Moral Principles

Propositionalism, the view that moral laws are propositional, is nearly a truism in metaethics. Against this, I argue that those who hold that moral laws play an ineliminable role in moral explanation should reject it. If laws are to play such a role, they must make what explains relevant to what is explained. Yet if laws are themselves propositions, this requirement yields an explanatory regress. I develop a relational alternative according to which moral laws are generative relations rather than propositions. (...) This relational account avoids the regress, preserves the explanatory role of moral laws, and has significant implications for metaethical theory. In particular, I show that it yields a non-trivial formulation of non-naturalism and clarifies the relation between moral and metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

This chapter examines various proposed ways of reading Mencius as a moral intuitionist – that is, as holding the view that some moral knowledge is non-inferentially acquired by intuition. In doing so, the chapter critically surveys different accounts of what intuitions are for Mencius: that they are perceptions with moral content, emotions, or products of thinking (sī 思). A close reading of selected key passages, such as 6A7, 2A6, and 7A15, shows that Mencius is probably less of an intuitionist than (...) many take him to be. This casts doubt on the widely accepted thesis that a distinguishing feature of Mencian Confucianism is its intuition-centric moral epistemology. (shrink)

This essay investigates the jurisprudential philosophy of the ‘nomian esoteric’ strand within the early Jaʿfarī school, focusing on the constructed image of the Imām as presented by esoteric thinkers. Through a close reading of select Shiʿi ḥadīths, I explore this image of the Imām as the bearer of legislative authority (al-walāya al-tashrīʿiyya), whose rulings are shaped by both epistemic and pedagogical concerns. The essay contextualizes the Imām’s rejection of qiyās (analogical reasoning) and his issuance of varied rulings within broader Jaʿfarī (...) concepts such as dissimulation (taqiyya) and intellectual accommodation (kalām ʿalā qadr ʿuqūl al-nās). Drawing on these traditions, I present the nomian esoteric image of the Imām as a legal demiurge and proto-Uṣūlī thinker who articulates a meta-ethical framework akin to Platonic Moral Realism and Realist Particularism. Finally, I trace the transformation of Jaʿfarī jurisprudence following the Major Occultation, identifying a marked shift in legal epistemology and interpretive authority. Access options. (shrink)

The neo-Humean account of moral principles (NHM) is a theory about the metaphysical status of moral principles. According to NHM, moral principles (in the genetic, non-propositional sense) are entities that supervene upon, and are nothing over and above, the distribution of properties located at the Humean mosaic (the set of fundamental, non-modal, physical properties). In this paper, I do two things. First, I make the case for NHM: NHM explains pure moral principles in a straightforward way while also explaining moral (...) supervenience in a dialectically advantageous way. Secondly, I defend the contingentist aspect of NHM: the properties that figure in the Humean mosaic are governed by a principle of recombination. And the fact that moral properties figure in that mosaic contingently suggests that moral principles are also contingent (i.e. they differ depending on a given world’s distribution of base-properties). This makes NHM susceptible to a normative authority problem, an epistemological problem, a moral luck problem, and a modal miracle problem. I show that NHM can meet these challenges, thus making it superior to other moral contingentist proposals on the market. (shrink)

This paper challenges the prevailing assumption in AI-safety research that advanced artificial agents require a unified, convergent value system. I argue that values are not universal truths discovered by intelligence but local assumptions used to resolve contradictory drives so that action can proceed. Once these assumptions are set, planning and optimization unfold downstream; the assumptions themselves do not require global coherence. I develop an anti-alignment framework in which an agent is permitted to retain incompatible motivational pressures without collapsing them into (...) a single doctrine. This structure mirrors evolutionary and ecological systems, where stability arises from variation rather than convergence. The model avoids the pathological risks associated with monolithic value optimization and prevents the imposition of human-centric value hierarchies. I conclude that the safest form of superintelligence is one that does not converge on a unified moral worldview but instead acts through context-sensitive assumptions without claiming access to universal principles. (shrink)

This paper proposes Optimal Adaptation Ethics (OAE), a framework designed to resolve the long-standing tension between moral universalism and cultural relativism. By establishing the "Principle of Contradiction Minimization" as an ontological axiom rather than a moral preference, OAE defines ethical norms as the output of an optimization function: Gamma (ethical norms) equals the argument that minimizes total contradiction (C_total). This system posits that while the content of norms must adapt to environmental variables (E) and internal factors (I), the form of (...) the norms is absolute and logically necessary for the survival of any intelligent agent, including Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). (shrink)

This Version Guide documents the complete evolution of the Waywardism Master Codex from its initial v1.0 release through v1.2.1. It records every structural correction, philosophical refinement, scar-triggered update, and installment-specific patch that shaped the current system. Using semantic versioning, the guide maps how each installment evolved independently, enabling transparent tracking of changes without revision-by-erasure. Major advancements across v1.1–v1.2.1 include corrections to Observer impartiality, bootstrap verification protocols, crisis and mercy architecture, Value Distance Metric refinement, harm-vector weighting, plural-governance rules, ecological amplifiers, and (...) RoseOS security hardening. By providing full scar lineage and version-specific change logs, this document preserves system integrity, ensures traceability, and frames Waywardism as a rigorously self-correcting ethical architecture. (shrink)

This installment provides rigorous definitions for all core concepts used throughout the Waywardism Codex, including the Four Constants, Drift, Scars, Awareness, Future-Agency Preservation, Triquetra, Observer, VDM, harm-vectors, Fast-HCL, Mercy, Bounded Pluralism, plural-scars, bootstrap verification, and the Perspectives Kernel. It serves as the reference backbone for all other volumes.

This installment maps Waywardism into technical and institutional implementation through the RoseOS ethical engine. It details Observer modules, harm-vector evaluators, consent maps, drift monitors, scar managers, Fast-HCL handlers, and Mirror-Trigger interfaces. The v1.2.1 Security Addendum introduces cryptographic scar ledgers, multi-party validation, integrity checks, and adversarial-resilience protocols. This volume bridges philosophy and operational systems.

This installment demonstrates Waywardism in practical settings including healthcare triage, end-of-life decisions, family systems, public policy, environmental regulation, criminal justice, high-conflict communication, whistleblower protection, cultural disputes, and AI autonomy. These examples show the operational interaction of Constants, Drift, Scars, Triquetra reasoning, and Crisis-Mercy protocols across diverse domains.

This installment catalogs major critiques raised against Waywardism and provides structured replies. Topics include Observer impartiality, verification regress, crisis paralysis, Mercy abuse, cultural imperialism, mathematical rigor, drift in novel domains, emotional sustainability, irreconcilable plural conflicts, and system complexity. Each objection is answered by referencing the structural corrections documented in the Scar Lineage.

This installment documents all known structural scars in Waywardism’s development, including the resolution of Observer neutrality, verification circularity, crisis failure, cultural interpretation gaps, Mercy ambiguity, harm-vector absence, mathematical overclaims, versioning, IS-tier ambiguity, and missing lineage. Scar #11—“Missing Scar Lineage”—is corrected by this volume itself. This document demonstrates complete recursive transparency.

This installment addresses the verification bootstrap problem: how Waywardism initializes and evaluates decisions when no scar history or drift patterns exist. It introduces First-Principle Mode, Minimum Viable Scar Thresholds, awareness-initialization methods, external anchors, blank-slate verification flow, and early-stage pattern formation. This volume ensures the system can operate transparently and consistently from a zero-history state.

This installment explores cultural interpretation, ecological stewardship, and long-horizon ethical responsibility. It introduces Bounded Pluralism, plural-scars, ecological harm amplifiers, and intergenerational Future-Agency Preservation. The v1.2.1 Plural-Governance Addendum defines shared-policy conflict protocols, minority-impact multipliers, and sunset-clause requirements. This volume strengthens Waywardism’s adaptability across cultures and time scales.

This installment presents the Crisis Architecture (Fast-HCL) and the Mercy Protocol—two mechanisms that preserve ethical integrity under pressure or emotional collapse. It includes crisis-mode compressed reasoning, post-crisis reconstruction, Mercy conditions, Mirror Triggers, and drift-prevention safeguards. The v1.2.1 Addendum introduces quantified Mercy-ratio thresholds and pattern definitions. This volume ensures Waywardism remains human-viable without abandoning rigor.

This installment details the operational architecture of Waywardism. It formalizes the Triquetra conflict-resolution model, the Observer as an impartial axiom-bound standpoint, the Ratio of Canonical Alignment, Value Distance Metrics, harm-vector modeling, drift mechanics, and the recursive Alignment Cycle. It includes the v1.2.1 Architecture Addendum, which adds formal VDM structure and harm-weighting hierarchies. This volume explains how philosophical principles become structural mechanics.

This installment defines the philosophical core of Waywardism. It elaborates the Four Constants—Non-Harm, Consent, Truth-Alignment, and Transparency—along with Drift, Scars, Awareness, and Future-Agency Preservation. It describes how these components function together as a recursive ethical system that resists dogma, preserves structural memory, and adapts over time. This volume provides the conceptual foundation for all later installments.

This installment presents the human and experiential foundations of Waywardism. It traces the system’s evolution from lived encounters with institutional failure to a structured ethical framework. It introduces the “bridge ethic,” the emergence of Drift and Scars, and the double-helix narrative that integrates rigorous philosophy with human experience. This volume establishes the emotional and historical grounding from which the full system grew.

Kantian ethics is traditionally seen as grounded in unchanging, universally binding, and a priori knowable principles. I argue that this picture is incomplete: Kant grounds his ethics not only in categorical moral principles, but also in regulative moral ideas of reason. On Kant's account, moral ideas contain metanormative moral content that outstrips agents' cognitive resources: they are unattainable in their entirety, indeterminate and unbounded, and cannot be directly represented. I show how Kant's ethics need not be supplemented with external resources (...) in order to explain moral change, but can instead rely on resources internal to it: moral ideas. In both the theoretical and moral Kantian systems, ideas of reason regulatively guide the respective acquisition of scientific and moral knowledge, allowing for the possibility of moral as well as epistemic progress. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified rational framework integrating PROVABLE and TESTABLE objective moral realism(P.13-15), along with metaphysical necessity, and cosmological coherence into a single system. It begins with the empirical observation that teleology (purpose) and moral order are intrinsic to life and consciousness, suggesting that these internal principles reflect a universal order. Evidence from the fine-tuning of the cosmos supports the necessity of a non-contingent, infinite ground that transcends space and time. From this, the paper argues that a being possessing (...) properties traditionally ascribed to God(Unity, Necessity, Moral Perfection, and Creative Will) is the most metaphysically probable and necessary conclusion. The framework further shows that misalignment with this moral order produces predictable and observable decay (“sin” to disorder), positioning morality as a foundational and testable law of existence. The model provides a rational foundation for evaluating theological claims without presupposing revelation, while avoiding pitfalls such as God-of-the-gaps reasoning and self-defeating axioms like nihilism. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified rational framework integrating PROVABLE and TESTABLE objective moral realism(P.13-15), along with metaphysical necessity, and cosmological coherence into a single system. It begins with the empirical observation that teleology (purpose) and moral order are intrinsic to life and consciousness, suggesting that these internal principles reflect a universal order. Evidence from the fine-tuning of the cosmos supports the necessity of a non-contingent, infinite ground that transcends space and time. From this, the paper argues that a being possessing (...) properties traditionally ascribed to God(Unity, Necessity, Moral Perfection, and Creative Will) is the most metaphysically probable and necessary conclusion. The framework further shows that misalignment with this moral order produces predictable and observable decay (“sin” to disorder), positioning morality as a foundational and testable law of existence. The model provides a rational foundation for evaluating theological claims without presupposing revelation, while avoiding pitfalls such as God-of-the-gaps reasoning and self-defeating axioms like nihilism. (shrink)

This thesis examines the liberating potential of embracing life’s lack of inherent meaning through the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. In contrast to religious or metaphysical worldviews that impose predetermined purposes, each thinker demonstrates how the recognition of meaninglessness can lead to authenticity, freedom, and flourishing. Nietzsche frames nihilism as an opportunity for value-creation through the will to power and the figure of the Übermensch. Sartre argues that existence precedes essence, condemning humanity to radical freedom and (...) the responsibility of self-definition. Camus confronts the absurd and presents revolt as the most life-affirming response. Synthesizing their perspectives, this thesis contends that rejecting external illusions and facing the void of meaninglessness directly is not a path to despair but to liberation. It further argues that in a modern world oversaturated with cultural, political, and technological pressures that impose illusory values, these philosophies remain urgently relevant. Ultimately, the beauty of meaninglessness lies in its capacity to reveal human existence as a blank canvas, inviting individuals to author their own values, commitments, and purposes, thereby achieving authenticity and dignity in the absence of predetermined destiny. (shrink)

On Kant’s view, human agents are “animals endowed with reason,” sensitive to both natural and moral incentives. His model is hybrid rather than dualistic: insofar as humans are sensitive to the authority of rational norms, they can transform themselves from animal rationabile into animal rationale. This raises the question: how do hybrid agents navigate the heterogeneity of incentives? This is a live question, giving rise to a methodological puzzle. What methodology fits hybrid agency? Two opposing approaches, reductive naturalism and anti-naturalism, (...) have prevailed, with John McDowell offering a middle ground through the concept of second nature. In contrast, this essay argues that Kant’s view vindicates the positive aspects of naturalism and anti-naturalism, while rejecting the reductive ambitions of the former and the robust ontology of the latter. Hybrid rational agency, characterized by self-reflection, allows for rational changes that are not merely adaptive responses but radical, original acts of reorientation toward the world. By refocusing on Kant’s account of moral agency, we recover the resources for a distinctive critique of reductive naturalism, showing its conservative and alienating effects. Kant provides an empowering view of human agency, in dialectical contrast to the second nature model based on habit and social training. (shrink)

This is the second article in our series “The Dark Sides of Modern Science” and is about publishing and dissemination of science (and knowledge in general). As the subject of “publishing and dissemination of science” is too big, we decided to divide it in more than one part. The remarks that we stated in the Introduction of the first article of this series (i.e. "Knowledge Production and Authoring") generally apply to this article and hence we do not need to repeat.

To identify the place of religious pluralism in democratic political discourse, this chapter refocuses on the purported normative authority of religious claims, providing a philosophical analysis of its features and implications. Bagnoli proposes an account of religious authority as a variety of normative authority, whose distinctive features are the independence of epistemic proof, the unconditionality and universality of its foundational claims, and the obligations based on membership. Bagnoli then considers whether and how the appeal to religious authority could contribute to (...) the process of rational justification in political discourse in contexts marked by divisive religious disagreements. To this purpose, she adopts a constructivist approach, which takes rational justification to be “public,” that is, addressed to others as having equal normative standing. Bagnoli takes reasoning to be productive and transforming: it does not merely manage conflicts by ratifying overlapping reasons but generates new forms of rational agency. Radically departing from current debates, Bagnoli argues that we should reconceive of public reason dynamically, rather than as a static concept. In the third part, Bagnoli points out and illustrates how constructivism may help provide a suitable normative framework for interfaith dialogue and normative adjustments. (shrink)

A central metaphysical debate about laws concerns whether they govern or merely summarize. This debate has recently been extended to moral laws, with fresh criticism directed at the Humean position by, inter alia, David Enoch and Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg. These criticisms have seemed compelling, we think, because a contemporary Humean metaphysics of moral laws has only been offered implicitly or with important metaphysical concessions. Our aim, therefore, is to sketch the first explicitly Humean metaphysics of moral laws, modeled (...) on David Lewis's Best Systems Account. We then employ this framework to rebut the objections from Enoch and Fogal. This paper rescues the Humean position from criticisms that have made it seem untenable, and clarifies the role of moral laws within a version of Humeanism: moral laws unify particular moral facts and guide practical deliberation without being metaphysically fundamental. (shrink)

In this essay, my ultimate aim is to show that the method of wide reflective equilibrium (MWRE) can be improved in a way that allows us to detect self-evident propositions in a reasonably effective way. In order to do this, I first argue that appealing to self-evidence does not have to be considered a dogmatic approach in the search for moral justification. I do this while describing characteristics of self-evidence that are worth considering in devising a moral methodology. This allows (...) us to see how the search for self-evident propositions may be compatible with the MWRE. I then defend that the method is not as radically opposed to the appeal to self-evidence as it has commonly assumed. When doing this, I argue that the MWRE is more effective in leading us to find self-evident beliefs than one might initially expect. Finally, based on some features self-evident beliefs have, I propose that, in addition to following the steps that the MWRE requires us to follow, we should meet two further requirements in order to detect self-evident propositions in a more effective way. Furthermore, the resulting methodological proposal, I argue, can be desirable even if there happens to be no self-evident propositions. (shrink)

Abstract : This article examines whether moral theory can provide satisfactory guidance to agents facing (resolvable) moral conflicts where mutually exclusive actions are required by significant moral reasons. Employing an exploratory approach, we map the alternatives offered by value-based moral theories, focusing on monism, which grounds moral reasons in a single value like utility, and hierarchical pluralism, which assigns a fixed ranking to multiple intrinsic values. Non-hierarchical pluralism is dismissed as it fails to offer practical guidance beyond subjective prioritisation. We (...) propose two criteria for evaluating these theories: scope of resolution (the range of conflicts a theory can address) and explanatory capacity (the ability to account for ordinary moral experiences regarding moral conflicts, such as moral residue). Monism is criticised for its inability to explain the persistence of moral reasons not acted upon, while hierarchical pluralism faces a dilemma: it is either too narrow in scope or unable to accommodate circumstantial variations in the relative importance of values. Our findings suggest that moral theory’s practical role in resolving moral conflicts is inherently limited. Instead, resolving most moral conflicts requires practical wisdom, as theorised in the Aristotelian tradition, which acknowledges the complexity and context-dependence of moral reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and defend a novel way for non-naturalists to account for the sui generis status of normative facts, which is consistent with the claim that contingent normative facts obtain in virtue of non-normative facts. According to what I call unsupplemented partial ground approach, non-derivative normative facts have non-normative partial grounds, but are not fully grounded in any collection of facts. This view entails that an explanatory gap separates the normative from the non-normative domain. I argue that (...) this account provides non-naturalists with a metaphysically coherent response to the challenge of accounting for explanatory dependence relations between two domains while positing metaphysical discontinuity (explanatory challenge), and avoids serious objections that alternative non-naturalist accounts face. Moreover, I show that the unsupplemented partial ground approach is an attractive option for the popular Reasons-First approach, which is often, but I argue prematurely, considered a particularly promising account for non-naturalists. (shrink)

This book integrates Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on the nature and justification of moral judgements. Arguing that moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities, the book concludes that it is through obligations tied to our multifaceted identities that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act.

I want to start by telling you a story about something which once happened in my house in Oxford — I cannot remember now all the exact details, but will do my best to be accurate. It was about nine years ago, and we had staying with us a Swiss boy from Lausanne; he was about 18 years old and had just left school. He came of a Protestant family and was both sincerely religious and full of the best ideals. (...) My wife and I do not read French very well, and so we had few French books in the house; but those we had we put by his bedside; they included one or two anthologies of French poetry, the works of Villon, the confessions of Rousseau and, lastly, L’Etranger by Camus. After our friend had been with us for about a week, and we thought we were getting to know him as a cheerful, vigorous, enthusiastic young man of a sort that anybody is glad to know, he surprised us one morning by asking for cigarettes — he had not smoked at all up till then — and retiring to his room, where he smoked them one after the other, coming down hurriedly to meals, during which he would say nothing at all. After dinner in the evening, at which he ate little, he said he would go for a walk. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how realist moral naturalists can provide an intra-theoretic explanation of the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This is a requirement on metaethical theories that has been recently defended by Akhlaghi (2021). After clarifying Akhlaghi’s argument and responding to Evers’s (2021) recent rebuttal, I argue that even under the assumption that moral facts are grounded in an appropriate subset of natural facts (N-facts), there is still a non-zero probability of wholesale moral error. This is demonstrated (...) by considering three types of epistemically possible scenarios: specifically, it could either be that N-facts do not actually exist, or that N-facts exist in a way that entails wholesale moral error, or that N-facts exist in a non-error theoretic way, but their existence is temporally restricted. (shrink)

It may seem that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons differently, because ties in practical rationality tend to generate permissions and ties in epistemic rationality tend to generate a requirement to withhold judgment. I argue that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons in the same way, but they have different "default biases". Practical rationality is biased toward every option being permissible whereas epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment's being required.

According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails. A pure moral principle like Act Utilitarianism (AU) cannot explain moral supervenience because AU is not a difference-maker for moral supervenience. There is nothing special about AU which explains why moral properties supervene on natural properties; other moral principles (...) would also explain moral supervenience. On the other hand, if the proponent of DC appeals to some general feature of pure moral principles (like the fact that they have a “bridge-law” structure) then there is a question of what explains that feature. In this paper I do two things. First, I explore a possible extension of the DC-strategy against Bhogal's objection: I consider whether pure moral principles have the right features to explain moral supervenience by showing how these features follow from plausible assumptions about the underlying metaphysics of moral principles. Secondly, I show how this extended version of the DC-strategy can be used as a novel argument for moral contingentism. (shrink)

Como começamos a refletir e deliberar sobre nossa conduta moral, colocando-nos no lugar dos outros? Mais especificamente, de que forma gerimos, de maneira arbitrária, nossa conduta a partir de uma perspectiva que prioriza o bem de todos os seres humanos de forma universal? Com o objetivo de responder essa questão, parto da hipótese de que o conceito de razão prática, frequentemente tratado como 'vontade' na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant, pode esclarecer o desenvolvimento de nossa capacidade de refletir (...) e gerir autonomamente nossas ações sob uma ótica que coloca todos os indivíduos em condições de igualdade, isto é, sob uma perspectiva universalista. Para atingir esse objetivo, minha investigação se desdobra nas seguintes etapas: (i) analiso o conceito de vontade a partir dos conceitos de dever e de razão prática; (ii) analiso o conceito de autonomia a partir dos conceitos de liberdade e de lei moral; e (iii) sintetizo as duas análises precedentes e abordo com mais detalhes o conceito de Imperativo Categórico no sentido de buscar responder como o conceito de vontade pode nos ajudar a compreender o processo pelo qual passamos a direcionar nossa conduta a partir de uma perspectiva universalista. Concluo que, embora a reflexão autônoma seja o caminho para a liberdade e para uma conduta moral universal, ela ainda pode — e deve — ser socialmente cultivada. (shrink)

Ang tradisyong pilosopikal sa paglapit sa moralidad ay pangunahing nakabatay sa mga konsepto at teoryang metapisikal at teolohikal. Sa mga tradisyunal na konsepto ng etika, ang pinakaprominente ay ang Divine Command Theory (DCT). Ayon sa DCT, ang Diyos ang nagbibigay ng moral na pundasyon sa sangkatauhan sa pamamagitan ng paglikha at Rebelasyon. Ang moralidad at pagka-Diyos ay hindi mapaghihiwalay mula pa noong pinakalumang sibilisasyon. Ang mga konseptong ito ay nakalubog sa isang teolohikal na balangkas at malawakang tinatanggap ng karamihan sa (...) mga tagasunod ng tatlong tradisyong Abrahamiko: Hudaismo, Kristiyanismo, at Islam, na bumubuo sa malaking bahagi ng populasyon ng tao. Dahil nakabatay sa pananampalataya at Rebelasyon, ang mga Divine Command Theories ay hindi mahigpit na nasasaklaw ng demonstrasyon. Ang mga kalaban ng Divine Command na konsepto ng moralidad, na nakabatay sa imposibilidad ng demonstrasyon ng mga metapisikal at relihiyosong palagay nito, ay sinubukan sa loob ng maraming siglo (bagamat hindi matagumpay) na bawasan ang kahalagahan nito. Inihain nila ang argumento na wala itong maipakitang materyal na ebidensya at lohikal na pagkakaugnay, at dahil dito, hindi ito maaaring isaalang-alang para sa mga layuning maka-agham o pilosopikal. Isa lamang itong paniniwala at, bilang ganoon, dapat itong unawain. Bukod sa mga matinding pagtutol na ito, maraming iba pang konsepto ang sumasalungat sa mga teorya ng Divine Command, sa isa o ibang paraan, bahagya o ganap. Maraming mga pilosopo at sosyal na siyentipiko, mula sa klasikal na pilosopiyang Griyego hanggang sa kasalukuyan, halimbawa, ang nagsasabing ang moralidad ay isang konstrak lamang, kaya’t ito ay kultural na relatibo at kultural na natutukoy. Gayunpaman, nagdadala ito ng maraming iba pang talakayan at nagpapataw ng hamon na tukuyin kung ano ang kahulugan ng kultura, kung aling mga elemento ng kultura ang moral na mapagpasya, at sa wakas, ano ang mga hangganan ng naturang relatibidad. Ang mga moral determinist ay nagsasabing ang lahat ng may kaugnayan sa pag-uugali ng tao, kabilang ang moralidad, ay natutukoy, sapagkat ang malayang kalooban ay hindi umiiral. Kamakailan lamang, ipinahayag ng mga modernong palaisip na mayroong mahigpit na agham ng moralidad. Gayunpaman, ang pamamaraang maka-agham lamang, sa kabila ng pagpapaliwanag ng ilang mga katotohanan at ebidensya, ay hindi kayang liwanagan ang buong nilalaman at ganap na kahulugan ng etika. Ang pag-unawa sa moralidad ay nangangailangan ng mas malawak na pananaw, at isang kasunduan sa mga pilosopo, na hindi pa nila kailanman naabot. Ang lahat ng mga tanong na ito ay may iba’t ibang anyo depende sa bawat pilosopikal na pananaw, at nagsisimula ng masalimuot na pagsusuri at walang katapusang mga debate, habang marami sa mga ito ay magkakasalungatan. Ang uniberso at ang atmospera na pumapalibot sa tesis na ito ay ang mga saklaw ng lahat ng mga konseptwal na tunggaliang ito, na sinusuri mula sa isang layunin at ebolusyonaryong pananaw. Sa kabila ng kalagayang ito at ng likas na kahalagahan nito, gayunpaman, ang mga tanong na ito ay malayo sa metodolohikal na paglapit ng isang analitikal na talakayan tungkol sa layunin ng moralidad, na siyang tunay na layunin at saklaw ng gawaing ito. Dapat nating muling balikan ang mga kilalang tradisyunal na teorya dahil ang tesis na ito ay sumisilong sa isang paghahambing na pag-aaral, at ang mga palagay nito ay hindi bababa sa ganap na naiiba mula sa lahat ng tradisyunal na teorya. Samakatuwid, nagiging kinakailangan ang pag-aalok ng direktang at tiyak na mga elemento ng paghahambing sa mambabasa, para sa wastong kritisismo, nang hindi nangangailangan ng mga nakakaantala na pananaliksik. Gayunpaman, kahit na muling binabalikan ang mga tradisyunal na teorya para sa layunin ng paghahambing at kritikal na pagpapahayag, mananatili silang nasa gilid ng ating pangunahing mga alalahanin, bilang “aliena materia.” Sa kabila ng bisa ng alinman o lahat ng mga elemento ng talakayang ito, at ng kanilang kahulugan bilang pilosopikal na uniberso ng tesis na ito, ang layunin ng gawaing ito ay ipakita at bigyang-katwiran ang pag-iral at kahulugan ng mga sinaunang moral na arketipo na lumitaw nang direkta mula sa pinakaunang mga pangangailangang panlipunan at pagsisikap para sa kaligtasan. Ang mga arketipong ito ang kahulugan ng mahalagang pundasyon ng etika, ang pagsasama nito sa kolektibong walang malay at kaukulang lohikong organisasyon at transmisyon sa mga yugto ng ebolusyon ng genome ng tao at iba’t ibang ugnayang espasyo-panahon, anuman ang anumang kontemporaryong karanasan ng mga indibidwal. Ang sistemang tinukoy ng mga arketipong ito ay bumubuo ng isang ebolusyonaryong panlipunang modelo ng tao. Ito ba ay isang metaetikal na posisyon? Oo, ito ay ganoon. Bukod dito, tulad ng sa anumang metaetikal na pangangatwiran, dapat nating maingat na tingnan ang pinakamahusay at lohikal na mga ruta, tulad ng iniaalok ng Analitikal na Pilosopiya. Kaya, ang gawaing ito ay makatwirang dapat ipakita na ang moralidad ay hindi isang produktong kultural ng mga sibilisadong tao o modernong lipunan at na sa kabila ng pagiging nasasaklaw ng ilang kultural na relatibong pagsasama at pagbabawas, ang mga mahalagang pundasyon nito ay arketipal at hindi kailanman nagbago sa estruktura. Ang pangangatwirang ito ay nagpapahiwatig na ang moralidad ay isang orihinal na katangian ng “homo sapiens”; ito ay hindi isang ari-arian o isang aksidente: ito ay bahagi ng kakanyahan ng tao at kabilang sa saklaw ng ontolohikal na pagkakakilanlang pantao. Ang penomenang pantao ay isang tuluy-tuloy na proseso, ginagampanan ang papel nito sa pagitan ng random na pagtukoy at malayang kalooban, at kailangan nating tanungin kung paano nagsimula ang moralidad at paano ito dumating sa atin sa kasalukuyan. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. -/- A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. (shrink)

The human factor in information systems is a large vulnerability when implementing cybersecurity, and many approaches, including technical and policy driven solutions, seek to mitigate this vulnerability. Decisions to apply technical or policy solutions must consider how an individual’s values and moral stance influence their responses to these implementations. Our research aims to evaluate how individuals prioritise different ethical principles when making cybersecurity sensitive decisions and how much perceived choice they have when doing so. Further, we sought to use participants’ (...) responses to cybersecurity scenarios to create profiles that describe their values and individual factors including personality. Participants (n = 193) in our study responded to five different ethically sensitive cybersecurity scenarios in random order, selecting their action in that scenario and rating and ranking of the ethical principles (i.e., Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Justice, Autonomy, Explicability) behind that action. Using participants’ demographics, personality, values, and cyber hygiene practices, we created profiles using machine learning to predict participants’ choices and the principle of most importance to them across scenarios. Further, we found that, generalising, for our participants Autonomy was the most important ethical principle in our scenarios, followed by Justice. Our study also suggests that participants felt they had some agency in their decision making and they were able to weigh up different ethical principles. (shrink)

The book develops, defends, and applies a "Dual Scale" model of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. It addresses, among other things, what the general issue of weighing reasons is; what it is to weigh reasons correctly; whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and/or commending weight); whether weight values are (...) context sensitive; how to tell what the weights of reasons are; how reasons for are related to reasons against; and how the weights of reasons aggregate. After addressing such issues, it explains a number of puzzling phenomena in ethics, such as the All or Nothing Problem, the normative significance of small improvements, and the intransitivity of the makes-it-permissible-to-act-against relation. (shrink)

To show the promise of the Kantian constitutivist approach to international relations, I consider its relevance in the case of the “sanctioner’s dilemma.” This dilemma arises when the costs of sanctioning a state for the violation of international law seem prohibitive, for instance when a state is strategically important and its absence would significantly undermine global cooperation, or because the proposed sanctions would have humanitarian consequences. This case is generally analyzed in terms of cost–benefit and discussed against the background of (...) strategic rationality. My contention is that the instrumentalist view fails to fully capture the nature of the dilemma. Instead, the constitutivist argument offers a deeper understanding of the dynamics of power and authority inherent in the sanctioner’s dilemma and highlights some morally perplexing aspects of sanctions. The discussion brings to the fore the potentially disruptive impact of a Kantian constructivist approach in the field of international relations. (shrink)

This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy – in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement.

This is a paper about model-building and overfitting in normative ethics. Overfitting is recognized as a methodological error in modeling in the philosophy of science and scientific practice, but this concern has not been brought to bear on the practice of normative ethics. I first argue that moral inquiry shares similarities with scientific inquiry in that both may productively rely on model-building, and, as such, overfitting worries should apply to both fields. I then offer a diagnosis of the problems of (...) overfitting in moral inquiry and explain how our current practice seems worryingly susceptible to such problems. I conclude by giving suggestions for how we might avoid overfitting when doing normative ethics. (shrink)

Prisoners, those who probably engaged in criminal activities, might possess different perceptions and notions of moral foundations than non-prisoners. Thus, assessing such foundations among the population without testing the validity of the measure may produce biased outcomes. To address the potential methodological issue, we examined the validity of the measurement model for moral foundations among prisoners and community members, i.e., non-prisoners. We conducted the measurement invariance test and measurement alignment to test whether the model was consistently valid across the groups. (...) We also employed the differential item functioning test to examine whether item responses were not biased between the different populations. Results demonstrated significant measurement non-invariance and differential item functioning. However, measurement alignment could address the non-invariance issue. Between-group comparisons of moral foundations were consistent with findings from prior research after performing the alignment. (shrink)

A presente investigação tem por objetivo responder à questão título considerando os argumentos apresentados, de um lado, pelos desenvolvimentistas e, de outro, pelos ambientalistas. Entendemos que os argumentos apresentados refletem um conflito de valores mais profundo que, se abordado por uma metodologia de solução de conflitos adequada, pode contribuir para elucidação da questão. A metodologia proposta é o personalismo ético de Scheler. A hierarquia de valores a ser aplicada na solução de conflitos traz (i) o valor pessoa como o mais (...) elevado, seguido dos (ii) valores espirituais, como a justiça, (iii) os vitais, como o bem estar e o útil, e (iv) os sensíveis. Através das ações de preferir e postergar, é possível encontrar pontos de equilíbrio numa permanente atitude crítica. O objetivo é contribuir para que as ações ocorram com a devida diligência para com os direitos humanos. A hipótese inicial é que, identificando os valores em conflito e aplicando a metodologia descrita, a solução de conflitos neste caso concreto permite pensar numa transição energética que concilie o desenvolvimento e o meio ambiente. Compreendemos que ambos têm como fim proteger o valor pessoa. Portanto, o que está em conflito de fato, sem com isso assumir uma postura ingênua, são os valores espirituais e vitais de cada uma das partes. Neste sentido, defendemos que, diante da inevitável demanda por energia da sociedade contemporânea e do alto custo da transição energética, é preciso conciliar o desenvolvimento com o meio ambiente a partir de uma programada transição energética financiada pela exploração do petróleo e gás, mas com metas definidas comprometidas com a neutralidade da emissão de GEE em 2050. Para tanto, é necessário regulamentação, monitoramento e fiscalização por parte do Estado e do governo federal com a finalidade de garantir a substituição dos combustíveis fósseis por fontes energéticas limpas. (shrink)

It is necessary to have mastery of sciences for a voyage to Mars. Finances cannot be ignored either. But, after that, what? Why generate the related technology and for what purpose? Are only the computers going to live in a new colony to be established on Mars?

The Moral Universe advances new answers to central questions in metaethics concerning the nature of moral reality, its fundamental laws, its relation to the natural world, and its practical importance. The book’s central thesis is that moral standards regarding what to do and how to be are not only objectively authoritative, but essentially so. Rather than arising from personal schemes or collective ideals, morality flows from the very nature of things.

Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three _prima (...) facie_ reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground. (shrink)