Religious Imagination

This paper proposes a novel way of exploring the interaction between science and theology. Situating the investigation at the level of cognitive dispositions and mental habits, it examines how and why modes of explanation can be, and often are, transferred from one area of intellectual work to another. Drawing from the work of Ernan McMullin on imagination and retroduction, the paper extends his ideas to determine how cognitive dispositions can change. Three examples are studied in detail: one dealing with styles (...) of reasoning, one dealing with determinism, and one with the logic of self-involvement. These examples indicate not only the way in which cognitive dispositions partly determine what we imagine but also how such dispositions can change. The paper’s overall result shows how agreement or disagreement between science and theology can arise from such deep-seated, cognitive dispositions of which we are sometimes unaware. (shrink)

A study of the methods, approaches, prayers, etc to realize the 'unity experience' with THE ONE REAL SELF (Vedanta, Hinduism, ) God (Judaism), Gottheit (Christianity), Buddha mind (Buddhism), The Beloved (Sufism, Islam) of a number of mystics from several religious traditions. I wrote about this in a number of books and articles, for example about methods, techniques, practices and methodology here: as well as exploring and illustrating the subject-matter of philosophizing here: Explorations, questions and searches not put down on paper (...) are probably more important than the ones mentioned above. These were occurrences for almost as long as I can remember. They took many forms, endless questions about everything under the sun, unsatisfied with unexplained socio-cultural institutions, communities, social relationships, social roles, behaviour, values, norms and much more – I had to question them rather than merely submit to them or act in accordance with them. Although I expressed these questions and queries about the status quo in many areas such as sport, art, social sciences, endless reading and marginal groups and relationships I realized that they form part of the philosophical discourse. Not the discourse that has become the expression of the professionalization of philosophy the last few hundred years, but of the not-institutionalized practice of original thinking, of creative philosophical thinking. As examples of the latter, Socrates, of course, the pre-Socratics, Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Plotinus, writers on Mysticism such as Meister Eckhart, van Ruysbroeck, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, from Advaita, Zen and other Buddhist schools, Wittgenstein, Hume, German Idealists, Rumi, novelists and poets, Paul Klee and other visual artists and many names who form part of the seeking for the unity-experience as explored in History of Mysticism (those who seek the unity experience, to become ONE with THE ONE, Godhead, the one real Self, Buddha mind, Sophos, etc). History of Mysticism *was first published by Atma Books in 1987, now and is a unique compendium of the lives and teachings of the world's best known mystics. They are presented in chronological order, and include representatives of every religious tradition, revealing the broad universality of genuine religious experience. expanded and revised Thirtieth Anniversary edition is available as a free downloadable PDF document on this website at my Downloads page. This book is fundamental for seasoned scholars of philosophy and religion as well as anyone new to the study of Mysticism. (shrink)

What is the nature of religious belief, and what factors influence an individual’s formation and maintenance of religious beliefs? This bibliography collects resources that address these questions. Since religious belief is a species of belief, we include resources on belief in general as well as on religious belief in particular. And since important work has been done on these topics in various social sciences as well as in philosophy, we include sources from several disciplines, although we emphasize empirical work from (...) the psychological sciences, with a secondary focus on philosophy. Thus this is not a bibliography on the rationality of religious belief or the epistemology of religious belief. We also set aside sources concerning the relationship between religion and well-being. Moreover, we focus here on religious belief rather than religious commitment, although some of the literature we include on factors influencing religious belief does rightly attend to the role of religious practice and commitment in sustaining belief. Psychologists have a loose taxonomy distinguishing four different aspects of human experience: the affective concerns feelings, the behavioral concerns action, the cognitive concerns thought processes, and the social domain attends to the importance of interpersonal and group dynamics. We use this taxonomy to organize our bibliography. After a list of reference works (section 1), we include key sources on the nature of belief in general and the nature of religious belief (section 2). Sections 3 – 6 then cover belief and affect, belief and behavior, belief and cognition, and belief and social factors, respectively. Section 7 surveys sources on the resilience of belief, and section 8 concerns whether and how human beings can exercise control over their beliefs. (shrink)

People regularly profess belief in religious ideas. But do they merely think of themselves as believing, or do they think of themselves as possessing knowledge? I first argue that it is difficult to determine this based purely on religious people’s self-descriptions. I instead appeal to functionalist considerations about the way religious metacognitive attitudes are formed and guide action, which suggest ordinary religious people often do self-attribute knowledge. This raises problems for recent arguments that first-order religious attitudes are a form of (...) make-believe instead of genuine belief, while also bringing out the importance of religious metacognition for fully understanding religious psychology. (shrink)

There is unquestionably a plethora of details and mysteries regarding the mind and the body. However, with the advent of psychopharmacology (the study of how psychedelics inform or alter brain states) there are more issues at hand. Do psychedelics allow us to access deeper areas of our consciousness? Are we having a spiritual experience under the influence of psychedelics? Dr. Rick Strassman does not want to continue asking these rather conspiratorial-like questions. Instead, Dr. Strassman believes that there is one special, (...) endogenous psychedelic, synthesized within the human physiological framework: N, N-Dymthethyltryptamine. Dr. Strassman concludes that this chemical is produced within and around the pineal gland, and is often the catalyst for spiritual and religious experiences. I will explore this topic further under the framework of discovering whether a naturalistic type explanation of spiritual experiences accounts for all types of spiritual experiences and whether one may be rational or justified in believing in God if a naturalist could explain spiritual experiences. (shrink)

This is a response piece to the commentaries by Alberto Cavallarin and Hans Van Eyghen, Lluis Oviedo, and Konrad Szocik on my book _Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity_.

This précis summarizes my book _Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief_,_ Imagination_,_ and Group Identity_ for its book symposium in _Philosophia._.

This piece is part of a book symposium in _Religion, Brain & Behavior_ on my recent book _Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity_. In it, I respond to commentaries by Bortolotti and Mameli, Funkhouser, Gow, Hong and Boudry, Lewis-Jong, Luhrmann, and van Elk. A key emphasis in this piece is on double coding, in which religious "believers" evince two strikingly different attitudes and behavioral repertoires toward the same phenomenon--the secular one of which seems to deny (...) precisely what the religious one claims. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the core Stoic concept of reason aligns closely with modern theories of fundamental information, offering a novel interpretation of their philosophy. Stoicism, aimed at eudaimonia (a state of human flourishing) through virtue, views reason as the driving force organizing nature from the origins of the universe. I propose that the Stoic tripartite system of physics, logic, and ethics facilitates a continuous flow of information from the universe's cosmological birth to the evolution of human thought. The paper (...) bridges this ancient philosophy with contemporary cosmological findings, where information at the Planck scale, the set of natural units derived from a universal measurement inherent to the fabric of the universe, holographically projects our physical world. Conceptual equations synthesize these ideas, asserting that the universe's evolution involves intropy, the informational content of a system that increases over time and can transform humanity by revealing its divine, interconnected composition. This work presents a unique, systematic integration of philosophy and physics, highlighting the wisdom of Stoic cosmology. (shrink)

This article explores Rudolf Steiner's Christology within the framework of cosmic evolution, focusing on the Second Coming of Christ as a pivotal metaphysical event. Identifying a scholarly lacuna regarding Steiner's developmental cosmology and the work of Yeshayahu Ben-Aharon, the study adopts an immanent-synthetic methodology to demonstrate a sacramental, participatory epistemology. The first part unfolds Steiner's vision of the 'Mystery of Golgotha' as a cosmic turning point where a macrocosmic death process is reversed into a resurrection life-stream. The second part examines (...) Ben-Aharon's esoteric development of these ideas into a contemporary 'knowledge drama of the Second Coming.' Through the spiritualization of consciousness, Ben-Aharon describes an individual 'essence-exchange' with the Christ impulse within the 'abyss of nothingness' of our age. Finally, the article discusses the social-metaphysical implications of this drama through the 'Reversed Cultus.' Here, the indwelling Christ is recognized as humanity's 'Higher Self,' grounding a new community and 'school of love' capable of responding to the techno-scientific challenges of mechanization of intelligence and life. By positioning the human being as a co-creative agent in cosmic becoming, the article argues for a renewed understanding of the Second Coming as a new step in humanity's spiritual evolution. (shrink)

This work highlights Christian scripture and ritual within a broader Middle Eastern and cross-cultural framework, drawing parallels with Judaic, Islamic, Egyptian, and other traditions in which sacred space and bodily form converge to engender a symbolic and theological embodiment of divine revelation and perception. By pointing out the shared physiological symbolism in religious architecture, ritual, and scripture, it shifts the perspective towards an externalized and directly experienced spiritual dimension and offers a novel glimpse into aspects of embodied theology and divine (...) perception. The demonstrated continuity of corporeal imagery, scriptural symbolism, and incorporation of the human form in ritual and architecture contributes to the areas of manuscript studies, comparative theology, and the history of religious thought in the Middle East. The focus on the body as a transhistorical and cross-cultural medium and site of divine manifestation presented in this study offers a model for multidisciplinary research on embodiment and cognition across the monotheistic religions and beyond. Using the methodological approach of symbolic and semantic analysis, the observed converging patterns are interpreted as examples of an embodied theology and hermeneutics that bridges metaphor and physiological processes. The work highlights the congruence between key scriptural terminology and symbolism, such as lamp, crystal, and niche, across cultures — illustrated by passages from the Qurʾanic Light Verse and Revelation — and suggests the possible theological implications of detailed neuro-anatomical knowledge. The results provide a new interdisciplinary framework for comparative theology that incorporates linguistic analysis, theological exegesis, neuroanatomy, and cognitive science. They underscore the centrality of corporeality as a neglected yet crucial theological category in the Abrahamic religions and emphasize the experiential dimension of revelation. (shrink)

This review critically engages Giulio Prisco’s Irrational Mechanics, a speculative and ambitious attempt to synthesise futurist science and metaphysical inquiry into a new religious vision. Prisco’s narrative reimagines Newtonian rationality through a quasi-theological framework that champions transcendent technologies—time travel, resurrection, faster-than-light propulsion—as the metaphysical infrastructure of a post-scientific age. The review situates Prisco’s work within the emerging discourse of space religions, drawing comparisons and contrasts with Astronism, particularly on issues of revelation, grace, morality, and institutional coherence. While praising the imaginative (...) scope and cosmic ambition of Irrational Mechanics, the review critiques its lack of revelatory grounding, ethical orientation, and structural clarity, suggesting these as essential components for any enduring religious system. The review positions Prisco’s work as a provocative, if incomplete, contribution to the growing constellation of philosophies and theologies seeking to unite science, spirituality, and the human future in space. (shrink)

In July 2024, the Astronist Institution published a video on TikTok that, within a week, amassed thousands of views and, up to that point, was the single largest exposure to the public that Astronism received after being founded in 2013. Since being posted, the video has received over 77,000 views, over 1,150 likes, over 120 comments and 297 shares on the platform. The mixed response to the video among members of the public prompts the question: How have people reacted to (...) Astronism so far online? By scouring the internet for reactions to the story of how Astronism was founded and Astronist beliefs and practices, this article answers that question. In turn, it develops an ethnography of Astronists and non-Astronists about their initial response to content published by the Astronist Institution. The article begins by focusing on the “What is Astronism?” video posted on TikTok but broadens its scope to address reactions to Astronism appearing on other platforms. The aim is to analyse comments on the TikTok video and elsewhere to understand early forms of Astronist self-identification, lines of criticism against Astronist doctrine and the themes that people tend to raise whenever they discuss Astronism. (shrink)

This chapter follows Lorenzo Magnani's observation that ongoing commercialization of science and academia impoverishes human potential for discovery. The chapter reviews Magnani on affordance, wonders what is accessible when "good" affordances appear absent, and answers self-affordance. Ecologies optimized for discovery should be optimized for self-affordance. The chapter considers the role of oracle as leading vision for discovery, and proposes a naturalized account of self that is essentially propositional, in pursuit of an inner oracle, seeking salvation through routine and religious ritual. (...) This is self-abduction. Variable biological development may motivate religious self-abduction characterized by self-sacrifice for the collective good over the long term. in conclusion, the chapter affirms Magnani's call to optimize cognitive ecologies for discovery, by prioritizing religious self-abduction. (shrink)

This article places Henry Corbin’s concept of creative imagination in conversation with the French phenomenological tradition. Section I explores Corbin’s phenomenological method and his view of the imaginal world, drawn from his interpretations of Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī. Section II then places this concept in conversation with the early Jean-Paul Sartre’s “annihilative” imagination and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique of it. This section argues that Corbin needs a strong distinction like Sartre’s between imagination and perception but also that he could be seen (...) as agreeing partly with Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre. What Corbin ultimately maintains, as the article’s conclusion argues, is that our access to the distinctive imaginal world enables a characteristic duality to arise in all perceptual life, a duality that is required if we are to be able to relate to perception either critically or charitably. (shrink)

Prompted and resolved by acts of volitional imagining, dramatizing figures a situation in which actors share in having something important at stake such that imminently some of their actions will be momentous (making great differences) and fateful (defining of lives). Religious dramatizing does this very ambitiously. In amplifying the stakes of action there is a danger of being inappropriately dramatic, as in Don Quixote’s fantasies or Chicken Little’s ‘The sky is falling!’ But dramatization can be validated by successfully enacting the (...) dramatic heightening of a situation, by conventionally instituting heights of importance, and by having convincing experiences of situations as dramatic. Kant worries about an inappropriately romantic dramatizing of the moral life; Lucretius warns that religious visionaries will make people crazy with fear of divine retribution. The issue is taken seriously within religious dramatizing. For example, apocalypticism seems to entail an irresponsible termination of care for continuing life. Correctives are offered by Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theory of ‘theo-drama’ and (Francis’s, 2015) encyclical ‘On Care for Our Common Home’. These examples show how the modulation of dramatizing is no less a religious concern than the dramatic heightening of human life. (shrink)

Biblical narratives include some of the most important and influential narratives in human history, shaping human understanding of the most basic questions of human life as lived individually or in social association with others. These narratives have lasted for so many centuries because they offer deep insights into the nature of the human condition and human flourishing. This volume includes chapters by accomplished philosophers and theologians who bring their expertise to bear on biblical narratives to show the way in which (...) each narrative contributes something distinctive to our understanding of human flourishing. They broaden the ongoing work in analytic theology with a new focus on narrative and the knowledge of persons in philosophical-theological biblical exegesis. They also illustrate the narrative cognition that this methodology can provide. The book will be of interest to scholars of philosophy, theology, and biblical studies. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. -/- A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. (shrink)

Cometan began writing the Omnidoxy, the founding text of Astronism, at the age of seventeen in 2015 and this first great treatise of the Astronist religion was published in 2019. Since then, the world has been introduced to Astronism and its central doctrine of transcension and its worldview of cosmocentrism but the time has come to reflect on the Omnidoxy. The Astronist System explores the major themes of the Omnidoxy including cosmic organicism, astrogenism, returnism and transcension and provides rigorous detail (...) on various aspects of Astronist philosophy, theology, spirituality, eschatology and soteriology. In this reflective work, Cometan also takes the time to analyse what the founding text of Astronism achieved and the legacy it has left behind for the worldwide Astronist community. Cometan's reflections on the Omnidoxy text from his current vantage point allow him to close the chapter on the Omnidoxy so that he can move forward with his writing and eventual publication of the next great Astronist treatise titled the Astrodoxy which Cometan has already titled the central text of Astronism. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates ancient ecological and indigenous cultural forms in response to contemporary crises of ecology and psychology—"an alienation that haunts the modern soul while increasingly choking the biosphere." Lady Raglan's (1939) documentation of foliate masks carved into churches throughout much of Europe is taken as a starting place: faces where "oak leaves grow from the mouth and ears, and completely encircle the head" (p. 45). Another data point: excavation beneath Notre Dame Cathedral uncovers a Roman-era stone block dedicated to (...) Cernunnos ("The Horned One"), demonstrating literal encasement of pre-Christian fertility traditions in stone (Evans, 1988). The inquiry examines such documented traditional forms alongside Classical, Roman, Greek, Sumerian, and Near-East archeological and textual sources, exploring how historical patterns of human-earth relationality might inform contemporary crises through the rediscovery of autochthonous creativity: the natural human capacity to reconnect with body, symbol, ancestry, memory, and ecological life-worlds. The study introduces the method of epistrophic hermeneutics: a novel synthesis of hermeneutics with Hillmanian therapeia and epistrophē—defined by Hillman (2007/2016o) as "the reversion or return of soul phenomena to the archetype, according to the principle of likeness or analogy" (p. 153). The term hermeneutic of hospitality is introduced as an alternative to hermeneutics of faith or suspicion, respectively – a practice of epistemic humility at depth, rooted in what Hillman (1981/2013a) termed a "poetic basis of mind"(p. 31). The method embraces Hillman's dictum that "we can never be purely phenomenal or truly objective" because "one is never beyond the subjectivism given with the soul's native dominants of fantasy structures" (Hillman, 1981/2013a, p. 32). Archetypes, in this sense, are understood as "the primary forms that govern the psyche" (p. 13): participatory lenses of the epistemic eye. A hermeneutic of hospitality thus protects epistemological pluralism that includes cultural diversity yet continues deeper, beyond tokenism and into a celebration of pluralism at epistemic depth: that is, a protection of the living ecosystem of mind and image. Concretely, this reading stance follows Hillman's (1986/2016f) therapeutic attitude: "Instead of inquiry: interest, respect, welcome, praise—even attachment. To greet… even mythic presences that may be unpopular or demonized."(p. 96) This epistrophic work aims to "release the mind into its originality beyond the old entrapped condition" (Hillman, 1986/2016d, p. 295), aligning with the work’s principle of autochthonous creativity. The argument proceeds via case-rich exegesis. In Classical Greece, Dionysian masks give the Green Man civic expression; Dionysus appears as “a horned god… crowned with serpents” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 34), binding horns, snakes, and vegetation to ecstatic ritual. This vegetal–animal fusion has deep Mesopotamian precedent: Enki of the Sumerian wetlands was “the Wild Bull of Eridu” whose iconography shows “two streams, the Euphrates and the Tigris, flowing out of his shoulders” (Kramer, 1961, p. 76), while Damu embodied “the power in the rising sap” (Jacobsen, 1976, p. 39)—both figures conjoining fertility, water, and vegetal renewal. The parallel is explicit in Greek cult: Dionysus Limnaios, “Dionysus of the Swamps,” inhabited Athens’ oldest sanctuary where “water pours abundantly from under the rocks” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.20.3), mirroring the Sumerian Dumuzi-abzi, “the power to renew life in the watery deep” (Katz, 2003, p. 35). Wild Bull Dumuzi is at once bull and cowherd—divine animal and shepherd—whose “bitter laments when he dies as the dry heat of summer yellows the pastures” (Wolkstein & Kramer, 1983, p. 64) mark the seasonal transition toward death and dormancy. The archetypal union of Goddess and God appears again in Baal and Baalath, “the male power identified especially with water” meeting “earth,” whose union makes “plants and trees, animals and men… the offspring” (Patai, 1990, p. 45)—a cosmogony of ecological reciprocity. These figures also share the power of metamorphosis. Humbaba’s “seven splendours” enable constant transformation—“Humbaba’s face keeps changing!” (George, 2003, p. 37)—a capacity echoed in Dionysus, who is “a lion, a bull, a boar, a bear, a panther, a snake, and now a tree, fire, water” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 101). In Near Eastern vegetal–arboreal myth, Adonis is born from the trunk of his mother-tree Myrrha, which “split open to allow the birth” (Graves, 1960, p. 74); Osiris is enclosed within a tree’s girth, Isis crafting his wooden phallus for resurrection (Graves, 1960, p. 60). Likewise, Ningishzida’s “winding roots, embodiments of living supernatural power, free themselves from the trunk and become live serpents entwined around it” (Black & Green, 1992, p. 136), a precise analogue to Dionysus Perikonis who “twines himself around the column” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 10.19.3). Taken together, these scenes form a coherent archetypal grammar: a horned-vegetal deity mediating between water and earth, embodying seasonal death and renewal, uniting the powers of plant, animal, and human through metamorphosis, and returning life to the land through sacred union. This grammar repeats across Sumerian, Levantine, and Greek worlds, providing the imaginal architecture that will later be carved into the foliate heads of Medieval Europe. By tracing – text by text, altar by altar, mask by mask – how these symbolic forms have historically mediated human–earth relationship, the study demonstrates that epistemic pluralism at depth is precisely the restoration of a type of human culture capable of ecological harmonization. This is not a dynamic that can be simulated through instrumental control; it depends on the cultivation of consciousness that lives in participatory reciprocity with the more-than-human world: an epistemic eye that glints green. A hermeneutic of hospitality, in this sense, is not merely a method of interpretation but a protection of epistemological pluralism capable of return to the imagination of the Earth. The image of the Green Man describes just this: a dynamic bridge mediating between the many worlds of participatory and epistemic possibility. His mythic dance, rooted in water and leaf, horn and mask, death and return, is the precise form through which the restoration of the living Earth and the living soul become an indivisible act. Published January 2023. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18447.50089. (shrink)

Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the (...) role of the imagination in conspiracist belief formation. I argue that conspiracists first become imaginatively absorbed in conspiracist narratives, where this helps to explain how they process their evidence. From there, we can better understand why they find this evidence so compelling, as well as the psychological role it plays in their belief forming processes. This account also has practical implications for combatting the spread of online conspiracy theories. (shrink)

In the 1960s, the Catholic Church made changes to its liturgy and ecumenical outlook during the Second Vatican Council. These changes sparked a small counter-revolution called the Traditionalists led by rebel Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre to keep the Latin Mass. My grandparents Derrick and Irene Taylor opened their home to the movement during the 1970s, offering their time, money and land for SSPX masses. They received backlash from modernist Catholics and Church leaders but held to their belief that the Traditionalists were (...) to save the Church. My research has sought to uncover why my grandparents involved themselves in the movement. (shrink)

The subject of the thesis is the relationship between aesthetic and God. It aims to discuss whether the sense of beauty is proof of the existence of God and to determine the plausibility of aesthetic proof. As a matter of fact that reality and the perception of beauty point to two-way consciousness. In this context, it will be inevitable to mention God's relation with consciousness in the emergence of beauty. In the first part, the concepts of aesthetics will be analyzed, (...) and their philosophical discussions will be investigated. In the second part, the source of beauty will be questioned, and beauty will be grounded way of a priori and a posteriori with God. Afterward, aesthetic proofs will be presented and an evaluation will be made in the context of naturalistic claims and objections. Among the traditional arguments in the philosophy of religion, aesthetic proof offers a value-oriented approach rather than a mechanical view. It appreciates beauty from an inclusive perspective and has an existential aspect. The study concentrates on the nature of beauty and aesthetics, philosophical discussions, and the rational value of aesthetic proof and concludes that it is rational to suppose that the existence of God can be ontologically and epistemologically explanatory for aesthetic properties. (shrink)

We often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil Van Leeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide make-believe (...) play. -/- Van Leeuwen argues that religious belief—which he terms religious “credence”—is best understood as a form of imagination that people use to define the identity of their group and express the values they hold sacred. When a person pretends, they navigate the world by consulting two maps: the first represents mundane reality, and the second superimposes the features of the imagined world atop the first. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence, Van Leeuwen posits that religious communities operate in much the same way, consulting a factual-belief map that represents ordinary objects and events and a religious-credence map that accords these objects and events imagined sacred and supernatural significance. -/- It is hardly controversial to suggest that religion has a social function, but Religion as Make-Believe breaks new ground by theorizing the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Once we recognize that our minds process factual and religious beliefs in fundamentally different ways, we can gain deeper understanding of the complex individual and group psychology of religious faith. [Abstract writing credit: book editor Andrew Kinney, HUP]. (shrink)

The idea of “nonbelieving prayer” might sound odd, maybe even paradoxical. a closer examination of the functions of prayer and how religious participants actually engage in it tells a different story. After developing a working definition of prayer, this chapter examines a few types and functions of prayer and argues that they can be performed non-doxastically. In fact, such a stance might even be more epistemically and theologically virtuous than that which would accompany full belief in the kind of God (...) who could be the recipient of such manifestations of human prayer. (shrink)

According to a prominent view in Jewish-Halakhic literature, “mitzvot (commandments) require intention.” That is, to fulfill one’s obligation in performing a commandment, one must intend to perform the act because it’s a mitzvah; one must take the fact that one’s act is a mitzvah as her reason for doing the action. I argue that thus understood, this Halakhic view faces a revised version of Thomas Hurka’s recent dilemma for structurally similar views in ethics: either it makes it a necessary condition (...) for the act’s being a mitzvah that one has a false belief about the act’s Halakhic status, or it commits proponents of the “mitzvot require intention” view to a sort of rational failure in performing the mitzvot. The dilemma arises, however, only if we interpret this Halakhic view as requiring one to have a belief about her act’s Halakhic status in order for it to have this status. I suggest that the dilemma can be avoided by interpreting the intention requirement as requiring a make-belief, instead of a belief. Under this understanding, Halakha (or God) doesn’t care about why one performs an act of a mitzvah, but rather about how she does it; how she sees and experiences her action. This suggests another form of worship central to Judaism—worship via make-believing. (shrink)

What does it mean to have “strong beliefs”? My thesis is that it can mean two very different things. That is, there are two distinct psychological features to which “strong belief” can refer, and these often come apart. I call the first feature epistemic confidence and the second identity centrality. They are conceptually distinct and, if we take ethnographies of religion seriously, distinct in fact as well. If that’s true, it’s methodologically important for the psychological sciences to have measures that (...) tease them apart. In this paper, I critique some measures that are currently in use and propose some strategies for developing measurement tools that track the distinction in question. (shrink)

In Greek mythology the Muses –patron goddesses of fine arts, history, humanities, and sciences– are tellingly portrayed as the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess Memory, who is of the race of Titans, older still than Zeus and other Olympian deities. The relationship between memory and such fields as epic poetry, history, music and dance is easily recognizable to moderns. But bards/poets like Homer and Hesiod, who began oral storytelling by “invoking the Muses” with their audience, knew well that (...) remembering, forgetting, and imagining are each to be esteemed as, in Hesiod’s words, “gifts of the goddesses.” The economy of memory is an important concern for moral psychology, philosophy of emotions, and philosophy of imagination. This chapter examines ways that amusements, both classically and today, can function to educate moral emotions in and though their multi-faceted engagements with the economy of memory. (shrink)

Ultimism is the view that there is a metaphysically and axiologically ultimate reality in relation to which it is possible to achieve the ultimate good. John Schellenberg believes that ultimism is the backbone of every religion, while the differences between religions arise from different views of what the nature of the ultimate is. Schellenberg tries to show that if there is progress in religion, then it is most reasonable to assume that we are only at the beginning of the inquiry (...) into the ultimate. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemological and methodological objections can be raised against ultimism. It will present an epistemological argument, pointing to the cognitive limitations of imagination, and a methodological argument, questioning the feasibility of Schellenberg’s project. (shrink)

This article introduces a novel conceptualization of sublimity: the sublime in the pedestrian. This pedestrian form of sublimity is exemplified by the Biblical figure Abraham, the central character in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous work “Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de silentio”. It is grounded in the analysis of one of the foundational narratives of the three monotheistic religions: Abraham’s near-sacrifice of his son Isaac. The defining characteristic of this new, pedestrian form of sublimity is that it remains concealed behind what (...) I term a total incognito. It resembles the classical ‘elevated mode of sublimity’ as developed by Burke, Kant, and Schiller, in that it simultaneously evokes two contrasting emotions: repulsion and attraction. However, it differs in that Kierkegaard’s pedestrian mode of sublimity remains hidden from view and can only be revealed indirectly. This article explores the new, pedestrian mode of sublimity by examining the relationship between the incognito and the sublime in “Fear and Trembling”. It accomplishes this by engaging with three perspectives: (1) the sublime failure that emerges in the incognitos of an imaginary Abraham; (2) the ‘fear without being afraid’ invoked by God’s incognitos; (3) the total incognito of the pedestrian, which conceals Abraham’s sublimity. (shrink)

This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, (...) the first-person perspective of a believer. Imaginings, it concludes, ‘mimic’ beliefs with respect to the property of being correct or incorrect by virtue of having true or false content. (shrink)

From religion to philosophy to science, all human systems of definition are formed by human brains. The nature and limits of the human brain are the nature and limits of those systems. This essay shows how the human brain works normally then unusually, and what this reveals about the limits of human knowledge. There are many conditions and instances where the brain processes information unusually, including mental disorders, physical events, and drug use. This essay focuses on the neurological events called (...) mystical experiences. (shrink)

In this entry, we survey key discussions on the role of narrative in theology and philosophy of religion. We begin with epistemological questions about whether and how narrative offers genuine understanding of reality. We explore how narrative intersects with the problems of evil and divine hiddenness. We discuss narrative's role in theological reflection and practice in general, and in black and feminist theologies specifically. We close by briefly exploring the role of narrative in theorization about life's meaning.

This edited collection investigates the kinds of moral reflection we can undertake within the imaginative worlds of literature. In philosophical contexts of ethical inquiry we can too easily forget that literary experience can play an important role in the cultivation of our ethical sensibilities. Because our ethical lives are conducted in the real world, fictional representations of this world can appear removed from ethical contemplation. However, as this stimulating volume shows, the dichotomy between fact and fiction cannot be so easily (...) categorised. Moral perception, moral sensitivity, and ethical understanding more broadly, may all be developed in a unique way through our imaginative life in fiction. Moral quandaries are often presented in literature in ways more linguistically precise and descriptively complete than the ones we encounter in life, whilst simultaneously offering space for contemplation. The twelve original chapters in this volume examine literary texts – including theatre and film – in this light, and taken together they show how serious reflection within fictional worlds can lead to a depth of humane insight. The topics explored include: the subtle ways that knowledge can function as a virtue; issues concerning our relations to and understanding of each other; the complex intertwining of virtues and vices in the modern world; and the importance of bringing to light and reconsidering ethical presuppositions. With an appreciation of the importance of richly contextualized particularity and the power of descriptive acuity, the volume maps out the territory that philosophical reflection and literary engagement share. (shrink)

When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...) with factual statements, pointing to two different understandings of claims made with these two terms. These patterns do not appear to reflect low-level differences based on the amount of consensus surrounding a particular claim, the extent to which the truth of a particular claim is known to the participant, or linguistic differences between religious and factual statements. We discuss implications of these findings for religious cognition (e.g., as supporting the theory that religious credences are qualitatively distinct from factual beliefs) as well as cognitive processes more broadly. Finally, we relate the present findings to prior theoretical work on differences between factual belief and religious credence. (shrink)

According to Thomas Aquinas, what distinguishes the theological from the cardinal virtues is the nature of their object: the latter aim at the natural excellence of humans, while the former direct us beyond ourselves to focus on the Divine. This paper considers the cinematic work of Drew Goddard — in particular, his 2018 film _Bad Times at the El Royale_ — as a post-religious response to Aquinas, insofar as it retains and re-presents Faith, Hope, and Love as valuable elements of (...) the human experience itself, even in the absence of a supernatural vector of their application. After the fashion of Caputo’s Derrida, I offer a religionless interpretation of each of the three theological virtues and show how _Bad Times_ itself deconstructs the roles of ‘god’ and ‘human,’ interchanging them in a way that manifests a “religionless religion” wherein the theological virtues can remain vibrant, even without the theological structure that might be expected to undergird them. In short: _Bad Times at the El Royale_ demonstrates how even if God is dead, Faith, Hope, and Love are not. (shrink)

This article explores the intricate interplay between religion, culture, and society, delving into the evolution of religious beliefs and practices within the framework of modernity. It examines how religion, centred on the belief in supernatural forces, weaves through the fabric of culture, impacting rituals, symbols, and societal norms. An emphasis is placed on the dynamic interplay between the emotional dimensions of religion and the rationality symbolised by science. As modern societies gravitate towards secularism and empirical foundations, religion undergoes a transformative (...) shift, adapting to coexist harmoniously with reason. This transformation is marked by changes in religious practices, from the all-encompassing influence in traditional societies to a more situational role in contemporary times. This evolution has led to the displacement of certain societal elements by religion, reshaping its contours within modern societies. Furthermore, the article underscores the intricate relationship between belief systems, artistic expressions, and ethical frameworks. It highlights that religion’s impact goes beyond mere ritualistic observance, permeating individual morality and behaviour. While religion remains a unifying force, providing cohesion and a sense of purpose, it can also be a source of conflict when exploited for political agendas. The author concludes the article with a philosophical reflection, emphasising that despite the rise of reason, religion remains a facet of human existence, offering solace and guidance in the face of life’s enigmatic uncertainties. This reflection postulates that the essence of religion transcends the confines of doctrine, encapsulating the timeless human pursuit for connection, meaning, and universal truths that reverberate across cultures and epochs. (shrink)

The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically and discuss the role of imagination in science and religion, with particular emphasis on its possible epistemic, creative, and meaning-making functions. In order to answer my research questions, I apply theories and concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind on scientific and religious practices. This framework allows me to explore the mental state of imagination, not as an isolated phenomenon but, rather, as one of many mental states that co-exist and interplay (...) in our cogntive architecture. Based on the philosophical discourse of philosophy of mind, four types of imagination are indentified and conceptualized: sensory, propositional, experiential, and creative imagination. These categories are then employed on five phenomena that can be found in scientific and religious environments: metaphors, models, thought experiments, aspect perception, and - in the religious case - rituals. In relation to the concept of religious "seeing" I consider how imaginings may influence visionary experiences and visualization, and compare these phenomena with cases of scientific visualization and eureka experiences. In regard to scientific and religious models, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, two notions of truth and, on the other hand, truth-independent meaning-making. In light of these categories, I differentiate between, and critically discuss, the use of imagination in doxastic, non-doxastic and fictionalist accounts. In light of this investigation, I formulate and defend the position of interactivism, which acknowledges a constant interplay between different attitudes and mental states. In my examination of rituals and scientific and religious thought experiments, special attention is given to the mental capacity to recreate the experiences that are entailed in an imagined scenario. At the end of the investigation, I consider the possible impact that my study might have on how we view science and religion as well as the dialogue bewteen these two fields. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) describes a philosophical discussion on the validity of the argument from design. What Hume investigates, however, is not the rational grounds of religion, but human nature and its attraction to the idea of design. I argue that the key to understanding Hume’s Dialogues is his conception of the imagination as described in the Treatise. Hume characterizes the human imagination or mind as self-indulgent, with a strong drive to unite perceptions in relations of resemblance, (...) contiguity or causality, often adding fictional constructions to create an easy transition between ideas. Natural religion is a prime example, as the whole universe is united in orderly means-to-ends relations and provided with a familiar cause: something resembling the human mind. This reading of the Dialogues, however, does not warrant the conclusion that Hume provides a reductionist natural explanation of natural religion. Knowing human nature helps to understand religion’s attraction and the attraction of religion helps to understand humans, because it is paradigmatic of who we are. To connect perceptions, construct wholes and create meaning out of chaos is an essential feature of human nature, and a source of great pleasure. (shrink)

* This is a fragment of J. L. Schellenberg’s paper “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy” originally published in Adam Green and Eleonore Stump, Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief, 23–25, 28. Reprinted by permission of the author.

This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...) types make distinct contributions to generating emotional responses to stories. Finally, the differences between the mental states illuminate how a given story can be both shared with others and at the same time experienced as personal. (shrink)

Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the US, Ghana, (...) Thailand, China, and Vanuatu. Participants everywhere routinely used different verbs to describe religious versus matter-of-fact beliefs, and they did so even when the ascribed belief contents were held constant and only the surrounding context varied. These findings support the view that people from diverse cultures and language communities recognize a difference in attitude type between religious belief and everyday matter-of-fact belief. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In order to explore what it means to pursue philosophical investigations for theological reasons, this paper argues that Ludwig Wittgenstein continues and corrects Pseudo-Denys’ project in The Divine Names. I first argue that The Divine Names should be interpreted as attempting to render human thought transparent to the divine by relativizing our concepts. The success of this project is compromised because the concept of ‘unity’ is not relativized. I then develop the claim that Wittgenstein does relativize unity in a (...) similar way and for similar religious reasons to Pseudo-Denys. As such, he can be read as continuing and correcting the Pseudo-Dionysian project. I conclude by reflecting on several of this argument’s implications for the relationship between philosophy and Christian systematic theology. (shrink)

Theorists such as Stuart Hall have problematised the idea that identity is something that remains essentially the same across time. Since doctrine has been cast as that which safeguards Christian identity, this provokes the question: what role can doctrine play if this is the case? Critiquing George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine in light of Kathryn Tanner's work on rules suggests that doctrine cannot regulate, constitute or generate the necessary conditions for Christian identity. Doctrine can, however, still play a role (...) in generating Christian meaning without regulating identity by determining how concepts are formed in Christian community. (shrink)

Theories about the nature and function of philosophical imagination depend on our understanding of what kind of universe we inhabit. Some theories are compelling if the universe is meaningful as a whole, but they make no sense if it is not. Raymond C. Barfield discusses conditions that would be necessary if the universe is meaningful as a whole, and then develops a theory of philosophical imagination in light of that starting place. The theory moves toward the conclusion that if the (...) universe is meaningful as a whole, the concept of the analogia entis, the analogy of being, illuminates philosophical imagination in a way that changes our understanding of its function and potential, along with the value of its discoveries through the things it creates. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the thematic section on Science Fiction's Imagined Technologies, which includes three articles that were presented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in San Diego, CA on November 24, 2019.