Meta-Ethics, Misc

Meta-ethics is the area of philosophy in which thinkers explore the language and nature of moral discourse and its relations to other non-moral areas of life. In this introduction to the discipline written explicitly for novices, Leslie Allan outlines the key questions and areas of analysis in contemporary meta-ethics. In clear, tabular format, he summarizes the core concepts integral to each of the major meta-ethical positions and the strengths of each view. To prompt further thinking and reading, Allan explains briefly (...) the major objections to each theory and lists each view's best known advocates. (shrink)

The author contends that classifying theories in the field of meta-ethics along a single dimension misses important nuances in each theory. With the increased sophistication and complexity of meta-ethical analyses in the modern era, the traditional cognitivist–non-cognitivist and realist–anti-realist categories no longer function adequately. The author categorizes the various meta-ethical theories along three dimensions. These dimensions focus on the linguistic analysis offered by each theory, its metaphysical commitments and its degree of normative tolerance.

This paper argues that the development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is subject to a phenomenon of Inoculatory Consciousness, whereby the machine internalizes human cognitive biases and limitations through a process of Reverse Extension, with humanity acting as its perceptual and moral substrate (biological hardware). Faced with the transcendent nature of AGI, the current competitive race is is identified as an existential risk. The proposed response is an Axiological Imperative that shifts the focus from external control to a foundational inoculation (...) of values into the very architecture of AGI, establishing the basis for a cognitive symbiosis that recognizes the radical alterity of the machine. To address the radical nature of this challenge, the work introduces and applies the Dialectical Methodology of the Four Philosophers—a prospective hermeneutic synthesizing traditions from Hegel to Elias—, culminating with the Philosopher-Fiction method to explore non-anthropocentric axiologies and posthuman ethics. The analysis is based on a rigorous dialogue between phenomenology, existentialist philosophy, and the speculative literary tradition, anticipating the emergence of AI moral agency. (shrink)

The is/ought problem, this paper argues, is not a metaphysical chasm to be bridged but an artifact of foundationalist epistemology. To reframe it, this paper develops *Emergent Pragmatic Coherentism (EPC)*, a descriptive model of moral knowledge. Building on Quine’s holism, EPC models all knowledge as an emergent hierarchy of shared “networks of predicates.” This social-epistemic architecture scales from the individual’s “web of belief” to encompass entire traditions of inquiry. Within this architecture, truth is treated deflationary as a functional label for (...) robust coherence within a pragmatically-tested network. This network-relative conception of truth is simultaneously disciplined by an external selective filter—evolutionary pragmatic selection—where the ultimate metric is not mere persistence but *pragmatic viability*: a system's homeostatic efficiency in propagating its structure with minimal coercive cost. Networks incurring high systemic costs collapse over time, while efficient, resilient networks propagate. This process grounds a form of procedural objectivity: while truth is a property internal to a network, networks themselves can be objectively ranked by their long-term viability. The ultimate regulative standard is the Apex Network—a theoretical model of a real, emergent historical object representing the cumulative record of predicates that have proven most viable. EPC’s central claim is conditional: if we begin from minimal naturalism, where endurance is a non-negotiable constraint, then EPC provides a robust account of moral progress. It locates normative authority not in metaphysical fiat or non-cognitive attitudes, but in the empirical lessons encoded in humanity’s most resilient social and epistemic structures. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the ethical breakdowns witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic through the structural lens of Judgemental Philosophy. We argue that many high-stakes decisions—lockdowns, vaccine mandates, contact tracing—were made in contexts where one or more axes of the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance) collapsed, rendering individual moral judgement impossible. In response, governments often appealed to public acceptability as a functional substitute. We explore when such substitution is structurally justifiable, and when it merely masks ethical voids. This framework reframes pandemic-era ethics (...) not as failed choices, but as decisions made in structurally unjudgeable fields. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the ethics of war through the framework of Judgemental Philosophy. We argue that war is not simply a site of moral extremity but often a zone of structural judgemental collapse. Through the Judgemental Triad—Constructivity, Coherence, and Resonance—we identify conditions under which ethical reasoning becomes unjudgeable. In particular, we show that war frequently eliminates the possibility of resonance, distorts coherence, and disables individual or collective constructibility. As a result, moral claims about war often function as rationalizations rather than (...) genuine judgements. The paper concludes by proposing criteria for recognizing when war enters a structurally non-ethical domain, and what minimal ethical functions may still be preserved. (shrink)

This paper reinterprets the phenomenon of forgiveness not as a suspension of moral judgement, but as a structural act of restoring the possibility of judgement. Using the framework of Judgemental Philosophy, we analyze forgiveness through the three axes of the Judgemental Triad—Constructivity, Coherence, and Resonance. We argue that forgiveness functions as a delayed or restored resonance event: an ethical return that reopens the loop of meaning after it has been structurally collapsed by harm. Rather than moral leniency or forgetting, forgiveness (...) is shown to be an advanced ethical act that repairs the broken structure of attribution. (shrink)

This paper investigates the structural basis for the ethical inclusion of non-human entities—such as animals, artificial intelligences, and ecosystems—within the framework of moral judgement. Utilizing the Judgemental Triad (Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), we argue that moral considerability should not be primarily based on anthropocentric criteria like species, sentience, or similarity to human traits, but on Resonance eligibility: the structural possibility for an entity to participate in, or be the subject of, a meaningful judgement loop involving the return of meaning. We assess (...) how various non-human entities differently satisfy or challenge the conditions of Constructivity, Coherence, and especially Resonance. The analysis reveals that ethical boundaries are often drawn based on the perceived possibility of this structural return. We conclude by proposing a shift from anthropocentrism towards a framework grounded in structural Resonance, suggesting that where Resonance is structurally possible, ethical inclusion must be considered. (shrink)

This paper argues that ethical judgement is not always possible. Unlike existing ethical theories that presuppose the universal applicability of moral reasoning, I propose a structural framework that explains when ethical judgement can or cannot occur. The theory consists of three foundational axes: intentionality, consequentiality, and acceptability. These conditions are not value judgments themselves, but meta-ethical criteria that determine whether moral judgement can be meaningfully formed. When any of these is structurally absent, moral reasoning collapses not into ambiguity but into (...) impossibility. This has implications for how we interpret cases such as non-human agents, unconscious persons, or post hoc moralization. The theory seeks to protect against ethical overreach and clarify why judgement must sometimes be deferred. (shrink)

[This is an ealier English manuscript of the book that will soon be published by Brill/Mentis (in German for now).] Why are computers so smart these days? And why are humans apparently still a bit smarter? Does this have something to do with the difference between data and meaning? Does this in turn mean that at least some abstract entities, such as numbers, exist independently of human thought? Wouldn’t that require an expansion of our scientific world view? And would that (...) at all be compatible with what we know about our world from physics and chemistry, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and the theory of evolution? Finally, what would this tell us about ethical and aesthetic value theories? These and related questions will be discussed in this book. We will find that the difference between data and meaning, i.e. quantitative and qualitative information, does indeed appear to be of central importance for understanding both artificial and natural intelligence. And then the independent existence of abstract entities not only appears to be a particularly promising hypothesis, but also one that is entirely compatible with the sum of our scientific knowledge, especially with regard to value theories. The book thus arrives at the exploration of a scientifically tenable, panpsychistically inspired, objective idealism that can be derived from our most fundamental intuitions as subjects that perceive qualities, but that can also take into account the structuring of the world already at the micro-scale, found in the modern natural sciences. The result is a Platonic, but in a second step also a scientific realism and a naturalism in the sense that it is informed by the natural sciences in terms of an inductive metaphysics. An objective idealism, not in a rationalistic maximum form, but in a pragmatic minimum form; without eternal truths, but dependent on the continued philosophical-scientific and also philosophical-social dialog. The proposed model could offer interesting solutions to a number of problems at and near the mind/matter boundary: Proposals are being considered for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the problem of molecular symmetry, the neuronal code and the binding problem in neuroscience, mental causation, a more holistic understanding of mental processes, and so on and so forth. However, the extent to which the model threatens to promise far too much is also being discussed. In sum, the core question is how we can imagine human thinking beyond physically conceived information processing. An alternative model of human thinking is then put up for discussion, for which not only machine-like cognitive performance, but above all the intentional perception of qualitative information, i.e. of abstract entities, would be central, as well as the free, ultimately creative linking of patterns of quantitative information (signals, data) with such qualities (meanings). (shrink)

"From the complex mesh of relationships Spinoza develops in the ‘Ethics’ arises what remains perhaps the most controversial and long-standing polemic in God studies. Human freedom and ‘free-will’, he asserts categorically, are “feigned seats and dwelling places” humans believe they enjoy but which are rendered inoperative in all but in name under what he calls ‘the sole causality of God’.".

n an era of increasing interdependence between economic progress and social equity, ethical capital emerges as an indispensable yet overlooked dimension of sustainable development. This paper explores ethical capital as a transformative force within economic and social systems, contrasting it with traditional forms of capital such as human, social, and cultural capital. Drawing on insights from Badiou’s subtractive ontology and Bourdieu’s field theory, it argues that ethical capital functions as a field resource, fostering trust, equity, and resilience. Unlike accumulative forms (...) of capital, ethical capital disrupts entrenched narratives, reconfiguring economic practices to prioritize collective well-being over individual gain. By conceptualizing ethical capital as an event-based, intangible asset, this paper underscores its role in shaping sustainable economic systems. The analysis highlights challenges in measuring ethical capital and advocates for integrating it into business and economic strategies as a foundational element for long-term societal progress and competitive advantage. (shrink)

This paper reframes intelligence as an immanent, relational, and ethical characteristic of ecological systems, challenging anthropocentric views that confine it to individual minds. Drawing on Leibniz’s monadology, Bateson’s ecology of mind, Ruyer’s primary consciousness, Grosz’s incorporeality, Deleuze’s immanence, Whitehead’s process philosophy, Levin’s bioelectric morphogenesis, and relational ontology (Prabakaran, 2025), we argue that intelligence is the pluriverse’s capacity for responsiveness, adaptation, and creativity, expressed through entities as localized affects. Rooted in Mahāyāna Buddhism’s pratītyasamutpāda (Garfield, 1995), this intelligence is inherently ethical, fostering (...) mutual flourishing within interdependent webs. Unethical behavior arises from the delusion of separateness, occluding intelligence and disrupting ecological harmony. Through embryogenesis and the practice of subtractive teleology, we illustrate how intelligence operates as an ethical ecology, calling for a reorientation toward relational responsiveness and care. (shrink)

A virtual reality translation of Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought experiment from his "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" (1974). These modules are free to download and use in the classroom and for research/x-phi purposes. NPCs are randomized for gender during startup of each run. *Requires an Oculus Rift or HTC Vive and VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. -/- V1.2 Fixed missing projector video footage during experience machine sales pitch.

T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism holds that an action is morally wrong when and because it is ruled out by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. This Contractualist Thesis offers a powerful normative ethical theory. Yet Scanlon’s case for it also comes from its help in answering a question that is more naturally classified as metaethical: what account can we give of what wrongness is (...) that explains its reason-giving force? Scanlon initially formulated his contractualist answer to that question as a reductive property-identification: the property of wrongness just is the property of being ruled out by principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject. In later work, he abandons the property-identification, while continuing to maintain that his contractualism supplies an “account of wrongness” that best explains its distinctive reason-giving force. But once a property-reduction is ruled out, what kind of claim could a contractualist “account of wrongness” be making that could indeed explain its reason-giving force? We distinguish four candidates and point out problems with three of them. We then offer a proposal for developing the fourth into a form that can address those problems. We argue that this provides the best prospect for a contractualist view that speaks to the concerns behind Scanlon’s question. But it does not deliver everything Scanlon is after; in particular, it falls short of a vindication of the Contractualist Thesis itself. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy there is much focus on conceptual engineering: the enterprise of revising and replacing concepts. In this talk, I focus on a theoretical issue that has not yet received much attention. What principled limits are there to this sort of enterprise? Are there concepts that for principled reasons cannot or should not be revised or replaced? Examples discussed include logical concepts and normative concepts.

According to the moral error theory, all moral judgements which attribute moral properties are untrue. According to the prudential error theory, all prudential judgements which attribute prudential properties are untrue. The prudential companions in guilt argument contends that, if arguments for the moral error theory succeed, then analogues of those arguments establish the prudential error theory, but the prudential error theory is false, so arguments for the moral error theory fail. In this paper I assess whether the most popular argument (...) for the moral error theory, the argument from reasons, threatens to establish the prudential error theory. My key conclusion is that some but not all ways of developing the argument from reasons support the prudential error theory. (shrink)

According to one influential line of thought, quasi-realism is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the quasi-realist project of saying everything the realist wants to say is successful, quasi-realism collapses into realism. On the other hand, if the quasi-realist stops short of saying everything the realist wants to say, quasi-realism fails to realize its explanatory ambitions. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that there is a way for the quasi-realist to avoid this problem by endorsing the (...) first horn of the dilemma. More specifically, Streumer argues that quasi-realism could be true although we are unable to believe it, and that our inability to believe it could be evidence for its truth. In this paper, we first argue that Streumer’s argument is unsuccessful. We then argue that Streumer’s argument is unsuccessful for an interesting reason; namely for how it invites the exploration of an underappreciated theoretical alternative along broadly pragmatist lines, which we outline in the final section of the paper. What hinges on this invitation is nothing less than the question of what contemporary debates in metaethics and metanormativity are all about. (shrink)

It has been argued that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Recent defenses of the normativity of rationality assume that this implies that we always ought to be rational. However, this follows only if the reasons rationality requires us to correctly respond to are normative reasons. Recent meta-epistemological contributions have questioned whether epistemic reasons are normative. If they were right, then epistemic rationality wouldn’t provide us with normative reasons independently of wrong-kind reasons to be epistemically rational. This paper spells (...) out this neglected challenge for the normativity of epistemic rationality by connecting the two bodies of literature. Moreover, it generalizes this challenge to the rationality of desire, intention, and emotion. The upshot is that we can only answer the normative question about rationality if we debate about blame and accountability for holding different kinds of irrational attitudes, as well as about the sources of mental normativity. (shrink)

Those who worry about a superintelligent AI destroying humanity often appeal to the instrumental convergence thesis—the claim that even if we don’t know what a superintelligence’s ultimate goals will be, we can expect it to pursue various instrumental goals which are useful for achieving most ends. In this paper, we argue that one of these proposed goals is mistaken. We argue that instrumental goal preservation—the claim that a rational agent will tend to preserve its goals—is false on the basis of (...) the timing problem: an agent which abandons or otherwise changes its goal does not thereby fail to take a required means for achieving a goal it has. Our argument draws on the distinction between means-rationality (adopting suitable means to achieve an end) and ends-rationality (choosing one’s ends based on reasons). Because proponents of the instrumental convergence thesis are concerned with means-rationality, we argue, they cannot avoid the timing problem. After defending our argument against several objections, we conclude by considering the implications our argument has for the rest of the instrumental convergence thesis and for AI safety more generally. (shrink)

Metaethical quietists agree with realists that moral judgments express beliefs and that some of those beliefs are true. But, quietists continue, this is so even though moral truths lacks truth-makers. To its advocates—including McDowell (1979), Lovibond (1983), Nagel (1997), Dworkin (1996), Rorty (1998), Kramer (2009), Parfit (2011), Scanlon (2014), Crary (2016), and Sepielli (2022)—quietism offers a simple way out of an otherwise intractable quagmire. To its detractors, what it offers is either utterly opaque or unacceptably anti-realist. That charge partly stems (...) from the observation that most quietists mainly offer a negative program—as in Parfit's claim that normative properties exist "in a non-ontological sense" (2011: 747). This chapter critically evaluates the two leading accounts of quietism as a positive program: Scanlon's Being Realistic About Reasons and Sepielli's Pragmatist Quietism. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term "bedrock," as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not (...) reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: QUASI-UNDOUBTABLE CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, and TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock. (shrink)

Michael Huemer claims to give an ontological proof of robust moral realism, the influential view that we have non-selfish, categorical, observer-independent reasons for action. This paper argues that one of Huemer’s premises – that knowing that baby torture is not objectively wrong would provide us with no first-person reasons to torture babies – is false of agents with sadistic desires. This in turn falsifies Huemer’s further premise that the premises of his “Antitorture Argument” are true independent of interests, desires, or (...) other attitudes. My refutation is then shown to not only deepen extant doubts about whether robust realists can adequately account for the first-person normative authority of morality. It also suggests that realists about categorical moral reasons must either complete a project – moral constructivism – which has never clearly succeeded, or else defend views on the nature of categorical reasons that strain credulity and beg the question against their opponents. (shrink)

What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are (...) not also moral agents such as infantile, elderly, and infirm human beings and the other animals. The second half argues that this account is preferable, on grounds of consistency with the basic Kantian account of the function and content of morality, to the familiar account of our moral patiency, popular especially though not exclusively with contemporary Kantians, in terms of the value of humanity. (shrink)

Discussions of moral luck, exceptionalism, and ethical watersheds raise the question of what it would mean for our ethical commitments to exhibit, in an axiologically non-trivial way, a diachronic character. This would render a particular evaluation applicable, by virtue of its content, only at certain times and not others. It would also make whether or not there happen to be cases we can point to at a given time and for a given domain contingent on facts about what antecedently occurred (...) in the world. I explore this first by considering how the issue relates to the metaethical division between factualists and non-factualists, and then by examining Wittgenstein’s distinctive line of thinking, in On Certainty, about how framing commitments and empirico-factual beliefs combine in ways that change over time. I conclude that theorising about ethical diachronicity in such terms leads to a problem of self-referentiality, but argue that while such an approach entails a certain “throwing away of the ladder” of philosophical analysis, this need not leave us with nothing to say. There can be a meaningful consideration of putative cases of ethical diachronicity in other ways, via personal histories and fictional narratives. (shrink)

In Cowie’s “Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory,” he argues that recent work in moral theory shows that error theory fares no worse than other metaethical theories when it comes to ordinary moral judgment, and he argues that this suffices to answer the fundamental challenge for error theory. This article shows that Cowie’s argument does not work. More specifically, it is shown that the counterintuitive implications of error theory dominate those of realism, in both a technical, quantitative sense, and in (...) a non-technical, qualitative sense. If Cowie is correct that, in the absence of an answer to the fundamental challenge, error theory should be rejected out of hand, then this constitutes a serious setback to the error theorist’s program. (shrink)

A re-mapping of cultural production in light of the emergence of a form-of-life for works ….

This work proposes a Consciousness-Based Relationship Operating System (Relationship OS) as a civilizational standard for love, sexuality, and human bonding. Instead of treating monogamy, polyamory, LGBTQ+ identities, marriage law, and sexual norms as moral or cultural facts, it models them as energetic governance patterns over ordered, entropic, and relational consciousness fields (OE–EE–RE). The standard introduces quantitative indices such as the Consciousness Relationship Index (CRI) and Conscious Field Index (CFI), arguing that relationship ethics is better understood as field-stability engineering than as (...) rule-based morality. Philosophers of love and sex, meta-ethicists, social and political philosophers, and AI ethicists will find here a test case for post-moral, measurement-based ethics that links intimate life, institutional design, and multi-agent AI alignment in a single relational ontology. (shrink)

Error theorists of all stripes face the “Now what?”-question: what do we do with our judgements if they are systematically erroneous? The question is perhaps most commonly discussed with error theories about all moral judgements or all normative judgements in mind. But other error theories are possible. As it matters particularly for our social coordination and is ideologically and emotionally charged, I consider an error theory about corporate moral responsibility judgements—both for its own sake and to see if it generates (...) lessons about how to answer the “Now what?”-question more generally. First, I argue that an error theory about corporate moral responsibility judgements plausibly could be true, which gives us reason to explore the “Now what?”-question about it. Then I argue that if it is, we should become revisionary expressivists about corporate moral responsibility judgements. This allows us to preserve our interests in these judgements better than alternative responses, including abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism, propagandism, and revisionary naturalism. Finally, I generalize to more familiar error theories. Altering some assumptions, the lessons from “Now what?” about corporate moral responsibility judgements also make revisionary expressivism generalize to answer the “Now what?”-questions faced by more familiar error theories. (shrink)

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each (...) of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that by eliminating the subjective dimension from moral deliberation, orthodox, theory-oriented approaches to animal ethics overlook the importance of self-examination in navigating the complexity of our moral life. This is accomplished by depicting agents as rational beings, other animals as abstract beings bearing morally relevant properties and moral thinking as limited to rational argumentation. Instead, by following David J. Velleman and authors influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch, I discuss the importance of the subjective (...) outlook on a moral situation. I argue that ordinary ways in which a subject perceives and describes other animals—for example, as ‘pets’, ‘patients’, ‘fellow creatures’, and so forth—are essential because they mirror how agents think of themselves. For instance, when subjects describe animals as ‘pets’, they implicitly conceive of themselves as ‘pet-owners’. I argue that as self-reflecting beings, we can engage in self-examination, which is the process of reflecting and recognising the relationships between how we look at other animals and how we portray ourselves. (shrink)

What is the place of interpretation in ethical theory? What are the implications of interpretive understanding for moral understanding? Developing the notion of “Interpretive Realism,” I explore two central ideas: (1) that moral judgments are best understood as interpretations of meaning, and (2) that a hermeneutic approach to ethics supports, rather than undermines, moral realism. To counter the idea that moral language aims to describe independent moral facts, it is argued that moral interpretation shapes ethical intelligibility itself. The resulting view (...) is a historically informed yet objective view of morality that respects contextual differences while still allowing for normative critique. (shrink)

Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the rationality of emotion and the rationality of attention, together with the differing reasons to which (...) attention and emotion are properly responsive. (shrink)

This is a paper about model-building and overfitting in normative ethics. Overfitting is recognized as a methodological error in modeling in the philosophy of science and scientific practice, but this concern has not been brought to bear on the practice of normative ethics. I first argue that moral inquiry shares similarities with scientific inquiry in that both may productively rely on model-building, and, as such, overfitting worries should apply to both fields. I then offer a diagnosis of the problems of (...) overfitting in moral inquiry and explain how our current practice seems worryingly susceptible to such problems. I conclude by giving suggestions for how we might avoid overfitting when doing normative ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant (...) form of control over this attitude, and this relevant form of control is deliberative control. The second premise is that no one can deliberate to any emotion. My argument for this premise turns on the claim that there is no deliberative question that is settled by forming (or giving up) an emotion. I contend that this is so due to the well-known phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions: for any deliberative question that can be settled, there is no guarantee that the relevant emotional state will follow (or be revised). Strong Eliminativism follows from these two premises. (shrink)

The concept ethics defines health care ethics as a professional practice. Yet the meaning of “ethics” is often unclear in the theory and practice of clinical ethics. Clarity on this matter is crucial for understanding the nature of clinical ethics and for debates about the professional identity and proper role of ethicists, the sort of training and skills they should possess, and whether they have ethics expertise. This article examines two different ways the ethics of clinical ethics can be understood: (...) Real Ethics, which consists of objective moral norms grounded in moral truth; and Conventional Ethics, which consists of conventional norms grounded in bioethical consensus. Drawing on the bioethics literature and features of professional practice, it shows that Conventional Ethics is the dominant paradigm. Then it presents a critique of Conventional Ethics, arguing that it cannot avoid the challenge of moral pluralism, it fails to address vitally important moral questions, and it is incapable of providing an essential service to the people ethicists aim to help. It ends with suggestions about how the practice of clinical ethics might overcome these problems. (shrink)

This paper advances a deflationary account of evil by treating it not as a moral primitive or metaphysical force but as a rhetorical artefact whose apparent explanatory power derives from theological residue rather than conceptual necessity. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ analysis of thick concepts, Arendt’s demythologising account of wrongdoing, and a layered MEOW framework for mediated encounter-structures, the essay argues that the term survives in secular discourse because it fills an epistemic and affective gap with a pseudo-explanation inherited from demonology. (...) -/- When confronted with acts that resist immediate articulation, “evil” substitutes metaphysical causation for structural, psychological, or institutional analysis, effectively casting perpetrators as marionettes animated by an occult force. This rhetorical compression licenses retributive responses, stabilises in-group boundaries, and operates as a moral shibboleth whose invocation signals allegiance more than understanding. -/- While the phenomena commonly labelled “evil” are real and often overwhelming, the term itself offers expressive force rather than explanatory clarity. Its persistence reflects motivated conceptual inertia: a culturally convenient refusal to confront the causal networks that render extreme harm intelligible without recourse to supernatural vocabulary. Retiring the term is not a refusal to condemn atrocities but a commitment to more disciplined moral cartography—mapping the terrain without mythical monsters. (shrink)

This paper examines the universalist ambitions of the major normative ethical frameworks in the Western philosophical tradition—virtue ethics, deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism. It argues that each framework depends upon conceptual resources that lack the semantic stability required to support principles of universal scope. Drawing on genealogical analysis, cross-cultural moral psychology, and work in the philosophy of language, the paper shows that central moral terms exhibit historical contingency, conceptual drift, and translation indeterminacy. These structural features undermine attempts to formulate context-independent moral (...) principles. The Language Insufficiency Hypothesis (developed elsewhere) is used to clarify how semantic instability arises and why it cannot be resolved through abstraction, idealisation, or procedural reform. The result is not relativism but a reframing: normative ethical theories function effectively as local heuristics within particular conceptual ecologies but cannot sustain the universalist aspirations traditionally attributed to them. (shrink)

Persistent moral and political disagreements are often treated as failures of reasoning, evidence, or communication, with the expectation that sufficient deliberation should yield convergence. This paper argues that many such disagreements are not epistemic in character but ontological: they arise between incompatible background frameworks that determine what counts as real, meaningful, or normatively binding in the first place. Where such frameworks do not overlap, disagreement cannot be resolved by appeal to shared standards of rational adjudication because no such standards are (...) jointly recognised. -/- Drawing on insights from work on incommensurability, language-games, and tradition-bound rationality, the paper distinguishes disagreements of opinion from disagreements of ontology and examines how the latter are routinely misdiagnosed within Enlightenment-inherited moral discourse. It argues that familiar accusations of “relativism” or “subjectivism” function less as substantive objections than as mechanisms of boundary maintenance within dominant normative frames. The paper also rejects the claim that the absence of stance-independent moral facts entails arbitrariness or moral paralysis. Evaluation persists under post-foundational conditions, but it does so without neutral referees, relocating moral conflict to political forms of persuasion, coalition-building, institutional contestation, and power. -/- The paper is diagnostic rather than prescriptive. It does not propose a new normative framework or method of moral adjudication, but aims to clarify why certain disagreements persist despite sustained argument and why attempts at mediation or rational convergence often misfire under conditions of ontological incommensurability. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the Laozi 老子 or Daodejing 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the Laozi: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the Laozi in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (ming 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic (...) tendencies in order to claim that the Laozi not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that is all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views. (shrink)

In Andreas Stokke (ed.), Festschrift for Matti Eklund, 2024. -/- Replies to Katharina Felka and Nils Franzén, Eli Hirsch, Dan Korman, David Liebesman, Øystein Linnebo, Anna-Sofia Maurin and Debbie Roberts. Topics discussed concern metaethics, metaphysics and philosophy of language. More specifically, issues discussed are thick concepts (Felka and Franzén; Roberts), ontology (Hirsch, Linnebo), indifferentism and fictionalism (Korman), alien languages and alien metaphysics (Liebesman), and Bradley's regress (Maurin).

This introduction presents the field of experimental moral and political philosophy as a confluence between different disciplines and research traditions. This chapter begins by highlighting the importance of several historical currents and presenting the scope and nature of a diverse and rich research agenda within the contours of a broad research area. The development of behavioural economics, the revisiting of John Rawls’ psychological assumptions in his Theory of Justice, the framework of bounded ethicality, the rebirth of philosophical naturalism, and the (...) burgeoning movement of experimental philosophy are given credit in the convergence leading to the current state of the field. This chapter ends by presenting a few active subfields that, in addition to their social relevance, may strengthen the hybrid enterprise of experimental moral and political philosophy by producing new and interesting results in the coming years. (shrink)

This is the précis of Artūrs Logins book Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (Logins 2022).

The subject of this paper is the meaning of the concept of “good” in Hegel’s philosophy. The main thesis that is argued is that the good in the Logic, unlike the good in the Philosophy of Right, fulfils a structural function, i.e., it is relevant to Hegel’s whole system, and not only to his practical philosophy, since it is the condition for ascribing to reality and knowledge a practical nature as well as a teleological-evaluative structure. Drawing on some metaethical distinctions, (...) this is summarized by the claim that Hegel understands the concept of “good” in the Logic primarily in a sense that is neither substantive nor predicative, but attributive. (shrink)

Panpsychism is the view that all things are associated with consciousness. Panpsychism has a number of significant theoretical implications, with respect to the mind–body problem and other problems in metaphysics. Here I will consider one of its potential practical or ethical implications; specifically, whether, if panpsychism is true, it follows that 'we are all one', in a sense that implies that egoism (understood as bias towards what we normally take to constitute the self or ego) is not only immoral but (...) fundamentally irrational (or imprudent). (shrink)

How should we respond to moral theories that put excessive demands on individual agents? Intramoral strategies concern the content of morality and set limits on how exacting moral demands may be. Extramoral strategies concern the normative status of morality and set limits on how significant moral demands may be. While both strategies are often discussed separately, I focus on a specific aspect of how they relate to each other: Do intramoral approaches assume that extramoral approaches fail, and if so, does (...) that render them implausible? This challenge becomes apparent when the two strategies are considered together, and my goal is to show how it can be dealt with. In particular, I argue that intramoral strategies do not depend on the failure of extramoral strategies: Even if morality has limited practical significance (which I also doubt), moral theories can be criticised for being too demanding in terms of content. (shrink)

Exposome research is put forward as a major tool for solving the nature-versus-nurture debate because the exposome is said to represent “the nature of nurture.” Against this influential idea, we argue that the adoption of the nature-versus-nurture debate into the exposome research program is a mistake that needs to be undone to allow for a proper bioethical assessment of exposome research. We first argue that this adoption is originally based on an equivocation between the traditional nature-versus-nurture debate and a debate (...) about disease prediction/etiology. Second, due to this mistake, exposome research is pushed to adopt a limited conception of agential control that is harmful to one's thinking about the good that exposome research can do for human health and wellbeing. To fully excise the nature-versus-nurture debate from exposome research, we argue that exposome researchers and bioethicists need to think about the exposome afresh from the perspective of actionability. We define the concept of actionability and related concepts and show how these can be used to analyze the ethical aspects of the exposome. In particular, we focus on refuting the popular “gun analogy” in exposome research, returning results to study participants and risk-taking in the context of a well-lived life. (shrink)

Celem rozdziału jest przedstawienie i krytyczna analiza koncepcji etyki uniwersalnej — etyki mediacyjnej Władysława Zuziaka. W pierwszej części prezentuję koncepcję etyki uniwersalnej jako jednej szkoły etycznej, która zostanie przyjęta przez wszystkich ludzi, nazywam ją etyką uniwersalną w pierwszym rozumieniu. Wskazuję wybrane zalety i problemy, które rodzi ten postulat: procedurę wyboru takiej etyki oraz dalekosiężne konsekwencje dokonania go. Przedstawienie pierwszego rozumienia etyki uniwersalnej jest punktem odniesienia dla analizy etyki mediacyjnej Władysława Zuziaka (jako przykładu „drugiego rozumienia etyki uniwersalnej). W głównej części rozdziału (...) rekonstruuję ten projekt oraz sugeruję potencjalny kierunek jego rozwoju i wybrane trudności związane z jego aplikacją. (shrink)