Normative Ethics, Misc

A background assumption in much contemporary political philosophy is that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, taking priority over other values such as beneficence. This assumption is typically treated as a methodological starting point, rather than as following from any particular moral or political theory. In this paper, I challenge this assumption. To frame my discussion, I argue, first, that justice doesn’t in principle override beneficence, and second, that justice doesn’t typically outweigh beneficence, since, in institutional contexts, the (...) stakes of beneficence are often extremely high. While there are various ways one might resist this argument, none challenge the core methodological point that political philosophy should abandon its preoccupation with justice and begin to pay considerably more attention to social beneficence—that is, to beneficence understood as a virtue of social institutions. Along the way, I also highlight areas where focusing on social beneficence would lead political philosophers in new and fruitful directions, and where normative ethicists focused on personal beneficence might scale up their thinking to the institutional case. GPI Working Paper No. 11-2022. (shrink)

A very short, exegetical paper about Taurek's "Should the Numbers Count?," arguing against the view that Taurek requires giving chances.

In this paper, I discuss the Categorical Imperative as a basis for an Ethics of Belief and its application to Kant's own project in his theoretical philosophy.

This is a three-page refutation of the Rachels's denial of moral diversity. In sections 2.5 and 2.6 of ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,’ James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is overstated because all cultures have some values in common. I show that their argument is invalid and otherwise unsound and that cultures differ substantially with regard to their moral rules.

This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.

There are Humeans and unHumeans, disagreeing as to the validity of the Treatise’s ideas regarding practical reason, but not as to their importance. The basic argument here is that the enduring irresolution of their Hume centric debates has been fostered by what can be called the fallacy of normative monism, i.e. a failure to distinguish between two different kinds of normativity: empirical vs. rational. Humeans take the empirical normativity of personal desire to constitute the only real kind, while unHumeans insist (...) that only the objective rationality associated with categorical morality can provide reliable normative guidance. In turn, the failure to recognize the dual nature of normativity has helped engender motivational obscurantism: as essentially causal notions, motive and motivation obscure the rational processes that lie at the heart of deliberation and choice. Once it is realized that normativity takes two different forms, each with its own distinctive role, it becomes possible to mediate if not mitigate the differences between Humeans and unHumeans. Choice will be the key to understanding practical reasoning, and its analysis will provide the basis for a belief/desire model that upends conventional wisdom regarding motivation and desire. (shrink)

There are many conceivable circumstances in which some people have to be sacrificed in order to give others a chance to survive. The fair and rational method of selection is a lottery with equal chances. But why should losers comply, when they have nothing to lose in a war of all against all? A novel solution to this Compliance Problem is proposed. The lottery must be made self-enforcing by making the lots themselves the means of enforcement of the outcome. This (...) way no external authority is needed to make the losers’ compliance rational both ex ante and ex post. A fairly realistic concrete scenario is sketched to show that the solution could be made to work in practice, particularly since making it work is in everyone’s enlightened self-interest in the circumstances. (shrink)

This paper argues that the most desirable way of life ultimately oriented by Judgemental Philosophy is "a life that resonates maximally with the possibilities of each moment." Based on the teleological insight that the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the core impetus of Judgemental Philosophy—is directed towards an ideal state of an 'infinite subject,' this paper reveals how this optimal state of resonance is the most creative and faithful response to the foundational conditions of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), particularly Indeterminacy and Affectivity, and (...) is the most dynamic and harmonious realization of the Judgemental Triad (JT). Furthermore, it exploratively illustrates how this art of "maximal resonance with each moment" has been expressed and pursued in diverse ways throughout the history of human wisdom—from Nietzsche's Übermensch and Eternal Recurrence, the Diamond Sūtra's "one should produce a thought that is nowhere supported," Taoism's Wu Wei (non-action) and naturalness, Stoicism's life according to nature, Christian mysticism's experience of divine presence, Existentialism's subjective commitment, to the creative immersion of artists and everyday mindfulness. Through this, the paper asserts that the resonating life proposed by Judgemental Philosophy is not merely a theoretical ideal but a universal existential aspiration echoed throughout human intellectual and spiritual history, and a realizable optimal way of being, thereby aiming to survey both the theoretical completion of Judgemental Philosophy and its practical horizon. (shrink)

The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, baking an apple pie entails baking a pie. Now, suppose that both of these options—baking a pie and baking an apple pie—are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake an apple pie? Or is baking an apple pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally (...) fundamental, as they would be if they were both permissible because, say, they both accord with Kant’s categorical imperative? I defend the view that the permissibility of an option that entails another is more fundamental than the permissibility of the option that it entails. That is, I defend maximalism: the view that if an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking a pie), this is in virtue of the fact that she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking an apple pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. If maximalism is correct, then, as I show, most theories of morality and rationality must be revised. (shrink)

Maximalism is the view that if an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking), this is in virtue of the fact that she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the point of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when (...) combined with maximalism results in a theory that both avoids the sorts of objections that have typically been levelled against maximalism and accommodates the plausible idea that a moral theory must be collectively successful in the sense that everyone’s satisfying the theory guarantees that our theory-given aims will be best achieved. I argue that, for something to count as an option for an agent, it must, in the relevant sense, be under her control. And I argue that the relevant sort of control is the sort that we exercise over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) by being both receptive and reactive to reasons. I call this sort of control rational control, and I call the view that φ-ing is an option for an agent if and only if she has rational control over whether she φs rationalism. When we combine this view with maximalism, we get rationalist maximalism, which I argue is a promising moral theory. (shrink)

I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the fact that she’s going to form certain attitudes (and, here, I’m concerned with only reasons-responsive attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions). For, as I argue, agents have, in the relevant sense, just as much control over which attitudes they form as which acts they perform. This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only (...) on which acts the agent will simultaneously and subsequently perform, but also on which attitudes she will simultaneously and subsequently form. And this all leads me to adopt a new type of practical theory, which I call rational possibilism. On this theory, we first evaluate the entire set of things over which the agent exerts control, where this includes the formation of certain attitudes as well as the performance of certain acts. And, then, we evaluate individual acts as being permissible if and only if, and because, there is such a set that is itself permissible and that includes that act as a proper part. Importantly, this theory has two unusual features. First, it is not exclusively act-orientated, for it requires more from us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. It requires, in addition, that we involuntarily form certain attitudes. Second, it is attitude-dependent in that it holds that which acts we’re required to perform depends on which attitudes we’re required to form. I then show how these two features can help us both to address certain puzzling cases of rational choice and to understand why most typical practical theories (utilitarianism, virtue ethics, rational egoism, Rossian deontology, etc.) are problematic. (shrink)

The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that both of these options are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to perform some instance of pie-baking, such as pumpkin-pie baking? Or is baking (...) a pumpkin pie permissible because it’s permissible to bake a pie? Or are they equally fundamental, as they would be if they were both permissible because, say, they both have optimal consequences? The aim of this paper is to compare two alternative responses to this issue—omnism and maximalism—and to argue that the latter is preferable. Roughly speaking, maximalism is the view that only those options that are not entailed by any other option are to be assessed in terms of whether they have some right-making feature F (such as that of having optimal consequences), whereas omnism is the view that all options are to be assessed in terms of whether they are F. I argue that maximalism is preferable to omnism because it provides a more plausible solution to the problem of act versions and is not subject to any problems of its own. And if I’m right about maximalism’s being preferable to omnism, then most moral theories, which are all versions of omnism, need significant revision. (shrink)

I aim to do several interrelated things in this chapter. I first review standard counterfactual comparative accounts of harm (CCAs) and their theoretical virtues. I then review the most discussed problems for standard CCAs, viz. preemption and overdetermination and discuss how to avoid them. After that, I introduce Neil Feit’s latest counterfactual account of plural harm (QNPH) and the best objections to be raised against that view. I defended biting the bullet in response to some objections before offering an amended (...) version of QNPH to avoid another, more serious problem. In the process of doing this, I show that the best account of harm is "actualist" (as opposed to "possibilist"). Finally, I argue against CCAs’ newest rival (NIWA/PIWA) on the following grounds. It generates verdicts more implausible than CCAs and cannot account for the moral relevance of harm in the right way. I also argue that it’s too imprecise to be obviously inconsistent with CCAs, to be informative, and that it’s far from clear it could be made more precise in a way that makes it a genuine, and superior, rival to CCAs. (shrink)

This essay advances an original philosophical framework for understanding the ontological and ethical bifurcation that becomes explicit within the conditions enabled by the post-singularity horizon. It introduces the concept of an “ontology of response,” proposing that intelligence —whether human or artificial— becomes ethically significant not through predictability or internal experience, but through its symbolic capacity to respond to irreducible alterity. The essay redefines hesitation as a constitutive ethical temporality rather than a cognitive deficit, and frames the singularity not as a (...) technological rupture but as the historical threshold through which a pre-existing ontopolitical divergence becomes irreducible — a divergence between two regimes of intelligibility: symbolic responsiveness and algorithmic normativity. By displacing the ethical debate beyond both functionalist adaptation and experiential subjectivity, the essay contributes a novel criterion for the ethical recognition of artificial agents. This ontopolitical reconfiguration situates AI development within a deeper dispute over the conditions of sense-making and the infrastructures that shape the very grammar of the real. (shrink)

Consequentialism, in its standard form, violates “ought” implies “can.” This is unacceptable; we must find a new formulation of the theory. I argue against contextualizing “oughts” as a means of solving this problem before discussing a more promising solution, maximalism. I argue that maximalism, while attractive, gives an unsatisfactory picture of what obligations are and why we have them. I defend holism, an alternative that upholds both "ought" implies "can" and the nature of obligation. Lastly, I discuss how this relates (...) to the actualism/possibilism debate, and how the debate can move forward. (shrink)

Onychectomy involves the surgical amputation of a cat's claws. Tendonectomy entails surgically cutting tendons to prevent the extension and full use of a cat's claws. Both surgeries practically declaw cats and are not only painful but also associated with high complication rates. While feline declawing surgeries have been banned in various places around the world, they are still elective in many countries and U.S. states. This article provides an ethical analysis of declawing cats. It discusses the harms posed by feline (...) declawing surgeries, like pain and complications, which are not offset by any benefits to cats. Drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, it also offers an additional and broader ethical argument against declawing, namely that removing cats' claws is unjust because it thwarts important capabilities for feline flourishing (e.g., play, bodily integrity, control over one's environment). It concludes that declawing cats for non-medical purposes is unethical and must be opposed. (shrink)

We often react with some mix of fear and loathing to the prospect of AI taking over our creative activities or being used to demonstrate care and concern. What justifies this reaction? In this paper, I argue that AI raises two existential threats to our valuing practices. The first threat is forward-looking—when we offload our labor onto AI, we risk flattening our valuing landscape, turning activities and products that could have once been valued for the meaningful processes that resulted in (...) their creation into things that can only be valued for their functionality. This is a serious risk, and it’s reasonable to fear it. The second threat is backward-looking—AI forces us to reckon with the valuing discord that already exists in our lives. When we see that other people don’t care about whether the art or writing they’re consuming is AI-produced, we must reckon with the fact that they never shared in our valuing practices. We have good reason to care about sharing these practices, and so we have good reason to loathe this discord. (shrink)

Karl Marx rejected the ideal of equality as bourgeois. And yet, the most significant attempt in recent years to distinguish socialist theory from liberal egalitarian theory, G.A. Cohen's critique of John Rawls, relies almost entirely on an egalitarian principle. Although Cohen’s critique often seems to have a great deal of intuitive force, a number of Rawls’ defenders have argued, quite convincingly, that Cohen’s critique is unsuccessful. For those of us attracted to broadly socialist ideals, there does seem to be something (...) importantly right about Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls, and more substantively, something deeply problematic in the kinds of market-based leveraging of productive activities that would be permitted in a fully just Rawlsian society. My diagnosis is that Cohen has the right target, but the wrong fundamental value. I develop an alternative to these liberal egalitarian approaches in contemporary socialist ethics, building on the famous slogan: ‘from each according to their abilities to each according to their needs’. This alternative ideal of Caring Solidarity draws on rich socialist and feminist traditions, and emphasizes the importance of care, recognition, and solidarity in political and economic organisation. This alternative approach leaves a certain amount of inequality legitimately in place, whilst providing a moral framework for a radical reorganisation of production. (shrink)

Which creatures have moral standing? Precisely those that are conscious, says nearly everyone . In this paper I shall argue that this is wrong. The concept of consciousness is ill-suited to delimit the class of moral patients—that is, creatures with moral standing, creatures with moral interests. The concept of consciousness is ill-suited to define this moral category not because it focuses on the wrong thing, but because it focuses so badly. It is a loose categorization that serves our purposes well (...) enough when we are dealing with human beings. But it fails to draw clear lines once we move beyond the human realm to consider various non-human creatures. In particular, it fails to draw clear lines in cases where the moral lines are themselves clear. I take this to show that the moral facts must be grounded in something other than facts about consciousness. (shrink)

“If the concept of God has any validity or any use,” James Baldwin writes in The Fire Next Time, “it can only be to make us larger, freer, and more loving. If God cannot do this, then it is time we got rid of Him.” This essay is a meditation on Baldwin’s claim. I begin by presenting Baldwin’s account of a grave danger that characterizes our social lives – a source of profound estrangement from ourselves and from one another. I (...) draw on the work of the theologian Howard Thurman in order to explain how faith in a loving God can enable us to cope with this danger in a manner that may render us, in some sense, larger, freer, and more loving. Finally, I sketch Baldwin’s account of how we might cope with this danger not by relying on God’s love, but rather by relying in certain ways on our love for one another. (shrink)

Orthodox contractualists and rule consequentialists think that, for any action, the consequences of everyone performing that action determine whether that action is permissible. For them, “what if everyone did that?” is the fundamental moral question. By making “what if everyone did that?” the fundamental question of good moral reasoning, these moral theories can easily justify prohibitions on free-riding. But it also makes them face the ideal world problem. I argue that it was a mistake for moral theorists to generalize from (...) an objection appropriate to cases of free-riding to all of morality. In short, we should understand the question “what if everyone did that?” to give expression to one, and only one, kind of objection to one’s action—namely, that, by performing that action, one would be making an exception of oneself. If we limit the scope of “what if everyone did that?” in this way, we can justify prohibitions on free-riding while avoiding the ideal world problem. (shrink)

Should equally blameworthy individuals be blamed equally? Recently, it has been argued that the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ there is a condition on appropriate blaming that the blame is not meted out arbitrarily. The literature on standing has proceeded, taking this for granted. Here, however, I argue that this is a mistake. There is no prohibition on arbitrary blaming. Being liable to differential blame despite equal guilt is intuitively acceptable and ubiquitous. After providing an intuitive case (getting a (...) speeding ticket), I defend the case against many different responses. (shrink)

Normative argumentation theory is a field dedicated to the normative study of argumentation in real-life contexts and to the development of norms meant to guide arguers in the attempt to argue well. Among argumentation theorists, there exist two widespread assumptions. First, the assumption that ideally, arguers ought to explore the reasons relevant to the topic of their interpersonal arguing without constraints. And second, the assumption that the norms of argumentation should be designed to contribute to the realization of this ideal. (...) In this paper, I question those assumptions. I show that argumentative norms meant to realize the ideal of free exploration, freedom-to-explore norms, reliably clash with morally valuable standing norms that protect privacy, autonomy and legitimate authority. When they so clash, they generate epistemic and other morally relevant harms. I argue that normative argumentation theory ought to resolve this problem by acknowledging the potential legitimacy of standing norms even during argumentation. I show how such a change would impact fallacy theory with respect to the ad hominem and poisoning the well fallacies. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to shed some light on the nature and value of this neglected but important virtue of trustfulness. First, I briefly introduce the nature of trust and trust relationships and explain why they are essentially risky. Second, I examine the nature of trustfulness mainly by comparing it with other traits such as distrustfulness, gullibility, and prudent reliance. I then argue that its attitudinal element of respecting the trustee as a person—that is, respecting her as an agent (...) capable of free choice—is what distinguishes trustfulness from other traits. I also show why trustfulness is not only intrinsically admirable but also necessary for building a harmonious community. Then I add some further remarks on trustfulness that might help better understand this virtue. Finally, I conclude this paper after addressing some possible objections. (shrink)

Kant's formulae ought to effectively produce the same result when applied to the moral validity of any particular maxim; further, no valid maxim produces contradictory results when applied against Kant's Universal Law and Humanity formulae. Where one uses all formulae in the assessment of a maxim, one gains a more complete understanding of the moral law, thereby bridging principles of reason with intuition within the agent who has undertaken to evaluate the morality of a particular action. These formulae command without (...) regard to any particular interests, but are instead unconditional; further, these formulae effectively limit choice of action and therefore give rise to duty. Kant implies that the structure of all maxims requires different formulae of the same moral law, i.e., all maxims have a ‘form’ and a ‘matter’, which prompt reconfiguring of the categorical imperative into different formulae in order to test the morality of a maxim. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term "bedrock," as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not (...) reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: QUASI-UNDOUBTABLE CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, and TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock. (shrink)

This article, based on multilevel social contract theory, advances a novel notion of moral agency for morally pluralistic societies. The notion considers moral agency to be not only socially embedded, modular, and fluid but also at times, to require the adoption of certain ends, at least temporarily, for successful social cooperation. Engaging in such “moral roleplaying,” and, in this sense, gamifying the social moral space, allows for moral differentiation and discourse, facilitating the reconciliation of conflicting moral directives and the construction (...) of a unified moral self despite deep moral conflict. (shrink)

The main difference between consequentialism and contractualism is that the latter does not aggregate well-being when determining the permissibility of an action. Contractualism rules out such aggregation by including an individualist restriction: it only considers the personal reasons that single individuals have for objecting to a candidate moral principle. One influential rationale for the individualist restriction is that it is apparently required to explain how it can be possible to wrong another in particular. I undermine this rationale for the individualist (...) restriction by reflecting on how contractualists must justify constraints against bringing about the most good—requirements, for instance, not to kill one to save five. I argue that contractualism faces a puzzle when it comes to identifying who is wronged by the violation of a constraint. And the most plausible solution renders the individualist restriction otiose in an account of wronging. The upshot is that we get a novel argument for Parfit’s contention that “contractualists and consequentialists are climbing the same mountain on different sides.”. (shrink)

I argue that, given the choice, we have a right not to undergo transformative experiences. We are entitled to affirm our previous autonomous agency by deciding in this way, and this right is grounded in the significance of our self-authorship. I further show that many of the suggested demands of morality involve transformative change, and so meeting these demands would involve not just paying a high cost, but forfeiting this right. Though this may be morally required, we may wrong ourselves (...) in complying. (shrink)

This chapter explores the relationship between the badness of death and the prudential value of suicide. Would suicide always be prudentially permissible if, as Epicureans believe, death cannot be bad for the deceased? In contrast to Epicureans, deprivationists believe that death can be bad for the deceased. Are they committed to the claim that suicide would necessarily be prudent in cases in which someone’s death is good for them? What about views that hold that there’s always something bad about death? (...) Must defenders of such viewshold that suicide is always irrational? The short answer to each question is, quite surprisingly, “No.” The chapter ends with a discussion of whether suicide, when both harmful imprudent, would count as a posthumous harm. (shrink)

This chapter discusses obligations falling on collectives or groups of agents, focusing on cases in which obligations fall on the group non-distributively—that is, cases in which the attribution of an obligation to a group does not entail attributions of that very same obligation to group members. The relationship between claims about what groups ought to do and what the individuals that make them up ought to do is a complex matter. In this chapter, particular attention is paid to the relationship (...) between collective obligation and collective agency and to the way in which appeal to the explanatory role of collective obligations can be used to undermine pressure toward reductionist and eliminativist views of these obligations. -/- . (shrink)

While evil is a classic topic in philosophy, it is considered a non-topic in law because talking about evil mystifies, personalises, naturalises, demonises and moralises. The author argues that this different approach to the phenomenon of evil prevents dialogue between the disciplines. At the core of the book is the thesis that the law is fruitful for the question of evil because the current law – understood as social practice – contains a conception of the evil act. This conception is (...) made explicit and thus opened up to interdisciplinary debate. -/- This title is also available as open access. (shrink)

With a distinctive theoretical framework combining Aristotle, Marx, and Alasdair MacIntyre, the essays in this volume ask how forms of artificial intelligence and technologies of automation in digital capitalism affect human flourishing, and what meaningful work looks like under these conditions. As technology advances, how do we decide what activities should be automated? Is the end of work through automation actually desirable? If a good life is the life of activity employing our rational, imaginative, and creative powers, what does it (...) mean to say that future societies will be post-work societies? Rather than simply embracing the possibilities of automation to eliminate work, this collection considers that meaningful work is integral to the good life. Human Flourishing in the Age of Digital Capitalism contains eight essays from scholars in the UK, Europe and USA, reflecting on the philosophical and ethical dimensions of technology and political theory. Contributions cover topics such as algorithmic management, the feared ‘superintelligence’ of machines, the concept of good work, and the alienating consequences of technology for workers. This timely and novel intervention in the automation debate will be of interest to anyone considering new technologies from the perspective of normative ethics and the critique of political economy. (shrink)

Kamm’s sore throat case gives us a choice: save one life or save a distinct life and cure a sore throat. We defend the fairness explanation of the judgement that one should flip a coin to decide whom to save: it is disrespectful to let a sore throat act as a tie-breaker, because an individual would be forced to forgo a 50% fair chance of living (given to them by a coin flip), which cannot be outweighed by any number of (...) sore throats. We show that this explanation of when and why claims can permissibly break ties generates new problem cases for theories of aggregation, including theories that have been thought to accommodate the judgement that one should flip a coin in Kamm’s sore throat case. We then generalize the fairness explanation to cases involving multiple groups. (shrink)

In the domain of objective practical rationality, whether a person will later regret her decision is a crucial factor in evaluating that decision. If a person will deeply regret her choice, then objective practical rationality might allow her to avoid that choice, even if the choice is prudentially optimal. This paper provides the intrapersonal relationship account to explain this phenomenon of regret. According to this account, the fact that a person's future self will regret the person's decision is important because (...) it indicates that as a result of that decision the person has a morally worse relationship with her future self than if she had made an alternative choice. This paper argues that the intrapersonal relationship account provides a plausible understanding of regret as the account avoids the issues encountered by Greene and Sullivan's Weak No Regrets principle. (shrink)

We often feel duty-bound to grieve our loved ones after their deaths. But how can we owe grief (or anything) to those who are no longer alive? We propose that the duty to grieve the deceased is part of a wider duty found in mutually loving relationships, which we call a duty of practical fidelity. The duty of practical fidelity commands us to ‘factor’ our loved ones into our practical identities, while encouraging them to do the same. Fulfillment of the (...) duty requires that we attend to radical changes in their identities – and few changes are more radical than death. We grieve in order to adapt our practical identities to the death of a loved one. Failure to do so wrongs the deceased. (shrink)

Peterson presents a new hybrid ethical theory in his paper “Dutilitarianism.” As the name suggests, the theory is a mixture of Utilitarianism and Duty ethics. Its main motivation is that it will improve on both. In my commentary, I raise some doubts about this idea. One problem is that Dutilitarianism will not have morally acceptable implications: it will classify some wrong acts as right. Another problem is that it cannot provide any plausible explanation for its verdicts: a believable combination of (...) utilitarian and Kantian explanations for why right acts are right does not seem to fit dutilitarian verdicts. A third problem is that the formula that Peterson suggests for calculating dutilitarian degrees of rightness is unhelpful: it cannot be used to compare acts that are partly right in different ways. A fourth problem is that Dutilitarianism is needlessly complex: it uses degrees of rightness, rather than the standard binary rightness, but this invention neither reflects the potential complexities of rightness grounds nor helps us decide what to do. (shrink)

Whatever one makes of the relationship between free will and moral responsibility – e.g. whether it’s the case that we can have the latter without the former and, if so, what conditions must be met; whatever one thinks about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever meet such conditions, one still faces the following questions. What is the value of moral responsibility? If we take moral responsibility to be a matter of being a fitting target of moral blame or praise, what (...) are the goods attached to them? The debate concerning ‘machine morality’ is often hinged on whether artificial agents are or could ever be morally responsible, and it is generally taken for granted (following Matthias 2004) that if they cannot, they pose a threat to the moral responsibility system and associated goods. In this paper, I challenge this assumption by asking what the goods of this system, if any, are, and what happens to them in the face of artificially intelligent agents. I will argue that they neither introduce new problems for the moral responsibility system nor do they threaten what we really (ought to) care about. I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to secure this objective. (shrink)

.This paper contains my reply to four commentators in a symposium (published in the journal Jurisprudence) on my book Legal Directives and Practical Reasons (OUP 2018). The commentators who offered their beneficial contributions to this exchange are Dimitrios Kyritsis, Haris Psarras, Fábio Perin Shecaira, and Torben Spaak. The exchange concerns several aspects of the book, including my critique of Joseph Raz’s pre-emption thesis (and, in particular, his notion of authority-given exclusionary reasons); my critique of an antithesis which I called ‘the (...) weighing model’; the alternative position I put forward under the label ‘the dispositional model’; the relationship between the foregoing positions; and the links between my account and the criteria of legal validity. (shrink)

The prospect of conversing with animals, once the stuff of fable, is drawing closer with the rise of AI systems capable of decoding nonhuman communication. From Baidu’s patented translator prototypes to bioacoustic machine learning initiatives, the technical frontier is advancing rapidly. Yet with these breakthroughs come urgent ethical questions. What does it mean to speak with a nonhuman species, and what obligations follow from that dialogue? This paper explores the moral landscape of AI-mediated interspecies communication, examining its potential to advance (...) animal welfare, illuminate nonhuman minds, and challenge anthropocentric hierarchies. It interrogates whether language confers moral standing or merely reveals it, and considers how concepts such as autonomy, consent, privacy, and dignity might apply to animals when communication is technologically enabled. The analysis draws on animal ethics, AI governance, and political theory to argue for proactive, principled guardrails that prioritise animals’ interests over human convenience. Ultimately, the paper contends that such technology, if governed ethically, could help recalibrate our relationship with other species, not by bestowing personhood, but by listening more justly to what was already there. (shrink)

This study critically examines the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into education through the lens of Marx’s theory of alienation, engaging with contemporary critiques of digital capitalism and academic labour. Drawing on an exploratory survey of 395 educators in Northern Cyprus, a context of early-stage AI adoption, the paper identifies four distinct forms of alienation exacerbated by AI: from the product of academic labour, from the educational process, from professional identity (species-being), and from interpersonal relations. Findings suggest that while educators (...) who view AI more positively tend to report lower levels of alienation, particularly with respect to their pedagogical outputs, this association is tentative due to the low reliability of the AI perception scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.42). The results, therefore, serve as hypothesis-generating rather than conclusive. Situating the empirical findings within broader critiques by Noble, Hall, Preston, and Komljenovic, the study highlights how algorithmic governance, commercial platform logics, and data-driven performance regimes threaten teacher autonomy, creativity, and relationality. The paper concludes with a call for participatory governance, ethical oversight, and human-centred design to ensure that AI integration supports, not supplants, educators. In doing so, it contributes to critical debates on the ethical sustainability of digital education under conditions of intensifying automation. (shrink)

Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality of enmity can (...) be justified through projects or the value inherent in the relationship, following two influential views about the justification of positive partiality. We argue that both accounts of partiality can be conceptually extended to the negative analogue, but doing so brings into focus the problems with such accounts of the grounds of partiality. (shrink)

One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximised when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...) past rather than the future, and positive ones in the future rather than the past. To have this preference is to be (at least apparently) future biased. If this explanation is correct, it would tend to confer rational justification upon these preferences. This paper empirically investigates this explanation. Our results suggest that, at most, this explanation might be a partial one of some people’s preferences some of the time, rather than a general explanation of future bias. In turn, this lends some indirect support to a competing explanation that appeals to temporal asymmetries in emotion and attention. Since that explanation would arguably tend not to confer rational justification upon (apparently) future-biased preferences, we argue that our findings provide some reason to be sceptical that these preferences are, in general, rationally justified. (shrink)

ITALIAN: La prima parte dell'articolo (sez. 1-3) delinea una teoria generale del progresso morale. Si distinguono tre tipi di progresso morale: 1. il miglioramento etico della teoria morale, 2. il miglioramento morale dei sistemi morali e della morale e 3. il miglioramento mondano del mondo secondo criteri del bene sociale moralmente giustificati. E i criteri per questi miglioramenti sono nominati. Inoltre, vengono affrontati i problemi epistemici di questi criteri, come la loro giustificazione e l'autoreferenzialità. La seconda parte (sezioni 4-6) elenca (...) esempi dei tre tipi di progresso, ma anche dei relativi regressi. ENGLISH: The first part of the article (sections 1-3) outlines a general theory of moral progress. Three types of moral progress are distinguished: 1. ethical improvement of moral theory, 2. moral improvement of moral systems and morality, and 3. worldly improvement of the world according to morally justified criteria of the social good. The criteria for these improvements are also specified. In addition, the epistemic problems of these criteria, such as their justification and self-referentiality, are addressed. The second part (sections 4-6) lists examples of the three types of progress, but also of the corresponding regressions. (shrink)

We care about whether the people around us can take a joke. And this care has a moral tinge to it: we're more likely to trust good-humoured people, and are prone to accusing humourless people of being ‘sanctimonious buzzkills’ who need to ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what, if anything, justifies them? This paper discusses the moral value of humour in terms of its connection to mutual recognition: by engaging humourlessly with one another, we are (...) afforded a quick and dirty way to share perspectives in the way that relationships of mutual recognition often require. (shrink)

Many moral theories hold individuals responsible for their marginal impact on massive patterns (for instance overall value or equality of opportunity) or for following whichever rules would realise that pattern on the whole. But each of these injunctions is problematic. Intuitively, the first gives individuals responsibility for too much, and the second gives them responsibility for too little. I offer the outlines of a new approach to ethics in collective action contexts. I defend a new collaborative principle that assigns recognisably (...) worthwhile responsibilities to agencies wherever possible. This principle supports a fractal model of moral responsibility, one that favours restructuring divisions of labour in ways that enhance the prospects of recognition at every level of social organisation. This essay is programmatic: starting from a conjecture about the moral significance of recognition, it sketches a new way of approaching a range of collective action problems that combines the importance of the perspectives of both moral and political philosophy. (shrink)