Democracy, Misc

On many science-related policy questions, the public is unable to make informed decisions, because of its inability to make use of knowledge obtained by scientists. Philip Kitcher and James Fishkin have both suggested therefore that on certain science-related issues, public policy should not be decided on by actual democratic vote, but should instead conform to the public’s counterfactual informed democratic decision. Indeed, this suggestion underlies Kitcher’s specification of an ideal of a well-ordered science. This article argues that this suggestion misconstrues (...) the normative significance of CIDDs. At most, CIDDs might have epistemic significance, but no authority or legitimizing force. (shrink)

I will discuss for two popular but apparently contradictory theses: T1. The democratic control of science – the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny via democratic processes of representation and participation. T2. The scientific control of policy, i.e. technocracy – political pro- cesses should be problem-solving pursuits determined by the methods and results of science and technology. Many arguments can be given for (T1), both epistemic and moral/political; I will focus on an argument based on (...) the role of non-epistemic values in policy-relevant science. I will argue that we must accept (T2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (T1). I will set out a framework in which (T1) and (T2) can be consistently and compellingly combined. (shrink)

Citizens of democratic societies often abstain from voting in political elections. This paper develops a novel account of why such electoral abstention is morally permitted. The paper argues that the moral right not to vote should be interpreted as an exclusionary permission not to vote - i.e. a permission not to respond to the reasons that in principle favour voting. And citizens fundamentally enjoy that permission because of their moral entitlement to moral autonomy. By developing this argument, the paper improves (...) upon existing justifictations of the right to vote, and aims to help the general public figure out what the legitimate place of electoral abstention is within a democratic society. (shrink)

The relations between the majority and minorities in a democracy have been standardly viewed as the main subject matter of toleration: the majority should refrain from using its dominant position to interfere with some minorities’ practices or beliefs despite its dislike or disapproval of such practices or beliefs. Can the idea of toleration provide us with the necessary resources to understand and respond to the problems arising out of majority/minorities relations in a democracy? We reply in the negative and make (...) two main claims: first, that resorting to toleration is not enough to make sense of the problems deriving from the unequal participation of minorities in society, and, second, that it risks sanctioning the asymmetric relation between the majority and minorities informed by the negative judgement of the former towards some belief or practice of the latter. We suggest resorting instead to the idea of equal opacity respect for persons: all persons should be treated equally as moral agents, in accordance with their equally possessing the capacity for self-legislation, and as if they were opaque to our judgement for all those properties of theirs which exceed moral agency. Looking at the majority/minorities relations through such a lens enables us to understand (and appropriately respond to) what is problematic in such relations: the majority often fails to treat minorities as moral agents by failing to take their voices into account on an equal footing, by seeing them merely as recipients of certain provisions affecting them rather than their authors, and by considering them as legitimately exposed to the majority’s (negative) judgment. The purchase of our argument is illustrated by reference to two minorities whose treatment is paradigmatic of the problematic nature of majority/minorities relations across Europe: Muslims and Roma. (shrink)

It must be interesting to some people to read the simply-worded reflections of a reasonably intelligent person of his/her time on a topic of enduring discussion, or chatter. For example, which field or profession or specialism has the cleverest people? I present an answer that occurred to me after years of observation but it might be arrived at much sooner by rational actor model. Then I consider challenges to this answer. (I would be careful writing an essay like this, though. (...) “Because it is timeless?” Um, er, um. “Because it is precisely what others would cut in a decision-making process: your essay versus a Hume specialist’s essay say?” Perhaps, but the people who have troubled themselves to converse a lot with me: this is the sort of thing worth reading for them, given how they come across, taken at face value. This is a democratic essay!). (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophy in the West is the philosophy of democracy, is democratic theory. Philosophy under democracy has become complacent. Even the recent reaffirmation of communism by influential philosophers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek failed to inspire a significant following. There has been no radical philosophical reaction to the near-collapse of the capitalist economic system, mainly because any criticism of capitalism would imply a criticism of democracy ("the best possible political shell for capitalism", as Lenin said). Techno-philosophical alternatives (...) to democracy, such as anarcho-capitalist "seasteading", and calls for the suspension of democracy to cure climate change are originating outside academic departments of philosophy. Is there still philosophy if everyone agrees? Is philosophy still philosophy if discontent with the-one-and-only-truth can only be voiced from outside the academy? Or does political philosophy more and more resemble Plato's cave? This paper will venture outside the cave, outside the comfort zone of western academic philosophy as always-already-democratic. Only in this way can it seek to engage in a meaningful dialogue with non-western worldviews. Only by stepping into the light will we illuminate why still, in the twenty-first century, scholars may be justified in studying not democracy, but anti-democracy. Where are the niches of anti-democratic thought that may yet save us from the destruction wrought upon the world by the failing capitalist-democratic complex? What are the political trends against democracy we miss at our peril and what are their philosophical implications, worldwide? What are the new alternatives to democracy that emerge in our day? Free of self-imposed prejudice, this paper rejects the boycott of thought that does not comply with western inhibitions, and refuses to shy away from the encounter of philosophical positions emanating from non-democratic political practices. Philosophy is not blind, it does not condone any ideologies uncritically, and philosophy does not equal democracy. (shrink)

For a research project I engaged in from 2004-2007, I gathered and analysed statements made by representatives of Islamist terrorist movements on the Internet and compared key themes of their ideology (such as "democracy", "capitalism", "globalization", "colonialism" and "underdevelopment") to the writings and ideology of authors in various traditions of Christian "political theology". In this paper, it is being established that there are clear similarities in the socio-political analysis advanced by Christian political and liberation theologians and representatives of Islamist terrorist (...) movements and radical Islam, respectively. The paper also offers a short history and extended discussion of the concept of "political theology" and elaborates on radical Islam's understanding of theology and politics. Primary and secondary literature on Christian and Islamic political and liberation theologies and radical Islam are being reviewed (including the most recent writings on "political theology" emanating from, mainly leftist, theory circles in Europe and the US). In an attempt to expand the term "political theology" to cover the socio-political analysis, arguments, and ideology of radical Islam, anti-liberalism is revealed as the single most important factor underlying all political theology. The argument is made that being anti-liberal means being (at least potentially) anti-democratic as well. A discussion of future lines of academic inquiry opens up the possibility of a common definition or framework covering all forms of political and liberation theologies and asks whether comparative political theology may be the ultimate political theory. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy depends on carefully designed institutional frameworks — such as participant selection, facilitation methods, and decision-making mechanisms — that shape how deliberation performs. However, identifying optimal institutional designs for specific contexts remains challenging when relying solely on real-world observations or laboratory experiments: they can be expensive, ethically and methodologically tricky, or too limited in scale to give us clear answers. Computational experiments offer a complementary approach, enabling researchers to conduct large-scale investigations while systematically analyzing complex dynamics, emergent and unexpected (...) collective behavior, and risks or opportunities associated with novel democratic designs. Therefore, this paper explores Digital Twin (DT) technology as a computational testing ground for deliberative systems (with potential applicability to broader institutional analysis). By constructing dynamic models that simulate real-world deliberation, DTs allow researchers and policymakers to rigorously test "what-if" scenarios across diverse institutional configurations in a controlled virtual environment. This approach facilitates evidence-based assessment of novel designs using synthetically generated data, bypassing the constraints of real-world or lab-based experimentation, and without societal disruption. The paper also discusses the limitations of this new methodological approach and suggests where future research should focus. (shrink)

Critics often argue that there cannot be a moral duty to vote because whatever reason there is to vote can be satisfied in other ways. This chapter develops a novel theory of the duty to vote—which the authors call the egalitarian theory—that responds to this challenge. The egalitarian theory grounds the duty to vote in the unfolding demands of treating others as equals in the pursuit of justice. Whatever private actions individuals perform to help some subset of individuals in need, (...) they have a duty to recognize the equal importance of all individuals in need. And the only way for most individuals to do so is by voting in elections. This is because elections present a unique opportunity to advance justice in a holistic way that takes account of the full range and scope of human need, and in a way that treats each person’s need as equally important. Furthermore, voting uniquely pursues justice in a way that is not unilateral and treats people as equals in the process. In the course of developing the egalitarian theory, the authors defend the idea that voting is not a merely symbolic act, but can partially contribute to the moral improvement of institutions. (shrink)

In an important new Article, titled A Matter of Facts: The Evolution of the Copyright Fact-Exclusion and Its Implications for Disinformation and Democracy, Professor Jessica Silbey argues provocatively that we “‘only” know that facts are excluded from copyright protection because Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service “says so.” She argues that both the nature and importance of facts has been underdefined and is in flux, nonetheless tracing it to the foundational cases of United States (U.S.) copyright law, and argues for (...) a stronger exclusion of facts, which are publici juris, and belong in the public domain. This central thesis is most agreeable, as is her analysis of doctrine and legislative history. The Article’s rich study of American pragmatism, legal realism, the Cambridge school of analytic philosophy, and the “new social scientists,” which Professor Silbey uses to support a strong fact-exclusion, is a tour de force. The Article ends with a list of proposals for a strong Feist application to evaluations, catalogs, manuals, and legal documents. It also includes a call not to allow for industrial dilution of copyright’s framework, including the facts and ideas exclusion. Both are laudable and timely in the era of generative artificial intelligence (AI), where proposals to protect non-authorial quasi-expression or to prevent copying of non-expressive subject matter abound. While I agree with a call for a robust public domain and strong fact-exclusion, and devote Part II of this Response to explore further doctrinal grounds for them, in Part III I explore Silbey’s argument that “pragmatist philosophy’s challenge to universal truths combined with legal realist challenges to formalist jurisprudence eventually shape what is (or should be) copyright law’s broad public domain in ‘facts.’” It is not immediately clear if pragmatism and realism are a solid ground for justifying strong legal principles and axioms. Engaging with this provocative argument allows us to uncover what realism means to Professor Silbey and the much more radical consequences of her arguments. Part IV concludes. (shrink)

Governments are often so focused on short-term gains that they ignore the long term, thus creating extra unnecessary burdens on their citizens, and violating their responsibilities to future generations. What can be done about this? In this paper I propose a package of reforms to the ways in which policies are made by legislatures, and in which those policies are scrutinised, implemented and evaluated. The overarching aim is to enhance the accountability of the decision-making process in ways that take into (...) account the interests of persons in the future. (shrink)

Digital privacy scholars tend to bemoan ordinary people’s limited knowledge of and lukewarm interest in what happens to their digital data. This general lack of interest and knowledge is often taken as a consideration in favor of legislation aiming to force internet companies into adopting more responsible data practices. While we remain silent on whether any new laws are called for, in this paper we wish to underline a neglected consequence of people’s ignorance of and apathy for digital privacy: their (...) potential to encourage capture by industry interests. In particular, we argue that such laws may be at increased risk of capture because they are unlikely to be democratically responsive. We make this claim on a twofold basis: first, well-known theoretical mechanisms explaining how the absence of responsiveness leads to capture, identified in prior political science and political philosophy literature, yield the prediction that digital privacy legislation is likely to be unresponsive and thus captured; second, empirical data concerning the European Union’s digital privacy laws, with a special focus on the General Data Protection Regulation, appears to confirm these predictions: the bloc’s (world’s?) flagship privacy protection law seems more responsive to corporate than citizen interests. (shrink)

In *How Propaganda Works* Jason Stanley argues that democratic societies require substantial material equality because inequality causes ideologically flawed belief, which, in turn, make demagogic propaganda more effective. And that is problematic for the quality of democracy. In this brief paper I unpack that argument, in order to make two points: (a) the non-moral argument for equality is promising, but weakened by its reliance on a heavily moralised conception of democracy; (b) that problem may be remedied by whole-heartedly embracing a (...) more realistic conception of democracy. That conception is at least compatible with Stanley’s argument, if not implicit in parts of it. (shrink)

Authoritarianism is on the rise globally and poses a serious threat to civil society. We define this term and show the difference between old- and new-school autocrats. Historical data demonstrate a developmental course for how autocracies start, persist, and end. They also show democracy occurs in waves, rising and falling at different periods over time. Much research attention has focused on right-wing authoritarianism. To balance this, we detail features of the left-wing version as well and its relation to postmodernism. We (...) then look at the authoritarian personality type and how easy it is for a would-be dictator to hijack populist sentiment and dismantle democratic institutions. Polarization, political capture and economic inequality are highlighted as three key factors that explain democratic erosion in the U.S. and around the world. We conclude with suggestions for how to stop dictatorships and reform societies to make them more resilient to autocratic takeover. (shrink)

There is a large literature on how the use of an intolerant style of political rhetoric can erode democratic communication and give people reasons to question their faith in the democratic system. But the reverse is also true: that is, everyday linguistic practices shape political communication by providing stylistic forms and common words. My central claim is that an interactionist interpretation of the more-speech argument offers a normative foundation for a distinctive model of counterspeech as democratic self-defense: counterspeech as decentralized (...) democratic self-defense. The core of this model is the idea that democratic institutions have a role to play in making it easier for citizens to engage in conversations with those they would otherwise avoid. (shrink)

La tesis central de este trabajo es que la tradicional tensión entre substancia y procedimiento socava las estabilidad de la justificación de la concepción liberal más extendida de la legitimidad (la Democracia Deliberativa). Dicha concepciones enfrentan problemas serios a la hora de articular de manera consistente dos dimensiones que parecen ir naturalmente asociadas a la idea de legitimidad: la dimensión procedimental, vinculada a la equidad del procedimiento, y la dimensión epistémica, asociada a la corrección de los resultados. En este trabajo (...) sostengo que a) esa tensión surge de la adopción de una concepción epistemológica social de tipo "veritativo-consecuencialista; b) es posible manejar dicha tensión mediante el remplazo de la epistemología subyacente por una concepción epistemológica social de tipo procedimentalista de orientación pragmatista y c) dicha operación orienta el diseño institucional en una dirección experimentalista. (shrink)

Politics abounds with bad language: lying and bullshitting, grandstanding and virtue signaling, code words and dogwhistles, and more. But why is there so much bad language in politics? And what, if anything, can we do about it? In this paper I show how these two questions are connected. Politics is full of bad language because existing social and political institutions are structured in such a way that the production of bad language becomes rational. In principle, by modifying these institutions we (...) can reduce the prevalence of bad language. However, as I show, such practical efforts are fraught with difficulties. After first outlining an account of bad language (Section 1), I examine the rationality of three different types of bad language: inaccurate language, insincere language, and unclear language (Section 2). Next, I discuss the possibility of implementing institutional reforms to improve the quality of political discourse (Section 3). However, I then outline and discuss two serious complications for institutional reforms—namely, they create risk of abuse, and they could preclude instances of seemingly bad language that, in fact, are socially beneficial (Section 4). I conclude with some thoughts about how to pursue institutional reform in an appropriately circumspect manner (Section 5). (shrink)

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). We call this (...) principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters. (shrink)

Mainstream news journalism [MNJ] faces a practical dilemma founded on a theoretical mistake about objectivity. In this article, we aim to bring this mistake to light and to propose a new model for its practice. MNJ has over the past century attempted to achieve its ultimate democratic goals — informing citizens and holding those in positions of power to account — by adhering to objectivity as a master value. This commitment to objectivity can be specified in terms of principles, such (...) as the principle of reporting ‘just the facts’ without interpretation. But, we argue, taking principles like this one to be maxims that must be followed in every circumstance tends to undermine the democratic goals of MNJ. Practitioners of MNJ therefore face a dilemma: either jettison objectivity as a master value or shirk the pursuit of its ultimate democratic goals. We argue that they should take the former route and, instead, adopt a conception of MNJ as a form of democratic political agency. Under this conception, MNJ aims at informing citizens and holding those in power to account while eschewing the partisan agendas of politicians or advocacy groups. We defend this conception against alternatives, including characterizations of MNJ as mere propaganda and the mistaken conflation of MNJ’s democratic goals with those of so-called activist journalism. In so doing, we try to provide the outlines of a philosophical approach to journalism, a profession that philosophers have largely ignored despite its social importance. (shrink)

What economic system does a Kantian ideal of freedom entail? In Living with the Invisible Hand, Waheed Hussain argues it entails intermediated capitalism. Here, I investigate these arguments within the framework of a Kantian theory of right. I sketch a Kantian theory of equal democratic government where we have the right to make together through equal democratic processes decisions that structure our rightful relationships with one another. I argue that any plausible Kantian view of the natural determinacy of property rights (...) justifies extensive government intervention in the economy, creating space to argue for alternative economic systems such as intermediated capitalism. (shrink)

This chapter surveys the four main contemporary theories of democracy. First is democratic elitism, developed mostly by Schumpeter and Downs. Elitism assumes that citizens are apathetic and politically incompetent, seeing democracy as a method for periodically selecting the ruling elites. Second is liberal pluralism, typically associated with Dahl, among others. Liberal pluralism sees democracy as competition among rival factions, calling for institutions that prevent the tyranny of any minority over the others. Third is populism (or radical democracy), chiefly defended by (...) Laclau and Mouffe. Populists believe that social identities are malleable and rational agreements unattainable, which leads them to see democracy as a struggle to rhetorically create a popular identity. Finally, deliberative democracy, pioneered by Habermas, holds that political power must be justifiable to all and proposes that democracy should be a process in which citizens exchange arguments to determine the most acceptable policies. (shrink)

In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably (...) constrained capacity testing regime is not simply defensible, but superior to the current system, which arbitrarily excludes some capable members of society from participation. Finally, I explain why only this limited capacity testing regime is acceptable. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the All Affected Principle generates a puzzle when applied to carbon tax referendums. According to recent versions of the All Affected Principle, people should have a say in a democratic decision in positive proportion to how much the decision affects them. Plausibly, one way of being affected by a carbon tax referendum is to bear the economic burden of paying the tax. On this metric of affectedness, then, people who pollute a lot are ceteris (...) paribus more affected than people who don’t, because the former stands to pay more in carbon taxes than the latter. Consequently, people who pollute a lot receive large voting power, while people who pollute a little receive little voting power. This is a puzzling distribution of voting power for several reasons. First, it is instrumentally counterproductive if the goal is to rectify damages to the climate. Second, it introduces prudential incentives for everyone to pollute more to gain voting power. Third, the relative difference in voting power between people who pollute a lot and people who don’t is puzzling from a desert-based point of view, since the former often make a serious effort to avoid polluting, while the latter don’t. (shrink)

Rights to petition occupy an unusual position in political theory. Legally speaking, few political rights are as long-established or ubiquitous. Yet, philosophers have rarely, if ever, engaged in a sustained analysis of their contents or justification. On the rare occasions when such rights have been discussed, they are also often treated with a degree of quietism, if not outright scepticism. If there is a right to petition, so the thinking goes, then it must be a relatively minimal right, which is (...) to say, one that secures for its holder no more than that to which they are already entitled under, say, their right to free speech. In this article, I reject this view. Instead, I argue that, unlike rights to free speech, citizens’ rights to petition secure a duty on public officials to engage in a certain decision-making process with regards to petitioners’ petitions. In short: they have a duty to listen. In this way, I claim citizens enjoy a far more ‘robust’ right to petition than many polities currently recognise. (shrink)

Some of the most philosophical aspects of Orwell’s early writings concern the nature and significance of work. While Orwell sometimes identifies as apolitical in the 1920s and early 1930s, his views about work reveal a form of proto-democratic socialism as far back as the publication of his first book, Down and Out in Paris and London, in 1933. This paper first looks at some of Orwell’s early views about the significance of work for human life. It then offers arguments that (...) these early views chart a natural path to Orwell’s democratic socialism, which he developed and defended in later works, including his famous dystopias. The paper focuses on three periods in Orwell’s career as a writer: (1) his early career, focusing on Down and Out, (2) his mid-career, focusing on The Road to Wigan Pier, and (3) his late career, focusing on Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

I defend the non-instrumentalist thesis that every adult member of a political society has a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say in determining the content of the laws to which she is subject. I begin by giving an account of an important kind of servility that has received only glancing notice in philosophical discussion. This servility consists in the willingness to subordinate one's capacity for moral judgement (as distinct from one's interests, desires, or will) to another's. (...) I argue that, barring special circumstances, an adult person who willingly acquiesces to a lesser political liberty displays this type of servility. An adult cannot normally self-respectfully acquiesce to a less than equal democratic say. But, I argue, a condition for a political society to be just is that its members can self-respectfully acquiesce to the status it accords them. Thus, it is a pro tanto intrinsic requirement of justice that all adult members of a political society be granted an equal democratic say. There is a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say. (shrink)

There is a particular kind of philosopher who does not begin by entering an existing conversation. Zaman Ali, born in Lahore, Pakistan in 1993, is one of them. His five books — HUMANITY (2017), ZAMANISM (2019), GOVERNMENT (2020), EVIDENCE (2022), and MORALITY (2023), collectively forming the Reciprocal Autonomy system — do not position themselves within a tradition or argue against one. They begin from a single observation that Ali found impossible to set aside, and follow it with the kind of (...) relentless logical discipline that is rare in any era of philosophy. The observation is stated in his first book and never abandoned across any of the five: everything is different and nothing is the same in the universe. What follows from this — through political economy, political theory, epistemology, and ethics — constitutes one of the most self-contained and internally consistent philosophical systems produced by an independent thinker outside institutional philosophy in the twenty-first century. To call Ali the philosopher of individuality, radical honesty, and the unsatisfied mind is not to impose a characterization from outside. It is to read back from the five books to what drives them. Each of these three terms names something that is present in every book, in every argument, in every moment where the system makes a choice about what to claim and what to refuse to claim. Together they explain why the system looks the way it does — why it begins where it begins, why it proceeds the way it does, and why it ends with an ethical conclusion that is at once confident and modest, earned and open-ended. None of the three can be removed without the system collapsing. All three must be understood to understand him. (shrink)

As AI outputs become indistinguishable from human work, the question of whose judgment lies behind them grows more urgent. Did the student wrestle with the essay, or did the model hand it to them? Did the doctor weigh the symptoms, or did the system generate the diagnosis while they clicked through? -/- When a polished essay no longer reveals who did the thinking, the grade above it becomes hollow, and so does the diploma. If a diagnosis can be generated by (...) a system, the doctor’s signature risks becoming a rubber stamp. Liability remains, but the expertise and judgment that justify it erode. Even when AI’s role is small, the client can’t be sure who drove the process. -/- Yet it isn’t just that grades and diagnoses are threatened: the credibility of our institutions is also in peril. The trust they carry cannot transfer to AI systems that bear no accountability, and vendors explicitly disclaim responsibility, warning us to use AI at our own risk. Consequently, institutional trust doesn’t migrate elsewhere. It dissolves. -/- The answer is not to shut AI out but to govern its use by the same principle we’ve always relied on with opaque systems: institute shared rules that tie outcomes to accountable processes, even when we cannot see into each other’s minds. These are not company policies or government regulations, but rather an open protocol — like the technical standards that make email and the web possible. It’s a distributed network of trust that allows even radically different systems to interact; it’s not the only infrastructure imaginable, but it is the only kind that has ever built trust at scale. -/- Instead of trying to halt the arms race at the level of capability development, where pressures to move ahead are overwhelming, the protocol secures the use layer. It restores trust not by stopping progress but by ensuring that progress doesn’t dissolve the institutions that sustain democracy and civic life. Education is the proving ground. Solve the problem there, and we may unlock AI’s potential where it matters most. (shrink)

Detta är ett bidrag till ett boksymposium om Torbjörn Tännsjös Från despoti till demokrati. Jag hävdar att Tännsjö inte har gett oss några skäl att betrakta en global despoti som en sannolik lösning på den globala upphettningens problem, samt kritiserar hans tes om överlapp mellan olika teorier om global rättvisa.

Deepfakes are AI-generated media. When produced competently, they are near-indistinguishable from genuine recordings and so may mislead viewers about the actions of the individuals they depict. For this reason, it is thought to be only a matter of time before deepfakes have deleterious consequences for democratic procedures, elections in particular. But this pessimistic view about deepfakes and their relation to democracy is flawed, whether it means to pick out current deepfakes or future ones. Rather than advocating for an optimistic view (...) in its place, I outline the opposite: a nihilistic account of deepfakes and their relation to democracy. On the nihilistic view, the harms that deepfakes pose for democracy are significantly more serious than those implied by the pessimistic view. Nihilism says that the real threat that deepfakes pose for democracy is that their existence counts against reforming current politics to be more truth-oriented. (shrink)

Cet article interroge la légitimité de l’exclusion des enfants de la participation politique. Nous y répondons à un argument paternaliste selon lequel quoique les enfants aient les capacités requises pour participer à l’exercice démocratique, il est dans leur meilleur intérêt d’en être exclus puisque cela leur permet d’avoir davantage de temps libre, de jouer, et de vivre de façon insouciante. Nous répondons d’abord à cet argument en montrant que dans notre monde non idéal, les droits et intérêts des enfants ne (...) sont pas adéquatement protégés par les adultes. Nous défendons qu’ils forment un groupe social opprimé, et que leur inclusion politique est donc requise afin que leurs intérêts soient pris en compte dans les décisions politiques. Ensuite, nous défendons que même dans des circonstances idéales, l’exclusion politique des enfants ne serait pas justifiée. En effet, si les enfants sont capables d’exercer leur agentivité politique, alors ils sont capables de décider de participer ou non. (shrink)

AI technology promises to be both the most socially important and the most profitable technology of a generation. At the same time, the control over – and profits from – the technology is highly concentrated to a handful of large tech companies. This chapter discusses whether bringing AI technology under collective ownership and control is an attractive way of counteracting this development. It discusses justice-based rationales for collective ownership, such as the claim that, since the training of AI systems relies (...) on a form of enclosing of the data commons, the value created by those systems should be fairly distributed. It also considers democracy-based rationales, like the suggestion that collective ownership is needed to ensure democratic control over the way this crucial technology is being developed and deployed. The paper also discusses possible forms of collective ownership, like publicly funded advanced AI research and democratically controlled AI companies. It concludes that the case for shifting to a model with collective ownership is the most compelling when based on the concern that the private model could come to concentrate economic and political power to such a degree that it threatens institutions designed to promote justice and democracy. (shrink)

Political liberals typically hold that reasonable citizens should not form political associations (e.g., political parties) with unreasonable citizens. This is because unreasonable citizens are unlikely to conform to the duty of civility—the duty to be able, and willing, to use public reasons in their public political deliberations. Here I argue that a general prohibition on political associations with the unreasonable can undermine the fair value of their political liberties. This is because unreasonable citizens can grow up in epistemic environments that (...) make it difficult to be reasonable, and so to direct citizens to not associate with them can deprive citizens from certain social backgrounds the equal opportunity for political influence. I propose instead that political liberals should distinguish between unreasonable citizens who are disposed to support de re publicly justifiable laws and policies and unreasonable citizens who support illegitimate laws and policies. Reasonable citizens may form political associations with the former group, but not the latter group. (shrink)

Eco-socialists argue that capitalism is incompatible with environmental sustainability and democratic egalitarian values. They argue that capitalist reforms, including ‘green growth’ and ‘degrowth,’ fail to take capitalism’s growth imperative seriously. I argue that Rawls’s justice as fairness offers a reasonable alternative to eco-socialism. Rawls rejects capitalism as incompatible with democratic egalitarian values. I argue further that Rawls’s distributive principles do not require growth, and his account of intergenerational justice requires controlling growth. Justice as fairness, however, offers two ways to realize (...) justice. First, a property-owning democracy (POD) broadly disperses control and ownership of productive means. Second, liberal socialism socializes ownership and disperses control of productive means. Socialists respond that POD keeps capital intact and therefore cannot control growth. I argue that the empirical literature on growth shows that the capital process is insufficient to explain growth. I contend that POD should implement degrowth policies to address the other growth imperatives. My arguments show further that the sustainability debate is wrongly focused on the capital process and ownership. Instead of trying to pinpoint some process or mechanism in capitalism as the culprit, my arguments show that we should focus on the underlying values of regimes and how to effectively realize environmental values in institutions. (shrink)

Critical Review of Lynch's book, focusing on his pragmatic theory of truth and heterogenous definition of democracy.

According to supporters of epistemic democracy, the most important virtue of democratic forms of government is that they provide the best method for determining correct public policies. On their view, this does not primarily result from the fact that any policy a democratic government enacts will reflect conjoined citizen interests and so be more likely to satisfy them, but from the fact that, as they believe Condorcet has demonstrated, majorities are more likely to get things right than any minority is. (...) I argue that any such view fails to capture what is usually meant by self-government, and that, due to this critical shortcoming, epistemic rationales for democracy should be abandoned in favor of voluntaristic, aggregative theories of the kind that were popular prior to mid-20th Century objections generally claiming either that collective preference aggregations are necessarily incoherent or that pervasive injustices must result from unconstrained, and hence tyrannical, majorities. (shrink)

This paper develops a fiduciary–constitutional theory of knowledge by diagnosing the modern university as a core organ of the epistemic estate undergoing systemic fiduciary breach. Building on Redefining Democracy for the Age of AI (Kahl 2025k), Epistemic Gatekeepers as the Fourth Estate (Kahl 2025l) and Epistemic Clientelism Theory (Kahl 2025h), the study argues that universities—historically conceived as trustees of public reason—have been transformed into hybrid entities divided between epistemic duty and market survival. Through this inversion, universities cease to function as (...) fiduciaries of knowledge and instead become agents of epistemic capture. The analysis proceeds across macro-institutional, micro-psychological, and constitutional levels. Chapter 3 examines the structural breaches produced by managerial opacity, network capture and branding-based optocracy. Chapter 4 extends the argument into epistemic psychology, using the Kahl Model of Epistemic Dissonance (KMED) alongside Friston’s predictive-coding and Carhart-Harris’s entropic-brain models to show how fiduciary breach conditions cognition: dissonance is suppressed, plurality narrows, and anticipatory obedience becomes a psychological norm. Chapter 5 reconstructs the constitutional consequences of this process, tracing the evolution of peer-review cartels, media–consultancy complexes, and algorithmic gatekeeping into an epistemic market state in which credibility is brokered rather than deliberated. Chapter 6 proposes juridical and institutional reforms through the Epistemic Fiduciary University (EFU) and the Fiduciary Commission for Knowledge Integrity, embedding fiduciary duties of candour, care, loyalty and accessibility as enforceable standards across the epistemic estate. Chapter 7 advances the philosophical foundations of this framework. Drawing on Arendt’s conception of a shared world of appearance and Habermas’s account of communicative legitimacy, it presents re-commoning as a constitutional remedy: a reconstruction of the epistemic commons in which knowledge is restored as a public trust rather than a proprietary good. The paper concludes that fiduciary law, epistemic virtue and institutional openness together constitute democracy’s moral infrastructure. The survival of an open society depends upon preserving a fiduciary order of knowing—an epistemic constitution in which the openness of thought and the openness of governance stand or fall together. (shrink)

When people feel that their country has betrayed its core ideals, it is natural for them to consider whether they ought finally to give up on their country. Our interest is with those who sincerely love their countries, and yet who are inclined to abandon their country because they judge it to have betrayed its ideals. We consider different variants of patriotism before defending what we call critical patriotism, a stance involving a commitment to a nation’s ideals without the attendant (...) need to love one’s country unconditionally. We further argue that even in the cases where one has good reasons to remain loyal to one’s country, doing so will typically be supererogatory rather than obligatory. The issue before us is of crucial practical significance given the current trend of people feeling justified in abandoning their country in response to feeling that their political ideals have been betrayed. (shrink)

In this article, I draw on the neglected tradition of African political and legal philosophy to address the sort of representative democracy suitable for twenty-first century urban societies. In particular, I present and evaluate for a global audience consensualism about democracy, the view that some kind of unanimous agreement amongst elected legislators should normally be a necessary condition for a statute to count as valid law. After expounding this view, which is more or less the default in the African philosophical (...) tradition, I present a new argument for it by drawing on a plausible communal ethic, contend that this argument is a better explanation of why consensualism might be justified than extant moral rationales, draw on the ethic to explain why consensualism might not be unconditionally justified and might be unjust in certain circumstances, and finally defend consensualism from major objections that have recently been made and remain as yet unaswered. (shrink)

The article examines issues related to the rise of authoritarianism in the context of geopolitical changes and shifts. Societies began to demand charismatic leaders and other changes due to declining trust in democratic institutions and a combination of political, economic, and informational factors. The emphasis is on revealing the basic characteristics of autocracy, its growing popularity and acceptance in the world as a countermeasure to existing conflicts and local wars. It is a form of state protection and guaranteed stability, as (...) well as an adequate level of economic development. However, it does involve certain restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms. The authors draw attention to the growing political influence of authoritarian countries around the world, the population's preference for strong leadership, and their increasing involvement in making crucial decisions about the current international situation. This is not least due to the weakening of liberal democracy and international law, as well as changing priorities in foreign policy, primarily that of the US political leadership as the guarantor of world law and order. It is a cause for concern that there is growing support for political parties that use authoritarian language and symbols. The authors believe that global poverty, environmental shocks, and tensions between indigenous populations and migrants shape electoral preferences during geopolitical changes and increased authoritarianism. Particular focus is given to Russia's role in establishing authoritarian traditions and exporting them to other countries. The authors emphasise the significance of the close connection between far-right forces around the world and the Russian autocracy which is increasingly exhibiting neo-totalitarian characteristics. The inability to resist the rise of authoritarian tendencies will contribute to a change in the political configuration of the world. This will have serious and lasting consequences in the context of the establishment of global democracy. (shrink)

Engaging the public with science is not an easy task. When presented, scientific findings, public health recommendations, and other scientific information filter through the personal values, beliefs, and biases of members of the public. Science communicators must contend with these differences in order to be effective in cultivating a public understanding of science. Given the importance of scientific understanding for living well in a complex world, increasing science understanding through science engagement is imperative. The field of public engagement with science (...) is dichotomized by a public information deficit approach and a contextualist approach. The deficit approach prizes the factual content of science, its epistemic authority, and its communication to the public while the contextualist approach recognizes the sociocultural embeddedness of science in society, how science is received by publics, and how local knowledges intersect with science. I contend both approaches are incomplete and I put forth a synthesis. My approach, the participant-centered model of science engagement, incorporates the factual content of science and its epistemic authority, but in a way that is sensitive to context. I argue for a deliberative democratic approach to public engagement with science and articulate a model inspired by learner-centered approaches to teaching in the formal education literature. I outline and assess six participant-centered strategies along with recommendations for particular practices associated with each. (shrink)

In Beyond Empathy and Inclusion: The Challenge of Listening in Deliberative Democracy, Mary F. Scudder defends a listening-based approach to deliberative democracy. On this account, democratic legitimacy requires that citizens listen to each other’s deliberative contributions to give them fair consideration. She opposes this listening-based approach to a recent “empathic turn” in deliberative democratic theory, which emphasizes the importance of imaginative perspective-taking in democratic deliberation. Scudder develops an incisive critique of relying on empathy in democratic deliberation. According to her argument, (...) our capacity to empathize is severely limited, and empathy cannot replace, but only distort listening. This argument suggests that we should listen rather than empathize in democratic deliberation. In this paper, we challenge the implicit assumption that empathy and listening must be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives. We argue that empathy still has an important place within a listening-centric approach to democracy because empathy can improve listening broadly understood, according to its own inherent aim of ensuring fair consideration. Specifically, we identify three constructive roles that empathy can play in facilitating democratic listening: it can help us to understand what someone has said, see where someone is coming from, and promote mutual understanding. We argue that recognizing these constructive roles for empathy in democratic deliberation is compatible with acknowledging empathy’s limits and accepting that we should sometimes prefer listening without empathy. Ceasing to conceive of empathy and listening as mutually exclusive options opens up new questions and we close by discussing some potential directions of future study. (shrink)

‘One person, one vote’ (OPOV) is an important slogan in democratic movements, a principle that undergirds a landmark series of cases in US constitutional law, and a widely accepted axiom of democratic theory in philosophy and political science. It is taken to be sacrosanct; some even state that OPOV “is, like the injustice of chattel slavery, a ‘fixed point’” (Kolodny 2023: 291). This is a rare distinction for an ideal. For all the ink spilt on Rawls’ Difference Principle, no one (...) printed it on the pamphlets and placards of trade unionist, decolonial, and anti-Apartheid protests; it never appears in US Supreme Court decisions; and none of its defenders would say that denying it is akin to accepting slavery. But despite this, OPOV has proved remarkably hard to pin down. It is not meant to be a mere slogan. It is meant to explain why practices of plural voting and vote dilution are inegalitarian. But there is no consensus and little debate about what it means. Many leave the principle undefined. Others say OPOV means anonymity, or equal voting weight, or equal representation, or equal voting power. These accounts differ significantly. But little is said about one should be preferred to its rival. -/- My goal is to convince you that the meaning of OPOV poses a deep, urgent problem, for which we have no adequate solution. I will argue that all current accounts of OPOV should be rejected. The key upshot will be that we need, but lack, a good explanation of the datum that practices of plural voting and vote dilution robustly fail a minimal condition for political equality. In closing, I’ll explain why my arguments also push us towards embracing what has often been considered a radical and overly demanding implication: namely, that all district-based systems—including those used in the US House of Representatives, Senate, and Electoral College—violate OPOV. (shrink)

The boundary problem in normative democratic theory is the problem of who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision-making. The boundary problem is at the heart of many pressing political issues, including voting rights of resident aliens in their host countries and of expats in their home countries, the legitimacy of border regimes, the justifiability of global democracy, and the democratic representation of future generations. The two most popular answers to the boundary problem are the all-affected interests principle (...) and the all-subjected principle. According to the all-affected interests principle, all (and only) persons whose interests are affected by a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in making that decision. According to the all-subjected principle, all (and only) persons who are subject to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in making that decision, where being subject is spelled out either in terms of being legally bound or in terms of being exposed to coercion. A well-known challenge for the proposed solutions to the boundary problem is posed by tourists. Tourists seem to be affected in their interests and subject in the relevant sense by democratic decisions in their host countries. But we would not normally consider tourists entitled to participate in the making of such decisions. In this paper, I examine the most natural responses to the challenge of tourists and argue that both the all-affected interests principle and the all-subjected principle are on the horns of a dilemma. The dilemma arises because responses that yield intuitively plausible verdicts about tourists on the other hand commit their advocates to implausible verdicts about dying citizens. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don't care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...) of bullshit, I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters. I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives. I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable. (shrink)

Universities have always been part of political and public discourse in one way or another. The EU has assigned universities a new model role as ultimate integrators for the designated European Education Area and European Research Area. In this sense, Homo Academicus must reflect on new arrangements, as the previously occupied position of an omniscient detached observer is no longer valid. It is doomed to remain an unaccomplished and misleading idealization. The European Council has introduced the idea of the European (...) University as a bottom-up network of universities across the EU. It presents education as everyone’s favorite muse, but it is not a silver bullet. The education system is entangled in national and supranational interests, constantly shifting between the public and private sectors. The academic community is experiencing one of the biggest existential conflicts in choosing between two options: 1) scholastic supra-civic detachment, ivory tower escapism, and elitist stance, or 2) intellectual social engagement and civic education. Unless this conflict is resolved, future universities will not be able to foster transversal skills and prepare accountable citizens. (shrink)

This paper philosophically explores the possible introduction of an alternative analytical approach to European integration. It is an invitation to reflect critically outside the mainstream paradigm. An extensive amount of scientific literature and research papers focuses on the EU, but it is quite easy to get lost amidst this stream of abundant writing. Meanwhile, the EU has been experiencing serious challenges since the previous enlargement, which has led to a broader definition of the “European project.” Numerous discussions have failed to (...) deliver the expected results. It is an interesting paradox that the EU has been proposed globally as a model of peacebuilding in the context of the Nobel Peace Prize 2012. However, since then, no clearly defined model of internal EU integration has been implemented apart from some basic premises. The Monnet method has become formalized within the official framework of the EU, thus justifying top-down institutional engineering, which is contrary to the concept proposed by Jean Monnet. The paper offers a metaphorical reasoning as an intellectual counterbalance to the unreflective application of integrational models, thus enriching analytical and critical discourse. (shrink)