate coherence and consistency. We propose two improvements to this section of the draft pandemic treaty. First, key guiding ethical principles should be clearer and more precise than they currently are. Second, the link between ethical principles and policy implementation should be clearly established and define boundaries on acceptable interpretation, ensuring that signatories abide by these principles. (shrink)

Media freedom in Western Balkan countries has been restricted for years, and the authority of the journalistic profession has been systematically undermined. Apart from pressure from governments, political and economic circles, the media in the region are also susceptible to foreign influences. The article analyzes the vulnerability of media in Western Balkan countries to third-party influence driven by cash flows. Prerequisites are presented that increase the possibility of direct intervention in editorial policy. Interference that results in biased coverage, the spread (...) of disinformation or the formation of certain attitudes among the audience. Answers are sought to the questions: what are the motives of foreign governments to sponsor media and “causes” the countries of the Western Balkans, what is the nature of the funding – secret or public? (shrink)

This Insight examines the stance the EU should adopt towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the basis of the political thought of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolò Machiavelli. Taking as its starting point Josep Borrell’s comment that “we are too much Kantians and not enough Hobbesians” at the 2022 EU Ambassadors’ Conference, this Insight offers a revisionist interpretation of both Kant and Hobbes while suggesting Machiavelli as a third possible inspiration for EU external action. Although he is often (...) portrayed as a proto-“realist” intent on increasing state power, Hobbes in reality favours stability above all else and would therefore presumably not support a more “aggressive” foreign policy. Kant, on the other hand, has traditionally been seen as more of a philosophical idealist, but his political philosophy in fact supports a more assertive conduct by states in their external relations. Both of these philosophers are thus quite different from how Borrell portrays them. The Insight also introduces the perspective of a third thinker, Machiavelli, whose philosophy suggests that the EU should adopt a pragmatic diplomatic strategy, forging alliances, supplying Ukraine with weapons, and maintaining strong ties with allies. (shrink)

Since the disintegration of the USSR Eurasia has gained a new geopolitical and strategic significance. Fifteen Countries emerged as a result of disintegration, among which only the Russian Federation was the successor state. The post-soviet era especially the era of the 1990s was a political and economic trauma for the Russian Federation and the post-soviet space. But Eurasianists were well aware of the American unilateralism and American ‘Grand Chessboard strategy” that was solely aimed at encircling Russian geography. With these concerns, (...) the Eurasianists advised the Russian political and military elites to initiate the Eurasian Union Project. This paper briefly sketches the Russian historical Eurasian dream, which deeply rooted in Russian imperial history, and discusses the importance of Eurasian philosophy for the political and economic stability of Russia-Eurasia. The paper also illustrates the challenges and opportunities for Eurasian integration and for the establishment of multipolar world order. Moreover, the paper also briefly outlines the geopolitical rationale behind the Eurasian project as a key objective of contemporary Russian foreign policy and geopolitics. (shrink)

The idea of a responsible cosmopolitan state (RCS) represents a recent attempt to reconcile the utopianism of cosmopolitan political theory and the practical constraints arising from the current realities of politics among territorial and largely self-interested states. I show in the chapter that the neorealist and/or geopolitical challenge rests on a misconception about what cosmopolitanism is meant to provide, because immediate practical advice is only a part of what normative political theory may bring to the table. Besides the notion of (...) self-interest which can be interpreted in different ways, it is mainly the action-modifying role of norms (especially international/supranational law) which may gradually change the game. Since the sustenance of state capacities is often preconditioned by events which take place beyond state borders, shared rules of conduct allow for more effective coordination in cases where collective action is required. Although the idea of a RCS primarily targets foreign policy priorities of smaller/weaker states (not-great-powers), it may turn out that collective action problems arising from empirical realities of the 21st century increasingly put great powers under pressure to accept such self-imposed constraints and comply with them. In the final part of the paper, however, I explain why this ‘cosmopolitan optimism’ needs to be aware of its own limitations, singling out the problems of internal motivation of actors in world politics and the deeper meaning of sovereignty which precludes an easy switch to the language of dispersed, pooled, or relational sovereignty. I conclude by arguing that if we are to take cosmopolitan ideals seriously, the RCS most likely represents a transitional stage on the route towards a centralised global political authority. (shrink)